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 ABSTRACT 
 
EVOLVING COMMUNITIES: ADAPTING THEORIES OF ROBERT KEGAN  
AND BERNARD LONERGAN TO INTENTIONAL GROUPS 
 
By Joseph Porter Draper 
 
It has been long known that groups of adults learn and enact their learning in 
certain ways; what is little known is how groups learn and how they develop in cognitive 
complexity.  This dissertation proposes a theory of group cognitive development by 
arguing that intentional adult groups are complex and dynamic, and that they have the 
potential to evolve over time.  Groups are complex in that they are made up of 
individuals within different orders of consciousness (Kegan), and they are dynamic in 
that different orders of consciousness interact and conflict (Lonergan) during the 
formation and enactment of group vision, values, and procedures.  Dynamic complexity 
theory of group development as it is referred to in this study is grounded in Robert 
Kegan’s constructive developmental theory and in Bernard Lonergan’s transcendental 
method.  While both Kegan and Lonergan attend to the growth of individuals, their 
theories are adapted to groups in order to understand the cognitive complexity of groups, 
intragroup and intergroup conflict, and the mental complexity of leader curriculum.  This 
theory is applied to two case studies, one from antiquity in the case of the first century 
Corinthian community engaged in conflict with its founder, St. Paul, and in one 
contemporary study of American Catholic parishioners engaged in contentious dialogue 
with diocesan leaders from 1994 to 2004.  The parish groups experienced a series of 
dialogues during a ten year period over the issues of parish restructuring and the priest 
sexual abuse crisis yielding cumulative and progressive changes in perspective-taking, 
responsibility-taking, and in group capacity to respond to and engage local and 
institutional authority figures.  Group development is observed against a pedagogical 
backdrop that represents a mismatch between group complexity and leader expectations.  
In Corinth, Paul’s curriculum was significantly beyond the mental capacity of the 
community.  In the case of Catholic parishioners the curriculum of diocesan leaders was 
beneath the mental capacities of most of the groups studied. 
It is proposed that individuals sharing the same order of consciousness, 
understood as cognitive constituencies, are in a dynamic relationship with other cognitive 
constituencies in the group that interact within an object-subject dialectic and an agency-
communion dialectic.  The first describes and explains the evolving cognitive complexity 
of group knowing, how the group does its knowing, and what it knows when it is doing it 
(the epistemologies of the group).  This dialectic has implications for how intentional 
groups might be the critical factor for understanding individual growth.  The second 
dialectic describes and explains the changing relationship between group agency, which 
is enacted either instrumentally or ideologically; and group communion, which is enacted 
ideationally.  The agency-communion dialectic is held in an unstable balance in the 
knowing, identity, and mission of groups.  With implications for the fields of adult 
education and learning organizations, dynamic complexity theory of group development 
notes predictable stages of group evolution as each cognitive constituency evolves, and 
notes the significance of internal and external conflict for exposing the presence of 
different ways of knowing and for challenging the group toward cognitive growth.   
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Chapter 1: Lay Catholics in Cognitively Evolving Groups 
 
 
The present study examines intentional groups of adults who, over a ten year 
period, grew in their capacity to enact their own slowly evolving vision of what it means 
to be a local community in a period of significant change.  This evolving vision changed 
the way the groups asked questions, posed problems, selected strategic values, and 
engaged in conflict with other organizational levels within the diocese.  The central 
question of this dissertation is twofold: do communities of adult learners evolve 
cognitively as a group, and what are the critical variables of that growth in terms of 
group members‘ ways of knowing, and the larger institution of which it is a part?  It is the 
argument here that group growth is a cognitive growth that has its sources in the 
reactivity generated by interacting and conflicting ways of knowing within and without 
the group. 
The present study proposes a model of development for intentional groups by 
studying a community of American Catholic parishioners who experienced a series of 
crises over a ten year period yielding cumulative and progressive changes in the group‘s 
perspective-taking, responsibility-taking, and in its capacity to respond to and engage 
local and institutional authority figures.  Rather than looking at groups primarily through 
the lens of the structures and practices of organizations and leaders, this study attends to 
the experience of groups themselves understood as complex, dynamic, and evolving.  
This ―from below‖ approach privileges the experiences of local groups of adults over a 
―from above‖ approach that often assumes members of a particular kind and constructs 
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organizational and leadership models based on such assumptions.  A ―from below‖ 
approach understands that adult groups are always more than products of the shaping of 
leaders, are often immune to the effects of change-strategies (Kegan/Lahey 2001), and 
―think‖ and act in ways that can defy structures and processes that attempt to direct or 
control thinking and acting.   
This study argues that adult groups are complex, dynamic, and evolving; a 
developmental complexity and dynamism that can help communities of practice better 
understand the functioning and evolution of groups as groups, and why conflict is a 
necessary ―dynamic‖ of growth.  Groups are complex in that their members are 
developmentally diverse (Drago-Severson 2004a), operating out of different orders of 
mental complexity.  They are dynamic in that different orders of mental complexity 
interact and conflict during the formulation and/or enactment of group vision, values, 
rules, and actions.  A group vision organizes a set of strategic values; strategic values, or 
theories of action, construct governing rules that in turn direct group action.  Each of 
these is understood differently by members operating from different orders of mental 
complexity.  This study argues that the dynamism of the interaction and conflict becomes 
a critical modality of group growth toward increasing developmental complexity. 
The context of this question is the congregational life of American Catholic 
parishioners from two parishes in the Northeastern United States struggling to respond to 
the priest sexual abuse crisis and the consolidation and closing of parishes in response to 
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the priest shortage.  These recent and ongoing crises
1
 offer a convincing example of a lay 
constituency finding itself inhabiting ecclesiastical structures that are no longer a good 
fit.  The ―rightness of fit‖ is not primarily a theological or canonical question, but a 
question of the meaning making capacities of lay parishioners as compared with the 
leadership structures that invite and shape their participation.  Asking this question allows 
one to foreground the experience of lay Catholics gathered in intentional groups 
confronting matters important to their faith and their faith communities, and allows one to 
problematize the coaching of these groups by church leaders.  ―Coaching‖ refers to the 
quality of informational and formational supports and challenges toward the goal of 
individual and corporate transformation. 
Of the many things that have emerged in both crises, one of the most striking is 
the surprise expressed by lay parishioners that, as lay parishioners, they have no 
effective, intra-ecclesial means of making their voice heard by diocesan officials, and that 
bishops, who hold the title to all church property, could in theory unilaterally sell their 
parish churches, schools and centers as a strategy for addressing the priest shortage or to 
pay abuse settlements.  The participants discovered that lay Catholic parishioners have no 
formal, stable means for holding priests and bishops who transgress church law and civil 
law accountable to the community; nor do they have sanctioned, institutional means for 
representatives of parishes to shape the temporal policy of the church.  Arthur, a study 
                                                 
1 In the parishes of this study the larger parish lost a resident priest (1996), both were twinned by the bishop 
without consultation (1996), and in the smaller parish, the diocese proposed to close and sell it (2001).  
Parish restructuring was experienced as a crisis because of these events; but more significantly, because 
parishioners‘ experience of disorientation and loss exposed their own developmental framework as 
inadequate to meet the new situation they were facing.  This is developed in greater detail in the following 
chapters. 
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participant, understood the lack of structures of participation for the laity in church 
governance as having potentially fatal consequences for the church: 
[Priests and bishops] make up one percent of the church, and we make up 99% of 
the church.  And they are shrinking, and we are growing.  Who the heck do they 
think they are to try to hold on to all the control?  They‘re going to fail if they do 
that.  The only way the Catholic Church will succeed at the local level and 
continue to be able to minister to its people is if they involve the laity much more 
than they do today. 
 
One outcome of the discovery of lay voicelessness has been the formation of lay 
groups, Voice of the Faithful only the most visible among them,
2
 as attempts to creatively 
respond to the challenges facing the church from a uniquely lay perspective.  While 
sometimes lacking theological sophistication, such groups are not lacking in 
―epistemological,‖ or meaning making sophistication.  American Catholics are changing 
and evolving, as they have since the colonial period.  These changes include more 
complex ways of understanding loyalty, of relating to authority, of defining commitment 
and, in the process, of reconstituting and reclaiming one‘s Catholic faith.  I will examine 
more closely in future chapters this gradual, but simultaneously radical, change in the 
mental complexity of lay groups. 
An evolving laity represents a growth that is in part a result of the post-Vatican II 
Church that American Catholics have inhabited and been nourished and challenged by 
these past four decades.  In the context of the present study, discovering why there is 
currently a poor fit between many American Catholics and the ecclesiastical structures 
they inhabit requires asking a different order of questions.  Instead of asking, What is lay 
                                                 
2 Voice of the Faithful is a group that formed in Boston in the wake of the priest sexual abuse scandal in 
2002.  It now has over thirty thousand members throughout the United States.  Its three main goals are to 
support victims of priest sexual abuse, support priests of integrity, and change the structures of the church. 
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ministry?, How are we to understand lay governance?, What are the possibilities and 
limits of lay jurisdiction in the temporal matters of the church?, or even, What is a 
theology of the laity?, this study asks, Why are American Catholic parishioners behaving 
in the ways they are?, or What are the ―forms‖, as in structures of mental complexity, that 
make American Catholics to be the way they are?  The latter are qualitatively different 
questions that remove ―lay participation‖ from a juridical category to a cognitional 
reality, and ―the laity‖ from the category of things, or objects upon which theorists, 
theologians, and church leaders operate, to evolving persons who are subjects of their 
own experience, insight, reflection, and action which, if one attends closely, might open 
up a whole new horizon of understanding. 
The question of meaning making is rarely adverted to in the literature on the 
theology of the laity, or lay ecclesial ministry.  It is, however, of central importance in the 
contemporary church where the above mentioned crises have brought the laity and 
hierarchy together in new and unexpected forms of dialogue.  Sources in theology, 
ministry and Church law have a great deal to say about the historical, doctrinal, and 
canonical factors that govern the roles and relationships between the laity and the 
ordained in the contemporary church.  They have little to say, however, to the question of 
how parishioners with different developmental orientations (Kegan et al 2001b; Drago-
Severson 2004a) differently understand these roles and relationships, and how they 
understand and respond to the educational and pedagogical strategies of the hierarchy.  
The question of meaning making within groups, therefore, has important implications for 
the way learning and dialogue are experienced by lay parishioners participating in 
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intentional groups.  It also suggests radically new ways to envision leadership strategies 
and practices by better attending to group complexity (its developmental diversity) and 
group dynamism (the fertile interaction and conflict among different orders of mental 
complexity).     
 
The General Context: Current Crises in the American Catholic Church  
 
The American Catholic Church has weathered many storms since the republican 
period of the early nineteenth century, but the twin crises of priest sexual abuse and 
parish restructuring, coming as they have at the same time, are perhaps the most 
significant challenge the Church in the United States has ever faced.  Catholic Church 
historian, John McGreevy states of the former, ―the sustained media coverage, 
disillusionment, and passion aroused by the sexual abuse crisis have no parallel in US 
Catholic history‖ (2004, 136).  This, together with diocesan initiatives to close, merge 
and cluster parishes in response to the priest shortage – decisions 72% of all U. S. 
dioceses have participated in (Rexhausen 2004, 17) affecting thousands of parishes and 
millions of parishioners
3
 – makes it hard to imagine a more turbulent time for Catholics.  
It is reasonable to state that few Catholics in the United States even remotely connected 
to the Church have been unaffected by these crises.   
                                                 
3 1077 parishes were identified by Rexhausen et al. (2004) as having undergone reorganization.  The 
average parish size consisted of 850 households; if each household had between 3 and 4 members, the total 
number of Catholics affected is between 2,746,000 and 3,662,000.  This figure is undoubtedly low since the 
study drew its data from 1995, 2000 and 2001.  Since that time, many more parish reorganizations have 
occurred throughout the United States. 
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There is a growing body of literature about priest sexual abuse (Breslin 1985, 
2002; Doyle 1985, 1987, 2006; Gonsiorek 2004; Loftus 2004; Plante 2004; Sipe 1992, 
1995), about the hierarchy‘s handling of the crisis, and Church structures and policies 
that contributed to its severity (Appleby 2002, 2004; Beal 2004a, 2004b; Post 2004; 
Ruddy 2002), but the literature on parish restructuring is only beginning to appear 
(Rexhausen 2004; Zech & Miller 2004).  In much of which literature, the perceptions and 
perspectives of lay parishioners are under researched and little understood.  This 
literature addresses the priests who perpetrated the crimes, the hierarchs who perpetuated 
their careers, and the theologies assumed to underlie their actions or that point the way to 
a better church.  The emerging research on parishes and parish restructuring also focuses 
on or is overly influenced by priests and bishops.   
The present study addresses this gap in the literature by researching groups of lay 
parishioners engaged in dialogue with diocesan officials over these two seismic issues.  
Before explicitly treating the research design of the present study, however, it is helpful 
to describe more fully the priest sexual abuse and parish restructuring crises and their 
attending literatures in service to better understanding the social, cultural and ecclesial 
context of the parishes this study researches.  My purpose in the next two sections is to 
not only review the historical contours of the crises as described in the literature, but to 
also examine the literature itself for how it understands the different roles and 
responsibilities of lay Catholics and church leaders. 
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Priest Sexual Abuse Crisis and an Under-recognized Laity 
 
The priest sexual abuse crisis was a highly visible and very painful experience for 
the parishes researched in this dissertation.  In 2002 conversations about the scandal often 
intruded unannounced into various groups in these parishes such as Rite of Christian 
Initiation of Adults (RCIA) sessions, the twice weekly Adult Faith Formation sessions, 
and the four different Bible Growth Groups that met each week.  In some of the adult 
gatherings, so intense were the questioning and conversations that these spilled over into 
gatherings outside the parishes such as a new Voice of the Faithful chapter in which 
parish members were recorded by local media boldly speaking about the anger, 
confusion, and learning first articulated in the parish sessions.  By the spring of 2002 
parishioners began to self-organize into their own Listening Sessions with the consent of 
the pastor.  Facilitated by the chair of the parish Pastoral Council, Arthur, who was 
quoted above, the group discussed the crises, their diocese‘s role in it, and proposed 
action steps to address the lack of transparency and accountability they perceived in their 
diocese (I discuss this in depth in chapter six). 
The crisis of priest sexual abuse is a story that is still being told.  An investigation 
begun in 2001 by the Boston Globe’s Spotlight Team into Cardinal Bernard Law‘s role in 
reassigning pedophile, Rev. John J. Geoghan, set the stage.  When articles first began to 
appear in the front page of the Boston Globe, it unleashed the most dramatic crisis in the 
relatively short history of the American Catholic Church.  One year, and over 800 Globe 
articles later, Law resigned.  The scandal attracted national interest – it made the front 
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page of the New York Times for over 40 consecutive days in 2002 – and media sources 
throughout the country began their own investigations of clergy sexual abuse and cover 
up.  By 2004, 450 priests had been pulled from ministry nationwide because of credible 
allegations against them for sexual misconduct, and four bishops had resigned.  Some 
voices insist that the stories, horrifying as they are, suffer from distortions and 
exaggerations (Steinfels 2002), and hints of anti-Catholicism (McGreevy 2004).  Others 
note how incomplete has been the reporting and how little is actually known about the 
number of victims (Doyle et al. 2006; Rezendez 2004).  Writes Michael Rezendez, 
journalist for the Boston Globe, and 2003 winner of the Pulitzer Prize for his reporting on 
sexual abuse in the Catholic Church: 
Nevertheless, it‘s clear that the number of accused priests revealed thus far is only 
a fraction of the whole, and that the true extent of clergy abuse in the Catholic 
Church remains unknown.  Complete Church records on allegations of clergy 
sexual misconduct have been aired in only a few of the 195 dioceses in the United 
States.  And even in those instances, the number of accused is nothing more than 
a measure of those whose victims had the courage to step forward and identify 
their abusers (2).  
 
 In reviewing the burgeoning literature on priest sexual abuse and the hierarchy‘s 
handling of the crisis, two tendencies frequently stand out.  First is the tendency to move 
quickly from priest sexual misconduct to re-debate long standing tensions in Catholic 
social and sexual teaching and hierarchical practices of governance.  Despite the fact that 
little is known about priest sexual abuse, a great deal of published speculation circulates 
as to its causes, but often in service to competing ideologies of Catholic teaching on sex 
and gender.  John Allan Loftus, researcher and professor of psychology and the 
psychology of religion at the University of Toronto, Regis College, identifies two 
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ideological camps that differently name the source of the crisis: there is the ―reform, 
reform, reform‖ camp, and the ―fidelity, fidelity, fidelity‖ camp (Loftus 2004, 85-87).  
Richard McBrien is representative of the former, argues Loftus; a camp which advocates 
for a review of the Church‘s teaching on the role of women, birth control, celibacy, and 
homosexuality.  John Richard Neuhaus is representative of the latter camp which 
identifies the source of priest sexual abuse in a failure to remain faithful to orthodox 
Catholicism.  Fidelity to the Church‘s teaching on sexuality, the argument goes, would 
have averted the crisis.  Loftus notes that the only common ground that exists between 
these two camps is ignorance grounded in a dearth of scientific, peer-reviewed research 
into sexual abuse by celibate clergy. ―To be really blunt about it: few really know what 
they are talking about.  They cannot know.  The paucity of actual research into the sexual 
landscape of celibate clergy is staggering… we know practically nothing scientifically 
about the subset of priests who have become involved in overt sexual misconduct‖ 
(Loftus 2004, 87, 91).  This ―paucity‖ has not chastened the speculating.  The energy 
generated by the crisis has sometimes yielded a debate where priest abusers and suffering 
victims serve as props for vetting competing ideologies of sexual morality that risks 
contributing to the opacity surrounding priest sexual misconduct, and risks obscuring the 
complexity of any connection one would make between Church teaching, hierarchical 
leadership, and lay participation in governance.   
The second tendency that stands out is the fact that the audience addressed in 
much of the literature is an audience of church elites (bishops and other hierarchical 
officials), and the proposed solutions are framed as advice-giving to these same elites 
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who are occasionally exhorted to change structures of governance, but often the exercise 
of their own ministry.  This has the unintended consequence of failing to acknowledge 
the traumatic experience of victims of clergy sexual abuse in particular and the voiceless 
laity in general, and perhaps of misunderstanding why the crisis has struck such a 
reverberating chord in the lives of American Catholics.  It is a tendency that 
overemphasizes the role of the hierarchy as the source of, and solution to, the problem, 
and under-acknowledges the responsibility and capacity of the laity to bring about 
change.  In the expanding wake of the crisis there have been many calls for structural 
change in the Church (Butler 2004; Heft 2004; Post 2004; Steinfels 2004), and for greater 
democracy (Bane 2004; Mannion 2004; Russett 2004).  There have been many more 
critiques of the divide that exists between the laity and bishops; and yet much of these 
calls are addressed to the hierarchy assumed to be the primary agents of change.  The 
laity in general, and lay parishioners in particular, do not factor in as primary change-
agents beyond theological exhortations to reclaim their baptismal rights.  Also present in 
the literature – perhaps less prominent but more troubling from the perspective of lay 
initiative – is the mixing of outrage over the practices of bishops with a high level of 
deference to the episcopal office, a discursive practice that, I believe, effectively 
undermines proposals for a meaningful lay role in the Church and undermines a role for 
the laity in bringing about meaningful change.   
Terrence Nichols proposes a ―participatory hierarchy‖ as a way of addressing 
authoritarian, non-conciliar governing practices that precipitated the current crisis (2004, 
124).  With others (Wuerl 2004), he mentions then dismisses a democratic egalitarian 
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society as a viable model for the church, and then proposes a hierarchical model that is 
more responsive and acceptable.  Hierarchies are ubiquitous and necessary, argues 
Nichols; they are the critical source of unity in most organizations.  ―Even simple social 
structures, like families, school classes… need some kind of hierarchy to function.  A 
family in which the children have an equal vote on every issue would disintegrate.  A 
class in which the opinions of the students were equivalent to those of the teacher would 
accomplish nothing… One purpose of hierarchy in the Catholic Church is to preserve the 
unity of the church‖ (112).  In social institutions whether simple or complex, the 
alternative to hierarchy is ―fragmentation and disintegration‖ (112). 
Participatory hierarchy eschews authoritarianism and avoids unilateral decision 
making, both of which are styles of leadership characterized by what Nichols calls 
―command hierarchy.‖   Command hierarchy is exemplified in the papal monarchy begun 
by the reforms of Gregory VII (1073-1085);
4
 continued in Boniface VIII‘s papal bull, 
Unum Sanctum (1302);
5
 reasserted by Pius IX who in Vatican I (1870) established papal 
infallibility and universal jurisdiction of the pope; reinforced by Paul IV‘s overruling the 
Commission on the Family in his issuing in 1968 of Humanae Vitae; and reaffirmed by 
John Paul II‘s issuing of Ordinatio Sacerdotalis prohibiting the discussion of women‘s 
ordination (Nichols 2004, 119-121).  A participatory hierarchy, on the other hand, is a 
style of leadership characterized by a willingness to listen to others, consult with them, 
and accept their advice (123), to facilitate consensus among bishops, and to practice 
                                                 
4 In his reforms, the pope asserted the right to install bishops over against the claims of local lay lords. 
5 Boniface stated, ―We declare, state, define, and pronounce that it is altogether necessary to human 
salvation for every human creature to be subject to the Roman pontiff.‖ 
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―subsidiarity, and conciliar models of discernment‖ (124).  Nichols recommends 
structural changes to the Church such as the election of bishops, reform of the Curia, 
giving more authority to national and international synods of bishops, and providing 
―more effective lay participation in decisions at the diocesan level‖ (123).  However, 
even if these structural changes are not introduced, priests and bishops can choose to 
increase their effectiveness in the performance of their ministry by exhibiting a 
participatory style of hierarchy. 
Setting aside the merits or demerits of the particular ecclesiology Nichols 
recommends, what I would like to foreground is the audience he appears to address, and 
his not-so-subtle portrayal of lay Catholics.  Regarding his audience, Nichols appears to 
be addressing the very pinnacle of power in the Church: the pope, the Curia, bishops and 
occasionally priests.  While this may seem natural in an article on ―hierarchy‖, the tacit 
assumption is that change can only come from the tip of the pyramid of power.  The 
papacy needs to reform itself through more participatory practices that affirm its primacy, 
but also practices ―conciliarity.‖  The unaddressed laity must wait until the hierarchy 
changes from a command style to a participatory style of governing, at which point they 
will have a say in the governing of the church.  If command hierarchy is as bad and 
powerful as Nichols reports, then his argument amounts to pleading with the oppressor in 
the hopes that he will unilaterally change his ways.  Given the history of command 
hierarchy he draws attention to, and the manner in which bishops have handled the sex 
abuse crisis, this seems highly unlikely. 
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Regarding his understanding of the laity, Nichol‘s argument sets up democracy as 
a fragile structure easily blown down by a more robust and useful hierarchy.  But more 
significant, it is an argument that explicitly seeks justification for hierarchy in a parent-
child model that inevitably portrays the laity as children whose constant care necessitates 
the construction of an unequal society.  In addition to the above quote, Nichols states: 
―Another example of participatory hierarchy might be a parent-child relationship.  
Certainly there are abusive parents who dominate their children, but good parents wish 
for their children to grow into the maturity that the parents themselves possess‖ (113).  It 
is clear that the reader is to translate ―bishops‖ for ―parents.‖  A lay reader would likely 
conclude that the laity must be children.  Bishops and priests are to the laity as adults are 
to children – with one unacknowledged difference: actual children mature and become 
adults, a fact which changes their legal status vis-à-vis parents, as well as the social and 
familial relationship between parents and adult children. Lay Catholics, in this view, 
never ―mature‖ beyond their status as juridical children.  Even if their bishop is a ―good 
parent‖ rather than an ―abusive parent,‖ they do not enter an adult-to-adult relationship 
with him.  Nichols‘ description of hierarchy prizes unity at the expense of voice rather 
than unity through voice, and looks only upward for sources of change in the Church.  
Like others in the literature sparked by the priests sexual abuse scandal, he respectfully 
addresses an episcopal audience whom he exhorts to voluntarily change; at the same time 
he risks offending lay adult Catholics whom he assumes will voluntarily remain in place. 
Christopher Ruddy (2002), professor of theology at St. John‘s University and 
College of Saint Benedict, highlights several problems the sexual abuse scandal reveals, 
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which for him is an indication of how far the Church has yet to go in implementing 
Vatican II.  The church ―has been offered the terrible but graced opportunity to renew 
itself by passing from suffering and death into new life in Christ‖ (Ruddy 2002, 7).  It is 
an ―opportunity‖ that calls for the retrieval of neglected teachings of the Second Vatican 
Council.  The first is the need to re-appropriate ―baptism as the foundation of all 
Christian life and ministry.‖  If lay ministry and responsibility was floundering in recent 
times, Ruddy suggests that the scandal has given new energy and life to the laity, which 
must now begin to take the initiative in its baptismal share in Christ‘s threefold office of 
priest, prophet and king.  States Ruddy, ―[T]hey are not helpers in the hierarchy‘s 
mission, but instead receive their mission directly from Christ through baptism‖ (8-9).   
Second, Ruddy argues that the church must recapture the council‘s (Lumen 
Gentium) understanding of the local church as the diocese in which the whole church is 
present, and its understanding of the bishop whose episcopal authority derives not from 
the pope but from sacramental ordination.  In present practice, Ruddy argues, ―The 
bishop, in effect, is defined apart from any necessary reference to a community‖ (10), 
which has the effect of separating the bishop from his local community by ascribing to 
him an identity which derives first from his place in the universal episcopal college and 
second from his place as a local ordinary.      
If one were to articulate a vision for lay ministry and episcopal leadership from 
Ruddy‘s article, one might begin by interpreting the legacy of Vatican II as an attempt to 
redirect lay attention from priests to their own Christian initiation (from orders to 
baptism); to redirect the attention of bishops from popes and the Vatican to their own 
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episcopal ordination and the local communities they lead; and to redirect leadership 
practices away from authoritarianism to humility and poverty of spirit (Metz 1998).  In 
this sense, Ruddy as a systematic theologian is very helpful since, while acknowledging 
the vital place of the universal, institutional, and hierarchical, his vision nevertheless 
privileges the local, personal, and relational.  However, as a practical ecclesiologist, or as 
a pastoral theologian his vision does not acknowledge any official role for the laity in the 
governing of the church.  A convincing vision possesses the capacity to organize strategic 
values around itself, and it is here that Ruddy‘s proposal for change breaks down since 
his status-quo-affirming strategies are in conflict with his liberating vision.  From the 
perspective of a lay reader attempting to enact this liberating vision in life and ministry, it 
is a very confusing article.    
This confusion may have its source in Ruddy‘s combination of harsh rhetoric with 
a high level of deference to Rome and the American hierarchy.  For example, the loss of 
the primacy of the local character of episcopal ministry to the centralizing power of the 
Vatican is ―a reproach to the church of today,‖ but one that should never ―be used to 
assert indifference or petulance vis-à-vis Rome‖ (9).  Again, ―Episcopal and clerical 
arrogance‖ is evident in the priest sex abuse scandal, but the reclaiming of one‘s 
baptismal mandate must not lead to ―a zero-sum or tug-of-war model of power-sharing, 
whereby the laity‘s gain is the hierarchy‘s loss‖ (8).  The combination of a rhetoric of 
condemnation with a rhetoric of deference chastises the hierarchy while at the same time 
advocates an ecclesial ideology that affirms the status quo.   
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Ruddy is aware of the practical status of the laity in the contemporary Catholic 
church, for he laments that, ―the laity remain objects, not subjects, of the church‘s 
mission‖ (9).  But here too he is confusing, for his lament is followed later in the article 
by this counsel to church leaders: ―Bishops need to listen better to their presbyterates and 
their people‖ (10).  Having argued that bishops have a mandate that is not derived from 
the pope but from their own episcopal ordination – in other words, that a bishop is not a 
pope’s bishop – he unwittingly positions the laity as objects of the hierarchy while 
castigating church leaders for doing the same – for failing to address lay persons as 
subjects. 
When asserting as fact that the Second Vatican Council‘s baptismal mandate has 
not been achieved in the Church‘s life and structures, Ruddy does not seek warrants for 
his assertion in ecclesiastical structures that exclude participation by lay parishioners in 
the governing of the parish and diocese, or to deficiencies in diocesan religious education 
and communication strategies directed toward adult Catholics.  Rather, as he draws back 
his stick to hit the hierarchy, he pokes the laity in the eye in a single sentence that 
assumes both episcopal and papal tyranny, and lay incompetence: ―Shaped by centuries 
of hierarchical dominance (sometimes justifiable), the laity are at once unable and 
unaccustomed to live up to their baptismal mandate‖ (8).  A laity described as ―unable 
and unaccustomed‖ is an example of the low expectations many theorists and theologians 
have of Catholics, and assumes that if they are ever to achieve their baptism, hope rests 
with a hierarchy learning to ―listen better‖ to ―their people.‖  A lay Catholic reading this 
might conclude that the hierarchy is to ease up on the dominating, but not give up on the 
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dominance, since its use against the laity is ―sometimes justifiable.‖  Ruddy may be 
defaulting on his own vision of baptismal ministry since he unwittingly reasserts the 
laity‘s low ecclesiastical status, tacitly affirms the laity‘s passivity and incapacity to act, 
and explicitly reminds the laity that hope for change rests not with them but with a 
gingerly handled hierarchy asked to voluntarily change.   
Theological arguments for lay participation that are addressed not to the laity, but 
to church leaders, leave lay Catholics with nowhere to go.  And yet, the laity are 
changing and have changed, and hope may rest with better understanding the nature of 
that change and what it means for the whole Church when many of its members actually 
buy into the baptismal rhetoric and recognize that they hold their own visions, values and 
actions.  Bruce Russett, co-editor of Governance, Accountability, and the Future of the 
Catholic Church, writes that in a crisis three responses can be expected: exit, voice and 
loyalty.  One option is to leave the Church.  Another is to affirm one‘s loyalty to the 
Church, ―accepting without protest whatever the hierarchical authority decrees or does‖ 
(Russett 2004, 202).  A middle option is to affirm a critical loyalty that insists ―on being 
heard and heeded.‖  Writes Russett: ―Voice implies loyalty to the community and to the 
institution, but not uncritical silence.  It means speaking up… It is not a course of action 
for the faint-hearted, and it requires a long-sustained effort‖ (202).  It is this option that 
many in the Church today are exercising. 
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Parish Restructuring Crisis 
 
Parish restructuring is the second seismic crisis that is affecting thousands of 
Catholic faith communities throughout the country.  It is difficult to overestimate the 
passion this issue aroused in the members of the parishes of this study.  Passions became 
acute when lay participants in diocesan initiatives felt that their committed participation 
had little or no impact in shaping diocesan decision making; when participants began to 
believe that there were arbitrary rule changes in the restructuring process, when their 
engagement in past restructuring efforts was perceived to be rewarded a few years later 
by proposals for closing the parish, or when diocesan decisions about parish restructuring 
were made without consulting local communities.  One interview participant in the 
present study, Theresa, with a deep sense of community sums up many of these passions.  
The following comments are her reflection on the difficult 1996 merger between her 
parish and another parish in the same town, followed five years later by another 
restructuring initiative, this time proposing to close and sell her parish.
6
 
We‘re going along and doing what we think we‘re supposed to be doing, what we 
were told we were supposed to be doing, looking forward to a new day because 
we acknowledged the fact that priests were becoming fewer and farther between, 
and really feeling like we were doing the right thing here in this Roman Catholic 
community.  And to have cavalier statements like, yeah, maybe [the parish] 
should be closed and possibly sold.  Wait a minute!  Why are we doing this?  
Why have you [bishop] asked us to do this if you really don‘t give a damn what 
we‘re doing here.  People who appear to be totally out of touch with the reality of 
parish life and the people in the parishes, [were] sitting down theoretically x-ing 
                                                 
6 These two are the parishes studied here.  Though the bishop instructed the pastor in 1996 to formally 
merge the two into one parish while retaining both sites of worship, the finance councils of both 
communities refused to merge.  Though the pastoral councils successfully merged into one council, the fact 
that the finance councils refused to merge meant canonically that the communities remained two distinct 
parishes; in this case, sharing one priest.   
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out these people and moving these people like it was some kind of an interesting 
chess game.  And it wasn‘t.  We were talking about real life and real people! 
 
This brief, ―from below‖ view of the crisis will be expanded in chapter six when 
we describe and explain the contemporary case study.  Before we address the literature 
on parish reorganization, it would be helpful to clarify terms, and to note a few 
considerations ―from above‖ as these relate to the diocese of the present study.  Though 
―reorganization‖ is the favored term in the emerging literature, parish restructuring is the 
preferred term for what this study identifies as a change not only in the parish-diocese 
organization, but also in the governing structures of both the parish and diocese.  
Governing structures in this Northeastern U. S. diocese refer to the relationship between 
bishop and priests, and pastors and parishes, not the relationship between lay and 
ordained Catholics.  None of the five major restructuring initiatives in the diocese from 
1994-2004 changed the juridical status of the laity; however, the final initiative proposed 
changes that would radically alter the relationship between pastors and faith communities 
and, potentially, between bishop and priests.  The faith communities of the present study 
exist within a diocese whose goal is to radically reduce the official number of parishes 
and missions from approximately 180 to 30 through a process of forming new ―clusters‖; 
by redefining the cluster as a ―parish‖; and by renaming former parishes within the 
clusters as ―worship sites.‖  In this way, the bishop is able presently to provide on 
average two, three or four priests per cluster, some of which have eight or more 
worshipping communities.  In this diocese, then, parish ―reorganization,‖ inadequately 
describes the scope of the structural changes introduced in this diocese.  These changes, 
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already underway, go beyond the way the diocese is organized to include the way 
worshiping communities are gathered and governed.
7
   
Pathways for the Church of the 21
st
 Century 
In 1995, and again in 2000, a groundbreaking study was undertaken by the 
Catholic Research Forum of the Conference for Pastoral Planning and Council 
Development (CPPCD) together with the Center for Applied Research for the Apostolate 
(CARA).  It was published in 2004 as Pathways for the Church of the 21
st
 Century: A 
National Study of Recent Diocesan Efforts at Parish Reorganization in the United States 
2003 authored by Jeff Rexhausen with Michael Cieslak, Mary L. Gautier, and Robert J. 
Miller.  The study was conducted in three phases.  Phase one surveyed 123 dioceses and 
six eparchies; phase two surveyed 273 parishes; and phase three gave in-depth interviews 
to 25 pastors and parish directors.  The relatively recent practice of restructuring parishes 
has proven challenging in many dioceses that find themselves inventing processes for 
communication, consultation, decision making and evaluation as they proceed with 
strategies for addressing the consequences of the priest shortage.  ―[D]ioceses and 
parishes have little or no experience with the conditions, issues, and structures that are 
encountered in the course of parish reorganization.  The experience is frequently one of 
                                                 
7 These changes raise many structural and canonical questions.  For example, do former parishes renamed 
as ―worship sites‖ lose their canonical status as a ―definite community of the Christian faithful‖ (CIC, 
515.1); will pastors, already struggling with an ever changing ministry made more difficult by having to 
serve multiple communities, have the authority to close a ―worship site‖ simply in order to carry out their 
ministries in ways serviceable to the community and meaningful to themselves; and have bishops, unable to 
provide sufficient numbers of priest-pastors, and facing tremendous pressure as a result of the priest sexual 
abuse and parish restructuring crises, simply transferred the painful task of closing ―parishes‖ to priest-
pastors (CIC,  515.2 holds that only bishops can ―erect, suppress, or alter parishes‖); and most basically, is 
it canonically licit to refer to a cluster of communities as a ―definite‖ gathering of the faithful, i.e., as a 
parish?  The critical piece here, assuming it passes canonical muster, is the possible new authority of 
pastors to close ―worship sites,‖ definite communities whose difference is not a shrinking population, 
poorly maintained facilities, or significant debt obligations, but a juridical change in status. 
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exploring uncharted territory and devising new ways to respond to these new situations‖ 
(Rexhausen 2004, 2). 
The CPPCD study found that the number one reason given by diocesan officials 
for parish restructuring is the shortage of priests, with increases or decreases in 
populations in parishes or dioceses as the number two reason (10-11). The types of 
organizational changes associated with parish restructuring are clustering (assigning one 
pastor to two or more parishes that are linked administratively but distinct canonically), 
merging (where two or more parishes are merged into one distinct parish, resulting in the 
closure of one of the parishes about half the time), closing/suppressing, building a new 
parish, or assigning a parish director in the absence of a resident priest.  
The number one goal for parish restructuring given by CPPCD study respondents 
is providing Sunday Eucharist.  Numbers two and three goals are avoiding over working 
priests and not requiring parishioners to travel excessive distances to celebrate Eucharist 
(13-14).  Seven out of ten diocesan respondents reported that parishes had been consulted 
―very much.‖  This included consulting pastors and 90% of parish pastoral councils.  
Other findings in this study disclose a tendency for dioceses in the Northeast and 
Midwest to initiate diocese-wide parish restructuring effort (p. iv); that two thirds of all 
diocese engaged in restructuring efforts mandated changes and one fourth were voluntary 
(22); and that 87% of phase two study (the survey of 273 parishes) respondents are 
priests (the rest are nuns, ordained deacons and lay persons).   
Changes in parishes usually mean significant increases in the time pastors spend 
on administrative responsibilities.  The most significant problems associated with parish 
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restructuring for priests are learning how to balance time between different parishes, 
getting enough volunteers, and dealing with unhappiness among parishioners associated 
with the changes (31).  However, respondents varied depending on whether their 
communities were clustered, whether parishes were assigned a parish director (i.e. not 
closed or clustered), or whether a new parish was built.  ―Overall respondents whose 
parishes have been linked [clustered] or share a pastor appear to have significantly more 
difficulty...  Parish directors and pastors in new parishes report less difficulty‖ (32).  In 
merged parishes pastors report challenges associated with the belief among parishioners 
that there was a clear ―winner‖ and ―loser‖ among the communities that came together 
(43), a belief that generated much animosity.  One pastor in the South reported on some 
of the difficulties associated with merging two different communities. 
One cannot overestimate the anger of the people, especially St. Andrew, toward 
the merger.  The previous two pastors left the parish when it became apparent that 
the diocese was going to merge the parishes.  The people of St. Andrew were very 
angry, feeling that St. Lucy ―took over.‖  The anger increased three years after the 
merger when the official canonical corporation of St. Andrew was dissolved 
legally, with all proceeds going to the corporation of St. Lucy.  In spite of the 
―we‘re all in this together talk‖ many St. Andrew people said that what happened 
was just what they feared – St. Andrew was closed and all their possessions given 
to St. Lucy (Rexhausen 2004, 43). 
  
The CPPDC study also interviewed 25 pastors and parish directors in the third 
phase.  Significant among the findings germane to this dissertation regard diocesan 
learning from parish restructuring experiences, and the quality and extent of diocesan 
consultation with lay parishioners.  The CPPDC study noted that ―most of the pastors felt 
that the local church (the diocese) has not tried to learn from these experiences‖ (45).  
One of the study‘s interviewers records the feedback from a pastor in a Western diocese: 
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―Fr John fears that the Church is not learning from these situations.  He reported that 
there was a lack of diocesan support.  In fact, he noted, no one from the diocese had ever 
formally spoken to him about the merger or evaluated it with him‖ (45).  Another priest 
states, ―The learning is anecdotal rather than systematic.  It is not integrated into how we 
operate the local church‖ (48). 
On the question of lay participation, and connected to diocesan learning, many 
dioceses inadequately accessed the voice of parishioners prior to and during parish 
restructuring.  A pastor from the Northeast states, ―The chief learning seems to be that the 
church gets into trouble when the people are not consulted sufficiently.‖  Another from 
the Midwest reports, ―A review of the process used to merge parishes recognized that the 
people were not involved.  It is necessary to make sure that meetings are held with the 
parish, that parishioners are involved in the process… The process never got to the heart 
of the communities‖ (45).   
The CPPCD study highlights the many challenges parish restructuring presents to 
the local church.  At the same time its findings offer new insights to pastors, diocesan 
officials and bishops about the need for early, on-going and broad-based consultation, 
training of all leaders including parishioners, thorough education, competent pastoral 
leadership, and an effective evaluation process that enables dioceses to learn from 
restructuring experiences.  It raises, however, two key concerns.  First, the sample 
population consists of mostly priests at the diocesan and parish level; the rest are high 
level parish directors who are nuns, deacons or lay persons.  Thus we do not directly hear 
the perspectives and perceptions of lay parishioners except through the voices of pastors, 
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diocesan officials, and parish directors.  We hear a great deal about parish restructuring, 
but from diocesan and parish elites.  How are lay parishioners reacting to these efforts?  
What are they saying about the extent and quality of the participation afforded them in 
restructuring initiatives?   
Second, phase two of the CPPCD study relied on diocesan officials to provide 
names of pastors or parish directors.  The study began with surveys of chancery officials 
(phase one) who were then asked to provide names of parish priests or directors involved 
in parish restructuring; these became the participants of the second phase of the study.  
This raises questions about sample populations derived entirely within the leadership 
structures of a hierarchical system; not only is this study grounded in the perspectives of 
an elite group within the American Catholic Church, but the elites within the elite 
ultimately determined who got to participate in the second phase of the study (and also 
the third, interviewing, stage since participants were selected from stage two 
participants).  Did diocesan officials include/exclude in their lists priest-pastors who 
resisted parish restructuring initiatives and, in solidarity with the communities they led, 
protested attempts to close or consolidate parishes?  Were priests included by diocesan 
leaders who, accepting the need to reconfigure dioceses in light of the priest shortage, 
nevertheless critiqued the structures and processes dioceses employed to solicit 
presbyteral and lay participation and dialogue?  These questions become important in the 
present study as the priest who led the two parishes did object to the process of parish 
restructuring and found himself increasingly marginalized by diocesan officials.  Relying 
exclusively on chancery officials to provide the names of study participants may have 
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skewed the data in service to conventional wisdom that assumes the necessity of 
restructuring parishes without either debating the issue or seriously addressing its root 
cause: the priest shortage. 
Zech and Miller Study 
Charles Zech and Robert Miller (2004) in, ―Listening to the People of God: Lay 
Leaders Reflect on Parish Reorganization,‖ address in part the questions left by the 
CPPCD research in their quantitative study presented at the annual meetings of the 
Religious Research Association, Kansas City, MO, October 2004.  ―There is a need to 
interview parishioners ‗in the pews‘ after the restructuring to discover the impact of the 
planning process used to make the decision to change, the process used to implement the 
change, and the effect of the change itself  on the lives of the parishioners‖ (3).  The 
―interviews‖ Zech and Miller conducted were quantitative surveys sent to parishes 
involved in the CPPCD study.  Pastors who agreed to participate were asked to provide 
survey instruments to pastoral council members.  In total, 114 pastors in ―reorganization 
situations‖ in 38 dioceses (representing every region except Region IV) agreed to 
distribute the surveys to lay council members (103 returned them).  This provided a total 
of 658 usable surveys from an original total of 2005 surveys (4). 
The Zech and Miller study asked 41 questions in the five categories of 
Education/Communication, Consultation, Support, Process, and Roles.  Most parishes 
were informed about the priest shortage and why changes needed to be made prior to 
restructuring (education); what is unclear is if education included a theology of the laity 
or parish community (Clark 2005; Lakeland 2003), or education about the parish in canon 
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law (Coriden 1997).  In the category of process respondents indicate the importance of 
groups of parishioners and clergy in the affected parishes gathering to discuss 
restructuring.  What is surprising about the category of process according to Zech and 
Miller is that participants have a low regard for the value of post-restructuring 
celebrations; moreover, they note ―the low value that parishioners place on a thoughtful 
planning process (fewer than half thought this was very important)‖ (7).  They speculate 
that ―parishioners placed a low priority on these activities because they happened so 
infrequently‖ (7).  In the category of consultation, the study states the following:  
A majority of parishioners thought it was important that options other than 
restructuring be thoroughly and honesty discussed before the decision to 
restructure is made. In only a tiny percentage of the cases did parishioners believe 
that this had actually occurred. The discrepancy between what parishioners 
believed to be important, and what actually happened is greater for this activity 
than for any other activity that we examined. This was mirrored in their comments 
contained in the open-end question where, as we note below, a large number of 
parishioners believe that the restructuring decision was dictated to them, and they 
had no meaningful input. (6) 
 
In the category of roles, authors note the high regard parishioners have for pastors: 
―respondents typically placed much of the credit for successful reorganizations, but little 
of the blame for unsuccessful ones, at the feet of their pastor‖ (7).  Parish pastoral 
councils also were highly regarded, even more than the role of the bishop; but the latter‘s 
support for reorganization was considered very important. 
The authors draw several conclusions about their survey of lay parish pastoral 
council members, two of which are important for this dissertation.  The first is the 
importance of process: ―Process issues dominate other considerations. Parishioners 
expect a process that treats each participating parish fairly, and they highly value a level 
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of input that allows them to feel a sense of ownership over the eventual decision‖ (9).  
Second is the importance of communication throughout the process of parish 
restructuring, but especially during and after.   
Similar questions, however, remain in this study as in the previous.  Like the 
CPPCD study, church elites selected study participants, again reflecting a top-down, 
clerical control over the sample population.  A study that seeks anonymous, identity-
protected informants might provide information qualitatively different from participants 
selected by a pastor whose status and authority might be used to influence the results of 
the study.  This is particularly the case where council members who were not elected, but 
appointed by the pastor, might not feel their participation is entirely voluntary.  But even 
if the participating lay persons felt their participation was voluntary, we do not hear from 
many others whose input was denied because of the decision of the pastor to not 
participate.  For example, after reviewing the survey instrument, pastors would be aware 
that some of the questions therein ask for lay feedback on priestly performance.  Some 
may have felt uncomfortable with lay persons critiquing their own actions, or the actions 
of any priest and, accordingly, may have either chosen not to distribute the survey to 
pastoral council members
8
 or chosen to distribute it to select members only.   
Second, the quantitative nature of the study precluded participants challenging the 
survey instrument regarding the kind of questions asked/not asked, or the way in which 
feedback was solicited.  In a study that includes semi-structured interviews, the capacity 
                                                 
8 Of 466 pastors sent information about the study with a sample of the survey instrument, 281 did not 
respond and 185 did respond.  Of the 185, 114 pastors agreed to participate, and 48 said they would not 
participate.  Of the 114 who agreed to participate, 10% failed to return survey instruments. 
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of participants to reframe questions, interact with the interviewer, and challenge 
perceived researcher bias is much greater in a qualitative study than in a quantitative 
study that relies exclusively on survey instruments.  For example, the questions about 
education/communication are purely practical (priest shortage and change) and appear to 
assume the necessity or inevitability of parish restructuring.  In a recorded interview, a 
participant might notice and address this, or share information about whether or not 
parishioners were educated about a theology of laity, about the need to expand lay 
ministry in the wake of an ongoing priest shortage, and/or about the canonical 
relationship between parish and diocese, or between laity and bishop.  
 
Summary 
 
The discursive practice in much of the literature on the sexual abuse crisis and 
parish restructuring assumes that sources of change in the church rest exclusively with 
the hierarchy.  This includes demands for change while tacitly downplaying the role of 
the laity in bringing about such change.  In some of the literature one sees also a rhetoric 
of outrage with regard to the hierarchy coupled with a rhetoric of deference that blunts 
the edge of any demand for change.  These tendencies affirm the status of lay persons as 
having no jurisdiction within the governing structures of the Church and therefore no 
sanctioned authority to effect ecclesiastical transformation.  The low expectations many 
have for lay parishioners occasions outrage that is expressed, not on behalf of the laity, 
but on behalf of ecclesial ideologies, and has the effect of reasserting that lay persons are 
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to look outward to the world and upward to their pastors, but not inward to the workings 
of the church in its ministry and governance.  Further, the intended audience for much of 
this literature is Church leaders rather than victims who need support and lay Catholics 
who need communication and access to forums of ecclesiastical decision making.  The 
two constituencies who are most affected by the crisis are the least attended to in the 
literature: victims of priests sexual abuse and Catholic laity.   
The little attention paid to the laity hides the possibility that the laity, particularly 
lay parishioners, have changed in ways which, if we pause to examine them, might better 
explain the interest, impact and energy these crises have unleashed.  Regarding the priest 
sexual abuse crisis, it may have less to do with the gravity of these very grave offenses, 
aggressive reporting by the media, or aggrieved parishioners who are better informed 
about the devastation of sexual abuse in general and priest abuse in particular, than it has 
to do with an American Catholic laity that has evolved toward greater complexity of 
consciousness.  It may have less to do with a loss of trust and loyalty than it has to do 
with a new way many lay Catholics have of relating to trust and loyalty.  In seeming 
silence and obscurity, the laity continue to evolve in complexity and are organizing 
themselves in groups that take the responsibility for change upon themselves.  In a church 
that has been confronted in recent times on the need to listen to the lay faithful, to hear 
lay voices in matters concerning the safety of children and other vulnerable persons, and 
to create better access for lay persons to ecclesiastical forums where policies are 
deliberated and decisions are made, further research is called for that studies lay 
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parishioners in the contexts of the faith communities they serve, sustain and draw 
nourishment from.   
 
Research Design 
 
It is important to state in this methods section my relationship to the researched, 
which has a bearing on the description and analysis that follows in this study.  I was 
employed in the parishes as a religious education director from 1997 to 2005, and was a 
participant in four of the five groups studied from 1994 to 2004.  With the exception of 
the 1994 group, I participated in the 2001, 2002, and 2003 groups either voluntarily 
(2002) or at the invitation of the pastor (2001, 2003).  In 2004, in my capacity as religious 
education director, I was the principle architect and facilitator of the group, and was the 
primary drafter of one of the documents the group produced.  My conscious bias is 
toward greater lay participation in the Catholic Church.  I understand that who I am 
affects everything in ways I can imagine and in ways I cannot imagine.  Therefore you 
my reader need to keep this in mind as you reflect on and weigh the experiences, insights 
and judgments I draw attention to, especially those in chapter six. 
 
The Focus of the Study 
 
This study investigates the cognitive development of groups by studying 
gatherings of lay Catholics in contentious dialogue with the hierarchy over the issues of 
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priest sexual abuse and parish restructuring.
9
  I am documenting the growth in cognitive 
complexity of a group of adults over a ten year period and the mismatch between the 
group‘s ways of making meaning and the curriculum coached by the hierarchy.  I am 
doing this with an innovative use of two powerful theories, adapting them to measure 
meaning making in groups of adult learners in non-formal settings.  This study applies 
Robert Kegan‘s (1982, 1994) constructive-developmental theory and Bernard Lonergan‘s 
(1972) theory of cognition and epistemology to how groups evolve in their meaning 
making capacity over time.  Understanding this better improves our knowledge of how 
groups contribute to their own learning and transformation, and how average adults can 
grow in their capacity to understand core issues, to articulate their learning, and to take 
appropriate action within a setting not always welcoming of such learning and action.  I 
do this through an extensive case study that explores one clustered parish‘s struggle over 
the priest sexual abuse crisis and parish restructuring.   
 
Research Question 
 
My question is how do groups of adult learners evolve toward greater cognitive 
complexity?  Given that groups of adult learners in the United States are made up of 
individuals with different developmental orientations or orders of mental complexity 
(Drago-Severson 2004a), how do these different orientations affect group learning and 
                                                 
9 The dialogue was contentious both because of the overt conflict that emerged between the parish groups 
and the diocese, and because of the intra-group disorientation that occurred among the group members at 
the slow discovery that their assumptions and cognitive frameworks were inadequate to address their 
ultimate concerns as they relate to safe and open parishes (Mezirow, 1991). 
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transformation?  What demands does a change in the cognitive complexity of the group 
place on the capacity of a group‘s leaders to adapt pedagogical approaches and governing 
processes?  The purpose of this dissertation therefore is to explore the cognitive growth 
of lay parishioners in contentious dialogue with the hierarchy.  This study privileges the 
voice of parishioners and enables one to see the reality ―on the ground‖ where most 
Catholics enact their faith.  Therefore, the question of lay participation is not simply one 
of ―what ecclesial tasks/ministries are laity theologically permitted to engage in?‖  It is a 
question of ―what horizonal/epistemological capacities does this group of lay men and 
women currently possess or hold and how do these interact within groups?‖  Further, it is 
a question of ―how is this community held, supported and challenged, by whom, and 
toward what ends?‖  These latter questions may establish new ground for a lay theology 
from below and offer new ways to examine issues of governance, roles and relationships, 
and communication in the Church. 
In order to do this I study the growth in cognitive complexity of groups within a 
two-parish community that were gathered in five major events during a ten year period 
over the twin crises of priest sexual abuse and parish restructuring.  I accomplish this by 
triangulating data sources consisting of archival material, interviews and my own 
observations as a participant in four of the five groups.  This study examines how adults 
learn together in non-formal educational settings and how they learn in a crisis.  There are 
practical implications for cognitive development and learning in other real world learning 
settings as well.  Adults learn experientially and toward their own self-directed goals 
(Knowles 1984).  Thus, most adult education happens outside formal learning settings.  
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What is new in this study is access to undisputed crises that are well defined, evidence of 
the evolving thinking of a group over time, and the response and reaction to that thinking 
by community leaders such as hierarchical officials. 
 
Data Sources 
 
Consistent with the requirements of qualitative research to gather extensive 
amounts of data together with thick description (Charmaz 2003; Geertz 1973), I have 
assembled a rich collage of data sources including, 1) ten years of archival material for 
each of the five events studied, including: nineteen institutional documents by educators 
and leaders (clergy, hierarchy and lay educators) who initiated gatherings, framed the 
discussion, summarized findings and responded to participants‘ inquiries; fourteen 
documents produced by lay participants at events; and approximately two hundred pages 
of emails from participants to each other and to leaders; and 2) interviews conducted in 
2004 and in 2005 from six lay participants who participated in most of the five events 
from 1994-2004.  My own observations as a participant in all but the first event are also a 
source of data.  However, I was a participant as an employee of the parishes from 1997 to 
2005 and therefore was not a research participant.  The primary data sources for this 
study are the archival material and interviews.  I personally interviewed all participants in 
two sets of 90 minute sessions using a semi-structured interview protocol which included 
probing questions about what participants learned about themselves; changes in their 
understanding of their roles and relationships within the community; their experience of 
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being educated in diocesan and parish contexts; and what they perceived their leaders 
were learning about their evolving participation as they, over time, turned knowledge 
production into creative action on behalf of their communities. 
 
Dissertation Outline 
 
In addition to laying out the focus of the study and research question, chapter one 
attempts to situate the study in the context of the contemporary crises of priest sexual 
abuse and parish restructuring.  This chapter has also examined where the laity and lay 
parishioners are situated in the context of the literature, noting the generally low 
expectations theologians have for lay Catholics, and the tendency to reassert a low 
ecclesiastical status by not including them as subjects of their addresses.  
Chapter two discusses Robert Kegan‘s constructive developmental framework, 
particularly as it attends to evolving communities, in an effort to draw preliminary 
conclusions about group growth.  Highlighted is the theory‘s openness to both the 
individual and social dimensions of human growth.  Here, the difficulties of using 
constructive developmental theory in group contexts are also reviewed.  I introduce 
Eleanor Drago-Severson‘s concepts of developmental diversity within adult groups and 
learning cohorts as communities of connection in order to further understand how 
individuals grow in intentional group contexts.  I also introduce William Torbert‘s theory 
of organizational development as a way of highlighting possible ways to look at how 
organizations as organizations can be understood to develop toward increasing 
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complexity.  After defining how the present study uses the term ―group,‖ chapter two 
concludes with a proposal for understanding groups, neither as monolithic entities, nor as 
collectives of individuals, but as complex and dynamic groups moving with directionality 
toward increasing mental complexity. 
Chapter three begins with a review of several problem areas in applying 
constructive developmental theory to groups; namely the problem of adults at second 
order of consciousness, the problem of using terms such as ―traditional‖ and ―modern‖ to 
describe periods of human history, and the problem using terms such as ―conventional‖ 
and ―post conventional‖ in pre-modern societies.  Also reviewed is the need to more 
closely examine the ―in over our heads‖ phenomenon identified by Kegan (1994).  I draw 
attention to assumptions in constructive developmental theory that cultural leaders are 
fourth order or above and that cultural functions, such as vision constructing, limit 
setting, and boundary managing, are the exclusive province of fourth order 
consciousness.  From this starting point, I introduce the first century Corinthian 
community and its founder, the apostle Paul, as a case study in service to building a 
constructive developmental hermeneutic for better understanding conflict between 
leaders and groups.  This case further serves the purpose of making tentative claims about 
the orders of mental complexity of the Corinthian community, and the complexity of the 
expectations Paul placed on the community.  Before doing this, however, I situate the 
Corinthian Christians within the larger Greco-Roman social, economic and religious 
context.  I propose that the many conflicts between Paul and the community have their 
sources in a mismatch between his expectations and the community‘s cognitive 
 37 
capacities.  I conclude chapter three by demonstrating how the coaching of a cognitive 
curriculum that is beyond the people to whom it is coached may at times under-whelm 
rather than overwhelm; how a second order culture sets limits, and manages boundaries; 
finally, and importantly, why leaders need to attend to multiple orders of mental 
complexity in their leadership, and the cost to the community for failing to do so. 
In chapter four I introduce Bernard Lonergan‘s transcendental method, 
highlighting his cognitive theory, different patterns of knowing, and his notion of 
conversion.  I then adapt his theory to group cognitive growth through the concept of 
dialectic as a mode of exposing different orders of mental complexity, or what Lonergan 
calls realms of meaning.  This chapter examines Lonergan‘s notion of conversion and 
argues that these likely occur at every differentiation of consciousness, from less complex 
to more complex, in the movement toward self transcendence.  In chapter five I bring 
Kegan and Lonergan into conversation on behalf of better understanding group cognitive 
development.  This chapter highlights similarities and differences on the notions of 
subject-object, directionality, of the ―how‖ of human transformation.  From this starting 
point the theory of evolving cognitive groups is further developed by adapting 
Lonergan‘s transcendental method to group knowing; particularly his notions of wonder, 
being, and the good.  Kegan‘s notions of communion and agency, and subject-object 
transformation, is examined within the social-cognitive context of groups. 
In chapter six I discuss the findings of the contemporary case study of the twin 
parishes researched in this dissertation.  I bring to the aid of analysis the dynamic 
complexity model of group development worked out in previous chapters, but expanded 
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here to identify different stages of group cognitive development.  After a brief description 
of the pedagogical approach used by the diocese, the groups are examined for structural 
and behavioral complexity.  The final chapter generalizes from the groups studied in the 
previous chapter to how four consecutively evolving groups might be understood in terms 
of complexity, dynamism, and development across time. 
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Chapter Two: Community Meaning-Making: Robert Kegan’s Constructive-
Developmental Theory in Group Settings 
 
This chapter has two goals: to introduce Robert Kegan‘s constructive 
developmental theory and to offer a preliminary approach to adapting it to groups.  
Kegan attends to human transformation by highlighting the evolving movement of 
individuals toward increasing complexity of consciousness.   
 
Robert Kegan’s Constructive-Developmental Theory 
 
Like all powerful and interesting theories, Kegan‘s theory of human growth is 
centered in very simple ideas, or what he calls, Big Ideas: constructivism and 
developmentalism.  Constructive developmental theory understands that individuals 
construct meaning – they are meaning makers – and evolve through various ―eras‖ or 
―adaptive balances‖ through which they defend, then surrender, then reconstruct new 
centers of meaning.  This growth process involves struggles of differentiation between 
self and world – what Kegan calls, emergence from embeddedness (Kegan 1982, 31, 82).  
Kegan comments on Evolving Self, ―I looked at psychological growth as the 
unselfconscious development of successively more complex principles for organizing 
experience.  Building on the work of Piaget and those who came after him, I took the idea 
of such principles of mental organization and extended its ‗breadth‘ (beyond thinking to 
 40 
affective, interpersonal, and intrapersonal realms) and its ‗length‘ (beyond childhood and 
adolescence to adulthood)‖ (1994, 29).   
These two ideas, that we make meaning and we develop, lend themselves to a 
considerable array of possibilities.  Simple description masks a system of great depth and 
breath.  The theory might be likened to playing the game of chess where a few basic ideas 
of play – pieces defined by their movement on a board of a fixed number of spaces; every 
piece from most complex (Queen) to least complex (Pawn) is necessary for successful 
play and capable of producing the decisive checkmate – lend themselves to a staggering 
variety of moves and many levels of complexity that allow playing chess to be fun and 
challenging for novices and experts alike.  The analogy here includes the game, but 
emphasizes the playing, an activity one can find oneself doing with this game throughout 
one‘s life.  One of the ―staggering variety of moves‖ that has been under explored in the 
―game‖ of constructive developmental theory is whether and how the theory can be 
applied to groups.  Is there a meaning constitutive evolutionary activity (Kegan 1980) for 
groups that attends to the developmental diversity of its members; that avoids construing 
groups as ―corporate individuals‖ in order to apply to them theories of individual 
development; and that understands groups as dynamic where different orders of mental 
complexity interact toward a coherent enactment of a group vision?  The ―move‖ I begin 
to develop later in this chapter understands the dynamism of the interaction of different 
developmental orientations as that which gives a group-as-a-whole certain characteristics 
that include an overall structure that governs how it understands, judges and acts, while at 
the same time avoids construing the group as a cognitive monolith.   
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The Holding Environment 
 
It is not a very great leap to make this move, for though Kegan‘s theory of human 
transformation clearly attends to individual growth, he avoids describing and explaining 
the individual apart from the communities of which he and she is a member.  The social 
influence on, and implications for, individual transformation are never far from one‘s 
attention when studying constructive developmental theory.  This is perhaps most evident 
in Kegan‘s concept of the holding environment.  Kegan has convincingly shown that the 
distinction between the individual and the social is not absolute (1982, 115).  The 
individual is one who is embedded in a ―psychosocial surround‖ that includes a 
continuous network of care and challenge that is sometimes adequate and sometimes not.  
Holding environment is a term first used by D. W. Winnicott who argued that, to the 
infant, the mother is not simply an ―other‖ but the very context of its surviving and 
thriving.  He famously said, there is never ―just an infant‖ to convey the fact that a 
thriving infant always comes attached.  Kegan takes Winnicott‘s notion of the holding 
environment and extends it to the whole of one‘s life, including and especially, adult life.   
A healthy holding environment provides an ingenious blend of support and 
challenge, and attends to the relationship between a person‘s mental capacity and the 
demands placed upon her by the ―cultural curriculum‖ (Kegan 1994).  Two key human 
yearnings correspond to the dialectic inherent in a holding environment between 
organism and environment, self and other, person and community: 1) agency, which is 
the yearning to be independent, autonomous, distinct and individual – an ―object-
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grasping‖ drive toward differentiation; 2) and communion, which is the yearning to be 
included, accepted, held – an ―attention-recruiting‖ drive toward attachment (1982, 18).  
Kegan calls the holding environment the ―culture of embeddedness,‖ ―natural therapeutic 
environment‖ (288), and ―lifelong psychological amniocentesis‖ (257) to emphasize the 
intimate connection between self and world.   
There is never just an individual, there is always a psychosocial holding 
environment within which one is ―cultured‖ and grows.  It consists of three functions: 
confirmation (holding on: encouraging, giving proper tasks and feedback), contradiction 
(letting go: appropriately opposing or resisting) and continuity (remaining in place: 
sticking around, being there when you are needed).  Kegan describes the way a 
community ―holds‖ and ―lets go‖ akin to a sacred dance that is vital to both community 
and individual.  ―Each time a particular culture of embeddedness ‗holds securely‘ it 
insures the integrity of the wider community of which the individual is a part; each time it 
assists in ‗letting go‘ it attests to the community‘s greater loyalty to the person-who-
develops than to the self-the-person-has-composed‖ (Kegan 1982, 260-261).  In language 
reminiscent of Abraham Heschel, he notes that when communities inadequately hold, or 
fail to hold members at every developmental era, ―time itself is profaned.‖   
Intact, sustaining communities have always found ways to recognize that persons 
grow and change, that this fate can be costly, and that if it is not to cost the 
community the very loss of its member, then the community must itself be 
capable of ‗re-cognition.‘  It must operate richly at many evolutionary levels, 
dedicating itself less to any evolutionary level than to the process itself (1982, 
261). 
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Later in this chapter we discuss further the implications for Kegan‘s reflections on the 
relationship between individual growth and community support when we make a 
preliminary attempt to adapt subject-object theory to groups. 
 
The Subject-Object Motion 
 
For Kegan, metaphors of motion, movement and dance, are crucial to 
understanding life and human living.  Human be-ing is an activity, whose entity-ness is 
inseparable from the activity itself.  ―Life is motion,‖ and person is ―an ever progressing 
motion engaged in giving itself a new form‖ (1982, 7-8).  Without keeping this in the 
foreground of ones thinking when moving on to his orders of consciousness, one risks 
mistaking the person for a developmental stage (1982, 277).  Objects are events, says 
Kegan, ―this book is about human being as an activity.  It is not about the doing which a 
human does; it is about the doing which a human is‖ (8). 
The foundational human evolutionary activity in constructive developmental 
theory is the movement from ―subject‖ to ―object,‖ and it is this movement that grounds 
both constructivism and developmentalism into a more comprehensive and inclusive 
framework for understanding human growth.  Kegan does not simply attempt a synthesis 
of various conflicting psychological schools of thought and practice, such as Freudian 
psychoanalysis with Piagetian cognitive-developmentalism; rather, he places both in a 
broader, more general, context in order to ask a new and richer set of questions.  He 
refers to this attempt as a ―metapsychology‖ that attends to both biology (a developing 
 44 
―entity‖ – in this case a person) and philosophy (the ―process‖ of constructing meaning – 
a person‘s epistemology or way of knowing).  Where Piaget‘s system remains 
descriptive, Kegan‘s subject-object theory is both descriptive and explanatory.   
Throughout Evolving Self Kegan attends to the change that occurs in the self-
world distinction at each adaptive balance by asking the question, ―To what extent does 
the organism differentiate itself from (and so relate itself to) the world?‖ (44).  This is a 
key question in subject-object theory and allows one to also ask to what extent is the self 
embedded in the world, and therefore prone to confusing itself with the world.  Says 
Kegan, with each new adaptive balance the self is better able to grant to the world its own 
integrity, to allow the world to be what it is, apart from one‘s own previous construction 
because there is a further differentiation between self and world.  This becomes a critical 
point when taking up below the question of how different orders of mental complexity in 
groups are related and coordinated to each other.   
In his neo-Piagetian epistemology ―‗subject‘ refers to the basic principle of 
organization; ‗object‘ refers to that which gets organized‖ (Lahey, Souvaine, Kegan, 
Goodman, & Felix 1988, 13).  In other words, what one holds as object one can reflect 
upon and decide about, but what one is subject to, since it is the means by which one 
reflects and decides, cannot be an object of reflection.  Subject is that which holds the 
self, that in which the self is embedded and therefore identified with.  In the evolution of 
the individual, the self slowly dis-embeds from what was subject, which then becomes 
held as object; what was behind the self, as it were, driving the ―operations‖ in one 
―stage‖ (subject) moves in front of the self, and is able to be noticed, held, acted upon in 
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the next ―stage‖ (it becomes object).  This process involves a very gradual evolution 
always in the direction of increasing complexity of consciousness.  Changes in mental 
complexity are always qualitative changes that transcend but include earlier orders of 
consciousness.  This becomes clearer as we look at orders of consciousness below. 
There are six orders of consciousness from infancy (―0‖) to late adulthood (―5‖) 
which Kegan variously names as adaptive balances, truces, orders of mind, or orders of 
consciousness.  I use these terms interchangeably with orders of mental complexity and 
developmental orientation, the latter term Drago-Severson prefers.  Since our concern is 
with adults, we will treat primarily second, third and fourth orders of consciousness, and 
only touch on fifth since it is so rare.  Kegan and his collogues have demonstrated that at 
any given time over half to two-thirds of adults in the United States are less than fourth 
order consciousness, and this percentage is based on a population that is ―whiter, 
wealthier, and better educated than the general population‖ (1994, 191).  In one 
composite study that is more representative of the general population over one third of 
adults are second order, over two fifths are third order and one fifth are fourth order 
(Kegan 1994, 195-196).
10
  The large presence of second order in the contemporary 
population is attested to in Drago-Severson‘s work with ABE-ESOL learners seeking a 
high school diploma (Drago-Severson 2004a) in which over half of study participants 
were second order. 
  
                                                 
10 Kegan refers to the composite study as ―Full SES.‖ The exact percentages are: second order, 36%; third 
order, 43%, fourth order, 21% (zero at fifth order).  
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Figure 2.1: The Motion of Human Development (from second order to fourth order) in 
Robert Kegan’s Subject-Object Theory 
 
 Orders of Consciousness 
 
Subject-object theory understands the motion of evolution as a meaning-
constitutive activity (Kegan 1982, 77); it is ―an activity of equilibration, of preserving or 
renegotiating the balance between what is taken as subject or self and what is taken as 
object or other‖ (81).  Kegan argues that this activity is the fundamental ground of 
personality.  It is very distressing during periods of dis-equilibrium or decentration in 
which the self defends, surrenders, and reconstructs a new balance.  The process of object 
creating – of making into a part of the self what was formerly identified with the self – is 
concomitant with that of subject losing – the experience of the loss of the self.  But 
subject losing is also object finding in the establishment of a new center of balance (83).   
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Impulsive first order of consciousness   
In Kegan‘s Impulsive first order of consciousness the self is embedded in 
impulses and perceptions, but holds reflexes as object.  Because impulses are immediate, 
rather than mediated, they lack the control older children are capable of.  In fact, failure 
to express impulses is experienced as a threat to the self, to who one is.  Objects separate 
from the child now exist, but they are also subject to what the child perceives them to be.  
The first order self also cannot hold two different perceptions together at the same time, 
nor hold two feelings about one object or person together at the same time.  The world 
cannot yet be a ―concrete‖ world – existing apart from one‘s perceptions of it – in the 
first order way of knowing since the world is as one perceives it to be.  Results, not 
intentions, are central as seen in Piaget‘s question to children: which child was naughtier, 
the child who took a glass and deliberately broke it, or the child who accidentally broke a 
whole tray of glasses.  Unable able to recognize intentions, impulsive children believe the 
child who broke many glasses is naughtier.  When the impulsive child ―loses its balance‖ 
between the ages of five to seven, she begins to be able to hold impulses as object, and to 
recognize that she exists in a world of ―durable categories‖ – objects that have their own 
characteristics apart from one‘s perception of them.  This is the world we discuss next.   
Imperial second order consciousness  
Second order consciousness is embedded in, or subject to needs, interests, wishes 
and goals; understands others as ―suppliers‖ to the self (Lahey et al. 1988, 13); and enters 
relationships on behalf of its own interests.  An adult with second order mental 
complexity holds impulses and perceptions as object.  The rule oriented second order, or 
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―Imperial‖ self can take the point of view of another person, but cannot hold her own 
point of view and the other‘s simultaneously and internally.  Writes Lahey and associates, 
second order complexity concerns, ―negotiating the fulfillment of the individual‘s own 
needs, wishes, and interests.  For the stage 2 [individual], these negotiations often take 
the form of mutual promises, deals, or pacts to which both partners promise to adhere‖ 
(1988, 127).  Though there are significant differences in the kinds of ―deals‖ or ―pacts‖ 
between children and adults, both are based on simple, tit-for-tat, reciprocity.  Conflict is 
therefore externalized.  Writes Lahey and associates, ―A Stage 2 self would view both 
viewpoints in terms of ‗what I want,‘‖ making the other the sole holder of alternative 
points of view with which the self negotiates in terms of its own point of view (1988, 50).  
Interpersonal third order consciousness 
In the third order self, one can hold one‘s own and another‘s point of view 
together; one can take the point of view of the other taking one‘s own point of view – 
holding both points of view simultaneously and internally (Lahey et al. 1988, 49-50).  
This becomes the basis for a new ―interpersonal‖ balance whereby individuals enter into 
shared realities with others; the other is now constructed in a relationship ―not as a 
separate individual with her own values and beliefs but as part of a shared reality‖ (Lahey 
et al. 1988, 327).  The other, ―now made object to the extent of being released from being 
the sole holder of an alternative point of view [second order] – can be engaged in the 
working of the interpersonal self, partnered to the self‘s own capacity to hold multiple 
points of view within itself‖ (Lahey et al. 1988, 50).  The self is able to subordinate her 
own interests and needs to those of others on behalf of building and preserving the 
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relationship, and to have loyalty to a community and to identify with it so that its success 
is one‘s own and its failure assessed in terms of cost to community (Kegan 1994, 47).  
Values and standards are internalized but have their authority in sources other than the 
self, such as parents, mentors, peers, traditions, institutions and their leaders.  The third 
order self is embedded in the psychological surround, according to Kegan, but holds 
needs, interests and point of view as object.  Conflict is also internalized, leaving self 
feeling responsible for the point of view/experience of others and simultaneously making 
others responsible for the self‘s point of view/experience.  A person‘s own feelings 
depend on, or are subject to, ―how he believes another person feels about him‖ (Lahey et 
al. 1988, 321).   
Institutional fourth order consciousness 
In the movement from third to fourth order, the other-authoring, interpersonal 
surround that once held the person (which made one subject to expectations and 
authorities outside the person) begins to move from subject to object – to that which the 
self holds and can decide about.   
Evolution between stage 3 and 4 is the story of gradually separating internalized 
points of view from their original sources in others and making the self itself a 
coherent system for their generation and correlation.  When that has happened, 
e.g., we stop making others responsible for our own feelings, and experience it as 
a kind of violation when others make us responsible for theirs (Lahey et al. 1988, 
51, emphasis original). 
 
The self, disembedded from the fusion that accompanies the shared reality of third order, 
has gained some distance from the interpersonal realm and can now decide about (hold as 
object) relationships – the self has relationships rather than being had by them (Kegan, 
1994).  The self as system has the ability to subordinate what it thinks on behalf of the 
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other; it ―is not about altering what [the self] thinks or making disappear the differences 
between them‖ (Lahey et al. 1988, 133).  The self holds onto what it thinks and is 
comfortable with and aware of differences between self and others, even as it temporarily 
brackets out what it thinks in order for the other to be heard.  The self ―visits the other‘s 
experience‖ (1994, 134).   Standards and values are self generated rather than internalized 
from sources outside the self.   
Interindividual fifth order of consciousness  
Fifth order of consciousness is extraordinarily rare, so much so that Drago-
Severson (2004a) suggests that it is a hypothetical way of knowing.  In the many studies 
cited in Kegan‘s 1994 work, not one research participant scored at fifth order.  
Limitations in fourth order, however, suggest the real possibility of a post-ideological 
balance.  In fourth order, the self-as-system presents a whole, complete self to others who 
are also assumed to be whole, complete selves (Kegan 1994, 312).  The self is the system 
in fourth order; the self-authored self is the organization, a fact which prevents it from 
reflecting on the self that is doing the organizing and regulating (Kegan 1982, 102).  The 
self is subject to the system.  In fifth order of consciousness the system becomes 
differentiated from the self; a self which now holds the system as object.   
Fifth order may be capable of reorienting and coordinating the powerful human 
yearnings for communion and agency that provide an underlying orientation in earlier 
orders of consciousness.  Agency and communion achieve a kind of divine status in third 
and fourth orders.  In third, the yearning for communion occasions the capacity to 
construct a shared reality in which mutuality grounds the self – the self is insofar as it is 
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in relationship with the other.  Mutuality constitutes wholeness and completeness in third 
order.  In fourth, the yearning for agency occasions the capacity to construct a self that is 
grounded in personal authority – a self that is whole and complete and relates to the other 
as a whole and complete self.  Fifth order, which subordinates self-as-system to a system 
regulating, or inter-institutional self, seems to de-divinize agency and communion as 
constructed by fourth and third orders of consciousness.  The fusion of self and other in 
third order is a communion that can discount autonomy; the distinctiveness of whole, 
independent selves in fourth order is an agency that can discount community.  Fifth order 
assumes the incompleteness of all communal ideations and agental ideologies because it 
recognizes the permeability or interpenetrablity of all selves and all systems.  This 
prevents the self from becoming over-identified with any one frame of reference.  Fifth 
order may recognize that community writ large is achieved not by ―sameness‖ (third 
order‘s tendency to flatten difference on behalf of fellowship), nor by an alienating 
―totalism‖ (fourth order‘s tendency to flatten otherness on behalf of its own meta-story).  
Rather, community in fifth order, because it is grounded in an assumption of the ―total‖ 
interpenetrablility of all systems, is always a local, historical, social enactment that is 
influenced by, and influences, others within the total field of action.   There are no utterly 
autonomous, self-subsistent selves or systems, nor does the interconnection of selves and 
systems blur their distinct, singular reality. 
Fourth order ideology digs a big hole into which its members unwittingly attempt 
to fit the whole world.  Because ideology is the structure of knowing for fourth order 
individuals, ideology is identified with the self; the world therefore remains 
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undifferentiated from it (ideology) and is assumed to be the same.  When the world 
shows up differently from ideology, when some of its parts ―don‘t fit‖ into the hole dug 
for it, then those parts are simply bracketed out and ignored.  Fourth order ideology 
marks out, as it were, a portion of the sky (templum), a consecrated space (effatum) in 
which to not only observe the world, but to make the world after the fashion of its own 
metanarrative.  When the world shows up differently, one simply cries, non consulto – 
―doesn‘t count,‖ ―not looking,‖ – as did the ancient (second order, but also agental – see 
chapter three) Roman augurs when startled by an inauspicious sign.  Because fifth order 
simultaneously refuses to be identified with any one ―system‖ or to identify the other as a 
complete, self-subsistent system, everything counts, everything matters, nothing is not 
looked at.  There is no templum, no space that is not already consecrated, no inauspicious 
time.  There is no world with which to confuse a self that holds the world. 
The fundamental task of cultural leaders, especially adult educators is to facilitate 
human evolutionary activity in ways appropriate to each order of mental complexity.  The 
extraordinary movement from one order of consciousness to another requires the right 
combination of support and challenge, and the building of ―consciousness bridges‖ that 
secure both ends of the mental divide (Kegan, 1994).  By doing so, one better engages in 
transformational learning. 
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Motion of Orders of Consciousness in Subject-Object Theory 
 
In subject-object theory, an order of consciousness does not necessarily refer to 
the reign of a dominant epistemology, such as the ―2‖ in second order.  Rather, it refers to 
an era one has achieved in which a new epistemological balance has fully emerged and 
the former balance has been fully transcended (but included).  In second order, for 
example, ―2,‖ having ―arrived,‖ enters a long waning phase in which a new, more 
complex epistemology appears and then waxes – in this case, ―3.‖  Arrival in this sense 
heralds an inevitable movement toward the decline and fall of an epistemology.  A 
meaning making structure – the whole – is a dialectic between one waxing and one 
waning epistemology – the parts (see figure 2 below).  One not only is in motion, one is 
developing; a development in which a hard-fought balance, given the right blend of 
challenge and support, is under sustained and increasingly persistent challenge from a 
new, more complex and therefore destabilizing epistemology.  Below are the five 
distinctions in each order of consciousness as used by Kegan (Lahey et al. 1988, 46). 
1 1(2) 1/2 2/1 2(1) 
2 2(3) 2/3 3/2 3(2) 
3 3(4) 3/4 4/3 4(3) 
4 4(5) 4/5 5/4 5(4) 5  
 
One is rarely just ―3‖ or ―4‖ since subject-object theory makes five distinctions within 
one order of consciousness and one moves slowly but steadily through them.  3, 3(4), 3/4, 
4/3, 4(3) are the five distinctions for third order.  3 simply means no evidence of second 
or fourth order; 3(4) means that one is third order, but fourth order is beginning to make 
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an appearance; 3/4 and 4/3 means both are strong but in the first, third is dominant and in 
the second, fourth is dominant; 4(3) means fourth order is strong but must defend against 
the appearance of third order which is still present. 
What might be initially confusing in this way of naming distinctions within orders 
of consciousness is, again, that a dominant epistemology is not necessarily an indication 
of a particular order of consciousness.  Further, an individual is not simultaneously third 
order and fourth order.  Rather, an individual is the dialectical motion between one 
waxing and one waning epistemology within a given order of consciousness.   
 
 
Figure 2.2: Waxing and Waning Epistemologies within three Orders of Consciousness 
 
Communities in Kegan’s Theory of Individual Development 
 
Collective Consciousness 
Kegan‘s constructive developmental theory describes individual growth, not 
community or group growth.  However, the place of communities for generating and 
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sustaining individual growth in Kegan‘s theory has a central place in Evolving Self as 
indicated above.  In fact, individual growth is unintelligible apart from one‘s rootedness 
in family, community and culture, an emphasis also evident in, In Over Our Heads: The 
Mental Demands of Modern Life (Kegan 1994).  Here he describes a ―cultural mentality‖ 
and a ―collective consciousness‖ that has in the past provided capacities individuals 
within communities lacked (1994, 134).  He speaks of ―communities of mind‖ which 
help to provide ―a common core of beliefs that are entered and reentered via a seamless 
fabric of ceremony, celebration, ritual, gesture, and symbol… such communities are 
distinguished by a kind of homogeneity that makes the notion of ‗role model‘ pandemic‖ 
(103).  In such communities the collective consciousness provides the tasks of vision 
creating, role creating, limit setting, and boundary managing. 
However unique the content, style, or mood of each community‘s creed, what 
they all share at the formal epistemological level is the delivery of a fourth order 
consciousness that creates and regulates the relations, roles, and values with 
which most of the adults in the community become identified and to which they 
are loyal.  For many, and even most, this may be the source of fourth order 
consciousness.  It does not and need not come from their own minds (Kegan 
1994, 103-104).  
 
Kegan refers to this as ―Traditional Community‖ where third order individuals are 
suspended in a ―borrowable mind‖ (105) that supports them in the fulfillment of fourth 
order tasks.  He argues, however, that this ―mental monolith of Tradition‖ is fragmenting, 
which means that today, third order individuals are inadequately supported in fulfilling 
the fourth order demands the hidden curriculum of the contemporary American culture 
places on them.   
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Consciousness Conversation at Cross-Purposes 
Kegan relates an interesting story to note the collision of third order collective 
consciousness with the emerging mind of fourth order consciousness.  He refers to this as 
a ―consciousness conversation at cross-purposes,‖ a theme I return to in chapters three 
and four when addressing intergroup and intragroup dynamism (conflict between and 
among different orders of mental complexity).  In Henrik Ibsen‘s nineteenth century play, 
A Doll’s House, Kegan draws one‘s attention to the collapse of Torvald‘s and Nora‘s 
relationship where the ―mind of Tradition speak[s] with the emerging mind of 
Modernity‖ (1994, 112).  Nora‘s newly emerging fourth order consciousness makes 
appeals to achieving autonomy, becoming her own person independent of her husband, 
thinking and acting on her own authority, and taking personal charge of her own 
education.  Torvald‘s third order consciousness makes appeals to what people will think 
with Nora running off, to the external, authoritative, ―infallible guide‖ of one‘s religion, 
and to cultural expectations such as a wife‘s duty to her husband and children.  ―An 
infallible guide outside ourselves, in which we comfortably invest authority and to which 
authority we pledge loyalty, fidelity, and faith – this is the essence of psychological 
dependence.  It is the essence of the premodern Traditional state of mind, and it is the 
essence of third order consciousness‖ (1994, 112).  What was in an early form of cultural 
advance at the close of the nineteenth century is today present with such force that its 
cultural demands now permeate higher education, management, parenting, partnering and 
the helping professions.  He speculates: ―I would guess that the number of Americans 
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with fourth order consciousness was considerably smaller one hundred years ago than 
today‖ (100).   
Kegan understands earlier periods in human history as characterized by a 
dominant order of consciousness (for example, Tradition Company) in which crucial 
higher order tasks are fulfilled by means other than the capacities of the dominant 
developmental constituency. Behind this understanding one can identify two key 
assumptions.  First, the fulfillment of higher order tasks is done by a less dominant 
(numerically), but more complex order of consciousness.  A critical question here is at 
what point does a more complex order of mental complexity, while a numerical minority, 
become determinative in creating and shaping the whole culture?  This study makes a 
fourfold distinction with regard to the capacity of fourth order to exert its presence in 
groups: 1) it is present but not influential; 2) influential but not determinative; 3) 
determinative but not dominant; 4) it is dominant.  This cumulative and progressive 
development of fourth order coincides not with a decline in third order, but a decline in 
second order.  This will be developed more fully in chapters five and six.   
The second assumption is that vision creating, role creating, limit setting, 
boundary management are the exclusive domain of fourth order consciousness, which 
therefore requires the positing of a ―cultural mentality‖ or a ―collective consciousness‖ 
whose creeds and rituals somehow deliver what the community lacks.  This is 
problematic for two reasons.  First, it appears to deny the possibility that boundary 
management, limit setting, etc., have counter parts within communities operating from a 
combination of early orders of mental complexity; that, say a community with a dominant 
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second order mental complexity would be unable to set limits or manage boundaries by 
itself.  The next chapter demonstrates that such a community can construct a second order 
vision that fulfills these tasks; but one that is an instrumental, rule and role-oriented 
vision.  Second, it assumes that in every period of human mental development there 
existed fourth order mental elites who, however tiny a percentage of the population, were 
responsible for establishing for the whole population its vision, values and rules.  The 
next chapter also argues that a third order curriculum is capable of introducing to a 
second order community a new, more complex vision that accounts for not only rules and 
roles, but organizes them within a set of ideational values (a theory of rules and roles).    
 
Toward Understanding Constructive Developmental Theory in Groups 
 
Eleanor Drago-Severson’s Developmentally Diverse Community of Connection 
 
One solution to understanding group complexity has been addressed by Kegan 
himself in a later study with colleagues including Eleanor Drago-Severson (Kegan, 
Broderick, Drago-Severson, Helsing, Popp, & Portnow 2001a, 2001b).  This multi-
method, multi-site longitudinal study understands adult groups as developmentally 
diverse – as containing multiple ―cultures of minds.‖  Drago-Severson (2004a) reports on 
one of the three sites studied, the Polaroid Corporation workplace site in Waltham, MA 
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whose study participants were ―employed as shop-floor workers and enrolled in a high 
school diploma program‖ sponsored by the company (2004a, 3).11    
In the Polaroid study, sixteen adult students completed the program and received 
High School diplomas.  Most were non-native English speakers ranging in age from 27-
58 who had moved to the United States from West Africa (ten), the Caribbean (three) and 
Asia (one) (2004a, 57-58).  Two were U.S. born citizens.  Using a variety of instruments, 
including but not limited to, the subject-object interview (Lahey et al., 1988) participants 
were scored for developmental orientation at the beginning of the study and then fourteen 
months later.  Of the three sites in the larger study, the Polaroid site showed the most 
growth among participants between the two periods of measurement.  Participants ranged 
in complexity of consciousness, with nine at various distinctions from early to late second 
order, six at various distinctions from early to late third order, and one at early fourth 
order. 
Drago-Severson‘s and her colleagues‘ research is helpful for this present study 
because 1) it demonstrates the presence of developmental diversity within adult groups 
and examines how different developmental orientations differently experience 
knowledge, decision making, and conflict, and 2) and it reveals individuals within a 
learning cohort growing in complexity of consciousness over time aided not only by the 
pedagogical approaches of educators, but also by the support of fellow students.   
                                                 
11 Drago-Severson‘s research was part of a larger study that was ―the first in-depth study of adult learning 
in ABE/ESOL [adult basic education/English for speakers of other languages] settings that applies Robert 
Kegan‘s (1982, 1994) constructive-developmental theory to understand how adults make sense of their 
learning experiences and their lives‖ (Drago-Severson 2004a, 3) 
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On the first point, the presence of developmental diversity with in the learning 
cohort, it is worth repeating some of the features of developmental orientations.  Clearly 
in the Kegan tradition, Drago-Severson applies his constructive-developmental theory 
within adult classroom settings
12
  for the purpose of studying how different 
developmental orientations differently understand learning experiences.  Drago-Severson 
and her colleagues found three different developmental orientations among the 
participants in the learning cohort.  This sheds further light on how notions such as 
knowledge, decision making, and conflict are experienced in qualitatively different ways 
by adults in various orders of mental complexity.  Instead of referring to adaptive 
balances as orders of consciousness, she refers to them as developmental orientations, 
which seems to be a preferable choice when studying adult populations since it sets aside 
(at least temporarily) questions of higher or lower, earlier or later, less complex or more 
complex.
13
  This is particularly the case when second order is not only present in an adult 
population, but numerically dominant.  Drago-Severson refers to second order as 
Instrumental orientation, third order as Socializing orientation, and fourth order, with 
Kegan, as Self-authoring.  
Instrumental developmental orientation understands knowledge as a possession 
acquired from authorities external to the self that is either right or wrong (2004a, 34); it is 
                                                 
12 Classrooms are a kind of group, though not a group working toward a corporate outcome.  Rather, adult 
educational cohorts as defined by Drago-Severson, work together in teams sharing common goals, but for 
individual outcomes such as getting one‘s diploma.  A group as this dissertation defines it is a group of 
individuals working together for outcomes that advance the interests of the group itself, or a larger group 
(parish) whose interests it represents. 
13 For Kegan, second order consciousness in today‘s cultural curriculum is the domain of the 8 to 12 year 
old child, which seems to suggest that second order among an adult population is a ―problem.‖  His 
examples of second order in Evolving Self (1982) and In Over Our Heads (1994) bear this out. 
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something that can increase, a fact which improves one‘s condition and opportunities in 
life and work.  Decision making for instrumental learners is about setting concrete goals 
and following correct rules in order to achieve them; deviating from the rules is 
experienced as doing it wrong (2004a).  Instrumental knowers watch ―for who is 
following the rules and who is not, and whether one‘s own concrete needs and goals are 
being met‖ (2004b, 30).  Conflict is experienced as resulting from rule breaking; where 
different points of view are characterized as one right and the other wrong; where 
rightness coincides with achieving one‘s own needs and interests; and where fairness is 
understood in terms of simple reciprocity (you do this to/for me and I‘ll do that to/for 
you).  Persuasion of others is a key strategy for ―winning‖ arguments. 
Socializing knowers also construe knowledge as something received from 
authorities.  ―Unlike instrumental knowers, socializing knowers conceive of knowledge 
as something a person should have in order to meet the goals and expectations of external 
authorities‖ (2004a, 34).  In adult groups, socializing knowers make decisions by 
―realizing an abstract goal and figuring out the best way to achieve it.  Goals are based on 
a sense of loyalty or obligation to another person or group or cause… Looks externally 
for support, encouragement and validation of progress‖ (2004a, 34).   Decision making is 
intimately connected to loyalty to important others including leaders, institutions, and 
traditions.  Conflict can be more troubling for socializing knowers because they are more 
aware of the feelings of others and because there may be more at stake in the dispute than 
simply who is right and who is wrong and how does this meet one‘s own needs and 
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interests (instrumental knowers).
14
  These knowers watch for ―commonalities and places 
of agreement that can be build on to decrease sense of difference and hurt feelings.  
[They emphasize] loyalty and inclusion of everyone and coming to a mutual 
understanding and resolution that everyone feels good about‖ (2004b, 30-31).  
Self-authored knowers experience knowledge as ―context dependent‖ where both 
others and self are sources of knowledge (2004a, 33).  Decision making for self-authoring 
individuals is an internally generated process not bound to outside authority.  Thus 
values, beliefs, and standards are adhered to not because they come from external 
authority to which one is loyal, but because they are internally authored by a self one is 
loyal to.   Decision making focuses ―on identifying one‘s own independently conceived 
and desired goal(s) and considering all of the possible ways to accomplish it/them… [and 
follows] one‘s own standards and values for reaching the goal, recognizing when and 
where one needs others‘ expertise and seeking that out‖ (Drago-Severson, 2004a, 34).  
Conflict is understood as an inevitable feature of adult groups that can be potentially 
helpful to ―clarify an issue and lead to better communication and relationship‖ (2004b, 
30).  The goal of conflict resolution for self-authoring knowers is to ―move the interests 
of the group forward‖ through vetting different opinions, perspectives and feelings 
(2004b, 31).  
                                                 
14 Drago-Severson argues that the self is defined for instrumental knowers as what one has; for socializing 
knowers as who one is; and for self-authoring knowers as who one can become.  Because socializing 
knowers are embedded in the psychological surround and therefore look to valued others as authorities, 
what may be at stake in conflict is one‘s very sense of self.  Because of this, socializing knowers may 
prefer advocacy of one‘s own position while respecting other positions, rather than persuasion to one 
position or another, as the chief strategy for disputes.   
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Drago-Severson‘s description of the program at the Polaroid site as a holding 
environment has important implications for the present study in terms of social learning 
in intentional group settings.  The participants worked within an educational cohort and 
educators employed methods of collaborative learning where students interact with each 
other in learning groups.  Collaborative learning is a ―constructive process‖ that ―creates 
a mutual learning environment for a teacher and a group of students‖ and better attends to 
students‘ own experiences and questions (2004a, 68).  It avoids approaches that 
understand learning as ―depositing‖ information from teacher to student.  Drago-
Severson reports that though the initial goals of the larger study was not designed to 
examine the effects of a cohort on the learning experiences of participants, ―we came to 
understand that being part of a learning cohort mattered greatly, although in different 
ways to participants, and especially to learners at the Polaroid site‖ (2004a, 71).  ―They 
became what I call a community of connection in which each member supported and was 
supported by every other member‖ (2004a, 71).  Cohort learning increases student 
commitment to each other‘s learning and, when offered paid release to pursue studies, 
increases the feeling that they are participating in something important and ―helped them 
gain the respect of their peers and supervisors‖ (2004a, 159).  Drago-Severson‘s 
description of a community of connection includes avoiding curricular strategies that 
unknowingly attend to one developmental orientation in favor of approaches that support 
learners in a variety of ways of making meaning.  ―This kind of developmental 
mindfulness can increase the likelihood that greater numbers of adults will feel 
recognized and valued in their learning‖ (2004a, 161).  
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Drago-Severson‘s work highlights developmentally diverse adult groups made up 
of individuals with different orders of mental complexity, a fact that greatly affects how 
they experience learning.  Highlighted also is the value of groups organized as learning 
cohorts using approaches of collaborative learning.  Such groups allow students to 
participate in each other‘s learning through mutual support and encouragement, and 
challenges educators to employ developmentally sensitive pedagogical approaches.  For 
the purposes of this dissertation, however, we are left with several questions.  Drago-
Severson‘s understanding of cohorts consist of individuals sharing common goals and 
mutual support, but whose members work toward individual outcomes (diplomas).  
Student cohorts as communities of connection necessarily attend more to individuals than 
to the community itself.  How are we to understand parish groups similarly gathered 
under common goals and enjoying mutual support, but whose outcomes are as much 
corporate as individual?  How do we understand the cognitive dynamics of 
developmentally diverse groups where ―collective‖ goals fuse with ―corporate‖ 
outcomes, where the implications of conflict are significantly greater, and where a single 
outcome (parish closure for example) impacts every member within the community 
equally?   
Obviously a parish or parish group is a different kind of community than a student 
cohort.  In the case of a parish, it is a community enjoying legal status in civil law, 
juridical ―personhood‖ in canon law, and is understood by its members as having a 
particular character or identity or ecclesial flavor.  While parishes are clearly made up of 
their members, all of these descriptions (and there are many more) understand the parish 
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as an organization, as an organic whole, that is more than the sum of its membership.  
Are there developmental features to the ―organic parish‖ as a whole or to groups as a 
whole? 
 
William Torbert’s Action Inquiry as a Model for Organizational Development 
 
William Torbert‘s developmentally sensitive approach to action research may 
shed some light on the question of how to construe the cognitive development of 
intentional groups.
15
  Though there are different varieties of action research (Reason & 
Bradbury 2002), each shares three basic elements: research, participation and action.  
Professional researcher and participants are co-researchers in the process of knowledge 
creation.  Participation therefore assumes that ownership of knowledge belongs to the 
participants as much as it does the researcher, and that together they are co-generators of 
knowledge.  ―AR is a participatory process in which everyone involved takes some 
responsibility‖ (Greenwood & Levin 1998, 7).  Action assumes the goal of changing the 
current situation of the community or group toward greater liberation and participation.  
In a context facing or requiring change, action research provides a framework for 
people and organizations to inquire into the concerns and issues their unique, local 
situation faces.  From the standpoint of the professional researcher, Peter Reason states 
                                                 
15 Kegan treats Torbert‘s earlier work in some detail in, Evolving Self (1982), and twice references it in, In 
Over Our Heads (1994).  ―One of the more thoughtful students of organizations, I think, has been William 
Torbert, whose books speak in an uncommon blend of candid self-disclosure and scholarly rigor‖ (Kegan, 
1982, 244).  Kegan is appreciative of Torbert‘s description of ―a qualitative evolution in the development 
of an organization‖ (244).  Later, Kegan states, ―Torbert‘s theoretical approach to the study of work and 
management makes explicit use of subject-object theory‖ (1994, 197) and ―explicitly incorporates a 
constructive developmental perspective‖ (1994, 321) 
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that ―there are two faces to action research: the practical question of how do we engage 
with this group of people in the service of doing things better; and the utopian project of 
helping bring forth a very different kind of world‖ (Reason 2003).  From the standpoint 
of organizations and their leaders, Torbert states that ―Action inquiry is a way of 
simultaneously conducting action and inquiry as a disciplined leadership practice that 
increases the wider effectiveness of our actions.  Such actions help individuals, teams, 
organizations, and still larger institutions become more capable of self-transformation 
and thus more creative, more aware, more just, and more sustainable‖ (Torbert 2004, 1).   
In Torbert‘s rich theory of inquiry and action there are many features that space 
does not allow me to develop.  What I highlight here are the specifically developmental 
features of Torbert‘s action inquiry as they relate to organizations.  Torbert fully 
developed his understanding of individual development in The Power of Balance (1991) 
and then applied it to organizations in Action Inquiry (2004).  What Kegan calls orders of 
consciousness, Torbert calls action-logics, which range from pre-conventional 
(impulsive, opportunist – Kegan‘s second order), conventional (diplomat, expert, 
achiever – third order), to post conventional (individualist, strategist – fourth order; 
alchemist/ironist – fifth order).  The characteristics of each action-logic are similar 
enough to constructive-developmental theory that they do not require repeating here.  
Torbert argues that individual action-logics correspond to the evolution of business 
corporations.  His ―Organizational Developmental Action-Logics‖ also include, pre-
conventional, conventional, and post-conventional stages of growth.  My purposes here, 
again, are not to repeat the different characteristics of each corporate action-logic, but to 
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inquire how his theory understands developing organizations.  The goal of organizational 
transformation according to Torbert‘s action inquiry is to become a ―learning 
organization‖ by which he means achieving a post-conventional stage in which the 
organization intentionally assists individual transformation and the ongoing 
transformation of teams, divisions and partnerships (122).  Organizational development 
―is more fragile than personal transformation‖ because a corporation‘s board may oust 
the senior management.  ―In such cases, the governing action-logic of the organization 
may regress virtually overnight‖ (122).   
Torbert makes a specific analogical connection between individual and corporate 
action-logics.  Organizational development is understood ―as a sequence of transforming 
action-logics, analogous to personal development‖ (124).  What this means for a given 
corporation is its evolving capacity to engage in inquiry and action in all the 
organizational functions of visioning, strategizing, performing, and assessing.  Torbert 
applies the analogy by stating that in his and his associates‘ description of early action-
logics (opportunist, diplomat, expert), ―we were describing not children in the normal 
process of development but, rather, adults in organizations who are still motivated by 
relatively early action-logics… By contrast, when we discuss organizations at these three 
early action-logics… we describe them in their natural developmental process (i.e., in 
their ‗childhood‘), so the positive attributes of each action-logic will be more obvious 
than its shortcomings‖ (125).   
In this use of analogy (the development of children and adults, is analogous to the 
development of organizations), organizations are described as evolving from one stage to 
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the next, like individuals, and are therefore developmentally uniform, or cognitively 
homogenous, at each stage.  The key contribution of Torbert‘s work is that it provides a 
helpful framework for describing and analyzing the development of organizations as 
organizations toward increasing cognitive complexity.  The present study adds to this 
body of work by positing that each ―stage‖ of an organization‘s development is made up 
individuals within multiple orders of mental complexity, and that the movement, or 
growth is connected to interaction and conflict between and among them.     
Torbert‘s description of organizations as moving sequentially along a 
developmental trajectory of increasingly complex action-logics inevitably portrays them 
as cognitively homogeneous at each stage rather than as hetero-cognitively complex.  It 
obscures the fact that an organization is also made up of members who likely organize 
meaning at two, three and perhaps four different orders of mental complexity; it makes 
organizational development over-dependent on and over-determined by senior 
management; and it assumes that organizations as developmental structures are less 
robust than perhaps they are.  While the goal of action inquiry is to create just and 
sustainable organizations that practice integrity and mutuality with their own 
stakeholders, but also with the broader social and natural worlds, more research needs to 
be done on how the diversity and interaction the of action-logics of its members are a 
constitutive activity of the organization itself. 
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A New Understanding of Evolving Groups  
 
In its analysis of Kegan‘s and Drago-Severson‘s constructive developmental 
theory, and Torbert‘s theory of organizational development, the previous section left 
several questions unresolved.  On the one hand, the groups I am concerned with are not 
simply gatherings of individuals sharing common goals, as in the case of the Polaroid 
study, whose ―product‖ is specific to the individual.  This approach uses constructive 
developmental theory in an educational cohort setting in service to better understanding 
the development of individuals, not the cohort as a group.  On the other hand, groups are 
not well understood by construing them as ―individuals,‖ an approach which directly 
applies developmental theory designed to understand individual growth; one that gives 
the appearance of turning organizations into individuals in order to better inhabit a theory 
of individual development.   Below, I define what a group is within the framework of this 
study, and then propose a constructive developmental hermeneutic for understanding 
groups as complex, dynamic, and evolving.  In this way, I argue that particular kinds of 
groups are more complex than a gathering together of individuals, and are more diverse 
than is accounted for in models that construe them as cognitively homogeneous. 
Definition of a Group.   
In this dissertation, a ―group‖ is made up of individual meaning makers operating 
from different developmental orientations within an intentional community.  It is 
gathered and authorized with a specific mandate, collaborating toward a common set of 
goals on behalf of the larger community of which they are a part.  Its processes include 
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knowledge production that can be expressed in texts.  It is a gathering in which normative 
communication among group members and between group and leaders is open and 
ongoing.  An intentional group that is or becomes a meaning making community is likely 
to exist over time, has a mechanism of boundary management and limit setting, some 
means of ―remembering‖, and at least a minimal continuity of membership across time.   
A group with no social or communal mandate beyond the edification of the 
individuals present, for example a Bible study in a Catholic parish, while producing 
knowledge within a small community of learners, nevertheless does not represent the 
congregation, does not speak or act on its behalf.  Nor does it usually articulate and enact 
its knowledge production in official texts.  As a group it is therefore less likely to 
demonstrate a complex epistemological structure than, say, a parish Pastoral Council or 
board of directors which is charged with particular responsibilities to produce knowledge 
(a pastoral vision, for example) and do something with the knowledge it produces on 
behalf of the community (for example, authorize and hold accountable other bodies – 
―commissions‖ – to organize ministerial and missioning strategies for carrying out the 
vision).  The key word is demonstrate; the structure that is likely present needs also to be 
measurable in some way.  In the model I develop here, a Bible group, since it typically 
produces no group texts, and does not formally interact with other governing bodies 
within and without the parish, lacks a ready means to discern the structures of mental 
complexity that are certainly present.  It is in the intersection of the knowing and doing of 
a group, how it understands, and what it does with what it understands, that is of interest 
here. 
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Groups as Complex, Dynamic, and Evolving: A Brief Look at Method.   
Intentional groups are complex in that they are made up of a diversity of orders of 
consciousness, and are dynamic in that change and growth is a factor of a dialectic 
between different orders of mental complexity.  Groups are also developmental in that 
they evolve in the direction of increasing complexity of consciousness through a 
succession of ―eras‖ each of which possesses a distinct character determined by the 
meaning making composite of the group.  In chapter six I more adequately support the 
claims I make here when I discuss the contemporary case study, however, it may be 
helpful to briefly discuss the method employed in the analysis of the groups of the 
present study.  My approach has been to adapt the guidelines for interpreting subject-
object data from A Guide to the Subject-Object Interview (Lahey et al. 1988) from 
individuals to groups.  In doing so, I score the groups from each of the five events from 
1994-2004 using the threefold procedure of analysis consisting of structural, behavioral, 
and developmental analysis.  Structural analysis notes the presence of different orders of 
mental complexity within lay produced documents and tentatively scores documents 
according to the strength of each epistemological structure present.  Behavioral analysis 
examines the group‘s response/reaction to the given crisis it was facing, with special 
attention to how its members experienced the group‘s suspension after each event, 
asking, a) to what did participants return, and b) into what did they transform?  
Developmental analysis examines the evolution of the groups over time looking for 
development in four areas: a) movement from solution proposing to problem posing 
(Freire 1970); b) changes in what the group could or could not take a perspective on; c) 
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changes in responsibility taking – who or what they were/were not responsible to/for; d) 
changes in the group‘s response to authority. 
A First Approximation at Understanding Groups as Complex, Dynamic, and Evolving.   
Setting aside for now the question of group dynamism, one way to understand a 
group‘s evolving complexity, or the presence of meaning making structures within 
groups, is to look at how it puts together a particularly challenging set of experiences.  
For example, after the 1994 restructuring initiative, the two parishes of this study, 
formerly separate parishes each with its own pastor, finance and pastoral councils, were 
instructed to merge by the bishop who, in 1996 installed one priest for both communities.  
The community‘s response to the merger though initially negative, did not include a 
challenge to the bishop‘s decision, even though the parishes had requested two years 
earlier (the 1994 process) a different parish configuration than what the bishop gave 
them.  Lay cooperation in the process was framed by study participants as an attempt to 
do what they believed was necessary to maintain parish viability in the face of a 
hierarchy with the power to close them.  This entailed holding the tension between 
cooperating with an unwelcomed merger while at the same time attempting to preserve 
each community‘s distinct character and identity.   
As they struggled in the following five years to bring the two communities 
together in a new kind of unity – an effort that led to a net increase in the number of 
ministerial and missionary activities the parishes engaged in – they began to believe that 
their experience of merging was unusual, even exemplary, and earned them a kind of 
perdurability, or right to ongoing existence as parishes.  The traumatic feelings of loss 
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and confusion when it was discovered in the 2001 initiative that the smaller of the 
communities was on a list of parishes proposed to be closed or sold led participants in the 
group gathered at the time to express their perception that they had done all the right 
things to stave off this eventuality in an era of priest shortages, that the hierarchy was 
somehow ―not playing by the rules‖ when it proposed to close and sell the smaller parish, 
and that such a proposal represented a serious breech in appropriate parish-diocese 
relations.     
In Kegan‘s framework, this response might be second order if the feelings 
expressed were derived from a fear of what the hierarchy could do to them if they didn‘t 
cooperate in the merger (i.e., refuse to provide them priests in the future, or formally 
suppress them – a canonical term for permanently closing the parish); or if their 
cooperation derived from an understanding of an implied bargain, that doing so would 
serve their interest in staying open and, having done so, they would thereupon get what 
they wanted from a hierarchy that existed to meet their needs.  If this is so, it is 
suggestive of a group organized around second order capacities; that is, organized around 
its own needs and interests, unable as a group to subordinate these on behalf of their 
relationship to the larger Catholic community (the needs of other parishes or the diocese).   
The response might be third order if the feelings about parish viability and 
sustainability were derived from other authority figures such as the pastor; if their playing 
by the rules was out of a felt expectation that it would win hierarchical approval; if their 
offense-taking was derived from a sense of loss at the perceived breach of an implied 
relationship between the parish and diocese; and, moreover, if the group was able to hold 
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its own point of view simultaneously with the point of view of the hierarchy.  This would 
then suggest a group organized around third order capacities.  That is, needs and interests 
no longer rule, but the group is embedded in the approval and expectations of authority 
inside and outside the group such as the pastor, bishop or chancery officials.   
The response might be fourth order if the feelings of concern over the proposal to 
close or sell the smaller of the parishes were derived from a sense of violation of how 
they had come to see themselves as a community; a sense of violation of who they had 
become as a self-constructed community in the five years post-merger (1996-2001); and 
if their participation and collaboration was understood by them as co-creating with the 
hierarchy a new and viable community that assumed a self-determining or governing role 
for themselves – one violated by the hierarchy‘s unilateral proposal in 2001. This would 
then suggest a group functioning at or near fourth order.   
In fact, all three orders of mental complexity are evident in the data (the archival 
material produced by the group in response to possible parish closure).  However, 
determining the relative strength of the presence of each order of mental complexity, or at 
least the dominant order, requires both structural and behavioral analyses – a search for 
both linguistic and non-linguist evidence of meaning making.  In this way we are able to 
differentiate between what a group espouses and what it actually does or does not do.  
For example, all of the groups from 1994-2004 gathered and organized around some 
action on the part of the hierarchy; action that generated strong negative responses from 
parishioners which, in turn, morphed into documents articulating the knowledge 
produced through the group process.  And yet, except for the 2004 gathering, groups 
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generally returned to status quo at the close of each initiative as measured by the fact that 
they did not protest their suspension, even when in the group documents they demanded 
new processes and mechanisms to preserve or implement what they had learned.  The lay 
quiescence after such events represents a non-verbal, epistemologically significant 
communication, and suggests both a concern that pushing too hard could generate further 
negative consequences; and suggests as well the presence of a pervasive trust in or 
loyalty toward pastors and bishops, or a return to trust when overtures, even slight 
overtures, were made by the hierarchy in response to parishioner demands.  One can infer 
from this a dominant third order base in many of the groups with a subdominant second 
order constituency.  While there were likely members who were fourth order, and exerted 
influence on the group, the overwhelming meaning making logic for most of the groups 
was third order with a less influential, but strong, second order.
16
  Prior to 2004, 
loyalty/trust is the general ground or structure of the group‘s knowing.  A value-generator 
working in the group that self-consciously relativized loyalty to a vision of 
parish/church/laity was not weighty enough to draw the group into its orbit.  There is no 
effective visioning capacity that not only preserves inter-ecclesial relationships but does 
so on behalf of a claimed identity of who they are as a community, a capacity that 
regulates and subordinates trust to a ―theory of trust.‖  The group‘s role creating, goal 
producing, boundary managing and limit setting functions were therefore ceded to the 
pastor and the hierarchy.  
                                                 
16 From the perspective of the dominant cognitive constituency, this can be expressed in a balancing 
feedback loop: Lay parishioner (LP) trust > hierarchy (H) action > LP lose trust > LP challenge H > H 
responds > LP return to trust.  This feedback loop operated as long as both parishes remained open, or until 
the group began to construct and act on its own vision of church (then a reinforcing feedback loop emerged 
in which the group resisted suspension and overtly challenged the hierarchy as in the 2004 group). 
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Thus, when a fourth order constituency puts forth demands for lay assemblies in a 
self-shepherding bid to partner with the hierarchy in the governing of the parish and 
diocese, or calls for stronger parish Pastoral Councils, financial accountability and two-
way communication in service to regulating relationships between laity, clergy and 
hierarchy, third order recognizes and supports these same demands, but from a horizon 
bounded by the ecclesio-psychological surround.  Third order offers its support on behalf 
of the emerging group consensus (knowing what it wants when others express what they 
want), on behalf of preserving relationships within the parish (against the threat of parish 
closures) and in service to re-authorizing religious leaders who have let them down.
17
  
When the diocese acknowledged parishioner contribution to the 1994 initiative, when it 
dropped its 2001 proposal to close one of the parishes after vociferous opposition, when 
the bishop responded in a letter to the parishes in 2002 addressing some of the 
parishioner concerns about his handling of the sex abuse crisis, third order goal‘s were 
largely met by such responses – trust was reestablished – and they saw little reason to 
protest the group‘s suspension.  The status quo was reaffirmed.  They were able to go 
along with calls for lay assemblies, accountability and communication, not from self-
shepherding ground, but because it provided a means to affirm and reaffirm their 
relationship with and trust in the very authorities they felt compelled to challenge in these 
instances.  Third order goals were met even as fourth order goals were not (no lay 
                                                 
17 Re-authorizing is not self-authorizing (fourth order).  A group dominated by third order is not simply 
held captive to authority, but in the dialectic between this constituency and leaders, third order unwittingly 
bequeaths to authority figures or tradition the power to tell them who they are.  It is other-authored, but also 
authorizing, not of self, but of its own mentors and leaders, empowering them with the capacity to organize 
their energy and lead.  The re-authorizing in this case is a return to trust once bishops or chancery officials 
responded by giving at least some attention to their concerns. 
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assemblies, weak Pastoral Councils, no episcopal accountability, no multi-directional 
communication).   
What of second order‘s presence?  Second order bought into the group‘s overall 
goals, but in service to their own needs and interests rather than in service to intra-parish 
and inter-parish relationships.  Leaders construed as extrinsic sources of needs-meeting 
are opportunistically engaged (as opposed to third order which, having internalized 
authority, is able to feel and respond to the claims of others – they internally matter – 
including and especially the perceived expectations of leaders).  The hierarchy for this 
cognitive constituency is that which has the power to save or close a parish; it is 
simultaneously a source of needs-meeting and a source that can render harm.  The 
fundamental need of this order of consciousness in this threatening context is regular 
Eucharist and parishes available to provide it (in that order).  If they perceive that the 
hierarchy‘s response (and their participation) is one that, a) keeps available the Eucharist, 
and b) renders no harm, then they would likely return to the status quo and lose interest in 
the group.
18
  This, in turn, would add weight to third order‘s decision to acquiesce to the 
group‘s suspension, further weakening the impact of four‘s complaint that not much, in 
                                                 
18 This is not to say that other cognitive constituencies do not also ―need‖ the Eucharist.  Embedded in 
needs, an individual operating with second order complexity might tend to view the Eucharist exclusively 
as the source or means of salvation.  The third order mind ―holds‖ needs and interests, needs which are 
subordinated to and relativized by interpersonal mutuality.  Because of this increased mental capacity one 
might view the Eucharist also as the critical means for establishing and maintaining one‘s relationship with 
God and one‘s relationship with the community – that the Eucharist establishes an authoritative community 
of salvation to which one owes one‘s loyalty and from which one draws one‘s values and beliefs.  An 
individual operating with a fourth order complexity might view the Eucharist as a participation in the 
mystery of Jesus; as an end toward which one moves in the enactment of solidarity with Jesus who cared 
for poor and oppressed persons; an internally authored vision and value generating capacity able to 
organize relationships and direct action toward that vision.  Therefore the Eucharist may be construed as a 
ritual act of solidarity with Jesus whose words and hands and feet become incarnate in the world through 
one‘s own utterances for, holding of, and journeying with the other. 
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fact, had been gained when measured against the goals of giving jurisdiction to a lay 
constituency within the parishes they build, maintain, and support. 
 A very significant change for group development was the slow but continual rise 
of a fourth order constituency which moved from present but not influential (2001), to 
influential but not determinative (2002, 2003), to determinative but not dominant (2004) 
and that this rise coincided with a slow decline in a second order constituency.  How this 
may have occurred is a question for chapter five when we take up the dialectic between 
different orders of mental complexity.  For now the above example shows possible new 
ways for understanding complex and evolving groups, and suggests the idea that why 
groups do what they do is a question of how different developmental constituencies 
within them make meaning.  
 
Conclusion: Challenges in Theory Adaptation 
 
We are left with many challenges in adapting constructive developmental theory 
to groups.  The first has to do with the theory‘s assertion that each successive order of 
consciousness transcends and includes the former order of consciousness.  While the 
transcending is clear enough, it is not clear how the former is included in the new form.  
Lonergan solves this, as we will see in chapters four and five, by allowing persons who 
have achieved self appropriation to move among what he calls the different cognitive 
contexts; a solution that has its own challenges.  If the question is one of retreating or 
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reverting to earlier orders of mental complexity, then Kegan powerfully and convincingly 
rejects this (1994, 371, n. 26).   
For example, retreating to former behaviors is not an indication of a retreat to an 
earlier meaning making system.  Piaget shares an endlessly quoted example of this.  A 
preschool child can be shown two identical beakers that hold the same amount of liquid, 
and two empty beakers, one is tall and thin and the other short and wide.  Water can be 
poured from the two beakers, one into the short one and the other into the tall one. When 
asked what beaker holds the most liquid, a three-five year old child invariably answers, 
―the tall one‖ without noticing the fact that the quantity of the liquid didn‘t change, only 
its appearance.  She is embedded in her perceptions – the world is as she perceives it to 
be (which can lead to meltdowns when the world keeps showing up differently than her 
perceptions).  But once the child gets that the liquid quantity doesn‘t change, around age 
6-8, she can never not get it! She has entered a new way of making meaning (second 
order) and now understands that objects in the world have their own qualities apart from 
one‘s perception of them; she now experiences what Kegan calls ―durable category,‖ that 
things retain their somethingness across change.  She can‘t go back to not getting this.  
She cannot not understand that Mommy in a costume and funny makeup is still Mommy 
(Mommy retains momminess across change) where before, Mommy in a costume was 
someone else.  The older child, however, can make mistakes that have the appearance of 
a mental retreat, say a 10 year old temporarily fooled by a particularly good makeup job 
by Mommy. But being fooled is not retreating to ―world equals my perception of world‖ 
way of making meaning. 
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In the same way, once an adult finally gets, for example, that their sense of self-
value is constructed internally, that who they are is not a matter of who they are with, that 
identity is self-authored and not simply a given that is given to them by persons, 
authorities, peers and traditions, then this person can never not get it.  This person 
remains in relation to persons, peers, authorities and traditions, but in a new way that no 
longer expects others to tell him who he is.  This person, having achieved some degree of 
psychological distance from others might say, ―I may be startled by an exchange that 
misfires and walk away with hurt feelings.  But that‘s all it is.  My feelings are my 
feelings and do not have their source in the actions of others.  The experience did not call 
my sense of self into question because I no longer seek my self in the face of others and 
therefore do not give blanket ‗permission‘ to others to fill up my sense of who I am.  My 
feelings about who I am have their origins in whether or not I am living up to the self I 
am struggling to become.‖  To use Kegan‘s wording, I now have relationships rather than 
being had by them because I have a relationship with my relationships.  The choices of 
others as they relate to me are about how they are, not who I am.  This internal, self 
authorship does not mean separation from others; it means I can now allow others to be 
more who they are rather than agents who fill up who I am.   
But does ―never not getting it‖ mean forgetting one‘s earlier orders of mental 
complexity?  While this question may not be relevant in constructive developmental 
theory and its focus on individuals, it is crucial when investigating group development 
since persons operating from many orders of mental complexity are likely present.  The 
―including‖ may be as important as the ―transcending‖ because of the tendency to forget 
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one‘s earlier structures of knowing.  This calls forth a particular developmentally attuned 
pedagogical approach that foregrounds not only multiple structures of knowing, but also 
foregrounds how these structures differently experience intentional groups and, further, 
how groups can be organized to better enlist the participation of members at different 
orders of mental complexity.   
This challenge leads to the second challenge about the how of change.  The 
explicit inclusion together with transcending is important because the relations among 
the members in developmentally diverse groups is constituted by and grounded in the 
varying meaning making structures that are the members of the group.  As I argue later, 
the how of transformation for the individual may have more to do with her presence in 
complex (cognitively diverse), dynamic (conflicting), and evolving (developmentally 
moving) communities with whose members she is in relationship, than with any other 
intrapersonal, individually understood cognitive factor.  Considering for a moment, not 
individuals, but cognitive constituencies (for example, subgroups of second, third, and 
fourth order members), what a given constituency has transcended constitutes its relation 
to a more complex constituency, and what it includes constitutes its relation to a less 
complex constituency. Transcending may be understood as intelligibly proceeding from 
that upon which it depends; it is a dependency, however, that does not subordinate what 
has proceeded to that from which it proceeded, as in third subordinated to second, 
because the procession is not causal.  In other words, third order depends on second order 
from which it proceeds; second order is the ground, but one that, in the transcending, is 
regrounded in a more complex system.  At the same time, that which is transcended is 
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neither discarded nor found defective; rather included in a more comprehensive and 
universal framework or context.  Third order is not possible apart from a prior evolving 
second order consciousness; a consciousness that, in individuals, does not cause third 
order to be.  For groups as defined here, then, the transcending can be understood as the 
differentiation and the inclusion can be understood as the relation.  It is the argument here 
that subject-object ―cross breeds‖ in complex, dynamic, and evolving groups, but always 
in the direction of increasing complexity.  A third order constituency transcends a second 
order constituency by way of subject, but includes it by way of object.  Its real relation to 
second order is grounded in what it has included, or holds as object; which is 
simultaneously that which second order is subject to. 
These epistemological relations are also correlated to each other as in second to 
fourth and fourth to second; third to fourth and fourth to third, etc.  Moreover, in the 
context of intentional groups with attention on the developmental diversity, because the 
correlation is directed, the individuals‘ orders of consciousness are also coordinated to 
each other.  That is, they are mutually attracted to each other, but in different ways.  The 
relation, correlation and coordination has to do not only with the subject-object relation 
between each constituency, but also with how each cognitive constituency relates to the 
whole group.  Fourth order includes the worlds of second and third, or holds them; it 
therefore does not confuse members within these cognitive constituencies with itself.  On 
the question of authority, for example, second order confuses leaders with its own needs 
and interests and construes them as suppliers of these same needs and interests – leaders, 
 83 
institutions, even the community, do not yet have their ―own integrity.‖  Second order 
does not relate to third and fourth as these relate to it.   
Another way cognitive constituencies in groups are related and correlated is 
through the two orienting principles: communion and agency.  Second order‘s over-
independence is resonant with fourth order‘s autonomy – that is, both experience agency 
(in different ways) as a fundamental yearning.  Third and fifth orders experience 
communion as its fundamental yearning.  Third order may relate to second and fourth as 
if they are the same, and second and fourth may relate to third as if it is ―other.‖  The 
relation, correlation, and coordination of the various cognitive constituencies can be 
observed in the groups studied in this dissertation (chapter six). 
A third challenge involves coming to terms with the large number of adults 
making meaning at second order of consciousness.  Subject-object theory does not 
distinguish between the meaning making of an adult and a child at second order of 
consciousness.  If there is no qualitative difference in degree of mental complexity, is 
there nevertheless a difference in kind?  When imperial, second order, adults join groups 
how do they interact with third order or fourth order members?  What is their relationship 
to leaders who may be second, third, or fourth order consciousness?  What is the 
relationship between a second order constituency and a dominant third order 
constituency?  Bernard Lonergan‘s work on what he calls common sense as a specialized 
way of knowing for many adults will shed light on these questions. 
A final challenge is how to understanding holding environments in light of 
complex and dynamic groups?  Kegan‘s constructive-developmental theory directs 
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attention to the individual and his or her transformational growth; when attending to 
social, communal dimensions of human be-ing, it is in service, not so much to 
community growth, but to the growth of the individual.  It is difficult therefore to answer 
questions about how a holding environment holds, not individuals, but multiple orders of 
mental complexity.  Moreover, who or what is doing the holding when it is a 
developmentally diverse community needing to be held?  What are the leadership tasks 
for culturing such groups?  How are leaders to construe conflict within the group and 
between the local group and broader institution as in the case of a parish and diocese?   
For now, we are left with these questions and with the following suggestion: groups 
themselves may be capable of providing some of their own ―holding‖, particularly in 
communities whose institutional structure and leaders inadequately ―culture‖ multiple 
orders of mental complexity. 
The framework for a constructive developmental hermeneutic of groups that I 
develop in this dissertation has implications for examining groups in different 
contemporary contexts and in different periods of human history.  In the next chapter we 
will look at the first century CE Corinthian community as a case study employing a 
constructive developmental hermeneutic of Paul‘s two letters.  Doing so sheds light on 
some of the above challenges. 
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Chapter Three: Constructive-Developmental Hermeneutics: A Case Study of the 
Complexity Consciousness of the Corinthian Church  
 
The previous chapter raised questions about the cognitive make up of both 
cultures and intentional groups.  If communities are dominated by a particular culture of 
mind, how can one investigate what is going on ―beneath‖ that mind, as in orders of 
consciousness that are less complex?  How can one understand what is going on ―above‖ 
it?  And, most importantly, what is the dynamic between the various orders of 
consciousness in the evolution of the culture?  A constructive developmental hermeneutic 
for describing and analyzing various cultural and historical groups is needed to address 
these challenges; one that is able to assess the levels of complexity of communities and 
compare these with the complexity of the curriculum toward which their leaders educate 
them.  In this chapter, a developmentally attuned biblical hermeneutic is proposed that 
sheds new light on a longstanding dispute within New Testament studies over the source 
of the conflicts within the Corinthian community: were they caused by heterodox 
Christian teachers, by external social pressures on the community, by adaptation of 
established first century norms, or a consequence of economic divisions between those 
who made up the community?  A constructive developmental interpretive theory will 
serve as a framework for understanding this complex and dynamic community and the 
factors that contributed to the tensions so evident in Paul‘s correspondences.  
This chapter places the Corinthian Christian community within a first century 
socio-cultural context heavily influenced by the presence of voluntary associations and 
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Greco-Roman religious practices.  It does so in order to better support claims about the 
orders of mental complexity that could have been operating in the first century CE.  What 
this chapter demonstrates is that ―convention‖ and ―tradition‖ are relative terms as used 
in constructive-developmental theory since human development is dominated by different 
―cultures of mind‖ each of which become the ―convention‖ of a particular period and 
location.  The chapter also addresses Kegan‘s ―in over our heads‖ phenomenon by 
evaluating the cognitive complexity of Paul‘s gospel and comparing it to the 
community‘s dominant order of mental complexity.  This project requires careful 
attention not only to New Testament scholarship, but also to shifts in Greco-Roman 
studies away from the literary sources produced by elites to neglected sources of data 
about ancient society including such archaeological artifacts as statuary, civic monuments 
and epigraphy.  This line of investigation foregrounds the social, economic and cultural 
experiences of non-elites comparable to Paul and the members of the Corinthian 
community.    
 
The Religious and Social Context: Greco-Roman Piety and Voluntary Associations 
 
Roman “Religion” As a Way of Knowing 
 
Beginning with a brief examination of Roman religious practices in a case study 
of the Corinthian Christian community in the Greek east is appropriate for two reasons.  
First, Corinth was a heavily romanized seat of government for southern Greece whose 
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religious and social practices would have likely influenced Corinthian residents attracted 
to Paul‘s preaching.  Having been leveled by the Romans in 146 BCE, the city was 
refounded one hundred years later by Julius Caesar in 44 BCE shortly before his 
assassination.  Caesar repopulated the new colony with Roman freedmen, approximately 
19% of whom were wealthy and politically successful (Clarke 2000, 38); the rest were 
among the urban poor.  When Paul arrived one hundred years later, it was still a fairly 
young, very Roman city, made up of Romans, Greeks and Jews.  Second, as the Republic 
gave way to Empire one of the many directions the evolution of Roman religious 
practices took was the development of the imperial cult, or emperor worship.  Worship of 
the imperial gods, however, was not a radical development in the kind of religion 
practiced by the populace.  Robert Turcan states: ―Whatever may have been said, the 
apparent innovations of the imperial cult – at least in part – descended directly from the 
mos maiorum [religious practices of the Roman ancestors]‖ (Turcan, 2000, p. 135). 
Philip A. Harland (2003) argues that the imperial gods were prominent features of 
voluntary associations, often worshiped along side of the group‘s divine patron (such as 
Jupiter or Minerva).  This becomes significant because I argue that the development of 
Roman religious practices from the Republic to the Empire
19
 did not represent a 
qualitative development, but a simple extension of the logic that underlies both.  The 
Corinthian Christians‘ experiences within voluntary associations was not only a likely 
source of the disputes between the community and Paul, as others have argued (Chester 
2003), but also that these experiences, which included worshipping favored local deities 
                                                 
19 The posthumous deification of Julius Caesar, a fact that made his son, Augustus a son of a god (Turcan, 
134-135) legitimated the practice of emperors receiving sacrifices, prayers and other forms of worship. 
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(probably Isis in Corinth) and the imperial gods, may shed light on the complexity of 
mind possessed by the Corinthians who struggled with Paul‘s unusual expectations.   
Roman Religious Practices 
To ask, ―What is your Religion?‖ of a citizen of the city of Rome in antiquity 
would likely confuse the recipient since the ―religious dimension‖ of his life was 
undifferentiated and therefore indistinguishable from every other aspect of life.  The 
terms ―religion‖ and ―dimension‖ are abstractions from a concrete, lived reality that are 
helpful to moderns when engaging in the tasks of inquiry and conceptualization.  The 
lived reality in ancient Rome was saturated with the presence of the gods whose 
ubiquitous communications through signs could be interpreted and exploited with the 
right ritual formulas.  The ―doing‖ of religion therefore was never separated from the 
activities of daily life for everyone from the highest magistrate to the peasant farmer.
20
  
Robert Turcan, professor of Roman history at the Sorbonne, states, ―There was really no 
such thing as Roman religion… Ancient Rome knew about religious procedures or, 
rather, processes and formulas required in any given circumstance to ensure the 
                                                 
20 Citing Servilius‘s (Serv.) commentaries on Virgil‘s Georgics (G.), and Augustine‘s (Aug.)  City of God 
(CG.), Robert Turcan writes: ―Every place had its Genius (genius loci) or its own god. Plains were 
attributed to Rusina, hilly crests to the god Jugatinus, hills to Collatina and valleys to Vallonia (Aug. CG, 4, 
8)… Here again, the Roman sense of operational realism made use of the indigitamenta [a code of prayers 
appropriate to the various divine powers]; one therefore had to pray to Sterculinius for annual manure, 
Vervactor for turning over fallow land, Redarator for the second ploughing. Imporcitor for the third, 
Obarator for a new turning of the soil. Occator for harrowing, Sarritor for weeding, Seia for the 
germination of seed, Segetia for the corn to grow, Nodutus for the stem to have nodes, Volutina for the 
sheath of the corn-ear, Patellana for it to open, Hostilina for the corn to be of the same height (to make 
harvesting easier), Lacturnus for the ears to be milky, Runcina for killing weeds, Matuta for the ripening, 
Messia for the harvesting, Convector for loading, Noduterensis for threshing, Condito for garnering, even 
Promitor for taking the grain from the granary, but chiefly Tutilina for preserving it (Aug., CG., 4, 8; Serv., 
G, 1, 21).  Even this list is by no means exhaustive‖ (Turcan 2001, p. 38).  A different, equally elaborate, 
ritual protocol was called for with regard to marriage, conception, pregnancy, labor, lactation, weaning, 
rearing, educating, etc. (Turcan, 18-21). 
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effectiveness of divine assistance‖ (2001, 2).  Paraphrasing the ―self-interested realism‖ 
of the ancient Roman mind, Turcan writes, ―What good are religious ceremonies?  To 
rescue us from danger… We venerate the gods in order to gain some advantage from 
them‖ (2).  This veneration meant that ―[e]very instance of the domestic day was thus 
governed by a ritual that was still observed in certain rural and even urban circles in the 
imperial era‖ (15). 
Gods were useful, and sometimes dangerous; facts which required scrupulous 
attention to any form of divine communication such as prodigies (predictions or warnings 
noted in the flight or sound of birds, lightening strikes, light flashing on spears, or even 
an ox on the roof of a house).  When interpreting the meaning of a particularly baffling or 
alarming prodigy, Romans also had recourse to a collection of oracles in the Sibylline 
books, or they could simply consult the various priestly colleges (Turcan 2001, 6).  They 
were scrupulous (religio), but they were also pragmatic.  Every general, for example, 
took on campaign a coop of sacred chickens; if the hens ate vigorously and food fell from 
their beaks, it was a favorable sign.  In order to ensure the quality of the sign, however, 
food was withheld from the birds until the rituals were performed thus giving ―favor‖ a 
little help.  With regard to the Roman citizen: ―He was a man of action who played a 
close game with the gods‖ (7).  Divine communications could also be obtained by taking 
the auspices – sacrificing a particular animal in the right manner using the correct 
formulas, and then reading its entrails; if the victim‘s entrails were unfavorable in 
appearance, another victim was sacrificed, and so on. 
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There are many features to Roman religion that are striking in terms of its 
complexity.  One is the tit-for-tat reciprocity assumed in divine-human transactions.  
Thus a person could fear the god‘s power to bring disaster and, accordingly, make 
appropriate prayers and sacrifices, while at the same time feel little apparent compunction 
about desecrating a temple if the god failed to make good on the bargain.
21
  While such 
displays of violence were rare, the logic behind them was not.  Turcan observes: ―Roman 
religion was wrapped up with judiciary procedure: it was contractual, do ut des… If the 
deity, duly invoked and propitiated by a suitable sacrifice, granted the prayers of the 
supplicant, the latter could discharge his debt by keeping the promises he had made; but 
if the gods failed to keep those they were believed to have pledged, they could be treated 
as faithless betrayers, if need be‖ (4).  He calls the legalism and ritualism of the Romans, 
―opportunistic realism‖ (7) and ―operational realism‖ (38) that was above all results-
oriented; an ―inveterate pragmatism‖ that sought the gods‘ favor, ―to reassure them in 
their plans and back them in their actions‖ (11).   
Another feature is the plethora of rules, rule-making, and rule-qualifying that 
governed all ritual actions.  Not only could sacred hens be induced to produce appropriate 
signs genuinely believed and promptly acted on, but augurs themselves, when consulting 
the gods, had many procedures to increase the likelihood that important tasks of 
government and war would have the weight of divine approval.
22
  Augurs read signs from 
the sky that included the flight of birds and their cries, as well as signs of thunder and 
                                                 
21 Turcan cites the example of the death of the popular Germanicus, after which angry people rioted and 
knocked down altars and heads of the gods who, having been properly invoked, betrayed their end of the 
bargain. 
22 Augur has its root in augere which means to increase – thus their religious responsibility included 
reading certain signs in order to add divine gravitas or weight to human activity. 
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lightning.  None of this was random.  The augur marked out a portion of the sky 
(templum) as a consecrated space (effatum) and a time of observance; if a bird‘s flight or 
cry was troubling, he could ignore it by crying, non consulto (Turcan, 7, 54, 85).  At the 
same time, once the gods were consulted through the taking of the auspices the resultant 
action had to be carried out (or avoided if signs were inauspicious).  Here, ―traditions‖ 
are practices; they are ritual protocols handed down from the ancestors preserved and 
continued in the present for the practical purpose of maintaining and advancing the 
concrete glory of Rome.  They are not beliefs or values (abstract ideation) that draw out 
loyalty to their sources in a sacred tradition within which people enact their meaning.  
Rather, they are the sacred rules that, when adhered to and duly performed by the people 
(concrete instrumentalism or ―imperialism‖), enact not only the Roman state concretely 
understood, but also enact the state of the gods (as in disposition of the gods toward 
Rome).  Thus ―intentionality‖, an interior disposition of the person making supplications, 
would have been a moot point since the correct performance of the ritual was itself 
effective.
23
  Intentionality is projected onto the gods whose intentions, or dispositions, are 
effectively shaped and directed by human ritual.  What governs rules are not ideas and 
values and interior dispositions, but the needs and interests of a people embedded in the 
living narrative of Rome.
24
   
                                                 
23 The Roman Catholic notion of opus operatum, (―work worked‖ or ―work having been worked‖) carries 
the same belief that ritual actions are by their performance effective (marking grace‘s here/now presence), 
with the exception that the ministers of the action must intend the meaning of the actions.  For example, the 
co-ministers in marriage – the woman and the man – have to intend the meaning of Christian marriage in 
order for the bond, ritually enacted, to be ―effective‖ or sacramental. 
24 A Roman narrative that citizens were unable to reflect upon because they were embedded in it.  In 
Kegan‘s terms, they were subject to the narrative.  
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A final feature of Roman religion was a disciplined, even passionate piety in 
service to the city-state that was grounded in immediate, concrete results.  It was a 
religion that did not require or necessarily inspire hope,
25
 was not rooted in a mythology 
(even the gods lacked genealogies, unlike the Greek gods), and had no religious 
iconography (Turcan 2001, 12).  This low esteem for hope may be what lies behind 
Roman disdain for Jewish prophesy, which they labeled, superstitio.
26
  They at times 
respected Jewish religion for its great antiquity, but looked down their noses at its many 
peculiarities, prophesying a distant future high on the list.
27
  One interpreted prodigies, 
took the auspices, or consulted the Sibylline books
28
 not in order to remember or 
liturgically make present a sacred past, anticipate a triumphant future, or denounce a 
cruel and unjust present, but in order to direct immediate action toward outcomes 
favorable to the people of Rome and acceptable to the gods.  Jewish liturgical anamnesis, 
and apocalyptic and prophetic literatures, from the perspective of Romans, offered little 
in the way of practical, concrete, real-time direction; required waiting on the gods to 
bring about a future that nevertheless remained in doubt; and perhaps most troubling, 
linked the gods‘ favor not only to correct religious practices, but also to interior 
dispositions such as righteousness or justice, values that favored the weak and lowly and 
condemned advantage-seeking by the powerful that fell particularly hard on such 
                                                 
25 If hope is as Rahner defines it (1978) in Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of 
Christianity, the capacity to accept the uncontrollable, a decidedly post-second order definition, then hope 
was not something many Romans would have valued.  
26 See Dale Martin (2007), Inventing Superstition: From the Hippocratics to the Christians. 
27 For Roman views of the Jews, see Martin Goodman (2007), Rome and Jerusalem: The Clash of 
Civilizations; Peter Schaefer (2003), History of Jews in the Greco-Roman World: The Jews of Palestine 
from Alexander the Great to the Arab Conquest. 
28 For Jewish Sybilline books, see John Joseph Collins (1997), Seers, Sybils, and Sages in Hellenistic-
Roman Judaism.  See also, John Joseph Collins (2005), Jewish Cult and Hellenistic Culture: Essays on the 
Jewish Encounter with Hellenism and Roman Rule. 
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vulnerable populations.  Piety and immediate, concrete results are bound together in such 
a way that it was impossible, or nearly so, to imagine gods who could not be made to 
happen, gods who were relational and covenantal rather than merely functional; 
communicating gods whose utterances did not come on the flight of birds or the entrails 
of bulls; whose manifestations did not exist exclusively to serve immediate, local human 
interest; gods whose epiphanies were not simple affirmations of grand human projects, 
but revelations of a divine word and god‘s grand projects, human transformation one 
among them.  For Romans, ―It was always a matter of diverting threats from the heavens 
rather than humbly submitting to their effects‖ (6). 
Meaning Making Threshold Required in Roman Religious Practices   
Turcan offers his analysis of Roman practices using language remarkably similar 
to what constructive-developmentalists refer to as the simple reciprocity of concrete 
instrumentalism.  The ―you do for me and I‘ll do for you‖ logic of human and divine 
interaction, was a contractual rather than relational arrangement.  The concern about what 
the gods could concretely do to them in terms of today‘s plans, and pragmatic rule 
following and rule creating all suggest an imperial/instrumental order of mental 
complexity.  While the rigorous ritual scrupulosity of the Romans may have been 
unusual, it required no greater complexity of consciousness than that of Kegan‘s second 
order.  This is not to say that some were not beyond second order, but that the practice of 
religion likely emerged from and supported second order consciousness.  Romans 
constructed a religious world grounded in rules, inherited roles, the meeting of immediate 
needs, in simple reciprocity, and in concrete as opposed to abstract reasoning.  This 
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construction represents a complexity of consciousness, however, that was not 
qualitatively different from the broader Greco-Roman world, at least as experienced by 
non-elites.  Harland writes of that world:
29
 
Within the Greco-Roman context, we are dealing with a worldview and a way of 
life centered on the maintenance of fitting relations among human groups, 
benefactors, and the gods within the web of connections that constituted society 
and the cosmos.  To provide a working definition of ―religion‖ or piety in 
antiquity had to do with appropriately honoring gods and goddeses…in ways that 
ensured the safety and protection of human communities (Harland, 2003, p. 61). 
 
The client-patron system that governed human relationships may also have its 
roots in a socio-cultural order of mental complexity.  Andrew D. Clarke highlights the 
system of benefaction, or patronage, and its connection to honor and shame that 
permeated the Greco-Roman world: ―It should not be overlooked that patronage only 
functioned effectively in that society because it operated by means of the ubiquitous 
Mediterranean culture of honor and shame which was active at all levels of society, and 
not just at the more rarefied level of the elites‖ (2000, p. 60, emphasis original).  In an 
urban context, the system of benefaction required that only the wealthiest citizens could 
attain the highest local offices since many of the important financial burdens of cities 
were funded not by taxation, but by the patronage of unsalaried office holders.  They 
were expected to self-fund various projects from food procurement, to providing wood 
and oil for the baths, and funding for religious festivals and public games.  In return for 
their patronage, leading citizens acquired great honor that came in the form of increased 
social deference, statues, monuments and inscriptions dedicated to the magistrate, the 
                                                 
29 Here Harland is also critiquing the tendency among some scholars of antiquity to bring into their research 
modern notions of individualism, religion, and religious worship. 
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best seats at the games or the theatre, and not least, immunity from prosecution.  
Patronage should not be regarded as a modern form of philanthropy but as an advantage-
seeking, self-benefiting pursuit of honor (Clarke, 2000, p. 46).
30
  
Honor was a ―thing‖ one could possess; something that could increase through the 
performance of certain public acts, and diminish through the public acts of others (shame, 
humiliation, a public insult by a person of ―lesser‖ status).  In a manner similar to the 
contractual relationship experienced in the human-divine interaction, the honor or 
dignitas conferred by the recipients of patronage among the plebs would quickly dry up 
once the funds did; that is, when the source of the funds among the patricians ceased their 
benefaction, the honoring among the plebs likewise ceased (Clarke, 2000, p. 48; Harland, 
2003, pp. 97-101).  The honor-shame culture also existed among non-elites; in the many 
voluntary associations that proliferated throughout the empire, that culture thrived.  
Citizens and non-citizens could join various associations and guilds, and achieve status 
and a degree of honor that was otherwise denied them because of their class (plebs, as 
opposed to members of the senatorial, equestrian or decurion orders), or social standing 
(family, ethnicity, occupation, education), or their legal status (slaves, freedmen or free 
born; citizen, non-citizen).  Not only did its members compete for honors, but 
associations competed with other associations for honors, and cities themselves competed 
with each other for special recognition by the imperial elites.   
                                                 
30 In the late Empire wealthy elites became less interested in funding public needs out of private resources, 
which may have been a consequence of a slow disintegration of the patronage-for-honor system during this 
period.  Future research on the change in the behavior among many of the elites may find its source in a 
change in complexity of consciousness.  Elites above second order of consciousness would likely be less 
attracted to honor acquisition and more drawn to value integration, a change that understands dignitas as 
who one is rather than what one has. 
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Conclusion   
In this brief analysis of the religious and social practices the Greco-Roman world, 
one observes a religious consciousness organized around concrete needs and interests, 
regulated by rules that governed relations between gods and humans, and did so on the 
basis of a simple system of tit-for-tat reciprocity.  The patron-client system that mediated 
the contractual relationship between gods and humans, as well as the relationship 
between imperial elites and the vast majority of plebs at the lower strata of society, fits 
well within second order consciousness.  The ethos of honor/shame meant that 
disadvantaged groups that sought benefactions from imperial elites and other patrons 
would likely do so in order to increase their status, or social standing, and would likely 
not be motivated by a felt experience of oppression.  Nor for that matter would elites at 
the top who received honors in the form of monuments and statuary and forms of 
deference in exchange for benefaction likely experience themselves as manipulated by a 
disadvantaged population.  All of this suggests a world that required no greater mental 
complexity than the ―imperial‖ second order of consciousness.  Third order individuals, if 
present, would likely constitute a very small percentage of the population, and exist for 
the most part among advantaged groups. 
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Voluntary Associations as Cultures of Embeddedness 
 
Recent Scholarly Developments   
Voluntary associations and guilds provide a helpful analogy for understanding the 
formation and organization of the early Christian church.  Recent scholarship in early 
Christianity has been moving toward analogical methods of comparative research, and 
away from so-called ―genealogical‖ methodologies that inadvertently isolate the church 
from its Greco-Roman cultural context.  This new perspective is particularly helpful in 
our study since it provides a better lens through which to view non-elite populations; a 
lens that is also better able to filter out the imposition of modern assumptions about 
religion (eisegesis and anachronism) onto ancient evidence.  Part of the reason for this 
shift is the work of Jonathan Z. Smith (1990) in the area of comparative religion.  Smith 
argues that scholars have overemphasized the ―uniqueness‖ of Christianity and have used 
inadequate methods of comparison when searching for the socio-historical origins of the 
church.
31
  Smith‘s recommendation is for scholarship to shift toward a more analogical 
approach that does not seek direct comparisons between the church and other groups, but 
instead looks for both similarity and difference within a specific set of data.   
Both Richard S. Ascough (1997, 1998, 2000) and Philip A. Harland (2003) pick 
up Smith‘s critique and construct methodologies of analogical comparison.  Writes 
                                                 
31 Smith calls earlier methods ―genealogical‖ because their strategies of comparative analysis emphasize 
the unique origins of Christianity (pedigree) or they emphasize Christianity‘s direct dependence on other 
religious groups whose practices and beliefs it borrowed.  Rather than arguing that Christianity is a cult 
association/mystery religion, or that the church is modeled after the synagogue/philosophical 
school/voluntary association/Greco-Roman household, one is better served by using comparative methods 
that preserve difference while at the same time acknowledge similarity.   
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Ascough, ―The analogy rests in the mind of the scholar conducting the investigation and 
helps one to understand how things might be conceived or redescribed… Through such a 
comparative method of emphasizing similarities and difference, the scholar gains a 
perspective on the material which leads to a more nuanced analysis of the material than 
simply postulating genealogical relationships‖ (1998, 96-97).  The benefits of this 
approach include no longer isolating Christianity from the surrounding Greco-Roman 
culture and letting go of sweeping generalizations (for example, ―Christianity is a 
mystery religion‖) in favor of more modest and defensible claims (Ascough 1998, 97; 
Harland 2003, 211).  An important benefit is that it represents an inductive method that 
begins with available data, and from these moves onto theory-building, rather than 
beginning with assumptions (deductions such as, ―Christianity is unique‖) that seek 
evidence in the data.  It is more likely therefore to allow first century meaning making 
structures to emerge because it is less likely to impose modern notions of ―religion,‖ 
―ideology‖ or ―community‖ onto the people of antiquity; i.e., less likely to impose 
modern ―made meanings‖, to use Kegan‘s terminology (1982), on to ancient ―meaning 
making.‖ 
Another reason Ascough and Harland (and Meggitt, 1998
32
) are helpful in this 
study is their critique of earlier scholars who rely too heavily on ancient literary sources 
and neglect archaeological, epigraphic sources for their interpretations of the social, 
cultural and historical context.  Exclusive reliance on extant literary sources inevitably 
                                                 
32 Meggitt, responding to critics of Paul, Poverty and Survival (1998) states, ―The basic methodological 
assumption of the work is that we need to include the undocumented dead of antiquity in our 
reconstructions (and primary deliberations) and cannot allow our dialogue with the past to be one where we 
are deaf to the great mass of those who lived and died in the period in which the New Testament was 
written and who left nothing, except perhaps their bones or ashes, behind them‖ (2001, p. 87). 
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reads antiquity through the lens of an elite population that enjoyed privileges and 
advantages not available to well over 90 percent of the population, such as wealth, 
education, and insulation from a precarious existence endured by a considerable majority 
of people (Meggitt, 1998).  The scholarly sources relied on in this case study place as 
much or more weight on epigraphy as they do on literary sources, which provide a more 
balanced view of the world as lived by most of its inhabitants. 
Voluntary Associations 
Voluntary associations, also referred to as cult societies, clubs, or guilds (in Latin: 
collegia, sodalitas, fraters; in Greek: thiasos, synagogue, ekklesia, and koinon), are 
groups where individuals choose freely to join, and are accepted in freely; where rules are 
well defined and enforced; that are based on a contractual relationship binding the 
individual to contribute time and money to the association, and the association to fulfill 
certain obligations to its members (Ascough 1998, 74; Clarke 2000, 62).  During the 
period of the early Empire, voluntary associations increased in number (Meeks 1983, 77) 
and in influence.  They provided a crucial social context for many urban poor, but others 
as well, to exercise some measure of influence by means of the association‘s many titles 
and honorifics that mimicked those of the civil magistrates (Clarke 2000, 60; Harland 
2003, 106).
33
   
                                                 
33 Harland, commenting on the ambivalent quality of ―citizenship‖ (which excluded women, rural 
inhabitants, foreigners, and slaves) quotes P. M. Fraser (1977, 60) with regard to an association of 
immigrants in Hellenistic Rhodes, ―with their grandiloquent titles, their own magistrates, priesthoods, 
assemblies, cults, and social services, they provided foreign residents… with the same type of social 
environment, the same modes of advancement, and the same opportunities for lavish benefactions, as were 
provided by the civic organization for Rhodian demesmen, who themselves rarely, if ever, belonged to 
[associations].  They were, so to speak, a microcosm of the state, and loyalty that they evoked in their 
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Most associations and guilds are best classified by membership profiles according 
to John Kloppenborg (1996), who identifies three main types: those based on households, 
occupation, or cult.  Association gatherings were occasions of conviviality, feasting, 
tackling practical business related to the group, and of course, piety that included prayers, 
pouring of libations, and sacrifices.  ―It is important to note, that for virtually all 
associations and guilds, sacrifices and libations in honor of the gods accompanied or 
preceded the banquet‖ (Harland 2003, 77).34  Rules were very visible features of 
voluntary associations, some of which have been preserved on monuments and other 
statuary.  These could include purity rules, particularly before participating in sacred 
rites.  Harland quotes one such inscription in Philadelphia that calls for appropriate sexual 
relations, to refrain from deceiving other members, and to honor the gods who ―will be 
gracious to those who obey, and always give them all good things, whatever gods give to 
men whom they love.  But should any transgress, they shall hate such people and inflict 
upon them great punishments‖ (Harland 2003, 70).  The first part of this code could find 
similar sentiments in many religions today for its obedience-equals-rewards formula.  
The second part – disobedience-equals-punishment – represents a similar understanding 
of divine-human relations, one less visible today; but it is the same morality at the base of 
                                                                                                                                                 
members was rewarded with honors similar to those awarded by the state‖ (Harland, 2003, p. 102.  
Brackets original). 
34 Harland emphasizes this point because many scholars both ancient (Philo and Tertullian, for example) 
and modern assume that the social and feasting functions of associations and the drunkenness that 
sometimes occasioned these, meant that the groups were only concerned with such activities and by 
implication, for modern scholars at least, were not sincere in their piety or serious in the business of the 
guild.  Piety for most associations, however, cannot be separated from any of the other purposes they 
served; moreover, most included codified rules for behavior with accompanying punishments that served to 
mitigate excesses such conviviality invited. 
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both statements and is suggestive of second order mental complexity.
35
  Failure to pay 
monthly dues could lead to denial of burial rights for the deceased.  Fighting, or publicly 
causing shame to an individual of greater dignitas could lead to expulsion for freedmen 
and free-born, but to brutal flogging for slaves (Clarke 2000, 67). 
Embedded in an ethos of honor and shame and the patron-client system 
(benefaction), associations of various kinds naturally sought connections to imperial and 
municipal leaders that would provide tangible advantages (as in the case of receiving 
financial assistance or securing a good location for a shop; Harland 2004, 152-153) and 
symbolic prestige within the polis.  In seeking such advantages, were associations 
broadly conceived seeking to enhance their own status for the purpose of better meeting 
their needs (second order), or were they seeking to establish or enhance a relationship 
between magistrate and association based on an ―internalized‖ value such as cooperation 
for the purpose of improving the working and living conditions of its members (third 
order)?  Did associations understand leaders as objects that were ―suppliers of the self,‖ 
to use Kegan‘s term (in the sense that they existed to meet the needs of the association), 
or did they experience leaders as authority figures from whose expectations members 
derived values and beliefs to which they were loyal?  In short, are needs and interests 
organizing actions or are values and beliefs organizing actions?   
One inscription of Demeter worshipers from Ephesus (ca. 90-110 CE) may shed 
light on these questions.  The following inscription is quoted in Harland, whose purpose 
                                                 
35 It represents an ―unbounded‖ functional ethic where one asks, ―what will happen to me if I do this; how 
will it help/hurt me?‖ rather than an ethic of obligation that binds one to a set of values (third order); or, for 
that matter, an ethic of responsibility where one binds oneself to one‘s own internally generated standards 
(fourth order). 
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is to point out how pervasive the imperial cult had become in the early Empire, how 
sincere its adherents were, and how it had been incorporated into the gatherings of 
various groups from mystery cults (as is the case here) to voluntary associations.  The 
quote also suggests a particular complexity of consciousness. 
To Lucius Mestrius Florus, proconsul (anthypato), from Lucius Pompeius 
Apollonios of Ephesus.  Mysteries and sacrifices… are performed each year in 
Ephesus, lord, to Demeter Karpophoros and Thesmophoros and to the revered 
gods (theois Sebastois [emperors, living and deceased, as gods]) by initiates with 
great purity and lawful customs, together with the priestesses.  In most years these 
practices were protected by kings and revered ones, as well as the proconsul of 
the period…, as contained in their enclosed letters.  Accordingly, as the mysteries 
are pressing upon us during your time of office, through my agency the ones 
obligated to accomplish the mysteries… necessarily petition you, lord, in order 
that, acknowledging their rights…(Harland 2004, 118). 
 
In the above inscription, the remainder of which is lost, a representative of Demeter 
worshippers at Ephesus is petitioning the current Roman proconsul for certain favors 
regarding the public celebration of their mystery rites.  Favors include the proconsul‘s 
acknowledgment of their ―rights‖ – rights which are not construed as ―right to celebrate,‖ 
as if without his permission they could not (2003, 118); but construed as ―right to be duly 
recognized by important public figures such as yourself.‖  If this is so, then the petition is 
suggestive of a group that construes important leaders not as those whose expectations 
matter, but those whose status does matter.  Leaders in this case are suppliers of needs 
who are not sought out because of a value-based relationship but as ones whose office 
and official recognition would increase the group‘s status.  This is confirmed by Harland 
who writes that the group of Demeter worshippers are ―seeking the prestige that further 
acknowledgment by important officials could give them‖ (2003, 118).  It therefore 
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suggests a needs-based relationship.  In this case, the proconsul is sent other 
correspondences perhaps memorialized by the group in the form of monuments as an 
attempt, through honorifics, to persuade him to act on their request.
36
   
Voluntary associations, even those formed around particular trades, were not 
analogous to modern trade unions since there is no evidence that such guilds militated for 
worker rights, better working conditions, increased wages, etc (Ascough 1997, 227; 1998, 
76).  Associations ―were economically all but impotent,‖ they ―rarely took any corporate 
action to defend their members‘ economic interests‖ (Meggitt 1998, 171).  Instead, 
associations were as Harland states, ―collectivistic‖ which I take to mean clubs of 
individuals from among poor urban plebs including slaves and freedmen, organized 
around rules and roles within a system of patronage whose purpose was to honor divine 
and human benefactors in order to achieve concrete advantages.  The association, in this 
sense, acted more like a collective of individuals than a community (itself an abstraction 
invented by modernity for the purpose of aiding conceptualization) from which its 
members derive benefits (a guild hall to gather in, feasts, divine and human protections, 
and an honorable burial that relieved one of the posthumous shame of having one‘s 
remains consumed by dogs) in a contractual exchange for the promise of honoring divine 
and human patrons (in the form of prayers, monuments, etc.).  All of this is suggestive of 
                                                 
36 Harland brings to his analysis an argument by G. H. R. Horsley who asserts that this kind of 
communication is a use of precedent ―that would make it hard for the official to deny what they wanted‖ 
(2003, 118; Horsley 1989, IV. 22).  If this is so, it remains an open question why it would be hard to say 
―no.‖  If the leader, whose response we do not have, finds it hard to say no because he cannot pass up on an 
opportunity to increase his dignitas through honor-enhancing monuments commissioned in his name, in 
exchange for recognition of a mystery rite, then the leader may be demonstrating second order complexity.  
If a leader cannot say no because he fears the power of the group or is concerned about wounding their 
presumed loyalty to Rome and to himself as its agent, or is embedded in perceived expectations of the 
group, then he is demonstrating a more complex, but in this context not necessarily more helpful, third 
order consciousness. 
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second order instrumentalism/imperialism.  Further, the lack of interest in improving 
economic conditions or of using the collective power of the association to influence 
social change favorable to its members suggests members who may not have been able to 
form generalizations about their society or their place within it (the use of evidence to 
make an inductive leap).  Harland is nevertheless suspicious of scholars who dismiss the 
possibility that associations could be considered ―communities.‖  However, he does not 
argue that associations were in fact communities.  Rather, his concern is the tendency of 
some scholars to caricature voluntary associations while presenting an idealized version 
of the Christian church where ―true community‖ purportedly abides (2003, 181).37 
Conclusion 
Thus, one sees in the voluntary associations a familiar advantage-seeking, rigidly 
defined rules for rituals and relations, divine and human role models that contract 
bargains with people according to simple tit-for-tat reciprocity within a system of 
benefaction.  The patron-client system not only cultured (nourished, supported) second 
order consciousness, it was likely a construction of this same order of mental complexity 
among an adult population; honor/shame was how the world turned and how things got 
done in a culture dominated by an imperial cognitive constituency (second order).  This is 
not qualitatively different from the religion of Rome discussed earlier.  With the brief 
                                                 
37 If community means a gathering of people organized around a powerful set of values, beliefs and 
traditions (not simply needs and interests) that are capable of attracting the loyalty of its members; where 
fidelity to these values, beliefs and traditions are internalized by the members through socialization (who 
believe them and follow them even when leaders are not looking or when immediate needs and advantages 
must be deferred); and where revered leaders human and divine are not simply powerful, heroic role 
models who supply needs and issue punishments, but role-conscious authorities commissioned with the 
responsibility to confer an identity on its members; a community identity that organizes roles and ground 
rules (rather than roles determining identity and rules determining membership), then voluntary 
associations do not appear to be communities.  Whether the Pauline churches were communities as just 
defined will be taken up in the next section. 
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study of voluntary associations, however, one sees in greater detail the social and 
religious practices of the lower strata of the Empire.  In divine-human interaction in both 
examples the motivation is to control and direct the gods toward the successful enactment 
of human endeavors through a system of rules, rather than forming a relationship with 
them through the mediation of a covenant; or yielding human control to a divine wisdom 
that shapes human values, beliefs and actions.  Such religious sentiments and 
organizational propensities are suggestive of a second order of consciousness.   
 
Coach Paul and the Corinthian Church 
 
Paul, a Common Laborer and “Religious Genius” Among the Urban Poor 
 
A constructive-developmental hermeneutic of Paul‘s Corinthian letters allows one 
to reframe the scholarly debate regarding the central issue of the presence of factions 
within the community and, connected to this issue, Paul‘s apostolic authority.  Rather 
than understand the source of the factions in socio-economic terms, one might be better 
served by asking what the correlation was between the expectations of Paul and the 
capacity of the community to meet them.  Whether the struggle was between the rich and 
poor, as suggested by Gerd Theissen (1982), or among the poor themselves, as suggested 
by Justin Meggitt (1998), or among more advantaged leaders, as suggested by Stephen 
Chester (2003), what may matter more is the possibility that the struggle was a 
consequence of a particular culture of mind organized around needs, interests, and 
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advantage-seeking in conflict with the mutuality demanded by Paul.  The theory 
proposed here does not replace other theories from New Testament studies but regrounds 
them in a prior, more general, theory of cultures of mental complexity.  
Paul‘s First and Second letters to the Corinthians provide more information about 
the social context of the early church than any other part of the Pauline corpus (Clarke 
2000, 185).  Situating Paul and the Corinthian community in the Greco-Roman world is 
important in the present study in order to properly assess the mental complexity of Paul‘s 
―community organizing‖ and the community‘s experience of Paul‘s demands.  Much has 
been written during the last hundred years about the social setting of early Christianity, 
and a great deal of the literature addresses Paul‘s place in that setting.  An earlier view, 
popularized around the turn of the nineteenth century by Adolph Deissmann, argued for 
relatively humble social circumstances for Paul because of his trade; but not one of 
absolute poverty because of his Roman citizenship and his unliterary, though ―not 
vulgar‖ use of Greek (Meeks 1983, 52).  Deissmann complained that the majority of the 
extant literary material was the work of upper class elites, ―which almost always had 
been identified with the whole ancient world of the Imperial age‖ (Malherbe 1977, 32).  
The windfall for Deissmann was the discovery of papyri and other fragments from the 
period which provided a glimpse into the lives of the common people.  This glimpse 
gives a more accurate view into the social conditions of the class out of which Paul 
emerged and to which he preached.  Deissmann, therefore, situates both Paul and the 
members of his communities in the ―middle and lower classes.‖   
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Around the middle of the last century, however, a ―new consensus‖ began to 
emerge, according to Abraham Malherbe, which argued for a social setting among the 
Pauline communities that represented a ―cross section‖ of society that included the 
wealthy and powerful as well as slaves and the free poor (Meeks 1983, 52; Malherbe 
1977, 61).  ―The more recent scholarship has shown that the social status of early 
Christians may be higher than Deissmann has supposed‖ (Malherbe 1977, 31).  The new 
consensus also paints a portrait of Paul as well educated, cosmopolitan who, if not 
himself wealthy, was able to move well in elite circles; a man of letters more than a man 
manual labor. 
It is precisely this claim that Justin Meggitt calls into question (1998, 2001).  He 
challenges the emergence of the new consensus concerning the social status of Paul and 
his churches, particularly scholars who argue Paul was economically above the great 
mass of plebs urbana and perhaps even affluent.  Key among the arguments of the new 
consensus is his Roman Tarsan citizenship, his elite education and his attitude toward 
work (Meggitt 1998, 80).
38
  Against this conclusion Meggitt argues that, far from residing 
comfortably among the so-called bourgeois middle class, Paul worked in the trades, 
probably as an artisan leather worker (1998, 75);
39
 precarious work consisting of long 
hours of hard manual labor.  Paul did not, subsequent to his conversion, choose a life of 
                                                 
38 Against the new consensus, Meggitt argues that Paul‘s father or grandfather could in fact have been 
slaves manumitted from a Roman citizen, thus securing their own citizenship (81-82); that education and 
wealth are not inextricably bound together (83-87); that Paul‘s assumed ―snobbish‖ attitude toward work 
and the assumption that he felt, along with elites of the ancient world, that labor was degrading, can just as 
easily be countered with the opposite argument that work was a source of pride for Paul.  In any case, says 
Meggitt, neither pride nor embarrassment regarding manual labor are indications of an elite status for Paul 
(87-88).  Also listed by Meggitt as reasons for Paul‘s so-called higher status, are Paul‘s reaction to social 
affronts; his ability to socialize with elites; the tenor of his ethics; his treatment by Roman authority; 
lineage; Pharisaism; and his use of a secretary. 
39 He references 1 Thess. 2:9; 2 Thess. 3:7-8; 1 Cor. 4:11-12; 1 Cor. 9:6; 2 Cor. 11:27. 
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manual work; nor was his poverty voluntary; nor, for that matter, did the financial 
assistance he occasionally received cover anything more than the loss of income he 
experienced as a result of his itinerate lifestyle.  Says Meggitt, ―We can, therefore, I 
believe, affirm with some confidence A. Deissmann‘s contention, that Paul was a 
craftsman whose wages ‗were the economic basis of his existence‘‖ (1998, 79).   
Accordingly, he argues that Paul was born into, and shared throughout his life in 
the dismal conditions of the great mass of impoverished humanity that made up, Meggitt 
argues, 99% of the Roman Empire in the first century (1998, 99).
40
  Thus, not only Paul, 
but virtually everyone else in the first century, the elite 1% aside, were among the 
destitute masses who, ―lived subsistence or near subsistence lives, in which access to 
necessities was inadequate and precarious.  Like their neighbours, none was potentially 
more than a few weeks way… from a life-threatening crisis, with little to call on material 
resources when in such need‖ (Meggitt 2001, 86).  Meggitt suggests that it is precisely 
the ―genius‖ of Paul that can distract scholars from the inescapable facts of his low social 
status, poor education, and economic destitution.  
Undoubtedly Paul was not a ‗typical‘ artisan of the Graeco-Roman world – he 
would not have left such a mark on history if he had been – but his uniqueness, 
particularly the uniqueness of his religious genius, should not blind us to the fact 
                                                 
40 He states here that the, ―Pauline Christians en masse shared fully the bleak material existence which was 
the lot of more than 99% of the inhabitants of the Empire, and also, as we have just seen, of Paul himself… 
To believe otherwise, without clear evidence to the contrary, given the near universal prevalence of poverty 
in the first century world, is to believe the improbable‖ (99).  Meggitt defines the poor with Garnsey and 
Woolf (for reference, see his note 17, page 5) as, ―those living at or near subsistence level, whose prime 
concern it is to obtain the minimum food, shelter, and clothing necessary to sustain life, whose lives are 
dominated by the struggle for physical survival‖ (5).  Even the ―wealthiest‖ of the poor, artisans, lived in 
constant anxiety and desperation as demonstrated by their use of defixiones (curse tablets) against their 
competitors: ―The lives of the artisans were characterized by extreme privation‖ (56).  Other factors 
contributed to impoverishment such as food shortages/costs leading to frequent hunger and starvation (59-
62), affordable and available housing  (63-67), old age, gender, ill health, overcrowding, economic 
disruptions and  slavery. 
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that his experience of material existence was far from unusual: it was nothing less 
than the arduous and bitter experience of the urban poor (Meggitt 1998, 96).   
 
While his treatment of Paul‘s actual status and the social and economic conditions 
of much of the first century Greco-Roman world is persuasive, Meggitt perhaps 
overcorrects the new consensus.  While it is highly probable that most of the early 
Christian communities contained a majority of poor, few if any wealthy, and no elites 
(senators or equestrians), not every Christian community fits his description of near total, 
abject poverty. Corinth is an example.  As we have already seen, it was founded as a 
Roman colony with an unusually high percentage of wealthy freedmen, and may have 
enjoyed immunity from certain tax burdens that crippled much of Greece and Asia during 
the costly wars that led up to the Principate established by Augustus.  Pheme Perkins 
argues
41
 that many of the Corinthian concerns, such as their admiration for rhetoric and 
wisdom, and their concern about Paul‘s appearance, indicate an elevated cultural 
condition not consistent with Meggitt‘s portrait.  Moreover, in 2 Cor 8-9, Paul states that 
they are better off than other churches who, though poorer, are contributing more money 
to the Jerusalem collection (such as the Macedonian churches).  According to Perkins, 
Paul‘s use of the prospect of public embarrassment to shame the Corinthians into 
generosity assumes a more economically differentiated community than Meggitt allows.
42
  
Thus, she concludes that, while not wealthy persons of noble birth, the Corinthian 
community must have consisted of not only desperate common laborers, but also a class 
                                                 
41 Personal communication, Fall, 2003, at Boston College. 
42 See Gerd Theissen‘s response to Meggitt (2001, 375-377).  He similarly argues that Corinth was 
wealthier than the Macedonian churches and both were better off than the Jerusalem church and that 
Corinth must have contained at least a small number of well-to-do members who were influential in the 
congregation. 
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of artisans and merchants whose skill and wealth somewhat insulated them from the 
immanent threat of starvation.  In fact, says Perkins, there were enough people of stable 
position to successfully de-stabilize those with a more precarious status.  ―They are not 
wealthy; just better off.‖43 While over-correcting the new consensus, however, Meggitt‘s 
work remains an important source for understanding the social context of non-elites and 
the social and economic location of Paul.  It is Paul‘s status that many within the 
Corinthian community reacted to.  The resulting conflicts, in turn, become a lens through 
which to see different cultures of mind in operation. 
 
Paul’s Leadership and the Cognitive Location of the Corinthian Church 
 
From the above argument, the religious, social and cultural context present in 
Corinth in the first century CE likely required no greater complexity than second order 
consciousness for the great mass of people.  That is, second order was the convention of 
the times; post-conventional third order would likely be a subdominant order of mental 
complexity present in considerably smaller numbers, and fourth order would be achieved 
by only the tiniest percentage of the population.  The likely connection between 
advantage and orders of consciousness
44
 means that for individuals to reach post-
conventional third order, certain supports would need to be in place, such as access to at 
least some education, certain distance from destitution, and families or communities that 
cultured (nourished, supported) post-second order consciousness.   
                                                 
43 Personal communication, Fall, 2003, at Boston College. 
44 See the thirteen dissertations that informed Kegan‘s 1994 work (195). 
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I argue here that Paul, however disadvantaged, likely received enough support 
and challenge to grow beyond the current convention.  Whether this can be attributed to 
his famous conversion and emersion in the new Christian community, or to his Jewish 
roots and experiences within family and synagogue, is not a matter for this dissertation.  
As is a pattern in this dissertation, my aim is to search for the curricular complexity that 
leaders such as Paul educated toward rather than speculate about their own order of 
consciousness (beyond saying it was post-second order).  Examining the mental 
complexity of Paul‘s leadership will proceed together with an examination of the 
cognitive complexity of the Corinthian church as a group. 
Paul’s Subordination of Status to Identity in the Body of Christ 
The Corinthian letters indicate many conflicts and concerns within the community 
surrounding the issues of marriage, eating meat sacrificed to idols, use of spiritual gifts, 
proper sexual norms, and liturgical etiquette.  Ascough argues that most of these can be 
subsumed under the crisis presented by the presence of factions within the community 
(2002, 4) which came in the form of members‘ attaching themselves to honored role 
models.  Paul, rejecting appeals to powerful individuals, instead appeals to Christian 
unity.  He writes:
45
  
Now I appeal to you, brothers and sisters, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, 
that all of you be in agreement and that there be no divisions among you, but that 
you be united in the same mind and the same purpose.  For it has been reported to 
me by Chloe‘s people that there are quarrels among you, my brothers and sisters.  
What I mean is that each of you says, ‗I belong to Paul,‘ or ‗I belong to Apollos,‘ 
or ‗I belong to Cephas,‘ or ‗I belong to Christ.‘  Has Christ been divided?  Was 
Paul crucified for you?  Or were you baptized in the name of Paul (1 Cor. 1:10-
13). 
                                                 
45 All biblical quotes from NRSV. 
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It is clear that Paul is not only unimpressed by their behavior, he likens those who attach 
themselves to prominent leaders to ―infants in Christ‖ whom he has had to feed ―milk, 
not solid food‖ (1 Cor. 3:2). 
Clarke (2000, 178) argues that the factions had their source in the patronage 
system, features of which we have already examined.  Paul as founder of the Corinthian 
community refused to be considered its patron (1 Cor. 1:13).  In this way, Paul 
preemptively discharged members of the community from the debt of honor owed to 
patrons.  This move, however, may have been lost on the Corinthians who proceeded to 
attach themselves to certain leaders – i.e., act as a client in the client-patron relationship –
and boast about the heroic qualities and accomplishments of their leader.  Promoting the 
reputation and status of apostolic figures was simultaneously self-serving for it enhanced 
the status of the client by association, and became a source for competition and conflict.   
Paul writes in response, ―let no one boast about human leaders‖ (1 Cor. 3:21) because in 
the Christian community, leaders are ―servants‖ (1 Cor. 3:5) and ―stewards‖ (1 Cor. 4:1), 
not powerful, eloquent public figures.  Besides, argues Paul, you already have everything 
because in Christ, ―all things are yours, whether Paul, Apollos or Cephas or the world or 
life or death or the present or the future‖ (1 Cor. 3:22).  ―I have applied all this to Apollos 
and to myself for your benefit…so that none of you will be puffed up in favor one against 
another‖ (1Cor. 4:6).  Writes Clarke: ―Such boasting in people was commonplace in 
Graeco-Roman society, and although flattery of others was, on the surface, self-effacing, 
it elicited its own gratitude and possibly even reward.  It was an acceptable mechanism in 
contemporary society of self-preferment and self-advancement‖ (2000, 178). 
 113 
Looking at this from a developmental perspective, Paul has relativized status-
seeking by turning the client-patron system on its head: Paul and Apollos are the servant-
clients to the patron-community – the Body of Christ – whose exclusive ―patron‖ was the 
Risen Lord.  In doing this Paul was pointing out that status was not a thing one could 
possess or lose, but a value one held.  Paul asserted that ―all things are yours‖ in Christ, 
and that therefore the Corinthians ought to cease their habit of trying to gain by human 
efforts what God has already given them: a new identity in Christ.   
Paul next subverts the honor-shame ethos behind patron-client relationship in this 
mocking passage:  
Already you have all you want!  Already you have become rich!  Quite apart from 
us you have become kings!  Indeed, I wish that you had become kings, so that we 
might be kings with you!  For I think that God has exhibited us apostles as last of 
all, as though sentenced to death, because we have become a spectacle to the 
world, to angels and to mortals.  We are fools for the sake of Christ.  We are 
weak, but you are strong.  You are held in honor, but we in disrepute.  To the 
present hour we are hungry and thirsty, we are poorly clothed and beaten and 
homeless, and we grow weary from the work of our hands.  When reviled, we 
bless; when persecuted; we endure; when slandered, we speak kindly.  We have 
become like the rubbish of the world, the dregs of all things, to this very day (1 
Cor. 4:8-13). 
 
When we read this today, we may feel sympathy for Paul‘s many sufferings, particularly 
his difficulties with and anguish over the failure of many within the Corinthian 
community to live up to the expectations of his gospel vision.  But if the Corinthians to 
whom this passage was addressed were embedded in the socio-cultural expectations of 
the day, including a second order ―cultural mind,‖ they would likely have been baffled 
and possibly offended by Paul‘s rejection of the honor some had tried to bestow upon 
him, and perhaps deeply embarrassed by an apostolic figure so willing to denigrate his 
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own reputation and rightful status, so willing to sully his own honor, comparing himself 
to garbage.  The mocking irony of the passage may have been entirely over the heads of 
members
46
 whose concrete thinking would not have constructed their founder‘s 
weakness/fool metaphor as, ―God cares for the lowly, humble, poor, and uncredentialed 
servants, like Paul; and in fact God prefers these to be divinely sanctioned spokespersons 
over what the world considers to be worthy and honorable,‖ but perhaps as, ―we have 
been mistaken about Paul; he may embarrass us in the eyes of other Corinthians and 
diminish our standing in the city.‖  
Paul anticipates the latter response from his audience in the next line of the 
passage: ―I am not writing this to make you ashamed, but to admonish you as my beloved 
children‖ (1 Cor. 4:14).  What did Paul mean by ―make you ashamed,‖ and what kind of 
shame was he assuming the community might be feeling?  We may read this as if Paul 
had just delivered a painful moral rebuke that he was assuming would be received by the 
Corinthians in a particular way; that he believed they would make the connection that this 
world and its practices are judged by the community of grace – the church; that what the 
world esteems and what God esteems are in conflict and that the latter trumps the former.  
Further, we may assume that the shame Paul anticipates the Corinthians to feel might be 
expressed as ―Look how our behaviors are in conflict with the gospel we value,‖ or ―look 
how poorly we are integrating the gospel we value with the behaviors we engage in!‖   
                                                 
46 I acknowledge Pheme Perkins for the following 10/03/2007 comments.  ―This observation can be 
supported by the subsequent conflicts in 2 Cor. 10-13 over the ―super-apostles‖ who may have come closer 
to meeting the Corinthian expectations.‖ 
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But shame of another sort may have been what they felt and what Paul feared they 
might be feeling.  Rather than ―we feel ashamed of ourselves,‖ their response may have 
been ―we feel ashamed of our leader‖47 whose strange teaching and behavior regarding 
honor and status would cause them to lose face in the eyes of others.  They may have 
feared that they would be exposed as a contemptible association with a vulgar leather 
worker as their patron; a patron whose tremendous spiritual glory that formerly some 
community members had exploited (―I am of Paul‖) – after all, he had heavenly visions 
and talked to the Risen Lord! – was now made meaningless to them because Paul counted 
it as insignificant next to the glory of a transcendent Christ (i.e., a figure without a 
figurine, a state without a statue, a moment without a monument).  In short, by sticking 
with Paul, they risked the shame of being exposed as defective and of being publicly 
denounced as such. 
Conflict as a Mismatch Between Paul’s Leadership and Corinthian Capacity 
The distancing of many in the Corinthian community from Paul, clearly supported 
by the evidence in his letters, might have its source in a mismatch between the order of 
mental complexity Paul preached and mental complexity of the community who heard his 
preaching.  It is possible that they felt overwhelmed by the challenge of his expectations; 
but it is just as likely that they were not overwhelmed but, rather, offended by it and by 
Paul‘s repeated refusal to give them what they wanted: a status that had real currency in 
Corinth such as increased social standing and bragging rights.  The Corinthians were not 
                                                 
47 I acknowledge Pheme Perkins for the following 10/03/2007 comments.  ―In 2 Cor 5:12 Paul has this 
paradoxical statement that he‘s not really boasting (its all from God, not himself) but he‘s giving the 
Corinthians a way to answer those who evaluate him by external standards – so they appear to have had 
some help in feeling ashamed of their apostle as it were.‖ 
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necessarily attracted by a gospel of the cross: their god was a human who rose from the 
dead and whose spirit gave supernatural gifts to everyone, gifts which are on display in 
the gatherings of the assembly on the first day of the week.  Unfortunately, their god 
might also have one or two unworthy apostles who claimed authority within the 
assembly, but who did not measure up according to everything everyone has always 
known about authoritative leaders – that they be honor-able.  Paul, as Perkins states, 
―could not produce the goods‖ (2004).  Evidence for the Corinthians‘ distancing 
themselves from Paul can be seen in their various confrontations: they began to scrutinize 
his apostolic credentials, his physical appearance, his performance as a public speaker, 
and his management of finances, all of which may amount to a second order bid to either 
find a true and correct leader beneath Paul‘s incomprehensible practice of hiding or 
denigrating his status, a leader worthy of the honor they wanted to bestow, or to 
manipulate Paul into behaving like a true and correct leader through the threat of public 
humiliation. 
Relationships deteriorated.  Traveling missionaries arrived who persuaded the 
Corinthians to accuse Paul of being ―crafty‖ and that he took them in by ―deceit‖ (2 Cor. 
12:16).  The Corinthians demanded proof that Christ was speaking through him (2 Cor. 
13:3) and, when Paul refused their patronage while at the same time receiving aid from 
the poorer Philippi, they accused him of financial mismanagement (2 Cor 11:7-12; 12:14-
18).  In terms of personal accomplishments, Paul also came up short.  Apollos was a 
trained rhetorician whereas Paul was an ineffective public speaker, a fact pointed out by 
members of the Corinthian community (2 Cor. 10:1) who referred to his presence as 
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―lowly‖ or humble in contrast to his letters that, written from afar, were bold.  A few 
verses later Paul complains, ―For they say, ‗His letters are weighty and strong, but his 
bodily presence is weak, and his speech contemptible‖ (2 Cor. 10:10).  He admits in 2 
Cor. 11:6, ―I may be untrained in speech, but not in knowledge.‖  Clarke argues that 
rhetoric was of particular importance in Roman Corinth for public leaders.  Paul‘s 
appearance and speech was regarded as an embarrassment to many in the community 
who responded favorably to other missionary preachers with greater rhetorical skill and 
appearance, missionaries whom Paul mockingly refers to as ―Super-apostles‖ (2 Cor. 
11:5-6; 12:11). 
What we have as Paul‘s second letter to the Corinthians (probably a compilation 
of two or three letters) reveals additional conflict between the community and its founder.  
In 2 Cor. 1:23-2:11, and again in 7:8-12, there is evidence of a ―disastrous visit in which 
a member of the church had publicly humiliated Paul‖ (Perkins 2004, 31); an experience 
his letters attempted to overcome.  The incident of public shaming was likely the source 
of Paul‘s very harsh letter to the Corinthians, which has not survived, and his decision to 
not visit the church at a time when they were expecting him.  This led to further attacks 
on his character by members of the congregation.  Perkins writes, ―2 Cor 2:1-3 indicates 
that a canceled visit to Corinth led to recriminations over the integrity of Paul‘s word.  
His refusal to accept Corinthian patronage, while at the same time receiving aid from the 
Philippians and soliciting funds for the poor Christians in Jerusalem, led opponents to 
accuse him of fraud‖ (Perkins 2004, 37-38, n. 39).   
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Paul‘s refusal to play the honor-monger so prevalent in the Greco-Roman world, 
preferring leadership characterized by service and putting others first, one that sought not 
human honor but God‘s honor, left a community that was deeply embedded in an 
established view of its needs and interests little recourse but to attempt to shame him into 
compliance.  Shame works when one‘s self-value comes from what one has (second order 
meaning making); but not when one‘s self-value comes from who one is (third order), or 
who one is becoming (fourth order).  In Paul‘s case the shaming incident greatly troubled 
him, but did not alter the substance of his preaching or leadership approach.  
Paul’s Third Order Curriculum  
Paul was not just content, but able, to live within the glory (a non-concrete honor) 
of a timeless, transcendent, grace whose spirit called into being a mystery in the form of a 
local, immanent, gifted community of Jews and gentiles.  He was content therefore to 
refer and deflect all worldly honor away from himself and onto Christ crucified and risen.   
This ability is aided by a certain capacity to hold the points of view of self and other 
simultaneously and internally (Lahey et al. 1988), to abstract and generalize; to allow the 
other to be authoritatively determinative of the self; in this case, the other as 
Christ/Church/Body of Christ/members at Corinth, especially the weakest and most 
vulnerable ―members‖ within the body.  All have a prior claim on the self.  Many among 
the Corinthians may not have been so able to defer or transfer honor to what may have 
been nothing more than an unintelligible abstraction for them.  Christ present as the 
Church (and not present as some guy who is there-but-not-able-to-be-seen-right-now-by-
me); my participation as a necessary and vital part of the whole body (one part of a whole 
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rather than a collective of many ones); and Christ‘s honor as my honor insofar as I remain 
faithful to Christ, and true to the idea that dying somehow completes my participation in 
the mystery of Christ‘s dying and releases me to a participation in his rising (an 
ideational movement of honor from the concrete to the abstract); all of these features of 
Paul‘s vision would be understood differently depending on whether a person was second 
or third order consciousness.   
Third order is a radical achievement, one that may be troubling and even 
annoying to adults who are second order and experience its presence.  Socrates traveled 
around Athens in the late 5
th
 century BCE trying to get someone, anyone, to give him a 
definition of something, anything.  And of course, no one could.  Not even Socrates 
(Lonergan, 1972).  No one could define ―courage‖ in a way that excluded all not-courage, 
and included all courage, without simply stacking descriptive examples of courage – 
because they could not perform third order abstractions and generalizations.  Socrates 
―corrupted the youth‖ by pointing out to adults that they had no claim to wisdom if they 
could not define wisdom and, of course, he was forced to take hemlock for his crime of 
offending adults.  Paul too was accused of many wrongs by a community underwhelmed 
by his curious tendency to make them feel that they could never do things correctly, and 
his own inability to do correctly the most basic requirements of an honor-shame system.   
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Paul’s Relativization of Roles-for-Self to Gifts-for-Others 
 
Paul was careful to avoid establishing visible, formal structures of leadership by 
denying the use of as honorifics; he refused to explicitly single out individuals with 
formal titles.
48
  This effectively vacated the conventional means by which role 
differentiations were made.  Instead, Paul placed emphasis on the manifestation of the 
Spirit within the community through various gifts of the spirit, as the sole means for role 
determination.  According to Paul, charisms are expressions of grace within and among 
the body of Christ.  Though they are not only the means of differentiation within the 
community, they are the means by which the community can be referred to as a body.  
For Paul they ―are essential to the very structure of the Christian community.  In the 
certainly authentic letters of Paul we find no other principle of differentiation in the 
Christian community than the charisms: no other basis for the decision as to who is to be 
a leader, who a teacher, who an administrator, than the charism that each one has 
received‖ (Sullivan 1982, 19).  Paul‘s concern with the Corinthians is that they not forget 
that a person having spiritual gifts is not necessarily a spiritual person.  The hermeneutic 
of love, chapter 13 of 1 Corinthians, is to be the only criterion of one who is walking in 
the Spirit (Sullivan 1982, 25).  Moreover, there is a difference between expressing a 
charism and having the gift, or vocation of the charism.  For example, prophesy.  All 
                                                 
48 I acknowledge Francis Sullivan, S. J. (personal communication, December 27, 2007) for the following 
observations: He notes that, ―in the salutation of the letter to the Philippians [Paul] gave the ‗episkopoi’ and 
‗diakonoi’ special mention.  In 1 Cor 16:15 he urged the Corinthians to be subordinate to Stephanas and his 
household.‖ Paul understood that certain community leadership tasks would fall to a group of individuals, 
and that respect should be paid to these as well as heads of households, such as Stephanas, in whose house 
the community gathered.  It is noteworthy that episkopoi and diakonoi were not formal titles in the mid first 
century, and both are used in the plural, referring to groups rather than individuals. 
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share in Christ‘s prophetic office and all should desire the charism of prophesy.  But not 
all share in or possess the charism of the prophet (92).   
In contradistinction to Paul‘s teaching on spiritual gifts, the Corinthians turned 
these gifts into matters of competition and advantage seeking, choosing the more visible 
gifts such as tongues as evidence of spiritual status.  Stephen J. Chester pinpoints the 
chronic confusion between Paul‘s expectations of the purpose of spiritual gifts (1 Cor. 
12:1-14:40) and how the community made use of such gifts.  He attributes their 
difficulties to the influence of voluntary associations on the members of the Corinthian 
church.  He does not argue that voluntary associations provided a model for how the early 
church organized itself, but that they explain how the Corinthians thought about status 
and authority; a thinking that was in stark contrast to Paul‘s own.  The titles and 
honorifics that proliferated in clubs allowed many members to achieve a status not 
otherwise possible in the larger civic arena.  While Paul was largely uninfluenced by 
voluntary associations in his own attempts to found churches, the members of his 
Corinthian community exhibited many signs that they were, in fact, heavily influenced by 
them, particularly in matters concerning status.  Chester argues that, while many in the 
church had undergone genuine conversion which emphasized transformed social 
practices, the community nevertheless fell short of Paul‘s expectations, particularly with 
regard to the Jerusalem collection, attitudes and practices during the common meal, 
spiritual gifts, and litigation. 
What distinguished the Corinthian community from associations was the fact that 
there were no officials or title-bearing leaders in the church.  This can be traced, as we 
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have seen, to Paul‘s leadership and his insistence that the hermeneutic of love (1 Cor. 13) 
serve as the principle around which the Corinthians were to organize themselves.  It is a 
hermeneutic which not only relativized earthly honorifics, but also flashy gifts like 
tongues.  Thus, social obligation became based around a kind of status-free mutualism, as 
argued by Meggitt (1998, 163) and Ascough (2002).  The Corinthian struggle to grasp the 
significance of what Paul was calling for can, according to Chester, be traced to the fact 
that simply removing the social mechanisms whereby patrons could be honored for their 
benefactions and clients could benefit from their association with such renowned leaders, 
did not end all status-seeking in the community.  Chester sees the rivalry between these 
groups ―as a struggle for ascendancy between their local leaders‖ who had few other 
avenues for status in the Christian community (2003, 241).    
What I argue is that something more significant grounded both voluntary 
associations and the Corinthian conflicts: a mental complexity organized around concrete 
needs and interests.  More significant than the social influences Corinthians brought to 
the church was the mental complexity organized around second order consciousness.  
Chester‘s argument is convincing in its explanation of the social influence of voluntary 
associations on the Corinthian members who vied for prominence, but why they may 
have done this may have more to do with a second order way of knowing than post-
conversion social influences.  Knowing how a community makes meaning provides a 
more inclusive and comprehensive framework for assessing conflicts within the 
community and conflicts between the community and its founder.   
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Paul’s Mutualism as a New Cultural Medium 
Richard Ascough (2002) has recently brought together the literatures on 
organizational change and New Testament studies by arguing that Paul‘s leadership style 
and strategy for community organization can be likened to ―chaordic leadership‖ as 
understood by Dee Hock.  Ascough‘s analysis of Paul and Pauline communities is 
particularly helpful and appropriate, from the current study‘s perspective, when it is also 
connected to the constructive-developmental literature.  Paul‘s curriculum subordinated 
the place of status and club rules to a community standard of mutual love.  Paul, argues 
Ascough, puts stress on three simple principles: Spirit-guidance, ―mutual up-building of 
one another in love‖ (1 Cor. 13:1-14:1; 16:14), and ―choosing to serve others as a slave‖ 
(1 Cor. 9:15, 19; cf. 7:22).  He argues that Paul did not offer a clearly defined set of rules 
about how a community is to structure and govern itself, but he did insist on a few simple 
values, which can be summed up as a command to put others first.  ―Throughout 1 
Corinthians Paul advocates that the Corinthian Christians recognize the rights of one 
another and that they be sensitive to one another… In terms of ethical behavior, Paul 
emphasizes that the corporate body takes precedence over the individual and the rights of 
the individual are embodied in the group‖ (Ascough 2002, 4).  While Ascough‘s use of a 
language of ―rights‖ and ―the individual‖ is problematic, he underscores the thrust of 
Paul‘s teaching.  From a constructive developmental perspective Paul‘s de-emphasis of 
concrete rules in favor of the value of ―putting others first‖ amounts to a demand upon 
the Corinthians to hold needs and interests as object; his frequent return to this theme 
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suggests that many in the congregation at Corinth struggled to achieve this and failed, or 
saw no reason to struggle at all.  
What Ascough and others do not address is the fact that Paul‘s theology of 
mutualism came with the high price of letting go notions that individuals are valued, or 
made worthy, by their status-accruing honor; that therefore advantage-seeking 
opportunism must diminish and other-attending values must rise; and that shame did not 
in fact have anything to do with self-value since such value is grounded in a relationship 
with the Risen Lord and the community of salvation that was the Body of Christ, a 
relationship that governed all human relations.  ―Shame‖ in Paul‘s curriculum, had to 
move from its place as an external, public event, to an internal, personal conviction; 
public shame had to become personal guilt (third order internal censor) or possibly regret 
(fourth order self censor).  Whether the practice of economic mutualism in the face of 
extreme privation put flesh on the bones of Paul‘s theology of putting others first, as 
Meggitt argues (1998), is an open question.  It is clear that Paul challenged the presence 
of advantage-seeking opportunism among the Corinthians.  The effectiveness of the 
supports Paul put in place, supports that at least implicitly acknowledged the cognitive 
location of the community and confirmed its steps toward the mutuality he preached, is a 
matter for future research. 
Paul’s Holding 
Paul was obviously aware that he needed to practice care in his preaching, that he 
not go over the heads of the community: ―For we write you nothing other than what you 
can read and also understand; I hope you will understand until the end – as you have 
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already understood us in part – that on the day of the Lord Jesus we are your boast and 
you are our boast‖ (2 Cor. 1:13-14).  At the same time Paul may have underestimated the 
kind of conversion necessary – transformation toward increasing mental complexity – for 
the community to, as he had done, subvert the social and cultural expectations of the 
period. 
In his final letter to the community, he altered his approach, perhaps to better 
engage the learning edge of the community.  Holding onto the teaching that God‘s power 
is manifest in human weakness, he lists an even greater catalogue of his spiritual 
credentials of humiliations (2 Cor. 11:21-12:10), but only by sandwiching them between 
affirmations of ―honors‖ the Corinthians may have been better able to recognize. He 
begins his catalogue by pointing out that he is a better Jew than the interloper apostles 
(11:23) because of his Hebrew/Israelite/descendent of Abraham/Minister of Christ 
pedigree.  He closes his catalogue of weakness by reporting on his supernatural visions 
and of being ―caught up to the third heaven…into Paradise and heard things that are not 
to be told, that no mortal is permitted to repeat‖ (1 Cor. 12:2-4).  It is difficult, as Paul 
discovered, to convince advantage seeking opportunists to embrace the humiliation of 
beatings, imprisonment, and malnutrition for no immediately good reason.  But it might 
be less difficult to first convince them of your hero-status and then, on the strength of that 
honor-enhancing credential, nudge them toward a meatier mental complexity that 
acknowledged the priority of the other and the capacity of vertical (heavenly) and 
horizontal (earthly) relationships to transcend time (as more than a chronicle of ―nows‖) 
and immediate needs and interests.  Paul may have learned this too late to realize 
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significant development in the Corinthian community, however.  Writes Perkins, ―In the 
final section of Paul‘s Corinthian correspondence (2 Cor 10-13), there is evidence of his 
deep disappointment and anger over the persistent challenges to his ministry as an apostle 
whose life exemplifies Christ crucified‖ (2004, p. 34). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Voluntary Associations as Cultural Schools among the Urban Poor 
 
Voluntary associations could be understood as cultural schools among the urban 
poor that coached a curriculum of mental complexity challenging to many adults in that 
period – rule following (control impulses), simple reciprocal responsibility-taking (pay 
dues, receive burial), role-taking (join a club, be part of a team), and learning to take the 
point of view of the other.  In fact, it is reasonable to assume that the heavy emphasis on 
club rules and punishments
49
 means that there was present a cognitive constituency 
within the adult population whose lawless, impulsive propensities, it was assumed, 
required them; startling as this may appear, there may have been a population whose 
mental complexity was beneath second order consciousness.   
Voluntary associations may have been schools within a second order imperial 
world that were defending against the presence of first order, impulsive adults; schools 
that were not simply celebrating their capacity to generate rules and accrue status.  As 
                                                 
49 Rules and consequences for breaking them were as prominent on some inscriptions as other information 
such as an associations origins, and its ―connections‖ among urban elites 
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difficult as it may be to come to terms with a potentially large minority of adults in 21
st
 
century United States that are below third order, there is no point in dismissing the fact.  
In the same way, when one considers the ubiquitous presence and violent treatment of 
slaves,
50
 the extreme destitution many experienced, and the significant use of curse 
tablets,
51
 it is not hard to imagine some, perhaps many, exploited children exposed to 
physical, mental, psychological and spiritual trauma growing into adults who were 
unsuccessful in evolving beyond first order consciousness.  Voluntary associations may 
have represented one cultural instinct to coach impulsive adults embedded in their own 
perceptions toward a more stable, productive, and useful order of mental complexity.  
They may have been schools of mental cultures where one‘s place is not mediated by 
force but by status; where the other is not just there (as in a self-other-than-me), but there 
with (as in other-on-behalf-of-my needs and vice-versa); where one is supported and 
challenged in the emerging capacity to negotiate and follow rules, and to take roles; 
capacities that enable one to be among clever ―Greeks‖ who build a world, rather than to 
be a heroic ―Achilles‖ building a lonely ego.  They were schools that may have coached 
                                                 
50 See Jennifer Glancy‘s (2006) work, Slavery in Early Christianity.  Slaves were referred to simply as 
―bodies‖, soma, and as things, res; were often found by slave traders as infants left to die on garbage heaps 
(exposed) and nursed by other lactating slaves; were often raised as child and adult sex workers; had to 
stand in their master‘s stead when a sentence of corporal punishment was handed out; and were excluded 
from the honor/shame system because they were in a state of perpetual shame.  Her work is a chilling 
reminder of the horrible conditions slaves in the Greco-Roman world lived in.  She specifically highlights 
the conflict slaves were put in by Pauline household codes for sexual purity since slaves did not enjoy 
bodily integrity and were therefore unable to resist the sexual advances of their masters, or to prevent him 
from bringing them to the harbor to serve as a source of prostitution income. 
51 Curse tablets, or defixiones, were small lead tablets on which were inscribed various spells and curses.  
Rivals who were neighbors, fellow artisans, laborers, etc. invoked the underworld gods and demons to 
immobilize (defixio) or bind their opponents through curses.  Meggitt (1998, 32-34, 56, 145, 170) argues 
that this represents further evidence of the precarious existence of 99% of the inhabitants of the first 
century CE who resorted to the use of curse tablets to gain some advantage in achieving economic stability.  
Turcan (2001, 148) points out that they represented a rise in magic and astrology during the early Empire, 
even among elites.  This resort to magic and belief in its efficacy may represent the construction of a first 
order adult mind.  
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one toward the understanding that the world was bigger than, and often very different 
from, one‘s own perception of it, and that that is actually a good thing.  They were 
schools lasting for nearly a millennium whose ―job‖ it may have been to patiently 
exclude from the adult population an order of consciousness better negotiated in early 
childhood;
52
 just as various cultural schools in the modern West (unknowingly) carry on 
the new job of patiently excluding from the adult population a second order of 
consciousness by better supporting its appearance and evolution in childhood and early 
adolescence.  
Paul‘s preaching and community organizing, then, could have disturbed the 
second order members of the Corinthian community for another reason.  Not only were 
they confused by Paul‘s refusal to credit honor with any merit, they may have been 
frightened by his doing away with shame, since the shame of exposing impulsive adults 
to public corporal punishment and expulsion may have been the only tool they, or the 
culture, knew how to use against rule-challenged adults.  To put it another way, third 
order‘s invitation to internalize values meant that right behavior had to move from 
following the rules because failing to do so could hurt my body, my status and my life, to 
fidelity to values because failing to do so could let my people down, hurt my 
relationships, and grieve my leaders.  Shame had to become guilt.  But guilt is a 
                                                 
52 I realize this is a problematic statement since ―childhood‖ is not only a modern concept but a modern 
invention.  Consideration of the child as a child, and not as a ―little adult‖ that can be made to work in 
fields, shops, brothels and factories; one who enjoys certain rights as a child to bodily integrity, safety, 
healthcare, education, and freedom from labor, is a very recent, and still inadequately realized, 
development.  My point is that the ―exclusion‖ of first order consciousness from the adult population would 
likely come from supports and challenges within an adult culture of embeddedness geared toward second 
order, but especially from creating a small space within childhood (first eight years), and properly 
supporting and challenging children therein, where many more children as children could make the move 
from impulsive to imperial order of consciousness. 
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dangerous thing in a shame-based world because it undermines the power behind shame, 
not by breaking the stick of punishment, but by bringing the stick ―inside‖, to whack 
oneself, as it were, for failing to live up to the values and expectations of valued 
relationships, revered leaders, and sacred traditions.  When a community embedded in 
needs and interests (second order) is invited to move the source of punishment within the 
individual, when you turn the stick into a metaphor (because you can at third order), it 
represents an invitation that may have troubled such a community brooding over some of 
its members who are not even aware that there is a stick!  Paul‘s invitation to move the 
stick inside may have terrified rule-following adults whose own stick-fearing behavior 
led them to believe that only this could work against the impulsive adult (who likely 
feared neither sticks nor shame) struggling to be ―socialized‖ into a second order world. 
 
Conversations at Cross Purposes in First Century Corinth 
 
When the Corinthians might have been expecting rules, Paul handed them values 
from which rules were derived; gospel values about caring for those who went hungry in 
the assembly meals while others gorged and drank to excess.  This meant rules, too, had 
to ―go inside,‖ to be relativized by internally operative values constitutive of rules.  When 
the Corinthians sought status and vied for roles of prominence, Paul relativized all roles 
by doing away with status altogether.  When the Corinthians sought high profile leaders 
to ―belong to‖ such as Cephas, Apollos, or Paul, whose status could rub off and increase 
their own, Paul insisted that they belong, not to elite individuals, but to a new community 
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whose gathering was constitutive of the Body of Christ.  Paul addressed their concrete 
sense of belonging through a highly abstract notion of community.  He highlighted a 
relationship to Christ through baptism and guidance by the Holy Spirit such that their 
coming together in love constituted the very making-present the Body of Christ; that 
disrespecting a disadvantaged member meant profaning Christ whom Paul equated with 
the church.  Thus one‘s relationship to Christ transformed the place of roles in the 
―association‖ that was the church, subordinating them to the gifts of the spirit in a 
hermeneutic of love that put others before one‘s own needs and interests.   
It is helpful in examining the New Testament corpus to differentiate the Pauline 
churches from Paul himself.  The members of the community at Corinth clearly took their 
experiences and understandings, not only of voluntary associations, but every aspect of 
their Greco-Roman experience with them into the new Christian community founded by 
Paul.  What was different, and perhaps ―uniquely‖ baffling for many of the members of 
the community, was Paul who challenged them to form a community grounded in 
mutuality.  If we read Paul‘s letters not as descriptions of the communities he founded, 
but as the expectations he had for their members, one quickly recognizes that the 
community acted very much like other inhabitants of the Greco-Roman world, including 
those within voluntary associations; a fact which was the primary source of conflict with 
their founder whose practical theology included mental demands that were confusing at 
best, and offensive at worst.  The ―uniqueness,‖ though it is hardly an appropriate term, 
may have been the revolutionary third order expectations demanded of its members; 
members who nevertheless failed to adequately achieve them.  A world dominated by 
 131 
second order mental complexity, a world whose laws celebrated a precarious victory over 
a lawless primitive order of consciousness where magic and violence were once 
ubiquitous; a world strongly defending against the ―reckless‖ appearance of a minority 
first order consciousness in the adult population, could recognize and respond to, and 
even be converted by, the gospel of Jesus Christ as preached by Paul, but only from an 
order of mind structured around concrete needs and interests.   
Clearly Christian conversion is not always an indication of transformation toward 
increased complexity of consciousness.  The limitations of this mind to live up to the call 
to live for others, to subordinate self interest to the corporate interests of the Body of 
Christ, to subordinate rules and roles to a divinely established relationship that grounds 
both, and to see their assembly not as a locus for status seeking but as an organic Christic 
unity, caused much vexation for Paul.  But beyond bafflement, it perhaps caused little 
trouble for the members of the Corinthian community who stood ready to unseat their 
founder at the appearance of a ―better,‖ more credentialed role model possessing greater 
rhetorical skills (Apollos), or higher spiritual pedigree (Cephas and the ―superapostles‖).  
It has caused, also, some scholars to read Paul as if they were reading the communities 
Paul founded.  That is, scholars may have confused the expectations of the community‘s 
founder with the community itself, assuming that Paul‘s expectations were, though rarely 
realized, entirely within their grasp; or the fact that they failed to achieve these 
expectations was a consequence of social, economic, or political factors rather than the 
mental complexity of the community.  
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Paul may have been among a tiny minority in the first century CE who 
constructed meaning above the second order.  But third order expectations apparent in 
Paul‘s preaching were probably not unique to Christianity in the first century.  It is likely, 
though not part of this study, that other communities (the Jewish synagogue, or 
philosophical schools, for example) had members who were beyond the cognitive-
cultural threshold of second order, or had leaders who placed expectations on their 
members that were beyond what was expected in the Greco-Roman culture.  What may 
be different is not the uniqueness of the Christian church in terms of its origins and 
pedigree but that, along with other select communities, the revolutionary challenge to 
practice third order mutuality came with leadership and community supports that made 
evolving toward it a real possibility.  It remains for future study to determine if Paul 
himself put in place such supports that adequately ―held‖ a community whose members 
were called to live, not for self but for others.  
What this case study demonstrates is a community and its founder in what Kegan 
refers to as a consciousness conversation at cross purposes.  But Paul did not exactly put 
the community in over its head.  That is, there was no emergent third order in the general, 
non-elite, population that was organizing beneath a culture dominated by second order 
consciousness that, while not dominant, was determinative of cultural expectations.  If 
the evolution of consciousness requires certain advantages (for example, education and a 
significant distance from destitution – something between 1%-9% of the population 
enjoyed in the first century CE), then Paul was among a tiny elite that, far from placing 
mentally complex demands on less complex masses, was likely hoarding an epistemology 
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all to itself.  It belonged to an elite that was more likely to punish or exploit displays of 
mutuality or actions of obedience arising, not from subservience to system of honor-
shame, but from a commitment to the gospel, since such displays would be perceived as 
destabilizing the ―imperial‖ axis around which the world turned.   
Visions often come complete and their ability to retain their original fecundity 
depends on the recipient‘s ongoing availability to the vision.  Had Paul been more 
attentive to the limitations of the second order mind; had he ended his defense at the 
articulation of his impressive credentials without detailing his many humiliations 
including corporal violence reserved for slaves, he may have been more convincing to his 
mostly gentile audience embedded in a culture of honor and shame.  But we who dwell in 
a period one hundred generations later would be the worse for it.  He preached an 
attractive risen Lord whose spirit bestowed palpable and useful gifts within the 
community.  But he preached, too, a dying Lord whose humiliations and embarrassments 
may be enacted in those who follow him in this life.  The Corinthians may have preferred 
only the former – an impressive, mighty man-god who breaks the bonds of death and 
promises to all who believe a similar death-breaking – rather than a human being who 
suffered a shameful death reserved only for the slave and the criminal; a being whose 
sufferings Paul saw worked out on his own body and in his life and ministry.  But Paul‘s 
great vision is seminal today because he attended not only to the needs of the people he 
encountered, but also to the demands of the vision itself.  He provided what might be 
considered an inadequate holding environment to first century inhabitants because he 
attempted to hold not just their world, but a world in motion; a world that, while moving 
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and transforming throughout the ages, would continue to find vitality in the gospel vision 
he made himself available to. 
 
Implications 
 
What this chapter has attended to is the possibility of doing a constructive 
developmental hermeneutic of groups in antiquity.  By examining the first century 
religious, cultural, and social context, and situating the Corinthian community squarely 
within that context what emerges are ―cultures of mind‖ constructing meaning 
recognizable ways.  A constructive developmental hermeneutic of groups does not only 
look for a dominant order of consciousness, it also posits developmental complexity in 
which multiple orders of consciousness are present.  Further, it posits that 
developmentally diverse groups are also dynamic in which the motion of different orders 
of consciousness are related, correlated, and coordinated to each other.  By positing 
complexity and dynamism researchers may be in a better position to nuance their 
interpretations of community behavior.  For example, in Corinth, tenacious two‘s (second 
order) were not only reacting to an audacious three (third order) curriculum, but also 
defending against ferocious one‘s (first order) who, as this study argues, were likely 
present in the community.  The tenacity of the dominant second order constituency is 
reflected in its struggle to maintain its balance against Paul‘s destabilizing preaching at 
one end of the plank, while simultaneously maintaining its balance against the presence 
of impulsive, first order adults at the other end.   
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What this study argues is that Paul‘s curriculum was radically new and therefore 
little understood in a community that had a tiny or non-existent third order constituency.  
Therefore, there were few members of the group who were able to ―get it‖ and act as 
internal leaven, creating intra-group supports for and challenges to late second order 
members.  In first century Corinth, it was a first order constituency that likely felt in over 
its head, but one that found at least some support and challenge in various voluntary 
associations.  Third order in the Corinthian church had not risen to the level where its 
demands were culturally determinative, where mutuality, for example, is a source of 
confusion and trouble for a second order constituency.  It is likely, in fact, that 
communities in the West took well over a millennium to grow a third order base sizeable 
enough to begin to generate a cultural curriculum that would put a majority second order 
population ―in over its head.‖  Third order in the early Empire could only be cultured on 
the sly, in select communities who supported and challenged their members to evolve 
beyond an imperial, second order convention. 
Instead of reading ancient texts such as Paul‘s letters and either ignoring the 
mental make up of the community, or assuming that its response to Paul would fall within 
a range of mental complexity qualitatively much like our own, a constructive 
developmental hermeneutic insists on reading the community‘s response through its own 
orders of mental complexity.  It requires asking not only the manner in which they 
responded to Paul, but in what way was their response a reflection of how they were 
knowing.  In the next chapter I take up features of Bernard Lonergan‘s theory of 
cognition and epistemology. It sheds light why concrete, practical knowing is so 
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―tenacious‖ and difficult to evolve beyond.  We will also look at Lonergan‘s realms of 
meaning in which he plots very generally the evolution beyond concrete common sense 
knowing to theoretical knowing and what he refers to as interiority.  In chapter five, I 
attend to his treatment of dialectic as a way of surfacing different ways of knowing and 
drawing attention to the necessity for conversion.  Doing so will help address some of the 
challenges highlighted in chapter two about adapting constructive developmental theory 
to groups. 
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Chapter Four: Bernard Lonergan’s Theory of Cognition and Epistemology in 
Group Settings 
 
Theorizing out of different fields of study, Bernard Lonergan (philosophy and 
theology) and Robert Kegan (psychology and adult education) provide us with complex 
theories of human transformation.  Bringing these two theorists into conversation helps to 
better understand the mystery of human transformation, and further ground this study‘s 
theory of evolving groups.  Including Lonergan in a study of group cognitive 
development is helpful for several reasons.  First, Lonergan‘s theory offers a helpful 
framework for assessing the cognitive complexity of the pedagogical context within 
which dialogue occurred between laity and hierarchy.  It allows one to ask several 
important questions: What did diocesan leaders expect of lay parishioners in terms of 
cognitive complexity; what was the heuristic quality of the discovery parishioners were 
expected to make (for example, did the pedagogical context anticipate the creation of new 
knowledge?); and how did the curriculum account for unanticipated outcomes?  Relying 
on Lonergan, chapter six and Appendix 2 provide a detailed analysis of the complexity of 
the pedagogical context and reveals that from 2001 to 2004 the groups of this study 
demonstrated a group cognitive complexity that went considerably beyond the 
complexity of the hierarchy‘s curriculum. 
Second, Lonergan‘s theory provides a helpful lens through which to evaluate 
group knowledge production and the capacity of that new knowledge to direct action.  
What the group came to know is an important component of this.  However, was the 
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experience of coming to know transformative for the group as measured by what it did 
with its new knowledge?  While Kegan‘s constructive developmental theory is relied on 
for determining group complexity (diversity of orders of mental complexity), Lonergan 
and Kegan together (chapter five) provide a theoretical lens through which to examine 
group dynamism, or conflict, through which the groups over time turned knowledge 
production into increasingly complex forms of group action.  Finally, Lonergan‘s theory 
helps to address a very perplexing question in constructive developmental theory: how do 
individuals evolve into later orders of mental complexity?  While the conclusions I draw 
are not without problems, they nevertheless provide a helpful way of assessing how a 
given cognitive constituency (members of a group who share the same order of mental 
complexity) might evolve in the context of intentional groups. 
 
Lonergan’s Theory of Cognition and Epistemology 
 
Intentional groups wonder.  What they wonder about orients the problems they 
see and pose.  But orienting wonder is directed toward varying notions of what 
constitutes the ―reality‖ groups inhabit.  What is wonderable and what is real is 
experienced differently depending on the mental complexity of a given cognitive 
constituency.
53
  The capacity of one cognitive constituency to grow into the awareness 
that there are other ways of asking questions and judging reality is a profoundly social 
and socially constructed experience.  Lonergan provides a helpful framework for 
                                                 
53 A cognitive constituency is a term used to describe the members of a group who share a particular order 
of consciousness (Kegan) or pattern of knowing (Lonergan). 
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discovering different patterns of knowing that, when applied to organized social settings, 
furthers this study‘s development of the idea of complex, dynamic, and evolving groups.  
It is important therefore to review Lonergan‘s cognitive theory and epistemology. 
Lonergan asserts that human knowing is both conscious and intentional; a 
consciousness and intentionality set in motion by the underlying dynamism of the 
unrestricted desire to know.  What Kegan refers to as the self, Lonergan refers to as the 
subject.  Consciousness refers to the operating subject and intentionality to the objects 
intended by the subject.  Said differently, the subject is operative consciousness; what the 
subject does is intend objects.  Because the world, and one‘s experience in the world, is 
wonderable, one‘s experience becomes generative of an increasingly complex set of 
questions as one moves, in inquisitive wondering, from experience to understanding; in 
critical wondering, from understanding to judging; and in ethical wondering, from 
judging to deciding.  As one moves toward increasing complexity, one is increasingly 
more self-aware and therefore more world-distinct (Lonergan, 1972, 29).   
Wonder, being, and the good
54
 are root ideas in Lonergan‘s cognitive theory, 
epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics.  Groups understand, they judge, and they choose.  
The groups of this study moved from inquiry within a practical world of rules and roles to 
inquiry about the values that include and transcend rules and roles.  But the intra-group 
and intergroup values were discovered to be in conflict.  Conflict, or dialectic, exposes 
the different patterns of knowing within which values are articulated by members of the 
group and therefore becomes a potentially transformative experience for the group.  It is 
                                                 
54 It should be noted here that Lonergan tends to use common terms and uploads them with significant 
meaning. 
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here that a group can discover that the transformational experience of knowledge 
production and enactment is guided and directed by a nascent vision that itself needs to 
be articulated.  A vision can be understood as an organizing narrative of intentional 
groups that brings together conflicting values into a coherent account of what constitutes 
the ―reality‖ they inhabit (being – metaphysics).  This is taken up in detail toward the end 
of the next chapter, and its implications are reviewed in chapter six.  Better understanding 
this necessitates a review of Lonergan‘s root themes, particularly wonder, being, and the 
good. 
Wonder is the orienting, underlying, and unrestricted desire that permeates all 
human knowing.  But this potency, or desire to know, is always directed to an object of 
knowing, which is some aspect of reality, or being.  All knowing is ordered to and 
ordered by being; being understood as object(s) within the horizon of all knowing.  
Lonergan does not begin by defining being or the notion of being (the task of 
metaphysics, or a theory of reality); nor does he begin with determining the validity of 
knowledge and how ―subject‖ is differentiated from, but related to, ―object‖ (the task of 
epistemology, or a theory of objective knowing).  Rather, he begins with cognitive theory 
by asking: what are we doing when we are knowing (1972, pp. 25; 261)?  Lonergan‘s 
deceptively simple answer is that human beings experience, understand, judge, and 
decide.   
As one evolves toward ―differentiation of consciousness,‖ or a change in the 
complexity of one‘s knowing, one‘s capacity to wonder more explicitly directs and 
orients the data of sense and the data of consciousness.  This movement corresponds to 
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the increasing personal stake one has when one moves from experience to understanding 
to judgment and to decision (Flanagan 2002).  As choosers of the good, we are most 
invested in and tend to carefully deliberate about the process of choosing because in 
doing so we not only commit ourselves, we create ourselves.  As judgers of the real and 
the true we are also heavily invested, though less so than choosing, in the process of 
coming to know, because what we judge requires that we take responsibility for our 
judging.  Insight, however, is a spontaneous function of consciousness which seeks 
patterns in the data of experience.  Even so, we can make insight more likely by how 
intelligently we ask the question and whether or not we proceed heuristically toward the 
unknown.  Though spontaneous, insight it is not entirely out of our control.  Experience is 
most spontaneous; senses attend to smells, touch, taste, sights and sound and present their 
data to consciousness; memories pour fourth; and imagination creatively erects schemes 
of the real and the possible.  If wonder is at one end of the process of coming to know, 
being and the good are at the other end.  Being and the good draw one toward becoming a 
knower of the real and a doer of the good. 
 
Transcendental Method 
 
Lonergan‘s transcendental method is a method of self transcendence that 
describes and explains the subject‘s movement through a succession of differentiations of 
consciousness.  Each differentiation as a form of self transcendence is an experience in 
which the subject ―objectifies‖ his own ―subjectivities‖ (1972, pp. 14, 262).  
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Transcendental method consists of ―a heightening of consciousness that brings to light 
our conscious and intentional operations‖ and leads to the answers to cognitional, 
epistemological, and metaphysical questions (1972, pp. 25; 261).  Cognitional theory as 
the starting point represents a reversal of the Aristotelian starting point of metaphysics, 
from whose terms and relations he (Aristotle) derived epistemology and a theory of 
cognition.   
To repeat, the question, ―why is doing that knowing?‖ is an epistemological 
question whose terms and relations are derived from a theory of cognition.  Epistemology 
concerns itself with the validity, or objectivity, of human knowing (Flanagan, 140).  It is 
a theory of objective knowing and, according to Lonergan, usually begins by posing the 
wrong question, such as, how do I know that objects in the world correspond to what is in 
my mind?  This not only posits a dualism between known objects and knowing subjects, 
but also assumes that both are already known, and known immediately through 
experience and perception (Flanagan, 141), rather than known through the tripartite 
structure of human knowing (experience, understanding, and judging).  Lonergan‘s way 
of asking the epistemological question, (why do I do knowing?) seeks to attain some 
grasp of being or reality.  Being, or what one judges as so or not so, makes knowing what 
it is; being or reality is the objective of knowing, and correct judgment (and the totality of 
all correct judgments) makes one an objective, valid knower.  Being is the subject‘s grasp 
of object.  This becomes a crucial connection between Lonergan and Kegan below. 
Everyone already knows transcendental method in the sense that everyone is at 
least to some degree attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible.  At the same time, 
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using it can be quite challenging since it is ―a matter of heightening one‘s consciousness 
by objectifying it, and that is something that each one, ultimately, has to do in himself 
and for himself‖ (1972, p. 14).  Consciousness objectified reveals operations of 
consciousness.
55
  But these do not just happen; they are operations related to each other 
occurring in an observable pattern.  Lonergan defines method as ―a normative pattern of 
recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results‖ (4).  He 
uses the metaphor of the wheel to describe transcendental method; it is a wheel that turns 
and rolls along.
56
  The operations of consciousness both recur according to an 
―unrevisable‖ pattern generating cumulative results, and develop, generating 
progressively more complex patterns of knowing.  A subject is a knower capable of 
developing ever more complex patterns of knowing in the transformational process 
toward self-appropriation. 
Object and Intentionality   
Lonergan refers to the operations as ―transitive‖ in the sense that they take objects 
(we hear something, we inquire into something, we have insights about something, we 
verify something, etc).  He means this not only in the grammatical sense, ―but also in the 
psychological sense that by the operation one becomes aware of the object‖ (p. 7).  Thus 
the operations of consciousness are intentional in that they intend objects, which can be 
                                                 
55 For example, experiencing (―seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, tasting, inquiring, imagining‖ p. 6), 
understanding (―understanding, conceiving, formulating,‖ p. 6), judging (―reflecting, marshalling and 
weighing the evidence, judging,‖ p. 6), and deciding (―deliberating, evaluating, deciding, speaking, 
writing,‖ p. 6).   
56 The turning, rolling wheel is a powerful metaphor that helps to link Lonergan to constructive 
developmental theory.  The turning wheel may be understood as the operations of consciousness, akin to 
Kegan‘s notion of meaning making.  The rolling wheel may be understood as the realms of meaning which 
we take up below, akin to Kegan‘s notion of development through various adaptive balances. 
 144 
objects from sense experience (sense, feelings, memory, and imagination) or objects of 
consciousness (the intelligible, the true or real, and the good).  For the former, the object 
of sense experience is intentional by attending to the data of experience.  The latter, 
objects of consciousness, represents a qualitatively different mode of intending.  On the 
level of understanding, for example, consciousness spontaneously seeks patterns in the 
data of experience; the discovered pattern (Eureka!) comes in the form of insight or, as 
Aquinas held, insight into the phantasm (image).  But the image of insight may or may 
not correspond with the actual data of experience; it requires an intelligent organization 
of the data in conception, formulation, and verification (p. 10).     
Consciousness as intentional intends qualitatively different objects; the operations 
of consciousness as experience intend attention; as understanding intend the intelligible; 
as judgment intend the true/real; and as decision intend the good/value.  Attention, the 
intelligible, the true, and the good are what Lonergan calls transcendental notions that are 
derived from objectifying the content of intentionality and serve the purpose of moving 
one from ignorance to knowledge (p. 11).  Knowledge is not the product of ―thinking‖ 
but of knowing; that is, of judging insights into experience.  Transcendental intending is 
unrestricted, comprehensive, and invariant and therefore drives toward ever more 
questions in the quest for a whole, or totality, but in the awareness that answers are 
always incomplete (p. 11).  The operations of consciousness in this radical intending 
therefore lead to four transcendental precepts, or imperatives: be attentive, be intelligent, 
be reasonable, and be responsible.  Each transcendental precept has orienting questions.  
Being attentive asks who, what, where, how and when.  Being intelligent asks these as 
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well (leading to potentially descriptive knowing), but also why (leading to potentially 
explanatory knowing).  Being reasonable asks whether it is so, true, or real.  Finally, 
being responsible ask whether it is good.  Each imperative is a qualitative movement 
beyond the previous operation.  Therefore, the operations themselves are progressively 
more complex but, as we will see, the operating subject is him or herself also a ―genetic‖ 
or developing subject moving toward increasing complexity of knowing. 
Subject and Consciousness.   
The operations are intentional, which presumes an intending operator: the 
conscious subject.  In a psychological sense, the subject is aware of himself operating, he 
is ―present to himself operating, experiencing himself operating‖ (Lonergan, 1972, p. 8).  
With intentionality, objects are made present to the subject; and with consciousness, the 
subject becomes present to himself in the operations (p. 8).  In a conscious state, there are 
four qualitatively different levels of consciousness: the empirical, the intellectual, the 
rational, and the responsible.  The empirical level consists of experiencing one‘s 
experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding.  But since the person has her focus 
on the object with the operations themselves in the background, it remains ―just 
consciousness‖ as Lonergan states (p. 15).  One must struggle to attend not only to the 
object intended, but also to the intending subject in order to notice or become aware of 
(conscious of) what one it doing when one inquires, experiences insights, crafts these into 
concepts, critically reflects, assembles and weighs the evidence, judges, deliberates and 
decides.  The subject as conscious and intentional also evolves toward increasing 
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complexity of consciousness or, what Lonergan refers to as a differentiation of 
consciousness.  He explains this in what he refers to as the realms of meaning. 
 
Realms of Meaning 
 
Lonergan‘s realms of meaning are common sense, theory, interiority, and 
transcendence.  They represent an evolutive transformation or developmental movement 
from undifferentiated consciousness in common sense, to a fully differentiated 
consciousness in interiority.  One can fit what Lonergan says about the realm of 
transcendence on a postage stamp but, as we will see when we take up conversion, there 
are significant implications for this post-interiority realm, particularly for religious 
conversion (below, and in chapter five).  The operations of consciousness operate within 
each of the realms of meaning with increasing complexity.  The realms of meaning are 
successive stages and represent a qualitative, meta-growth of a person toward self-
appropriation, or the self-knowing, self-transcending self.  This qualitative growth from 
the previous realm neither destroys nor simply advances, but transforms by way of 
―sublation‖ that which came before.  Sublation is a term Lonergan derived from Karl 
Rahner and means ―transcending and including.‖ 
Primitive Consciousness   
Lonergan refers to primitive consciousness in several places in Method, but he 
never develops it as a realm of meaning.  It is a fully undifferentiated consciousness.  In 
primitive consciousness, language is used to point out what can be directly and 
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immediately presented to the senses or represented to the imagination in the case of 
symbols (1972, 87); however, the generic, or general, can be neither presented, nor 
represented nor, for that matter, directly perceived.  Lonergan points out that in Homer 
there are words for glancing, peering and staring, but no word for seeing (87).  Relying 
on Bruno Snell‘s classic, The Discovery of the Mind (1960), Lonergan describes this 
―realm‖ of consciousness as not thinking, but as conversing with objects of sense and 
imaginable experience (262).  In Homer, ―inner mental processes are represented by 
personified interchanges. Where we would expect an account of the hero‘s thoughts and 
feelings, Homer has him converse with a god or goddess, with his horse or a river, or 
with some part of himself such as his heart or his temper‖ (88).  ―Within the literary 
tradition there occurred a reflection on knowledge. For Homer, knowledge comes by 
perception or by hearsay‖ (90). 
In primitive consciousness, because the world is as one perceives it to be (the 
world has no autonomy or integrity apart from one‘s perception of it in the parlance of 
Kegan‘s first order consciousness), wonder could be understood to reside in objects 
themselves.  Wonder is extrinsic because the ego projects sense, feeling, memory and 
imagination onto objects in the world.  Because memory, for example, is projected onto 
stories, myths, places, objects, and people, it suggests that it cannot be internally accessed 
by individuals as a resource for aiding intelligent action.  Therefore, the consequences of 
one‘s own past actions may be beyond one‘s mental reach as a reliable guide for directing 
present choices.  Questions regarding self experience – questions that are directed to 
one‘s own experience as one’s own – are therefore rare.  The movement beyond primitive 
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consciousness may be referred to as an encounter with the juridical exigence,
57
 by which 
I mean that, at some point in the history of human development thoughts and feelings 
began to be juried inside.
58
  That ―point‖ is common sense. 
Common Sense Knowing   
One of the charges against theories of psychological development is that they are 
prone to elitism; that their proponents sit at the peak of a developmental mountain 
looking ―down‖ on foothills of the ―lower‖ slopes of everyone else.  This seems to imply 
that later or higher stages are somehow ―better‖ or make one a better person, and that the 
task of education is therefore to ―move‖ learners ―up‖ the developmental mound to later, 
higher, better stages from which they, too, can look ―down on‖ (or so the elitist charge 
suggests), others ―beneath‖ them.  Whatever the merits of this charge, Lonergan partially 
solves it by making everyone common sense knowers, at least at times.  He does this by 
referring to cognitive contexts one can move in and out of as needed, a notion developed 
more fully in the next chapter.  Because contexts change, the exigencies of that context 
call for different ways of knowing.  The broad social context in which communities get 
things done and solve practical problems on behalf of improving day to day living, is a 
common sense context.  Even theorists and scientists must, as Lonergan points out, leave 
the lab and return to homes where common sense, not theory, operates (1972, 83).     
                                                 
57 We take up Lonergan‘s various exigencies in more detail in chapter six.  He refers to the systematic 
exigence, critical exigence, and methodological exigence as critical moments in the West where new stages 
of meaning were introduced.  He did not use the term, juridical exigence, nor did he explain how human 
cognition evolved from primitive consciousness into common sense knowing. 
58 I use the term ―juried inside‖ to emphasize the experience of internally thinking and feeling rather than 
projecting both onto external objects; this internal regulation does not mean that one is aware of what one is 
doing when thoughts and feelings are juried inside. 
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Common sense is an adult pattern of knowing that has been operative from 
antiquity to the present.  The difference between then and now is that the content 
available to common sense knowers has vastly increased.  Common sense knowers use 
practical reason to address current, local, everyday problems on behalf of living more 
intelligently and successfully.  Joseph Flanagan, S. J., a thorough and accessible 
interpreter of Lonergan, states that this realm of meaning is a ―specialized pattern of 
knowing‖ that relates things and others to the self – it understands things in subject-
centered ways (2002, 127).  Common sense does not abstract from the particular and the 
concrete to wonder about things as they relate to each other or things as they are in 
themselves, because it operates entirely within a descriptive context.  That is, common 
sense does not seek the universal and comprehensive within an explanatory context that 
relates and correlates things as they are in relation to each other.  To repeat, common 
sense relates things and others to the self – its knowing is subject-centered.  However, 
common sense can and does make correct judgments within its descriptive context.  
Moreover, this realm of meaning can correctly generalize from particular instances to a 
succession of similar cases (Flanagan 2002, 128) so that development in knowledge 
occurs. 
Common sense also does not seek to move out of its own descriptive context.  Its 
driving question is ―what‖ something is, not why it is the way it is, and so it does not 
abstract from sensible, material presentations to discover patterns or forms (the ―why‖ of 
things).  Therefore knowing and choosing occur within the level of the senses, feelings, 
memory and imagination – what Lonergan calls the level of experience or the empirical 
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level of consciousness.  It is a purely descriptive context; that is, non-abstract relation of 
things to the subject, which makes understanding undifferentiated from experience itself 
– one has insights without knowing what one is doing when one has insights.  And so, 
contents (objects of intentional consciousness) understood and contents defined are all 
derived from sense, memory and imagination.  However, things are the way they are not 
because of the material parts, but because of the patterns in which things are embodied; 
patterns or forms which are abstracted from the material parts (Flanagan 2002, 19).   
In common sense, one could say that wonder is directed toward and orients 
experience.  This makes experience – sensing, feeling, remembering, and imagining – 
internally wonderable.  Experience has ―gone inside‖ which enables one to access past 
consequences as a reliable guide to present choices; to hold memories internally without 
their needing to reside exclusively in or be distributed to tribal myths, physical symbols, 
sacred rituals, photo albums and the like; to generate imaginative schemes of the 
possible; and to internally wonder about and reflect on one‘s own sense experience.  It is 
for this reason that practical knowing, the what of things, is such a powerful, if exclusive, 
way of knowing for common sense knowers.  When one becomes differentiated from 
one‘s own experience, it becomes wonderable in new ways: it can become intelligible, it 
can be reflected upon, and it can be deliberated about.  In primitive consciousness, 
experience is assumed; to use a Kegan term, one is ―embedded‖ in experience.  Therefore 
one cannot deliberate about it, reflect upon it or make it intelligible as experience; one 
simply experiences.  To make experience an object of intentionality (common sense) 
greatly adds control to human experience.  What remains undifferentiated is 
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understanding.  Since common sense derives its objects exclusively from experience, 
understanding is assumed. 
Common sense and Kegan‘s second order of consciousness have important points 
of connection, one of which is the question of certainty.  Common sense can be 
understood as an explicitly adult version of second order consciousness.  A difficulty is 
presented when leaders chafe at the need common sense knowing and second order 
consciousness has for being ―correct‖, as if the correctness is the problem.  Common 
sense knowers, because they can judge correctly, are able to be correct and to know with 
certainty; they judge within a limited horizon, but they can arrive at certainty within that 
horizon.  Any ―bolt from the blue;‖ that is, any knowledge coming from a horizon of 
greater complexity, is translated by common sense into common sense content, and is 
judged as such.  The problem is not the correctness and certainty common sense knowers 
so strongly defend.  The challenge is recognizing the limitations of common sense 
knowing presented by its ―location‖ exclusively within a specialized and limited 
descriptive context, and it is in recognizing the tendency of common sense knowers to 
feel they are omnicompetent, as Lonergan puts it (1972, 53, 231); to not notice the 
horizon of knowing within which they operate, nor its limitations.  The problem is, again, 
not the certainty, but inability to reflect on the limitations of one‘s present common sense 
horizon – that what one knows is not all there is to know, and how one knows is not the 
only way of knowing.  One implication for leaders may be to not confront the correctness 
by pointing out how it is ―wrong‖ within a broader context.  Rather it is to affirm its 
correct status within its specific context, and then present new problems and questions for 
 152 
wonder that cannot be answered within the framework of common sense knowing.  It is 
not to confront the caboose and its cabin of correct answers, but to frontload new 
questions at the head of the train in the hopes that it will switch onto the tracks that take it 
out to the country. 
Theoretical Knowing  
Lonergan‘s examples of theoretical knowing, naturally as the name indicates, 
come almost entirely from the fields of mathematics, physics, and other sciences.  
Theoretical knowing uses technical language as opposed to ordinary common sense 
language, in service to working out the relations of things to each other.  It ―refers to the 
subject and his operations only as objects‖ (Lonergan, 1972, 257).  In other words, 
theoretical knowers are using the operations of consciousness in a more differentiated 
manner than common sense, but they have not fully appropriated the operations of 
consciousness in the sense that they are aware of what they are doing when they are 
theorizing.  Theoretical knowers are not self knowing knowers, however vast and 
complex their theories prove to be.  Having transcended and included descriptive 
knowing, they are knowers within an explanatory context.  That is, they are not simply 
the interested knowers of common sense whose knowing is subject-centered, but are 
―disinterested knowers‖ seeking the relations of things to each other.  The disinterested 
knower means one recognizes a world utterly distinct from one‘s own self and one‘s own 
experience; a world of ideas where things are subsistent and intelligible with no 
immediate or necessary connection to the subject and his imagination. 
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Lonergan highlights two key points in history where theory made its entrance: 
Fourth century BCE Athens and Renaissance science.  In the former, Socrates initiated 
the ―Greek discovery of the mind‖ by asking a question that had never been asked before; 
the question of the definition of things such as wisdom, courage, holiness, and love.  
While Socrates failed to achieve satisfactory definition, Aristotle worked out not only 
definitions of all the virtues, but included ―sins‖, or vices, of excess on either side of each 
virtue (Lonergan, 1972).  The key figure in Renaissance science is Galileo who was the 
first to articulate the laws of terrestrial motion in a systematic treatise that included 
experiments that tested and verified his laws.  In theoretical knowers, wonder orients 
experience and understanding.  It is the beginning of inquisitive knowing that moves 
beyond practical knowing directed to the self to understanding patterns and the relations 
of things to each other.  It is the beginning of the capacity for abstract thinking, of 
constructing intelligible meanings that find invariable sequences or laws in the variables 
of experience; it is the capacity to discover the invariant form (the pattern) in the 
variables of a given experience (the parts). 
The presence of common sense and theory can be seen in the dialectic, or conflict, 
that occurred in the 2001 parish group.  In order to limit the workload of parish priests in 
an era where their numbers were declining while the number of parishes remained stable, 
diocesan leadership either established a rule, or insisted on the execution of a pre-existing 
rule (it is unclear in the documents), that priests were not to celebrate Mass more than 
four times on a given weekend.  Given the continual decline of priest numbers, the rule 
meant that within a five to ten year period some parish communities would have to 
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consolidate or close in order to continue to celebrate weekend liturgies (that is, if priests 
were to preside at no more than four liturgies, and priest numbers were in continual 
decline, then the number of parishes had to decline if all were to continue to celebrate the 
Eucharist on weekends).  Consistent with the newly emphasized rule, the diocese 
proposed a series of consolidations and some closures.  One of the parishes of this study 
was proposed to be ―closed (or sold)‖ (parentheses original).   
Some in the group experienced the situation within a purely descriptive, common 
sense, context.  It was a simple matter of determining what the problem was (they might 
lose one of their parishes to closure because of the priest shortage), and to propose what 
alternative solutions were available (finding more priests, reducing the number of times 
Mass was celebrated, using retired or foreign priests).  In proposing these solutions they 
took for granted the rules (in this case, bishops make the rules, and priests are not to 
celebrate more than four Masses per weekend), the established roles within the church 
(bishop, priest, deacon, lay people), as well as the established jurisdiction of each (the 
bishop has total local jurisdiction within his diocese, priests partial but comprehensive 
jurisdiction within the parishes they pastor, and lay people nominal jurisdiction within 
parish finance councils).   
Others in the group, however, were able to abstract from the rules, roles and 
jurisdictions out of which the proposal emerged to ask why things were the way they 
were.  These same members went beyond how the proposal might affect them practically 
and immediately, to understand how the various orders in the church stood in relation to 
each other; and further, that the bishop‘s proposal did not seem to them to consider the 
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whole church, but only its ordained members.  That is, these members were not 
considering the crisis exclusively in relation to themselves, but had abstracted from the 
concrete particularities of the immediate situation and attended to how the orders of the 
church are in relation to each other, and how the needs of one order (priests and the need 
to place limits on what could be asked of them in the exercise of their pastoral 
responsibilities) must not ignore or trump the needs of another order (lay parishioners and 
the need to keep viable parishes open despite a shortage of ordained leaders).  Having 
abstracted thus, they then returned to the immediate, particular context and judged that 
the bishop‘s proposal represented a strictly priest-centered model.  It was, to them, a 
model that exclusively favored the needs of pastors to not be overextended, but did so at 
the expense of parish communities whose viability was now tied, not to the adequacy of 
their own exercise of ministry and mission, but to the availability of priests.  In the 2001 
group, however, there is little evidence that its members went beyond the complexity of 
the above two arguments and assembled a response grounded in interiority, or fourth 
order consciousness. For example, understanding that relations (a theoretical context) 
constitute rules and roles (common sense context), they did not in 2001 organize this 
value (relations) together with other values (mutuality, ministry, mission) under a more 
comprehensive vision (such as Lumen Gentium’s notion of the church as the People of 
God and church as Sacrament which ground church as institution). 
The Self-Knowing Knower: Interiority   
Interiority is the achievement of differentiated consciousness.  Interiority for 
Lonergan not only grounds one in a proper theory of knowledge, it enables one to give an 
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account of his/her own operations of consciousness, thus enabling one to take 
responsibility resulting from the heightening of consciousness that is for Lonergan self-
appropriation, or the ―objectification of the subject‖ (Lonergan, 1972, 262, 14).59  In self-
knowing knowers, wonder underlies and orients experience, understanding and judgment.  
It is the beginning of critical wonder where one moves from understanding to verifying, 
affirming and judging whether what is understood is also true or real.  Interiority is 
treated more extensively in the next section. 
Lonergan is particularly useful because his theory of cognition posits that each 
realm of meaning has a corresponding stage of meaning (not a psycho-social stage of an 
individual, but a stage in human cognitive history) in which a new pattern of knowing 
appeared in the history of the West; that each appearance was precipitated by a crisis in 
the reigning realm of meaning, a crisis he calls an exigence, or need that exposed the 
fundamental weakness of the earlier realm of meaning‘s capacity to answer new 
questions and address new problems.  Within a given historical stage of meaning, the new 
realm of meaning that appears operates along with previous realms.  Within individuals, 
many realms can operate depending on various exigencies.  Sublation (what both 
Lonergan and Kegan refer to as transcending but including) does not mean the 
disappearance of earlier realms, but that they are ordered and directed by the new, more 
inclusive and more complex realm.  Key here is the recognition that crises precipitate 
transformation, understood as the evolution into a more complex realm of meaning, or 
                                                 
59 This is another subject-object-like statement in Method.  Cast in Kegan‘s language, through the 
achievement of ―interiority‖, one is no longer subject to, but holds as object, key capacities of the self and 
can, accordingly, look at, examine, decide about them rather than be embedded in them. 
 157 
meaning making system.  It is the argument of this study that groups within a given 
culture also evolve through stages of cognitive development.  The model developed looks 
for conflicts that precede and resolve particular crises in groups.  The conflict can be 
within a particular order of mental complexity (for example, conflicts between parish and 
diocese that are argued or negotiated from theory, or third order consciousness, each with 
a different assumption about what constitutes ―convention‖), or between different orders 
of mental complexity (for example, an argument from established convention against an 
argument from ideology).  
Lonergan very generally dates and locates the emergence of new patterns of 
knowing in the West, particularly the emergence of the realm of meaning of theory in, as 
he claims, fourth century BCE Greece.  What Lonergan leaves under developed is the 
likelihood that other, earlier, realms of meaning, remained dominant in the culture. He is 
interested in the appearance of the new realm of meaning, but leaves unsaid the fact that 
its presence operated in a small elite enjoying many advantages (sufficient wealth that 
purchased both leisure and education) the rest of the population did not enjoy or were 
unable to access.  Though theory made its appearance, it likely took centuries, even 
millennia, before it became common in the general population.  It is probable therefore 
that individuals in the general population continued to operate from the realms of 
common sense and what he calls primitive consciousness, with theory present in a tiny, 
highly advantaged, and therefore educated, elite. 
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Operations of Consciousness within Realms of Meaning: An Interpretation 
 
It is curious that Lonergan did not explain how the different operations of 
consciousness differently inhabit the realms of meaning.  How does common sense, for 
example, experience and understand judgment?  What might interiority be assuming 
about decision?  Below is an attempt to address what an individual in each realm of 
meaning might be assuming about the operations of consciousness within Lonergan‘s 
own framework. 
As stated above, in primitive consciousness the self is undifferentiated from 
experience itself and therefore is not able to reflect upon it.  The subject is its senses, 
memory, and imagination, and feelings; one is one‘s experience.  The achievement of 
common sense is the capacity to reflect on experience.  One can now notice what one is 
doing when imagining, remembering, sensing and feeling.  However, common sense 
knowers, using understanding, do not reflect on understanding.  Therefore insights are 
assumed to be full explanations of reality.  That is, common sense knowers do not test or 
verify insights beyond ―what works‖ in a descriptive context oriented to the self.  Insights 
can be verified, but only those provided by the data of experience.  What works for 
oneself is what is true and good within a consciousness that differentiates self and 
experience, but is undifferentiated from understanding.   
The achievement of theoretical knowers is the capacity to reflect on both 
understanding and experience.  The data now reflected on is provided by experience 
(sense, imagination, etc.) and consciousness (the intelligible, the ideational), which 
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allows the self to recognize not only the patterns in things related to the self, but also 
ideational patterns abstracted from material presentations.  The self is differentiated from 
experience and understanding, however reality or truth remains ―outer‖ or extrinsic to the 
self in that one does not self-consciously judge it as true or real on one’s own authority.  
Judgment for the realm of theory concerns the verification of ideas (as in insights 
conceived and formulated), not the verification of the knowing self.  Common sense 
makes valid judgments within a descriptive context and theoretical knowers make valid 
judgments within descriptive and explanatory contexts; however, theoretical knowers are 
not judging their own judging because judgment remains assumed.  One‘s ―truth‖ or 
―reality‖ resides in explanatorily verified ideas and therefore is outside the self.  As with 
Kegan‘s third order consciousness, theoretical knowers are ―embedded‖ in the ideational.  
This has two implications.  First, the self is not the source of authority, even the authority 
of its own ideas; rather, the source of authority resides in correct explanatory judgments 
(not the authority of the judging self).  Second, authority is constructed by a self that is 
unaware that it is investing authority to something outside itself.  Therefore, while using 
cognitive theory and epistemology, theoretical knowers lack a self-conscious 
metaphysics.  Theoretical knowers do not recognize that it is they who have judged 
something to be real, they who are correctly affirming the reality of what they have come 
to know, rather than simply stumbling upon, discovering, and working out the axioms of 
an already-out-there reality or truth – one whose valid out-there-ness is authoritative.  
The achievement of self knowing knowers, or interiority, is the capacity to notice 
and reject the self investiture of authority outside the self, and therefore, to ―bring it 
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inside the self.‖  It is the capacity to recognize one‘s own capacity as a judger of the true 
and real – to not simply affirm one‘s own ideas and those of others as real or otherwise, 
but to judge oneself as a subject-authoring judger of the real.  One does not simply verify 
and affirm ―being‖, rather, one takes responsibility for, and stands on, one‘s own 
construction of what constitutes being or reality.  This stance, however, a fully 
metaphysical stance, assumes decision.  It therefore, lacks a self-conscious ethic able to 
regulate and organize competing metaphysical ideologies under a more comprehensive, 
universal, and unified system.  As with Kegan‘s fourth order consciousness, ideology by 
itself is unable to construct a comprehensive ethic because it cannot see beyond the 
powerful horizon of its own self-knowing agency; or rather, the ethic it constructs is 
overly agental, privileging the interests of the individual, of the human; over-attention on 
human rights that can trump the rights of a planetary community; an ethic that justifies 
the metaphysical space one‘s ideology has excavated within which to backfill the whole 
world.   
Theoretical knowers, assuming they are also third order consciousness,
60
 
construct an ethic that is overly communal, privileging the interests of local human 
communities, values of ethno-mutuality that can trump the rights of individuals and the 
interests of different communities.  Something beyond both is needed to construct a 
                                                 
60 The cognitive capacity that enables theoretical knowers to construct vast scientific systems, laws, and 
theories, is likely the same capacity that enables third order meaning makers to abstract and to hold 
multiple points of view simultaneously and internally.  Both theoretical and third order knowing place 
authority outside the self.  What Lonergan describes as the ―outer realm‖ of theoretical knowing is its 
ability to know within an explanatory context, to see the relations of things to each other and not just to the 
self. Kegan describes third order as embeddedness in relationships – in Lonergan‘s terms, it is an 
embeddedness in the relation of things to each other (subject to) while the self holds as object the relation 
of things to the self.  In other words, it is the same cognitive capacity that underlies both the construction of 
abstract theories and human relationships grounded in mutuality. 
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universal and comprehensive ethic that attends not only to the relations of human 
communities to each other, but also to the relations of humans to all other psychic (as in 
conscious, feeling animals) and biological forms (as in non-conscious living organisms); 
to every planetary system that is the condition of the possibility of life; and, finally, to the 
relation of the whole material cosmos to its spiritual origins and ends.    
 
Horizons, Conversion, and Conflict 
 
The notion of horizon is, as Tracy points out, a core analytical tool for Lonergan 
(1970).  What this section attends to is the relationship between horizons as qualitatively 
different ways of knowing, and conversions as modalities of transformation.  It is argued 
here that conflict, or what Lonergan refers to as dialectic, provides a social medium that 
helps expose and clarify the different patterns of knowing inherent in conflict.  For 
Lonergan, the critical variables are not differences in ideas or interests, but differences in 
horizons brought to light in dialectical opposition.  This illumination, in turn, suggests 
that the way forward is brought about through conversion, or horizonal transformation.  
Intergroup and intragroup dialectic is addressed in the next chapter as an important 
source of group cognitive development.  
Lonergan defines horizon as follows:  
In its literal sense the word, horizon, denotes the bounding circle, the line at 
which earth and sky appear to meet.  This line is the limit of one‘s field of vision.  
As one moves about, it recedes in front and closes in behind so that, for different 
standpoints, there are different horizons… Beyond the horizon lie the objects that, 
at least for the moment, cannot be seen.  Within the horizon lie the objects that 
can now be seen (1972, 235-236).   
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Lonergan defines conversion as ―a transformation of the subject and his world.  Normally 
it is a prolonged process though its explicit acknowledgment may be concentrated in a 
few momentous judgments and decisions‖ (1972, 130).  There are three modes of 
conversion: intellectual, moral, and religious.  One is tempted to see the three different 
modes of conversion as ―successive stages‖ and, therefore, as what we ought to link with 
the ―realms of meaning.‖  There is, however, no necessary chronological priority of one 
mode of conversion over another whereas realms of meaning represent successive stages 
of differentiation.  Lonergan states, ―In order of exposition I would prefer to explain first 
the intellectual, then moral, then religious conversion… In order of occurrence I would 
expect religious commonly but not necessarily to precede moral and both religious and 
moral to precede intellectual‖ (quoted in McShane 1971).   
When asking what horizons are for Lonergan one might also think intellectual, 
moral and religious conversion.  They are not the same thing as conversion, however.  
Rather, a horizon is an evolutive stage one achieves, and is closely linked to the realms of 
meaning.  Conflicts within, between and among horizons reveal a need for a qualitative 
transformation; they reveal the need for intellectual, moral and religious conversion.  
Horizons are Lonergan‘s attempt to explain not simply the particular ―viewpoint‖ or 
―world view‖ of a person, but to explain different patterns of knowing within which 
positions and counter-positions get sorted out.  Horizons, then, may be understood as 
epistemologies; they are various stages of knowing whose criteria of objectivity, or 
validity, moves from the simple (what works; what makes sense) to the complex (what is 
real; what is good).  He states that horizons ―are related as successive stages in some 
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process of development.  Each later stage presupposes earlier stages, partly to include 
them and partly to transform them‖ (Lonergan 1972, 236).  These horizonal stages 
therefore are not the movement from intellectual to moral to religious conversion, but 
qualitatively different and more complex patterns of knowing.  In conversion, then, one 
experiences the changing of one‘s horizon; conversions are not ―stages‖ but can be 
understood as a series of experiences through which horizonal structures of knowing are 
transformed toward self-appropriation and self-transcendence.   
Conversion is an experience of an individual that also has a communal dimension.  
When a significant and intense experience occurs in many individuals, ―they can form a 
community to sustain one another in their self-transformation and to help one another in 
working out the implications and fulfilling the promise of their new life‖ (130).  When 
this occurs conversion takes on historical significance as communities evolve through 
generations and move into different cultural milieus.  As personal, communal, and 
historical, ―conversion calls forth a reflection that makes the movement thematic, that 
explicitly explores its origins, developments, purposes, achievements, and failures.‖  
Conversion made thematic is what Lonergan calls foundations.  Dialectic exposes the 
need for conversion while foundations establishes a new horizon within which the 
meanings of conversion can be reflected on, worked out, and appropriated (131).  
Intellectual Conversion 
Lonergan identifies three major categories of conversion: intellectual, moral and 
religious.  Intellectual conversion is overcoming the persistent myth that knowing is like 
looking; that the objectivity and validity of knowledge can be had by taking a good look 
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(1972, 238).  It is overcoming a kind of correspondence theory of truth, which holds that 
objectivity involves verifying that what is in one‘s head corresponds to what one is 
looking at in the world of experience.  ―Knowing, accordingly, is not just seeing; it is 
experiencing, understanding, judging, and believing… The reality known is not just 
looked at; it is given in experience, organized and extrapolated by understanding, posited 
by judgment and belief‖ (238).  Intellectual conversion begins with cognitive theory 
whereby one is able to give a proper account of knowledge – that it is the fruit, not 
simply of ―thinking‖, but of the threefold structure of knowing: experience, 
understanding, and judging; of attending to wonderable experience, intelligently seeking 
and finding the patterns in experience (insight/understanding), and of correctly judging 
one‘s insight into experience as true, actual, or real.  However, the capacity to give an 
account of what one is doing when one is knowing is only possible in the realm of 
interiority where one is a self-knowing knower (1972, 261).  Given this, Lonergan 
appears to reserve intellectual conversion for interiority, as a movement into fully 
differentiated consciousness. 
Moral Conversion 
Moral conversion ―changes the criterion of one‘s decisions and choices from 
satisfactions to values‖ (240).  Lonergan compares the moral decision making of children 
who act rightly through compulsion and persuasion, and the decision making of more 
developed human beings who find their own authenticity through responses to human 
values.  Here, ―our mentors more and more leave us to ourselves so that our freedom may 
exercise its ever advancing thrust toward authenticity… when we discover for ourselves 
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that our choosing affects ourselves no less than the chosen or rejected objects, and that it 
is up to each of us to decide for himself what he is to make of himself‖ (240).  The move 
from satisfaction to value is not the same as moral perfection and requires the uncovering 
of individual, group and general biases.  Since Lonergan situates biases in common sense, 
moral conversion might indicate a transformation into theoretical knowing.  However, 
Lonergan goes on to assert that moral conversion results in the capacity to open oneself 
to criticism, and enables one to scrutinize ―one‘s intentional responses to values and their 
implicit scales of preference‖ (240).  The complexity suggested by this is highly 
developed as it requires a capacity to internally generate, organize, and evaluate values 
and one‘s response to them. 
Religious Conversion 
In the realm of transcendence, the self is related to divinity in prayer and silence 
(257) in a ―cloud of unknowing‖ (266).  Religious conversion is being grasped by 
ultimate concern and can theoretically occur in every realm of meaning.  Lonergan 
describes it as the experience of ―falling in love with God,‖ which is experienced 
differently depending on one‘s horizon of knowing.  Lonergan‘s notion of religious 
conversion is taken up more fully in the next chapter.   
In closing this chapter it is important to note a key challenge presented by 
Lonergan‘s cognitive theory and epistemology.  As can be observed from the above, his 
notion of conversion as a modality of intellectual transformation seems to represent a 
movement from the outer realms of common sense and theory to the inner realm of 
interiority; his notion of moral transformation suggests a move from common sense to 
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theoretical knowing, or possible a post-interiority transformation.  But is it not likely that 
a tripartite form of conversion occurs between every pattern of knowing?  How can 
Lonergan‘s notion of conversion be better integrated with the realms of meaning?  
Addressing this question might also address the overly intellectual/cognitive feel one gets 
with regard to the realms of meaning.  That is, as Lonergan describes them, one wonders 
about the relationship between cognitive and affect, between individual and social, and 
between biological and spiritual.  The three modalities of conversion address each of 
these relationships, but primarily for late-stage development.  To repeat, how might each 
realm of meaning be understood as an achievement of some form of intellectual, moral, 
and religious conversion?  The next chapter takes up this question, as well as others, as 
the theories of Lonergan and Kegan are brought into a mutually critical correlation in 
service to better understanding intentional groups.  Having discussed the central ideas in 
Lonergan‘s and Kegan‘s theories, as well the complexity that flows from them, the next 
chapter puts both of these theorists in conversation for the purpose better understanding 
intentional groups. 
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Chapter Five: Lonergan and Kegan in Conversation 
 
Before returning to intentional groups as complex, dynamic, and evolving, it is 
important to put the theories of Lonergan and Kegan in conversation for the purpose of 
working toward a mutually critical correlation between them.  This is the goal of the first 
part of this chapter.  It is not the intention here to ―synthesize‖ Kegan and Lonergan into 
a more general theory of individual growth, or to subsume one into the other, since both 
stand within different fields of knowledge and each represents a comprehensive 
reintegration of various traditions of scholarship within their fields.  Thus, while standing 
in their respective fields, they are considered here to stand alone with respect to each 
other.  That said, each nevertheless provides a helpful lens through which to see 
subtleties, gradations, and possible lacunae in the other that might not otherwise be 
apparent.  By highlighting key points of connection and difference, the goal here is to 
generate a more integrated theoretical grounding for the notion of evolving groups. The 
second part of this chapter begins to more rigorously work out a framework for 
understanding cognitive groups.  It does this by addressing how notions of being 
(metaphysics) and the good (ethics) might be experienced by different cognitive 
constituencies within groups; and how the dynamism of object-subject reactivity, as well 
as agency-communion reactivity, between different orders of consciousness contributes 
to group evolution. 
Both Kegan and Lonergan build labyrinthine systems whose complexity is 
grounded in and governed by a few simple ideas – foundational ideas whose simplicity 
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can be easily overlooked while glorying in the vast edifice erected on their footings.  A 
student might therefore find himself racing toward the complexity, but because these are 
robust theories of human transformation, it becomes a race whose finish line ends in a 
confrontation with the self.  Switching to an ecological metaphor, it can be likened to a 
hike up a great mountain where the foliage changes and the views expand with altitude.  
At the top, where you thought you‘d find a self that is ―post‖ whatever is meant by ―self 
authored,‖ or ―self appropriated,‖ you see instead a guru-mystic uttering 
incomprehensible noises and utterly uninterested in your presence.  What with the thin 
air, the great height, and the baffling, offensive stranger, you begin to make your way 
back down.  Distracted by the failure to find yourself in the higher altitudes, you slip and 
tumble down the remainder of the mountain until, at the foothills, you look around at the 
familiar and comprehensible.  And you discover that where you have landed is where you 
once were, and you rest there for awhile observing everything in a new way.  You rest 
not in the mountain‘s complexity, but in the simplicity of an ascending, descending, 
transcending self.  Somewhere between where you might be and where you have been 
lies the becoming you; and that ―becoming you‖ is a motion and an activity in Kegan‘s 
and Lonergan‘s ingenious systems.  Nowhere is this more evident than in their respective 
use of the terms subject and object. 
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Chapter Five: Constructive Developmental Theory and Transcendental Method in 
Conversation 
 
Lonergan and Kegan on Subject/Object Activity/Motion  
 
Lonergan and Kegan differently use the terms, subject and object; however, both 
use them to convey the notions of motion, activity, and intentionality.  For Kegan, the 
philosophically attuned psychologist and educator, there is no article; there is subject and 
there is object in the unity that is the self.  Subject is identified with the self; it is the 
structure of knowing that organizes content, or object.  For Lonergan, the psychologically 
attuned philosopher and theologian, there is the conscious subject and an intended object.  
The subject as conscious experiences, understands, judges and decides, and the subject as 
intentional intends objects of attention, the intelligible, the true, and the good.  Thus, 
intentionality may be a term that unifies both Kegan‘s and Lonergan‘s understanding of 
object.  Object for Kegan is that which is acted upon by the self within a particular order 
of consciousness; i.e., object, because it can be reflected upon, or held, is able to be an 
object of intentionality.  For example, the third order self can be intentional with regard 
to needs, interests, point of view and the concrete.   
The terms activity and motion are also notions that govern the relationship 
between subject and object in these different systems.  What governs the relationship of 
subject and object in Kegan is the meaning constitutive evolutionary activity of human 
be-ing and growth; motion, activity is the ground of the subject-object relation.  For 
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Lonergan, what governs or grounds the conscious subject and her intended objects of 
sense and consciousness, is the movement of the recurrent and related activities of the 
operations of consciousness as they flow from the desire to know (wonder) and are 
ordered to being and the good.  In both systems, activities are the means by which we 
know (subject for Kegan; subjectivities for Lonergan), and content is what we come to 
know (object, objectivities).  Lonergan puts it this way:  
I have used the adjective, present, both of the object and of the subject.  But I 
have used it ambiguously, for the presence of the object is quite different from the 
presence of the subject.  The object is present as what is gazed upon, attended to, 
intended.  But the presence of the subject resides in the gazing, the attending, the 
intending.  For this reason the subject can be conscious, as attending, and yet give 
his whole attention to the object as attended to (Lonergan, 1972, p. 8). 
  
Finally, there is for both an organism-environment or self-world distinction.  We have 
already discussed Kegan‘s understanding of this.  Lonergan states: ―It is only in the 
process of development that the subject becomes aware of himself and of his distinction 
from his world.  As his apprehension of his world and as his conduct in it develop, he 
begins to move through different patterns of experience‖ (1972, 29).  Kegan, however, 
places stronger emphasis on the fact that the self that holds, notices, reflects on objects is 
a self that is also embedded in what he is subject to, which can be noticed or reflected 
upon only with difficulty – or not at all.  Only in the evolution from one balance to 
another – in which what was once subject becomes object – can the self notice 
―subjectivities,‖ and then, only as they become object. 
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On Directionality   
 
When Kegan‘s constructive developmental theory is introduced to an audience a 
question that is certain to arise is whether a person can move up and down the orders of 
mental complexity.  We have shown that Kegan‘s system involves an invariant, uni-
directional movement always toward increasing complexity, but we have only touched on 
Lonergan‘s multi-directional movement.  Lonergan‘s system explicitly holds that 
persons, however complex, operate at times in different contexts of complexity.  That is, 
a highly differentiated, self knowing, self appropriated individual may at times not only 
exist in a common sense context, but think in practical, problem-solving common sense 
knowing.  The critical piece here is Lonergan‘s concept of context.  If the context calls 
for common sense problem solving, then all that is needed is practical reasoning.  
Kegan‘s second order consciousness is sufficient to handle such a context.  Were third or 
four order individuals to reside in a common sense context, then common sense is what 
they would employ to successfully meet the exigencies of that context however 
relational/socialized or self authored they were.  You don‘t need a guru to solve a 
plumbing problem; but if all you have is a guru, then she will use common sense to fix 
the leak. 
A few points of clarification are in order here. First, the multi-directionality in 
Lonergan‘s system is a directionality reserved for differentiated consciousness (1972, 
272).  Theoretical knowers (for example, scientists) can operate within theory, but also 
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common sense.  Self-knowing, subject-aware knowers operate within interiority, but also 
within theory and common sense – and know when they are doing it.  However, 
undifferentiated, descriptive knowers operate exclusively within common sense.  Second, 
what determines the level of complexity deployed is both the subject and the context.  In 
the case here, the context discloses a set of interlocking questions and answers that can be 
answered within a given horizon (1972, 82, 163, 313).  Exigencies arise when that 
horizon proves inadequate to answer new questions.  These include the systematic 
exigence between common sense and theory, and the critical exigence and 
methodological exigence between the ―outer realms‖ (common sense and theory) and the 
―inner‖ realm of interiority (83).  Therefore, the context discloses the kind of questions 
asked and answers sought, and the exigence discloses the horizon within which the 
answers may be found.  Context and horizon are nearly interchangeable terms for 
Lonergan with the exception that horizon assumes both a subject (the operator) and an 
intended object while context seems to assume only an object – a wonderable text, a 
perplexing problem, need, or situation.   
If one‘s consciousness is undifferentiated and one begins to wonder about why a 
set of relationships seem to be ordered to each other in a particular way, one encounters 
what Lonergan calls the systematic exigence.  It represents a challenge to evolve beyond 
a purely descriptive context, and an invitation to seek a new, explanatory context within 
which to discover answers to a set of new and more complex questions.  If one operates 
within the realm of interiority, one is able to shift from one context to another depending 
on the exigencies demanded.  Two things can be noted here.  First, it is doubtful that 
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Lonergan would argue that an individual who has achieved interiority retreats from her 
own self-appropriation when she deploys practical, common sense knowing because of 
the exigence of a given context.  Second, when all that is called for in a given context is 
common sense, attempting a theoretical response is hardly appropriate.  Further, when 
what is needed is a theoretical construction or deconstruction of a given set of relations, 
interiority is unnecessary.  A biologist does not need to be a self-knowing knower in 
order to construct a complex theory of organic matter; but that biologist may, in fact, be a 
self knowing knower using theoretical knowing in his given scientific context. 
It is precisely here that we see simultaneously a point of contact as well as a point 
of difference between the two theories.  Lonergan‘s is essentially a cognitive-
epistemological-metaphysical theory of self transcendence grounded in ethics, while 
Kegan‘s is a psycho-social-cognitive theory grounded in meaning constitutive 
evolutionary activity.  The fecundity that lies in coupling these two theories resides in 
part in the cognitive piece.  If one were to bracket out the intrapersonal (psychological) 
and interpersonal (social) from Kegan‘s theory, and focus on the cognitive, then clearly, 
even in Kegan’s theory, if one is fourth order, one can move back and forth from the 
concrete, the abstract, and abstract systems depending on the exigencies of the given 
cognitive context.  However, since the self is a unity of all three, one‘s order of 
consciousness does not change together with the cognitive exigencies (unless the subject-
object relations are transformed by such exigencies).  At the same time, Lonergan‘s 
―cognitive‖ theory cannot ―fit‖ entirely into Kegan‘s cognitive piece since, as we will see 
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when we return to conversion, it includes the social and intra-psychic dimensions of 
human knowing. 
On the “How” of Transformation  
 
Conversion as a tri-part modality of transformation into a more complex horizon 
of knowing and choosing helps to understand the what of change.  The following 
addresses the question of how Lonergan and Kegan might construe the how of change in 
mental complexity. 
The Role of Assumptions in Kegan and Lahey 
Both Kegan and Lonergan understand human being as an activity or motion 
whereby one moves toward and through increasingly complex orders of consciousness, in 
the case of Kegan, and realms of meaning in the case of Lonergan.  Since any object in 
motion moves as a result of some force exerted upon it, a critical question can be raised 
for both Lonergan‘s and Kegan‘s theories: what is ―causing‖ the mental movement? 
Another way of asking the question is how does one move from one order of 
consciousness or horizon of knowing, to another; how does change in mental complexity 
occur?  Kegan‘s earlier work attends more to the argument that it happens and what it is 
that is happening rather than how it happens.  In his collaborative work with longtime 
colleague, Lisa Lahey (Kegan & Lahey, 2000), the authors proposed ―seven languages of 
transformation,‖ or what might be called a constructive developmental pedagogy for 
human growth.  The how of change and growth in this work seems to be the uncovering 
of hidden assumptions that govern a set of tacit values that are in conflict with one‘s 
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espoused values.  These hidden, orienting assumptions serve the purpose of keeping one 
in a state of dynamic equilibrium; a state that continually rebalances the self-system when 
attempts at change and growth destabilize the system.  In other words, tacit values and 
hidden assumptions work against transformation.  In this work, Kegan and Lahey keep 
constructive developmental theory to a minimum; what is highlighted is a process of 
moving what is at the back of one‘s knowing (subject territory) toward the front of one‘s 
knowing (into object territory) in order to understand it, reflect on it, and make decisions 
about it. 
A critical question here is whether uncovering and challenging hidden 
assumptions can bear all the weight of change.  To stick with our metaphor, are 
undisclosed assumptions the inertial drag that keep a person from changing her direction 
or rate of acceleration, and is the process of discovering and challenging assumptions a 
force ―massive‖ enough to initiate change in direction and velocity?  Assumptions may 
indicate what one is subject to, but they come from somewhere.  In Lonergan‘s system, 
they are judgments; when they are hidden, they are tacit, implicit answers to yes/no, 
true/false questions.  But judgments are derived from insights into experience, and these 
from orienting wonder.  Therefore, any assumption, whether hidden or not, is a judgment 
one made about an experience understood – however inattentive (overlooking key bits of 
data), unintelligent (poorly conceived pattern or insight), or uncritical (unverified truth 
claim) one was with regard to the experience understood and judged.  Assumptions as 
judgments once made also have a countervailing influence on how one experiences (what 
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one attends to) and how one understands one‘s experience (what bits of data become 
organized into a pattern as well as how that pattern is conceptualized). 
The question remains whether a process of uncovering hidden assumptions and 
commitments is also capable of initiating the movement from subject to object.  
Kegan/Lahey‘s constructive developmental pedagogy includes Lonergan‘s operations of 
consciousness, but with a ―from above‖ emphasis.  That is, it represents a pedagogical 
moment whose goal is to lead participants to the discovery of hidden, growth-preventing 
assumptions that govern a set of tacit values that, in turn, direct action away from explicit 
attempts at change and growth.  As a ―change machine‖ (2000), its goal is to destabilize 
the self-system by initiating simple low-risk tests of one‘s formerly hidden assumptions 
to verify them, in Lonergan‘s terms, as ―unreal‖ or ―untrue.‖  It does so, however, 
without a ―from below‖ description and explanation of their origins in experience, how 
that experience was interpreted in terms of understanding, and how that understanding 
was affirmed as real or true in terms of judgment.
61
  One never makes the attempt to 
source the native experience.  Rather, Kegan and Lahey seem to have proposed a 
pedagogy of descent that moves from above, down toward new action – from judgment 
(a discovered assumption) to new understanding, and to new experiences.  But if, in one‘s 
own learning and growth, experience is the root, understanding the trunk, and judgment 
                                                 
61 Kegan and Lahey employ a four column exercise that includes, in column two, an inquiry into the 
behaviors (experience) that one engages in that ensure one‘s espoused values (column one) will not be 
effectively enacted because of the presence of hidden commitments (column three) and assumptions 
(column four).  While this may represent a from-below attempt to source the problem in experience, it in 
fact observes experience in order to uncover operative disvalues and assumptions on behalf of testing their 
validity.  What remains unobserved is the originating experience that explains the recurrent pattern of 
behaviors that work against one‘s espoused values.  Discovering that native experience, however difficult it 
might be to retrieve, might be worth the quest; for in it, one may also discover the sense-making one 
engaged in at the time (understanding), and the truth-making, reality-making assumption (judgment) that 
was carried into the future as a hermeneutic that mediates the self/other dialectic. 
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the branch, it seems that uncovering assumptions may amount to mere leaf rustling if it 
does not also include the establishment of a heuristic method for discovering the origins 
of the assumption in experience and in understanding.   
The Role of Discovery in Lonergan 
Lonergan attends to the change process which he developed throughout his long 
career.  It is both individual and social in that one discovers the existence of a horizon 
that must lie just beyond one‘s own, a discovery made through encounters with others.  
Wonder, ―exigencies,‖ and heuristic structures are key categories for Lonergan that not 
only describe the that of change, but also attempt to explain what changes, and how it 
changes.  Stated most simply, for individuals one of the critical sources of change in 
mental complexity is brought about by wondering and asking questions.  Change can be 
horizontal or vertical (1972, 40, 237); in the former, one grows within the same context, 
or horizon, of knowing (content); in the latter, one transforms one‘s current horizon by 
moving it into a more inclusive, general and universal context or horizon.  How this 
happens is through the discovery that one has been asking the wrong question, or is 
asking a new question that cannot be answered within one‘s present horizon.  Lonergan 
refers to the former as an inverse insight whereby one discovers that one‘s question or 
line of questioning cannot lead to anticipated discovery – it is simply the wrong question.  
In the case of the latter, the potential discovery is a known that is ―out there,‖ but beyond 
one‘s current horizon.  It remains unknown but not unattainable; it is what Lonergan calls 
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a known unknown.
62
  When one discovers that one does not know, and knows that he 
does not know it, he is poised for setting up an anticipatory heuristic method for attaining 
the unknown.  One does not set up a plan, which includes not only a process for attaining 
the goal but also a known goal.  A heuristic method begins with what is already known.  
It establishes a process of new discovery guided by the heuristic, or question, toward an 
unknown goal (Flanagan, 2002, 14, 95).   
Anticipatory, heuristic structures reveal 1) an operating subject; 2) the operations 
of consciousness through which the subject operates; 3) the context or horizon within 
which he operates; and 4) the context or horizon toward which he is moving.  This 
amounts to a temporary retreat from the anticipated answer to the originating question in 
order to examine its heuristic quality, or capacity to rightly lead one toward discovery.  
Kegan and Lahey‘s constructive developmental pedagogy is precisely such a heuristic 
method for discovering hidden, unknown assumptions, one that begins with leading 
participants to the discovery that there is an unknown about themselves they can, with a 
little work, come to know; and knowing, can make choices about.  Another set of 
heuristic structures, however, can be set up where one can source one‘s own assumption 
generator (why did I go about verifying/validating the assumption the way I did?  What 
can I discover about the way I select and judge evidence?); or one‘s own insight 
generator (why did I select this particular pattern about the why of things and not others?  
                                                 
62 Lahey et al. (1988) address this more comprehensively in the development of their method for 
interpreting subject-object interviews.  Four basic heuristics function as guides for assessing the 
epistemological quality of a given participant‘s response: a) what does she know and know she knows it; b) 
what does she know, but does not know she knows it; c) what does she not know, but know she does not 
know it; d) what does she not know, and does not know she does not know it?  In Lonergan‘s system, b) 
and d) are not relevant; a) and c) refer to what we are treating above – a heuristic for making known a 
discovered known unknown. 
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What can I discover about the way I conceive and define insight?); and finally, source 
one‘s own experience generator (why was my attention attracted to these data?  Why did 
my senses, memory or imagination select these bits of data and ignore other bits that, 
upon more careful observation, are clearly present?). 
Social Dimension of the “How” of Transformation in Lonergan 
Lonergan‘s understanding of transformation is not simply a private, individual 
affair.  Change and growth is a social, dialectical phenomenon that requires the presence 
of others, of a community.  For Lonergan, conflict, or dialectical opposition, exposes the 
different delimiting horizons through which people perceive the world.  These are not 
simply differences in ideas, but of persons operating within fundamentally different 
horizons.  Horizons, as we have seen, are structures of knowing; they are ―the condition 
and the limitation of further development… they are also the boundaries that limit our 
capacities for assimilating more than we already have attained‖ (Lonergan, 1972, 237).  
Dialectic involves ―an objectification of subjectivity,‖ (Lonergan, 1972, 253)63 through 
which horizons are revealed in conflict but only changed through intellectual, moral and 
religious conversion, each of which is a modality tending toward self-transcendence 
(1972, 238-243).   
Looking solely at an individual tells us little about the how of transformation.  
Both Kegan and Lonergan underscore the fact that individual transformation is largely 
unintelligible apart from the communities of which one is a member or in which one 
                                                 
63 Dialectic is Lonergan‘s 4th functional specialty, revealing the need for interiority and conversion, see 
Method, 235-266.  The 5th functional specialty, foundations, ―objectifies conversion‖ (144), meaning that in 
foundations, one is standing on, operating out of, or in Kegan‘s language, holding one‘s own conversion. 
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takes out membership.  It is in families, intentional groups, and various communities of 
worship, work, and play, that individuals grow.  As argued here, individuals grow 
because they are in groups.  And the corollary is also true: groups grow because the 
individuals within them grow.  While this does not solve the problem of the how of 
change, it nevertheless provides a starting point for understanding cognitively reactive 
groups; how they are and are not construed in this study: they are not collectives of 
individuals, nor are they cognitive monoliths (evolving, but as a single organism).  To 
summarize and review, groups are complex in that they are made up members who are 
cognitively diverse (many orders of mental complexity); they are dynamic in that their 
movement toward growth is a factor of the interaction and conflict between and within 
cognitive constituencies, a factor that simultaneously is the critical source of growth for 
the individuals themselves; and finally, groups evolve in observable ways toward 
increasing capacity in the way they generate, recreate, and enact a clear, coherent, and 
rigorous vision of who they are and what they are about. 
 
On Conversion   
 
Revisiting the theme of conversion has important implications for understanding 
the evolution of complex and dynamic groups as it highlights the cognitive, social, and 
intra-psychic elements of horizonal shifts.  Lonergan‘s theory of conversion is very 
helpful when understood as a modality of horizonal transformation – of moving toward 
increasing differentiation.  It is a theory, however, that requires further development in 
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order to recognize the possibility of gradations within the experience of conversion.  
Constructive developmental theory can help fill in these perceived gaps.  One notices in 
each mode of conversion as Lonergan describes them a preference related to Kegan‘s 
notion of fundamental yearnings (1982).  For example, intellectual conversion, since it is 
described as a move into interiority, is a conversion that strictly favors agency; moral 
conversion as a possible move into Kegan‘s third or fifth orders of consciousness, is one 
that favors communion.  How might intellectual conversion be understood as also 
appropriate to communion, and moral conversion appropriate to agency?  How might a 
tripartite conversion be understood to mediate the move into each realm of meaning?    
Intellectual Conversion Revisited 
If each is understood as a modality of self transcendence, then some mode of 
intellectual, moral, and religious conversion would likely occur during each horizonal 
―sublation‖ or transformation.  Therefore, Lonergan‘s explanation of intellectual 
conversion as directed at philosophers might also occur between common sense and 
theory; that is, a form of intellectual conversion must also mediate the move from 
concrete, subject-centered, descriptive knowing to abstract, disinterested, explanatory 
knowing.  Further, a form of intellectual conversion would likely have occurred between 
primitive consciousness and common sense where direct perception evolves into 
perception of the general or generic – a kind of proto-abstraction where, for example, 
complex terms (―seeing‖) are discovered to be capable of including within their meaning 
a host of simple but related terms (glancing, peering, staring, looking). 
Moral Conversion Revisited 
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Moral conversion represents a movement from interest to value, on one level, but 
on another level, the movement from being a knower of the intelligible, true and real to 
being a chooser of the good.  In the former, when one moves from interests to values, the 
complexity of this move depends on where Lonergan locates interests and values.  In 
Kegan‘s system, it would constitute a move from second order to third order 
consciousness if one became disembedded from needs and interests and began to 
internalize values such that they were authoritatively operative in the self.  Values in third 
order consciousness can be chosen and even constructed, but not self authored since their 
authority resides in sources outside the self – sources the self has invested with 
authority.
64
  This is perhaps why Lonergan refers to common sense and theory as ―outer 
realms‖ – one is not aware of what one is doing when one bequeaths authority to ideas, 
traditions, texts, schools of thought, and leaders, since one is not a self-knowing, self 
authored knower.  In this sense, the third order mind constructs not only values, but also 
their authority.  However, values are not self authored because there is no self-as-author; 
rather, there is other-as-author whose authority is bequeathed by a third order self.  
Lonergan‘s moral conversion presents another difficulty when he describes a person‘s 
transformation from a knower of the real to a doer of the good (a judger of value).  If 
                                                 
64 While this remains an arguable point for individuals, in groups with a majority constituency at third 
order, leaders do not simply shape and mold groups according to their own theoretical or ideological 
designs.  Rather, the leader herself is constructed by the third order group and is granted a particular kind of 
authority to govern.  The ease with which such a leader can be so constructed depends on what order of 
consciousness she is balancing.  A third order constituency as ―other authored‖ makes known in various 
ways to leaders the quality of leadership expected of them.  Therefore, a third order leader can become 
―authored‖ by the group and, because he is a third order, socialized knower, may feel reluctant or be unable 
to challenge the group.  A fourth order leader may recognize this group dynamic and resist how a group is 
constructing her.  This was particularly noticeable in the 2003 group which was asked by its leader, Fr. 
Charles, to ―vision‖ with him about what it means to be church.  One group member said, ―We look 
forward, Father, to your views on the matter‖ – a cue to him on how to govern and lead.  The leader, 
perhaps over-bluntly, rejected this invitation and challenged her to think for herself about the question. 
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interiority makes one a knower of the real (where one, as a metaphysical knower, judges 
the knowing self), it suggests a move from Kegan‘s fourth order to fifth order 
consciousness where, as I argue, ethics begins to ground self-authorship.   
As suggested above, what is not apparent in Lonergan‘s treatment of moral 
conversion are the agental transformations between primitive consciousness and common 
sense, and between theoretical knowing and interiority.  In the former, moral conversion 
can be understood as a move from ―me‖ consciousness to a rule constructing, rule 
following adult able to take a role and work with others on behalf of subject-centered 
interests.  In the latter, it can be understood as a move from an other-oriented 
responsibility (where the self holds others responsible for its own experience and takes 
responsibility for the experience of the other) to a subject-generated responsibility that 
allows others to be who they are, and allows a high degree of self-creation where the 
expectations of others can be valued, but are no longer determinative. 
Religious Conversion Revisited 
Religious conversion can also be illuminated by putting Lonergan and 
constructive developmental theory in conversation.  Religious conversion might, from a 
human perspective, be understood as a progressive release of God from what one has 
held as object, toward a progressive subject-yielding into God.
65
  As humanity achieves a 
new horizon of knowing, it liberates God from its previous mental construction and sets 
itself to the arduous task of immobilizing God within the horizon of that new knowing.  
                                                 
65 The following is not interested in the question of ―God,‖ as in the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; the 
God of Jesus Christ; or God as God is in Godself (intra-divine life of God as Trinity).  Rather, it is 
interested in how human beings differently hold God as an object of human consciousness depending on 
one‘s order of mental complexity.  
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Primitive consciousness makes material figures and images and invests them with 
divinity.  God is a mobile object one literally touches and holds, a fact which represents a 
kind of uber-control over God.  Ritual does not require intentionality; simply uttering the 
words or retelling the myth brings one into ―dream time‖; the shaman puts on the mask or 
animal skins and becomes the divine being or original ancestor (Eliade 1994).  The sacred 
object, whether mask or figurine, can be likened to a magical talisman.   
Common sense is able to move God from a material image to an object of 
imagination.  God is wherever imagination takes God.  It constructs God as an object 
whose favor is secured through a contractual relationship based, not in magical 
incantations, but in ritual protocol (the rules and roles of religious ritual); rituals through 
which God is made to supply human needs and interests (gaining favor, averting divine 
and earthly threats).  Ritual is now intentional, but represents an intentionality that is 
assumed rather than reflected on.  When the God does not come through, one need only 
tweak the ritual or, as we saw in chapter three, one can punish God – whose knockable 
presence is ―objectively‖ available in totems, temples, and tabernacles.  Because 
intentionality is assumed, it is projected onto the god‘s.  It is the gods‘ intentions that 
matter, not the supplicant‘s; ritual makes those divine intentions known.  In this realm, 
communities retain an iron grip on divinity, an object tightly bound within the hold of 
sacred words and actions enacted on behalf of immediate, practical needs and interests.   
In theoretical knowing, one may reject the notion that God can be imagined and 
therefore made into a material image or an anthropomorphized object of imagination.  
God is pure intelligibility, pure relationality; but at the same time an object of one‘s 
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theoretical construction – one that may be understood as establishing a communion 
among the people themselves, and a communion between God and the people of God.
66
  
As ideational, it is a non-imagined, non-material relationship that grounds human/divine 
interaction in this life and the next.  Ritual moves from a transaction to a conversation 
between a people and God; ritual protocol mediates that conversation through which all 
parties, including God, are made present – that is, efficaciously available, one to the 
other.  Intentionality is no longer assumed and projected onto the divine, for God‘s 
intentions are known, and known to be gracious.  Intention as an inner disposition (rather 
than religious perfection as an outward ―status‖) is now required for both the priest and 
participant in order to make present the divine mystery.  Theoretical knowing constructs a 
covenantal mutuality where obedience moves from correctly fulfilling rules and roles, to 
fidelity to human and divine relationships.   
In the realm of interiority one begins to recognize that God is not simply an object 
of one‘s own understanding; God cannot be ―materialized‖ or anthropomorphized; nor 
can God be ―idealized‖ or conceptualized.  God as mystery is simultaneously 
incomprehensible and present.  God is actuality, truth, and life as affirmed by one‘s self-
knowing judgment.  Ritual becomes a here-and-now participation in the everywhere-and-
                                                 
66 This enabled, for example, meeting of the ―systematic exigence‖ (Lonergan, 1972) that occurred in the 
first five centuries of the Church as a result of the Trinitarian and Christological controversies.  Through 
the experience of religious, moral, and intellectual conversion that moved many theologians in the Church 
beyond common sense, the meaning of terms such as being (ousia), nature (physis), objective reality or 
individual (hypostasis), and person (prosopon) became clarified and limited in the attempt to define 
relations in God while preserving the unity of God – one being, three persons; and the two natures of Christ 
(a hypostatic union in the person of the Logos (who is one in being – homoousios – with the Father) with 
Jesus of Nazareth), both subsisting, ―without confusion,‖ in a fully human nature and fully divine nature.  
This relational understanding of both the Godhead and Christ, who in Christian theology becomes the 
source of a new relationship between God and all of creation, as well as a new communion among 
humanity itself, is not possible in the realm of common sense, but is in the realm of theoretical knowing.  
Moreover, it lends itself to reinterpretation in the realms of interiority and transcendence. 
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always-present divine mystery perfectly realized in the liturgical action.  In the world, 
one imperfectly enacts God‘s presence in human-divine solidarity through which one‘s 
own self authored actions are made available to a transcendent Other.  In this way, one 
―realizes‖ the myth; that is, makes real, here and now, a sacred narrative stripped of its 
magical, mythical features through an ongoing intentional inhabiting of its truth.  But this 
ideological construction of participation in the immanence of God through self-authored 
solidarity means that God nevertheless remains an object of human agency.   
The more world-distinct one becomes (Lonergan), or the less one confuses self 
and world, organism and environment (Kegan), the more of the world one holds as 
object.  This is inversely proportional to the degree to which one holds God as a material, 
imaginable, intelligible, and immanent object.  Said differently, the degree to which one 
objectifies God may be proportional to the degree to which one is subject in a 
transcendent economy.  It is not that God comes closer or moves further away; in 
successive religious conversions, the self slowly releases God from the chains of human 
consciousness, to let God be ―Wholly Other.‖  And, perhaps, as one achieves this one 
becomes an articulate subject/object of the self communication of an incomprehensible 
God – a God not ordered by ideological or instrumental agency, nor by an ideational 
communion or material fusion, but a God allowed to orient the self, and the world the self 
holds as object. 
Human history might be understood as a ten thousand year struggle to manumit 
God from the bondage of human consciousness.  A world wholly other, a self no longer 
subject to it, may allow one to become wholly the subject of God‘s self communication 
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and, simultaneously, allow one to become an incarnate object of the divine presence, or 
grace: not for self alone, not for humanity alone, or humanity‘s ―world‖; but also for the 
Earth – the fullness of the world God creates, sustains, and loves.  This idea of self-as-
sacrament suggests a kind of subject-purging kenosis which, however it is accomplished 
(whether in the silence of Lonergan‘s clouds of unknowing, or in self-emptying kenosis 
of Rahner‘s theology of incarnation – ―man is insofar as he gives himself up‖ to be 
delivered up and abandoned, is an open question), presents a self unfettered from 
―subjectivities‖ and able to offer itself to a God unfettered from former ties to human 
―objectivities.‖  A liberated self no longer world-subject, no longer holding a bondsman-
God may be better material, or form, to be in-formed by grace for the transformation of 
the world.   
While humans have always been inventing a humanized, ―holdable‖ God in their 
own images, ideas, and ideologies, Jewish and Christian theology have also noted that 
God has always been liberating and divinizing a people created in the image and likeness 
of God on behalf of that great object of God‘s love: the world (John 3:16).  If evolution 
has achieved consciousness in humanity (Chardin 1959, 1969), then it seems evolution‘s 
human eye has yet to turn its gaze from the mirror of its own majesty and the glory of the 
constructed God it sees therein.  Loving Earth, loving that God-object, may be 
humanity‘s unique challenge; for that object in ancient Hebrew cosmology was uttered 
into being by God‘s word.  In the theology of the Jewish Christian, John, God as love 
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uttered Godself into that which God created in the Word made flesh (John 1:1-18).
67
  
Love ―languaging‖ matter into being; God organizing matter toward life, and life toward 
consciousness and voice in the human creature; God as Love becoming the material 
world in the Word made flesh; may mean that nature‘s conscious eye must turn its gaze 
away from the mirror and onto nature itself in order to inhabit the mystery of an utterly 
hidden and incomprehensible God (Deus absconditus) who is simultaneously other and 
same; distinct from and one with the world.  God speaks in order to create not-god; 
creates in order to give Godself to not-god; gives by becoming matter in order divinize 
not-god; and divinizes in order to hear the human sound of God.  Dwelling for a moment 
in the irony of this, a fifth order atheist who loves the Earth and humanity in it may more 
fully inhabit the Christian mystery than a fourth order Christian whose theology is part 
idolatry. 
Conversion as a process of horizonal transformation, then, achieves different ends 
depending on the complexity of consciousness one evolves into.  They are not stages or 
realms of meaning.  Rather, as argued here, they represent different modalities of 
transformation between different orders of mental complexity.  What seems evident is 
that intellectual, moral, and religious conversion, as modalities of horizonal 
transformation, must occur at each order of mental complexity, whether construed in 
Lonerganian terms or constructive developmental terms.  Each developmental change in 
mental complexity likely includes a threefold transformation of one‘s knowing 
(intellectual conversion – knowing being/reality/truth), one‘s choosing (moral conversion 
                                                 
67 See Karl Rahner, ―Theology of the Symbol‖ (1966a); ―Theology of the Incarnation‖ (1966b); and 
―Consideration on the Active Role of the Person in the Sacramental Event‖ (1976). 
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– choosing the good on behalf of self and other), and one‘s intra-psychic loving (religious 
conversion – falling in love with God; letting go of God as object; God having a more 
self-available, subject-free self to hold).  That is, when fully integrated with the realms of 
meaning, conversion as understood by Lonergan includes Kegan‘s cognitive, 
interpersonal, and intrapersonal framework.   
 
Evolving Groups: Connecting the Philosophical and Psychological Pieces 
 
Though there are overlaps and challenges in any comparison between the systems 
of these two theorists, somewhat expected since one theorizes out of a theological method 
and the other out of constructive-developmental psychology, what can be observed so far 
is that there are remarkable points of contact.  The point of this study, however, is not 
only to bring Lonergan and Kegan into conversation, but to see if their theories can be 
extended beyond individuals (in the case of Kegan) to include groups, but ones 
considerably smaller than ―the West‖ (in the case of Lonergan). 
 
Knowing Reality, Choosing Goodness: The Metaphysics and Ethics of Groups 
 
Cognitive constituencies in groups are related, correlated, and coordinated to each 
other by the object-subject
68
 relations between them, and by the fundamental yearnings of 
                                                 
68 Subject-object relations refers to individuals in constructive-developmental theory.  I use ―object-
subject‖ relations to refer to the socio-cognitive dynamic between constituencies within consecutive orders 
of consciousness.  While this may be very uncreative example of altering established terms to account for 
the new context in which they are used, it is also a morphology I find helpful in that it describes and 
 190 
communion and agency.  Lonergan‘s notions of being and wonder can be helpful here by 
asking: what is the reality, or being, that orders the constituencies within common 
sense/second order, theory/third order, and interiority/fourth order?  For second order, 
reality is what works; for third order, reality is what makes sense; and for fourth order, 
reality is what is true/real as judged by the self.  But being is oriented by questions, by 
wonder, which leads to the question: what is the fundamental heuristic that orients each 
order of mental complexity?  For second order, it is concrete, inquisitive, descriptive 
wondering about the what of things directed to the self; for third order, it is abstract, 
critical, explanatory wondering about the form of things, the why of things as they are 
related to each other; for fourth order, it is reflexive (in the sense of critically reflective 
and self-reflective) wondering about the reality of things, whether they are so or not, true 
or otherwise, real or not real, as affirmed (judged), not by outside authority, but by the 
self.   
The different notions of being and the different orienting questions of each order 
of mental complexity may be a root source of conflict in groups as each cognitive 
constituency struggles to enact what it defines as ―the real/actual‖ (what it considers 
knowable reality) or ―the good‖ (what it considers actionable).  The good constitutes a 
nascent ethic within each cognitive constituency.  Being is that which is judged to be so, 
real, actual, or true within a descriptive (second order), explanatory (third order), and 
self-knowing/self authored (fourth order) context – what works, what makes sense, what 
is true.  The good is the enactment of that judgment in real time and; and for second, 
                                                                                                                                                 
explains the fact that the object of one order of consciousness is identical to what the previous order of 
consciousness is subject to; a fact what constitutes the cognitive relations between them. 
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third, and fourth orders of consciousness, is ethically grounded agentally or communally, 
but not both.  Third order‘s ethno-centric ethic is grounded by communion, but in an 
ideational context that assumes the truth or reality of the good (it doesn‘t self-consciously 
judge it).  Second and fourth orders are grounded by an ethic of agency.  Second order‘s 
instrumental, ego-centric ethic assumes the self-evident nature of what is good, and does 
so without awareness that its subject-centered ―good‖ lacks other-oriented mutuality.  
Fourth order‘s ideological, anthro-centric ethic assumes the completeness of its self-
authored vision without awareness that its own self-knowing ethic of agency can be 
relativized by a more general and comprehensive ethic that integrates both agental and 
communal yearnings; one, moreover, that is not exclusively human attending.  
Theoretically, a fifth order ethic would be eco-centric, one that assumes the 
interpenetrability of all planetary communities and systems. 
 
Object-Subject Reactivity as a Modality of Group Transformation 
 
As stated at the end of chapter two, for a given cognitive constituency, say third 
order, what it has transcended differentiates it from second order, and what it includes 
constitutes its real relation to second order; what second order is subject to, third order 
holds as object.  This represents a sharing of properties that is constitutive of the socio-
cognitive relationships within group settings that bring together consecutive orders of 
consciousness.  It is a sharing that is an exchange of properties where two different 
―natures‖ are brought together by the relation between them; and where one is assumed 
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by the other into a new form that includes the one in its totality, and simultaneously 
transforms it by virtue of its more radical, more universal nature.  In the case of 
consecutive orders of consciousness, it is not that the two become one, but that in the 
continuous relation between them the one becomes other.  This cross communication of 
object-subject contributes to the volatility, or reactivity, that makes cognitively diverse 
groups dynamic.   
Understood from Lonergan‘s cognitive theory, second order cannot comprehend 
the horizon within which third order makes meaning.  However, second order can come 
to know that it does not know something others seem to know.  A horizon, to recall, is the 
totality of one‘s knowing within a given and limited frame of reference.  In the 
interaction and conflict with third order, second order can discover a known unknown 
and begin to construct a heuristic method for making it known.  Heuristic methods begin 
with what is known; what second order knows is ―what works‖ in a practical, descriptive 
context.  What it does not know is how to relate things, not to self, but to each other.  To 
take one example, coming to know this as a known unknown may have to do with the 
discovery that rule following and role taking do not always lead to favored outcomes; that 
there is something beyond rules and roles that constitutes and organizes both in a higher, 
more general context.  The discovery that there is a horizon of knowing beyond the 
horizon within which it knows does not cause a movement into that horizon.  This study 
proposes that what causes the movement is interaction and conflict with a constituency at 
third order of consciousness, where third‘s object can, for second order (which is subject 
to it), be discovered capable of becoming intended rather than just assumed – it can move 
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from subject to object – through an exchange of properties in the dynamism of 
cognitively complex groups.  In this particular exchange, late second order members may 
come to recognize that they have been distributing knowledge of mutuality to others and, 
in the exchange, begin refusing to continue doing so. 
Some members of the 2001 group discussed the fact that their participation in the 
1994 parish restructuring events and in the 1996 merger was understood by them as 
following the rules and doing what they thought was necessary to keep their parishes 
open.  The diocesan proposal in 2001 to close or sell one of the merged parishes as a 
solution to the priest shortage was therefore a source of consternation and anger for a 
constituency that relied on rules to measure not only their own performance, but that of 
the diocese as well.  The discovery that the diocese did not seem to follow the same set of 
rules that parishes were following, and were expected to follow, constituted the discovery 
of a known unknown: Rule following alone is not a reliable enough guide for assuring 
parish sustainability.  Following all the rules, faithfully, even rigidly, could still result in 
the closure of the parish.  Something else had to be in place that governed not just rule 
following, but rule construction.  That ―something‖ was values; values that relativized 
parish and diocesan rules under an organized set of norms that created a shared reality 
under which all orders of the church could work together toward a mutually beneficial 
outcome.  When rule following and role taking present a disorienting dilemma for a 
second order constituency embedded in descriptive knowing, they may begin to question 
their own horizon of knowing, and reevaluate the frustration they feel at a third order 
constituency‘s advocacy of community and values of mutuality – an advocacy that before 
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was experienced as slowing progress down because it refused to simply name a problem, 
define rules and assign roles, and then act on them.  Rules and roles may, after all, be 
created and organized by something more complex and comprehensive.  But a second 
order constituency will discover this in an encounter with a third order constituency.  In 
the same way, third order‘s encounter with irreconcilable conflict between competing 
authorities (the pastor they support and a bishop they do not, for example) can disclose a 
known unknown that sets up the condition of the possibility for transformation.  In this 
case, what third order ―sees‖ is an unknown but achievable, and perhaps even desirable, 
horizon; a horizon within which fourth order holds with facility several conflicting 
authorities, and does not seem bothered by that fact.   
In the thousand year evolution of the ancient Greek term, prosopon, the object-
subject exchange between consecutive cognitive constituencies can be understood as a 
mediating experience where one first puts on the ―mask‖ (the original meaning of the 
term in fifth century BCE Greek drama); a mask that in time becomes the ―face‖; a face 
that becomes one‘s ―presence‖; a presence that becomes the ―person‖; a person that is the 
organizing principle that governs the sharing of multiple ―natures‖ in the one dynamic, 
unconfused union that is the group.  It is a union that does not blur the distinction of 
different orders of mental complexity, but mediates their motion.  Person understood as 
relation is a fluid concept.  The mask that one takes off in the move from first to second 
order allows the world an integrity apart from one‘s perception of it.  One can now feel 
the world‘s wind on the surface of one‘s face and know that it is not the smell of one‘s 
own breath.  In the move from second to third order, that face turns inward as one 
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becomes an other-oriented presence.  And finally, that presence, in the move from third 
to fourth order, becomes a person who fashions her own mask in a self-choreographed 
human drama.  In groups, prosopon may be understood as a relational principle of 
organization that sustains the object-subject relations.  As parishes in canon law are 
juridic persons, intentional groups may be construed as socio-cognitive persons that 
sustain and organize the exchange of properties between different orders of mental 
complexity.  Those members who are fourth order and above act upon that socio-
cognitive person in ways other cognitive constituencies do not. 
 
Agency-Communion Reactivity as a Modality of Group Transformation 
 
If second and third order constituencies are related by the object-subject relations 
between then, second and fourth are related by a shared fundamental yearning.  Second 
and fourth orders of consciousness are both oriented to agency; second by an 
independence that is grounded in an instrumental world of rules and roles, and fourth by 
an autonomy grounded in an institutional world of ideology.  As suggested above, both 
construct an ethic with a greater emphasis on the individual; second an ethic of duty and 
honor, and fourth an ethic of human rights.  Third and fifth orders of consciousness are 
oriented by communion; third by an interpersonalism that is grounded in an ideational 
world of mutuality, and fifth by an intercommunalism that is grounded in an 
interindividual world of connection broadly construed.  Both construct an ethic grounded 
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in communion; third a relational, other-attending ethno-ethic,
69
 and fifth an ecological 
ethic that situates human communities within the interconnection of all communities, 
human one among them.  Though oriented by communion, the notion of interpenetration 
in fifth order consciousness (Kegan 1982, 1994) as well as what I argue is its post-
metaphysical, fully ―ethical‖ balance (i.e., the good grounds and constitutes the real/true; 
Lonergan 1972), theoretically means that its ethic would account for both orientations – 
communion and agency. 
A second order constituency conflicts with a third order constituency in the 
object-subject relations and in differences in fundamental yearnings, or orientations.  
However, shared yearnings become a source of connection between second and fourth 
order constituencies.  The reason for this is not because second order understands fourth 
order ideology or the self-authorship out of which it is constructed, but that second order 
can translate ideology into rules and find for itself discernable roles within such an 
agental system.  Second order may resist a third order constituency‘s mutuality, or 
become confused by the fact that it (third order) is comfortable with probability rather 
than black-and-white certainty, and subordinates results to relationships.  Second order 
attends to what works, and can become annoyed by what it sees as a squishy, distracting 
intrusion of values (mere ―niceness‖, for example) from a third order constituency that, in 
its communal orientation, understands ―results‖ as relational rather than simply 
functional; where the results consist as much of ―getting along‖ as they do of solving an 
immediate problem.   
                                                 
69 The others one attends to here are one‘s own people, community, etc. 
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The affinity between second order and fourth order makes a second order 
constituency potentially vulnerable to manipulation by fourth order whose ideology may 
be organized on behalf of a vision that excludes the interests of third order‘s 
communitarian values while simultaneously exploiting second order‘s rule following and 
role taking capacity.  Third order‘s inability to craft a value-organizing vision – one that 
readily translates into rules by second order – means that the many values it marshals on 
behalf of its communitarian interests may remain unconvincing to a fourth order 
constituency since it (fourth order) privileges values of agency on behalf of an 
institutional vision.  A third order constituency‘s tendency to make others responsible for 
its own inner states may offend second order whose members would bristle at the 
suggestion that duty (what I concretely do here and now) or honor (what my status is in 
the doing) has to be interrupted by other-attending mutuality rather than correctly 
following a code, and offend fourth order whose members would feel violated by the felt 
attempt to make them responsible for the experience of others.  Second order‘s ―let‘s just 
get it done‖ thrust allows fourth order to decide for them on the doing that gets done.  At 
the same time, third order‘s attempt to ground the rules of ―getting it done‖ in values 
whose thrust is ―can‘t we all just get along‖ may conflict with a fourth order 
constituency‘s judgment that getting along will not necessarily further the cause of the 
task at hand whose exigencies go beyond one group functioning well to a well 
functioning group with a capacity to engage multiple levels of an institution toward the 
enactment of a coherent group vision.  Second order grows because it recognizes a 
horizon just beyond its own instrumental way of knowing; and that horizon is third order.  
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In the same way, fourth order provides the context for third order‘s discovery of a known 
unknown.  Second order also grows because fourth order provides a learning context 
where agency can be enacted on behalf of something other than self interest.  When and 
if fifth order as a constituency emerges in a group, it will provide a context where third 
order‘s mutuality can be discovered capable of being enacted on behalf of something 
greater than the group itself. 
What can be reasonably concluded from this is that third order presents a 
challenge to second order because of its object-subject relation to it, but it may also lack 
the complexity to adequately support second order.  The nature of its challenge, including 
the expectation to hold multiple points of view simultaneously and internally (Kegan), to 
see things ―disinterestedly‖ as related to each other and not just to the self (Lonergan) 
may overwhelm second order if it does not come with supports.   Such supports may 
include helping a second order constituency to relativize ―being correct‖ to a cross-
contextual horizon (descriptive and explanatory knowing) where probability is 
discovered capable of accounting for a broader range of outcomes, especially long-range 
outcomes – where a demand for certainty settles into acceptance of probability.  Supports 
coming from a third order constituency may have to overcome suspicion coming from a 
second order constituency.  Fourth order may provide receivable support to second order 
because of its agental relation to it.  A self-authored constituency that is developmentally 
attuned may also be able to challenge second order constituency in a way that does not 
overwhelm it. 
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Intergroup Dynamic 
 
The above treatment of groups concerns itself primarily with intragroup 
complexity and dynamism.  Another key factor in group evolution, however, is the 
intergroup interaction experienced by a group with other levels of an organization.  In the 
case of this study, the parishes experienced five major events with the diocese; a dynamic 
that constitutes a critical feature of the cognitive evolution of the groups.  Dynamism, it 
will be recalled, concerns interaction and conflict that exposes not simply different 
arguments and interests, but different horizons, or orders of consciousness from which 
arguments are assembled.  Intragroup interaction and conflict consists for the most part of 
instrumental, ideational, and ideological conflicts.  Not only are there conflicts between 
these, but there are also conflicts among them.  For example, disputes can arise over the 
question of what constitutes ―convention,‖ or what constitutes the status quo; a recurrent 
conflict in the American Catholic church where many lay parishioners espouse hierarchy 
but assume democratic participation, and hierarchs espouse collaboration and 
participation but assume monarchical decision making.  We take up intergroup relations 
more fully in the next chapter.  It discusses the two parish communities that, over a ten 
year period, engaged in dialogue with the diocese over the issues of parish restructuring 
and priest sexual abuse.  The chapter is organized by a description and analysis of the 
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cognitive development of the groups over time, and by an analysis of the pedagogy 
provided by diocese throughout this period.  In doing this, chapter six will better support 
some of the claims made about complex, dynamic and evolving groups. 
The General Structure of Group Knowing 
 
We are now in a position to further clarify the cognitive evolution of complex and 
dynamic groups.  This study argues that group knowing and choosing occurs within a 
fourfold structure of vision, values, rules, and actions.  A governing vision has the 
capacity to organize values around it; values which in turn construct a set of rules that 
direct action toward an enactment of the group vision.  This rubric is also helpful when 
looking at how one level of an organization interacts with another level as in the case of a 
diocese with a parish.  Is the diocese guided by a coherent vision; what values does that 
vision privilege; are espoused values in conflict with its vision; are there hidden values 
that work against it; do those values construct a particular set of rules for research, 
dialogue and deliberation; and do those rules set the group in motion toward an 
enactment of its espoused vision, or some other vision?     
Different cognitive constituencies differently inhabit this fourfold structure of 
group knowing.  A subgroup at second order recognizes rules and rule following, blinks 
at values, and ―understands‖ a clear vision, but only insofar as it is able to translate it into 
a set of rules and procedures – a process a clear vision allows; a clarity, that is, of the 
visional terms and relations.  By correctly following an integrated procedure, a second 
order constituency enacts the group vision without knowing it is doing so; what it knows 
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is that correctly following procedures will secure its needs and interests – needs and 
interests it confuses with the vision.  A subgroup at third order recognizes and helps to 
craft an organized set of values.  It recognizes not only values, but the fact that values 
construct rules and rules assume a set of values; it does not recognize that it is a vision 
that is organizing its own set of values and is therefore prone to mistaking values for 
vision.  It does not know how to reconcile conflicting values.  A third order constituency 
follows rules, but does so on behalf of the valuing it does, or is subject to.
70
  Rules and 
procedures are subordinated to values.  It enacts a vision that is clear and coherent – the 
case the vision makes hangs together because it organizes a coherent set of strategic 
values.  A subgroup at fourth order explicitly seeks and seeks to perfect a rigorous, 
coherent, and clear vision – rigorous in that its inferences are known and adequately 
supported.  Fourth order members of a group, while able to bring together a set of 
conflicting values into a coherent whole, are quick to exclude what it considers 
superfluous values and may also fail to be mindful of the importance of rules that direct 
action by assuming their self evident nature.   
As we discussed above, there is a natural affinity between fourth and second order 
constituencies because of their shared agental orientation.  However, fourth order 
members may offend second order members if its vision is seen to conflict with the 
                                                 
70 This might seem confusing since, what one is subject to one cannot notice or reflect on; therefore, how 
can one in third order construct values if one is subject to them?  Third order consciousness understands, 
notices, reflects on, creates, and chooses values, particularly values of mutuality.  What it cannot reflect on 
is that it is the self that is choosing and creating values; it self-consciously values values, but un-self-
consciously creates and judges these same values.  One ―theorizes‖ values into ―being‖; the being of which 
represents a ―true judgment‖ whose truth is assumed.  An individual at this order of mental complexity 
does not reflect on the fact that the values he understands, he also judges as true and real and therefore does 
not notice that their authority is bequeathed by the unselfconsciously judging, or ―truing‖, self.  
Accordingly, they remain ―outside‖ the self and the self is therefore subject to them. 
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―laws‖ of the instrumental world they inhabit.  This is a common experience in Catholic 
parishes where highly educated leaders employ ideas and ideologies without awareness 
of how they are experienced by various cognitive constituencies.  To pick one example, 
many leaders uncritically use the historical-critical method in Bible retreats, seminars, 
and classes.  By uncritical, they employ a pedagogy that is cognitively insensitive to the 
developmental diversity that is likely present in such groups.  Fourth order individuals are 
better able to hold the tension between a Bible that is simultaneously an ancient artifact 
(its entire content is historically conditioned and therefore must be critically interpreted) 
and a sacred text (it contains claims by the Jewish and Christian people of their 
experiences of God; it is the text of sacred liturgy).  As one‘s community of belief is the 
link to the worldwide people of God, the Bible is one‘s link to the history of that people‘s 
coming to know and love God.  The Bible as ancient artifact and sacred text can mediate 
fourth order‘s sense of solidarity with the people of the past and with the worldwide 
people of today.   
For second order, the Bible may be understood as a sacred, inspired, infallible text 
in law.  It is a concrete, sacred artifact; however, not on the order of a magical talisman 
(first order), because any approved version of the Bible will do – so there is no magical 
quality to any one text.  It is not one‘s link to the past or present people of God, but a 
direct link to God.  One need not interpret the text since its meaning is self-evident.  ―It‘s 
God’s word for God‘s sake,‖ as I heard one person remark.  When an educator educates 
in a parish context and makes a statement such as, ―The First and Second letters to 
Timothy attributed to Paul describe a highly developed community structure that reflects 
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thirty years of development in the church since Paul‘s death,‖ everything said after 
―attributed‖ is lost.  ―Wait a minute.  The letters start out claiming they are from Paul… 
they contain specific medical advice Paul gives Timothy.  What are you saying, that its 
‗real‘ author was a liar; no, a clever liar; that God‘s word contains error; that God is a 
liar?‖71  These black and white choices are not easy to entertain if one is the educator.  
What the educator has not done is build what Kegan calls a consciousness bridge 
anchored at both sides of the divide between orders of mental complexity.  If the hearer 
locates himself in the sacred world of the text, the speaker has instead led him by a short 
route to a chasm that threatens not only a loss of faith, but a loss of meaning. 
Understanding the structure of group knowing may be helpful to leaders in the 
way they offer support and challenge.  Support and challenge ought to consider both the 
object-subject pole as well as the agency-communion pole.  Second and third order 
constituencies conflict on both, but fourth and second agree on agency.  Supporting a 
second order constituency in the object-subject pole is helped by acknowledging its 
―correctness‖ however black and white it may seem, since it is a correctness that may be 
faithful to the rules and roles they find themselves in – rules and roles that are suggestive 
of a self-evident course of action.  Challenging this constituency, as we have seen, does 
not mean pointing out how incorrect they are when their answers are appropriated to a 
more complex context – a context they cannot see.  Rather, it is continually raising 
questions that expose the limits of a second order context; questions that cannot be 
                                                 
71 Josh McDowell in his early work, Evidence that Demands a Verdict, Jesus: Lord, Lunatic, or Liar, and 
The Resurrection Factor, explicitly makes this argument – that if the Bible contains error, then it must be a 
God-inspired error; in which case, God is unworthy of our worship.  But God is worthy of our worship; 
therefore, God‘s word cannot contain error. 
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answered in such a context.  This challenge to ―go beyond‖ can be supported by such 
questions insofar as they reveal a known unknown and the need for a heuristic method for 
making known that unknown.  As suggested above, that heuristic structure can include a 
tri-part method of uncovering the judgments (assumptions), understanding, and 
experience of descriptive knowing. 
A second order constituency can also be supported and challenged to move 
beyond the over-independence of its orientation toward agency.  Second order is already 
moving toward communion as ―3‖ is a waxing epistemology within the cognitive 
structure of second order individuals.  A third order constituency may over-challenge a 
second order constituency on communion, or mutuality; however, fourth order may over-
support second order.  Finding the right balance may involve coaching second order 
toward the understanding that mutuality furthers their needs and interests.  
As argued above, powerful visions are clear, coherent, and rigorous.  In this way, 
they are better equipped to meet the differing cognitive exigencies of a developmentally 
diverse community, and are therefore more likely to be practically, intelligently, and 
truthfully enacted.  But visions are not necessarily good.  A clear, coherent, and rigorous 
vision as the construction of a fourth order constituency lacks an orienting and governing 
ethic capable of relativizing the ideology of its grand story within a more comprehensive 
and universal system (an ideology of ideologies; a vision that ―goes meta‖).  Without 
such an ethic, ideology as constructed by a fourth order constituency is inherently 
vulnerable to acts of exploitation in the enactment of the vision.  But this takes us far 
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beyond the limits of the present study since, as argued in the next chapter, vision 
enactment was in a very inchoate form at the close of the ten year period studied. 
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Chapter Six: A Case Study of Group Cognitive Development within Groups in Two 
Catholic Parishes 
 
In the iconography of Catholic churches in the American Northeast perhaps the 
most prominent images of Jesus are the crucified messiah hung behind the altar, and 
often close by, the holy infant in the arms of the Blessed Virgin.  In statuary, paintings, 
and stained glass, Jesus is depicted at the beginning and end of his earthly life.  The 
teaching, healing, feeding Jesus, or the Risen Christ are often artistic afterthoughts or 
secondary images to the overwhelming presence of a dead or cooing Lord.  Surrounding 
the assembly are the always-present Stations of the Cross that depict in fourteen images 
the torturous last day of Jesus on his Via Dolorosa between Garden and Golgotha.  Even 
here, there is no ―fifteenth‖ station; there is no Risen Lord.  There is Jesus, detested, 
dying, and dead.  Catholic worshippers can never forget this circumference of suffering 
as they look around at the Stations and ahead, beyond the altar, at a horrible death 
Adam‘s ―happy fault‖ seems to have necessitated. 
In the larger of the parishes of this study, Calvary,
72
 these images are radically 
reinterpreted, and mixed with moments in the life of Jesus. The cross is suspended high 
above the altar, but instead of a human being nailed to the wood is an arching figure 
unfastened and seemingly bursting from a patina cross.  It is as if the artist, in fashioning 
the piece, draped his bronze figure on its back over a large orb and then placed it not on, 
but in front of the cross.  It is a shocking depiction of the crucifixion capturing in this 
                                                 
72 At the request of participants, the names of parishes have been changed and the location of the diocese 
undisclosed. 
 207 
powerful symbol a moment of transformation between death and life.  The three 
dimensional Stations, also done in metal, are similarly provocative in that you cannot 
immediately tell from what perspective you are viewing the image.  The artist has 
confused the viewer‘s location by making her first wonder from what angle the images 
are depicted: from above, from in front, from behind?  Also prominent in the church are 
images of the teaching Jesus in massive paintings, and mosaics of a pair of Apostles 
above each of the six doorways.  Finally, flanking the sanctuary are large mahogany 
statues of Joseph and Mary.  They are very tall and thin.  Mary lacks any hint of docility, 
innocence, or ecstasy; rather, she is depicted as a furrow-browed, fierce looking Jewish 
girl with an apprehensive face set like flint toward becoming whatever it means to be 
theotokos, God-bearer. 
In the smaller of the parishes, All Saints, one is immediately struck by nearly two 
dozen large, slender stained glass windows that surround the assembly on both sides of 
the nave, depicting saints from Paul and Peter, to Augustine, Aquinas, Catherine of Siena, 
and Theresa of Avila, to early modern saints and, finally, North American saints.  The 
church, in the shape of a cross, depicts the central stories of Catholic faith in huge, round 
stained glass windows at each end of the apse-nave axes.  In front, behind a standard 
crucifix is depicted Good Friday from John‘s gospel showing a talking, teaching Jesus 
even in dying.  Directly facing this image, at the back of the church, is the Christmas 
image of the nativity.  To the left of the crucifixion is the Easter image of the 
Resurrection; to the right is the Pentecost image of the birth of the church with the Holy 
Spirit in the shape of a dove descending on the infant-free Blessed Mother, symbol of the 
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church, surrounded by all the Apostles.  These images of birth, death, resurrection, and 
restoration, together with the men and women who stand as a ―great cloud of witnesses‖ 
across time in the communion of the saints are powerful reminders of the depth and 
breadth of the Christian mystery.  Despite the fact that all the saints at All Saints are 
either celibate males (except Peter) or consecrated virgins, one feels the penetrating gaze 
of common women and men who believed and lived this uncommon mystery. 
Through years of liturgies good and bad, homilies fine and not-so-fine, through 
somber processions and light-hearted recessions, through crying babies, angry looks, 
pious kneelers, jovial talkers, beautiful music, off-key cantors, colorful banners, and 
tacky banners, these core images continue to teach, to catechize, to evangelize.  And what 
do they teach?  Perhaps they teach that the mystery of Christ is a regenerating wheel of 
birthing, living, dying, and renewing; a turning wheel that becomes a church rolling 
through history; a church at once made up of the holy and the unholy, the just and the 
rude; a people and an institution constantly dying and rising as one small prayer in the 
―terrible and sublime liturgy of the world.‖73  At Calvary and All Saints, these 
multivalent images and symbols may be what lie behind a people, at once obedient and 
confrontational, that produced the groups of this study who so readily demonstrated their 
capacity to learn and grow as individuals and as a community in a very challenging 
context. 
Because this dissertation is written within the academic discipline of the 
humanities and not the social sciences, its primary argument is theoretical.  Robert 
                                                 
73 The terrible and sublime liturgy of the world is from K. Rahner (1976) who himself got the idea from 
Teilhard de Chardin‘s Hymn of the Universe. 
 209 
Kegan‘s constructive developmental theory and Bernard Lonergan‘s transcendental 
method are brought into conversation in service to understanding how intentional groups 
evolve cognitively and how this evolution can be understood as a consequence of the 
interaction and conflict between constituencies operating in different orders of mental 
complexity.  This is a theory of complex, dynamic, and evolving groups.  At the same 
time, however, the theory itself has been constructed out of a critical inquiry into a 
succession of groups that, except for the first (1994), I was a participant in.  My growing 
awareness was that these groups were not just getting ―better‖ at being groups; they were 
getting better because they were changing and growing; a growth suggestive of an 
increase in the groups‘ cognitive complexity over time.  The dissertation is a theoretical 
work grounded in a new theory adapted from the works of Kegan and Lonergan.  The 
empirical study included in this chapter does not prove the theory; rather it offers many 
critical, and I think convincing, supports to a theory whose central claims will ultimately 
require further longitudinal research; studies that not only look at group-produced 
documents and group behavior as a measure of group complexity, but also measure the 
cognitive complexity of its members over time through instruments such as subject-
object interviews (Lahey 1998). 
This chapter begins with an analysis of the complexity of the curriculum 
employed by diocesan leaders.  It then proceeds to describe and analyze each of the five 
parish-diocese events between 1994 and 2004.  Each event is described from the 
perspective of group experience; group documents and behaviors are then evaluated for 
their cognitive complexity; and finally, the dialectic within the group and between the 
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group and the hierarchy is evaluated.  The groups are scored, using a simple adaptation of 
Kegan‘s scoring system for individuals; the score indicates not only the presence of 
multiple orders of mental complexity, but also the relative strength of each.  Scores 
between events indicate the directionality and change in complexity of the groups across 
time.  
 
Hierarchy Curriculum 
 
Because this study is about evolving groups, and on behalf of keeping this chapter 
to a reasonable length, treatment of diocesan curriculum will be kept to a minimum here, 
attending primarily to judgments or conclusions about its complexity.  However, because 
these conclusions are drawn from research of archival material from bishops and 
chancery officials, I have included a description and analysis of these documents in 
Appendix 2.  This section attends to the complexity of hierarchy curriculum and to three 
important patterns in how the diocese structured lay participation over a ten year period. 
 
Cognitive Complexity of Diocesan Events 
 
In each parish-diocese event the hierarchy engaged lay participants on the level of 
common sense (Lonergan, 1972).  That is, the kind of participation it invited required no 
greater complexity than Kegan‘s second order consciousness (Kegan, 1982).  Theorizing 
occurred on the diocesan level in advance of dialogue with parishes; parishioners, 
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however, were never invited to develop, or learn about a preexisting, theoretical 
framework as an analytical tool for understanding and coming to terms with the priest 
shortage and its consequences. Instead, the hierarchy produced a set of plans out of its 
own theoretical framework; one that anticipated a range of acceptable outcomes.  These 
outcomes, known in advance, were presented to lay participants for discussion and 
decision making.  When lay participants went beyond the outcomes anticipated by the 
hierarchy, proposing their own questions, solutions, and problems, these outcomes were 
either discarded (1994, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004) or disparaged (1994, 2002, 2004) by the 
bishop or chancery officials (see Appendix 2).   
All of this suggests that the hierarchy‘s curriculum was not designed to discover 
unknown knowledge together with its dialogue partners: lay parishioners; it was never 
structured to make new discoveries.  That is, the curriculum was not designed as a 
heuristic structure, but a series of plans that anticipated a certain range of known 
outcomes.  It was not a process that moved through inquiry, education, and dialogue 
toward the discovery of a known unknown – toward the production of new, actionable 
knowledge.  This represents a purely descriptive, common sense curriculum that was 
considerably beneath the capacity of most of the groups of this study, it suggests 
confusion by bishops of the mental complexity of lay participants who surpassed the 
limits of a restricting pedagogy; and it suggests pedagogical commitments that set 
diocesan officials up to misunderstand their own dialogue partners. 
The hierarchy‘s curriculum also had the unintended side effect of diminishing the 
willingness of participants to take responsibility for the official outcomes of the events.  
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The pedagogical approach used by the diocese defined a basic problem, suggested 
possible implications for the problem, proposed various solutions, and finally, gathered 
lay parishioners to inform them about the problem and form them toward its resolution.  
There is a shortage of priests; but we are a hierarchical church in structure and identity; 
therefore how can we reconfigure the notion of parish in order to maintain that structure 
and identity as the priest population ages and its numbers decline?  We can achieve this 
by having parishioners discuss and choose how to reconfigure parishes.  The problem is 
posed in advance of the process, rather than emerging from the process itself.  Framing 
the question and proposing answers without a thorough inquiry process into the 
experiences and understandings of the participants meant that the answers represent 
judgments that cannot be verified and truly owned because they are disconnected from 
the present praxis of the learners (Lonergan, 1972; Groome 1980, 1996).   
 
Hierarchical Patterns of Dialogue 
 
There are three patterns that can be observed between 1994 and 2004 in the 
diocese‘s attempts to dialogue with lay persons on the question of parish restructuring.  
One pattern is the dramatic decline over time in the number of lay persons invited to 
participate.  The numbers of lay parishioners went from 8,500 in 1994; to approximately 
400 in 2001; to zero in 2003; and 12 in 2004.  This precisely coincides with the second 
hierarchical pattern of structuring dialogue with lay parishioners in settings that over time 
were further and further removed from the immediate local parish context.  For example, 
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in 1994 the event was held throughout the diocese on the parish level; in 2001 it was held 
on the deanery level; in 2004 it was held on the diocesan level.  The movement is from 
parishes to deaneries to diocese.  That is, the further one moves in time the further lay 
representatives are removed from their local parish community and the more diffuse is 
their voice; somewhat ironic since what to do with parishes in light of the shortage of 
priests was the critical question throughout.  These two patterns also coincide with a third 
pattern of becoming less democratic over time in the manner in which lay persons were 
selected to participate.  In 1994, lay parishioners were invited through general bulletin 
and pulpit announcements to join the process on a volunteer basis; in 2001 pastors were 
instructed to select two or three representatives from each parish to participate; in 2003, 
pastors were not instructed to include any lay parishioners; and finally, in 2004, twelve 
lay persons were chosen by the bishop. 
One might conclude from these patterns that as the diocese evolved in its 
understanding of the challenges posed by the priest shortage for parishes, it moved from 
broad-based consultation to more focused deliberation – that it moved from the perimeter 
to the center as it drew closer to a decision on parish restructuring.  In other words, the 
three patterns may simply be the result of an organized strategy of moving over time to 
an informed, focused decision.  This conclusion is, however, not consistent with either 
the interview data or the diocesan documents themselves.  Interview participants reported 
their perception that each new initiative represented an entirely new attempt at addressing 
the same problem, and meant that their previous work was either ignored or discarded.  
Because there was little or no follow up from previous initiatives, because former 
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experiences were not adverted to, and because new initiatives had no logical connection 
to previous ones, participants believed they were ―starting over‖ each time.   
The bishop himself reinforced this belief.  In 1994 he stated in his ―Summary 
Report‖ that it is merely a ―preliminary‖ report; it is a ―kind of first-step in our continuing 
discussion of this problem [priest shortage].‖  But after the considerable work done by 
parishioners, priests and chancery officials in 1994, the same bishop‘s letter initiating the 
2001 process states, ―Once again I repeat, these proposals are very preliminary, a starting 
point.‖  In the 2003 initiative none of the documents reference the previous events by 
name nor, make explicit reference to the insights gained from them.   
In order to conclude that parish restructuring initiatives were related and 
coordinated requires that knowledge production was cumulative and progressive 
(Lonergan 1972).  That is, learning about the challenges and opportunities presented by 
the priest shortage and its impact on faith communities would accumulate over time; but 
this learning would not just stack up; it would develop and therefore change the dialogical 
ground on which new learning in consecutive events would occur.  In other words, there 
would need to be a method that governed how knowers from one dialogical event would 
create new knowledge and how knowers from future events would access that knowledge 
in service to increasingly complex patterns of knowing.  As we learned from Lonergan, 
transcendental method governs the accumulation and development of knowledge by 
indicating the cognitive context within which discovery can be made, by exposing the 
limits of that context to arrive at new knowledge (dialectic), and by indicating the need 
for psycho-social-cognitive transformation toward increasing mental complexity 
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(conversion) in order to meet the exigencies required to make new discovery.  There is no 
evidence that such a methodological framework served as a guide for the diocese over the 
ten year period of this study.   
To summarize, by leaving out critical pieces of education and dialogue, and by 
directing questions not to an analysis of the multi-layered problem, but to how 
parishioners might experience a loss of a resident pastor and a reduction in Eucharistic 
celebrations, the diocesan pedagogy is one that, in Lonergan‘s terms, remained purely 
descriptive.  It directed participants‘ attention not to the relation of things to each other, 
but to the self.  Without an explanatory pedagogy, understanding is limited to affirming 
and accepting judgments that come ―from above,‖ in this case, the chancery.  Placing the 
dialogue within a descriptive context frontloads the presumed needs and interests of 
participants without inquiring of parishioners what they perceive their needs and interest 
are; it also directs parishioner attention toward presumed needs and away from a more 
complex analysis of the problem.  In short, the hierarchy‘s curriculum required no greater 
complexity than second order consciousness (Kegan 1994) and, I argue, represents a 
mismatch between it and the complexity of mind of most of the participants.  While the 
bishop, throughout the ten year period, used a language of mutuality in his suggestion of 
collaboration, and used a language of personal authority (a decision-making laity), the 
parish restructuring processes themselves occurred within a descriptive, common sense 
context that precluded both.  When participants went beyond this context – when they 
encountered and met a real but undisclosed systematic exigence (Lonergan 1972) – and 
therefore moved into an explanatory theoretical context (third order), the bishop, by 
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ignoring or disparaging their responses, domesticated (Freire 1970) the transformational 
potential of knowledge production. 
Outlined below are a summary of the events pertinent to this study.  Of the events 
below, five groups were organized, including 1994 (1), 2001 (3), 2002 (4), 2003 (5), and 
2004 (6). 
1. 1994 Group: “Parish Dialogue on Ministry.” In this initiative parishioners 
gathered in their own parishes throughout the diocese to discuss the priest 
shortage and lay leadership with the objective of selecting one of five parish 
restructuring options.  The present study has archival data only from All Saints 
which met twice.   
 
2. 1996 Merger.  All Saints and Calvary, both in the same town, were asked to 
formally merge, share one pastor and one pastoral staff.  Since the bishop 
unilaterally decided to merge the parishes after both of their priests retired, no 
group was formed to discuss the issue.     
  
3. 2001 Group: Deanery Gatherings.  Pastors were invited to come with two or 
three lay parishioners each of two deanery meetings to discuss a diocesan 
proposal to merge, cluster, close, or sell parishes throughout the diocese.  
Participants from All Saints and Calvary met twice at the parish level and twice at 
the deanery level.  Before each of the two deanery gatherings, the pastor gathered 
eleven parishioners and staff to discuss the proposal and craft an initial response 
to it and, before the second deanery gathering, to discuss the proposal and the 
prior gathering.  Of the eleven, three had participated in the 1994 group. 
 
4. 2002 Group: Listening Sessions.  A group of about 40 parishioners formed in 
response to priest sexual abuse crisis gathered for two meetings.  A smaller 
drafting committee made up of nine members from the larger group was formed 
to draft a letter to the bishop.  The group secured signatures from over 350 
parishioners and sent it to the bishop who eventually responded.  Six members of 
the larger group had attending the 2001 initiative, and four of these were on the 
drafting committee. 
 
5. 2003 Vision for the Diocese.  The bishop instructed pastors, in light of the 
continual shrinkage in the number of priests, to send to him their own vision for 
the diocese for the next five to ten years.  The pastor of the parishes gathered a 
group of about 15 parishioners and staff for four ad hoc meetings to co-craft a 
vision for the diocese.  Eight participants had attended the 2001 and/or 2002 
groups. 
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6. 2004 Lay Collaborative Inquiry Groups.  Diocesan leaders formulated a new 
parish restructuring strategy for dealing with the priest shortage under the rubrics 
of a ―new evangelization.‖  The 2004 parish group met six times in the summer 
and eight times in the fall and winter to educate themselves about what it meant to 
be a lay Catholic in the church today and to formally begin a conversation with 
the bishop on the question of parish restructuring.  The meetings coincided with 
the pastor becoming suddenly removed from ministry by a new bishop.  The 
groups took up a leadership role within the parish and went on to craft one letter 
to the parish and one to the bishop.  Of thirty two participants, six had participated 
in one or more of the previous groups. 
 
1994 Group: A Dialogue on Parish Ministry 
 
In late February, 1994, All Saints and Calvary participated as separate 
communities in a series of parish meetings referred to as ―A Parish Dialogue on 
Ministry‖ initiated by the bishop in order to educate Catholics on the looming priest 
shortage and the consequent need to consider alternative means of staffing parishes.  The 
initiative was designed by a diocesan committee formed by the bishop in 1993 and 
implemented in all parishes the following year.  It was a comprehensive initiative 
consisting of parish workshops facilitated by a parishioner appointed by the pastor.  The 
role of the facilitator at each parish was to make a pulpit announcement inviting 
parishioners to attend two or three workshops for the purpose of engaging in a process 
―to examine its needs and suggest a plan for alternative parish staffing.‖  The facilitator 
also led each workshop and directed questions and discussion through survey worksheets 
provided by the diocese, and wrote up a final report that was submitted to the Office of 
the Bishop.  The thrust of the restructuring initiative was far reaching, and the scope of 
the dialogue was broad based – including every parish in phase one, and deaneries in 
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phase two.  It was an initiative that educated parishioners about the likely consequences 
of a significant problem, it proposed various solutions to the problem, and it created a 
local context in which participants could discuss both problems and solutions. 
 
Group Experience and Understanding  
 
Of the five groups that gathered from 1994 to 2004, the 1994 group is the most 
difficult to assess for developmental diversity (complexity).  While there is significant 
archival material from the diocese that includes description of the restructuring initiative 
as well as an analysis of the results, there is very little archival material from the parishes.  
In fact, only All Saints was able to provide data, all of which included the pulpit 
announcement, notes, survey, and write up of its one facilitator.    It should be noted also 
that the two parishes were not formally merged until 1996.  Finally, I was not a 
participant of this initiative since I did not join the parish staff until 1997.  Therefore, 
claims made about this group remain very tentative. 
At All Saints, the facilitator‘s pulpit announcement briefly described the initiative 
goals and process, and included an appeal to parishioners to participate.
74
  Thirty seven 
people attended the first session, and forty five attended the second, sixty percent of 
                                                 
74 The announcement reads: ―The Parish Dialogue on Ministry… can only be a success with your 
participation.  Each and every one of you can help to decide on our fate with God‘s help.  Each and ever 
one of you has something you can offer to help plan for the staffing and smooth operation of [our parish] in 
the future.  Please consider this a personal invitation to as many of you that can attend to come Tuesday 
evening and talk to us about your ideas.  This is th  e first step in the process leading to concrete staffing 
plans for our parish.  For many parishioners it will be the first time we have dealt with these issues.  These 
are challenging times for the Church.  However, Bishop N feels that we are ready, willing and able to face 
the future realistically and unselfishly.‖ 
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whom were women.  Participants represented a cross section of the parish that included 
concerned parishioners as well as Pastoral Council members, Commission members, and 
various lay ministers such as lectors and Eucharistic ministers.  The first workshop 
session began with a short video presentation by the bishop outlining the scope of the 
problem and encouraging the participation of parishioners in the dialogue process.  The 
workshops were organized around survey questions that facilitators used to guide 
discussion.  These included general questions about the priest shortage and its 
consequences for parishes; questions about lay leadership; and questions about what 
constitutes a Christian and Catholic community.  In the second workshop participants 
were guided by a document that listed the responsibilities of a pastor; that identified five 
different models for staffing parishes; and finally, a series of questions designed to help 
participants reflect on what kind of staff the parish would require in light of its choice of 
parish model. 
In reviewing the archival material from this gathering, it is clear that the bishop 
proposed three core themes that served to organize the conversation of the participants.  
These include priest shortage and Lay Leadership, Christian and Catholic identity, and a 
pastor‘s responsibilities.  Each warrants its own discussion here. 
The Priest Shortage and Lay Leadership 
To focus the conversation on the impact of the priest shortage participants were 
asked to indicate concerns they had about the priest shortage and lay leadership.  They 
were invited to select from the following list: 
a) Fear that a reduction in Priests would reduce Eucharist and other sacramental 
celebrations. 
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b) Concern over the quality of parish leadership if a Priest is not present. 
c) Fear that people will leave the Church if there are no resident priests. 
d) Worried that the Catholic Church will become more like the Protestant 
Churches. 
e) Fear that the laity is not trained enough to handle parish responsibilities. 
f) Concerned over a lack of priestly presence at times of sickness, death, wakes, 
funerals. 
g) Fear that the Church will become more congregational [emphasis original]. 
h) Worried about losing uniquely Catholic identity. 
i) Other. 
 
In the summary report of the survey completed by the facilitator at All Saints, all of these 
were checked.   
The survey worksheet next asked participants‘ response to ―a greater role for the 
laity in parish ministry,‖ to which they responded ―7‖ on a scale of one to ten, with ten 
reading ―very comfortable.‖  Of the concerns about lay leadership listed on the survey, 
four were checked off including concerns over  
 Lack of sufficient training. 
 Fear that they may become an ‗elite‘ or special group within the parish. 
 If they are paid, the parish might not be able to afford lay salaries. 
 What kind of authority would they exercise. 
   
The three concerns over lay leadership not checked read,  
 Lack of confidentiality. 
 People who minister would be too well know[n] or familiar to the parish 
community. 
 If a priest becomes available, what would happen to the lay ministers?  
  
Community “Truly Christian” and “Uniquely Catholic” 
Following this, the survey records the group‘s response to two questions on what 
constitutes ―a truly Christian community‖ and ―a Christian community which is uniquely 
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Catholic.‖  The survey worksheet suggested options for both.  For ―the most important 
elements of a truly Christian community‖ the options were:  
 Commitment to the Gospel. 
 Prayer. 
 Care for the poor and Needy [sic]. 
 Work for justice and peace. 
 Life modeled after Christ. 
 Sense of being an assembly of God‘s people. 
 
The facilitator wrote in participant responses as: ―Belief in Christ and living his 
teachings; Family – living and cohesiveness; serving people, especially those less 
fortunate than us.‖ 
For the elements that ―identify the Christian Community as Uniquely Catholic‖ 
(emphasis original), the survey listed the following options:  
 Mass (Eucharist). 
 Sacraments. 
 Priesthood. 
 Bishop, Pope (Hierarchical Structure). 
 Liturgical Celebrations (Holy Days). 
 Devotions (Rosary, Benediction, Novenas, etc.) (all parentheses original). 
 
Parishioners responses were: ―The Eucharist; Sacraments; Devotions; Consistency of the 
Catholic Faith; Hierarchical structure.‖ 
Pastor’s Responsibilities and Parish Models 
At the start of the second session, the group was introduced to a document 
entitled, ―A List of the Pastor‘s Responsibilities,‖ as a strategy for dialoguing about the 
nature and scope of his duties.  The list included fifteen administrative and ministerial 
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responsibilities.
75
  The six follow up questions sought information about how participants 
understood ―the scope and variety‖ of a pastor‘s responsibilities as well soliciting ideas 
on how to better inform the whole parish of his duties.  None of the questions asked how 
these responsibilities might be shared by members of the parish, by staff, or by council 
and commission bodies.  However, in the one open-ended question in this section of the 
survey (―Please list any comments… made by participants during the discussion period 
that were worthy of special note‖), the facilitator recorded the following: ―Pastor is 
overburdened with administrative responsibilities.  This may infringe on spiritual duties.‖  
In the final question, ―Do you feel it would be beneficial for more of the parishioners to 
know about the variety and scope of the pastor‘s responsibilities?‖ the facilitator checked 
―yes‖ and added, ―It is difficult because pastor cannot do it all.‖ 
Of the five models, parishioners at All Saints chose ―model C‖ which proposed 
that one priest would pastor a cluster of parishes (two or more) with the aid of Parish 
Administrators in each parish of the cluster.  Parishioners wanted a priest-pastor, but one 
―relieved of administrative duties‖ in order to better attend to spiritual responsibilities.  
They found that a lay parish administrator was ―acceptable‖ but they accepted this 
possibility ―reluctantly‖ out of concerns for the cost of lay salaries, the lack of clarity as 
to his or her training, and the scope of his or her authority within the parish. 
Two weeks after the second workshop, the facilitator submitted his write up to the 
bishop, which included a verbatim review of survey responses, as well as a brief 
                                                 
75 The survey read: ―Financial Oversight… Clerical/Secretarial Oversight… Personnel… Legal 
Representative of Bishop… Temporal Goods… Eucharist… Baptism... Confirmation Preparation 
Program… Sacrament of Reconciliation… Sacrament of Anointing… Matrimony… Religious Education… 
Individual Counseling… Funerals… Special Programs & Parish Celebrations.‖ 
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summary of the experience.  In short, All Saints proposed that the pastor hand over 
administrative responsibilities to a lay parish administrator, but to a well trained 
professional.  Their chief concerns were twofold: if a priest had to pastor two or more 
parishes, he would need to be supported by a lay administrator so that the exercise of his 
spiritual responsibilities could continue unhindered by increased of administrative duties; 
and second, the exercise of authority of the lay parish administrator, particularly one in a 
community with an absentee pastor, would need to be clearly defined.  
 
Dialectic: Curriculum and Group Cognitive Complexity  
 
Hierarchy Curriculum 
What emerged in this experience was a conflict between the bishop‘s rhetoric of 
collaboration with how lay collaboration was actually solicited.  In the 1994 process and 
its immediate aftermath, collaboration was limited to participation in the hierarchy‘s 
restructuring plan.  Not included in the understanding of collaboration was working 
together to become better educated about the full scope of the issues (theological, 
sociological, canonical, and historical), to frame the problem, and to form possible 
solutions, but to ―collaborate‖ with the hierarchy‘s pre-existing plan.  Lay parishioners in 
the diocese, however, had a very different notion of collaboration, one recorded by the 
bishop himself in his Summary Report.  He states that there was ―a consensus throughout 
the parishes that indeed the parish of the future will need to operate out of a collaborative 
mode of ministry‖ and that ―the laity will be invited to share in the decision-making 
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process on the administrative and pastoral levels‖ (emphasis original).  Later action by 
the bishop demonstrated that lay calls for collaboration and decision making were not 
heeded (see Appendix 2).  For example, he unilaterally ordered the merger of All Saints 
with Calvary in 1996 without calling for the support of a parish administrator, and in 
2001 he proposed closing All Saints. 
Group Complexity and Dynamism 
Unlike the documents produced in the post-1994 groups, the single survey 
instrument plus the facilitator‘s write up to the bishop only grudgingly yields complexity; 
it yields less information on dynamism.  What can be stated with some confidence is that 
All Saints group inhabited with little resistance the framework provided by the diocese, 
even as the bishop‘s summary notes that other parishes struggled with the curricular 
habitat.  The All Saints group learned and followed the rules of an initiative designed to 
choose a parish model for the purpose of retaining their access to priests and the 
Eucharist as priest numbers decline.  It is likely that they assumed that the work they 
were engaged in was meaningful and that the decisions that they were expected to come 
up with through their good faith participation would be valued by their leaders.  In the 
bishop‘s Summary Report, some communities did not make these assumptions; rather 
they felt controlled and under-challenged.  The bishop recorded comments from 
frustrated lay parishioners who stated that they felt ―led like sheep,‖ and asked, ―Can we 
ever be challenged as a people to find some course of action without having to wait for 
the Chancery?‖ 
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It is argued here that the All Saints group not only trusted in the rules of the 
process, but also that they believed these same rules bound all parties; themselves, but 
also the clergy and hierarchy.  This is based on the feedback of the facilitator of the 1994 
group who, in the 2001 group, expressed confusion and anger over the 2001 diocesan 
proposal to close and sell All Saints as a new response to the same priest shortage 
problem.  He argued that the diocese was not following its own procedures established in 
1994; procedures which the 1994 group had carefully followed in order to avoid the 
permanent loss of both priest and Eucharist – the inevitable consequence of parish 
closure.  This suggests that the 1994 group may have believed that rule following would 
enable them to come up with a parish model that is right, or correct in terms of 
maximizing the likelihood of achieving its primary objective; and that the decision they 
came to would be honored by the bishop when it came time to enact change.  The group 
did not take a perspective on the fact that someone came up with the rules of the process 
and may not feel similarly bound by them.  The group assumed that the implicit rules 
were self-evident and known by all parties who would adhere to them with equal fidelity. 
All of this suggests the strong presence of a second order constituency in the 
group that had no vision of church and few self-consciously held values.  This 
instrumental thinking, however, is accompanied by another which allowed the group to 
subordinate some of its needs (of having a resident priest) on behalf the needs of the 
priest – that he not be overworked while serving two or more parishes.  This, and the 
willingness of the group to cooperate with the bishop and the general trust that they 
exhibited in the process, suggests a loyalty to external authority grounded in third order 
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mutuality; and suggest further the presence of a constituency able to internalize values 
and subordinate self-interest to the interests of the group and the broader community.  
The group was also concerned about the nature of the authority a lay parish administrator 
would exercise.  What we do not have is enough information on why it was concerned.   
Other groups in the diocese gave clear indication of ―why.‖  These groups saw the 
introduction of lay administrators through a theoretical framework able to anticipate and 
construct various patterns of governance.  That is, they went beyond simply asking how 
they might experience a parish without a pastor and how they might come to terms with a 
lay administrator, to recognizing the relation of things to each other (Lonergan 1972).  
Accordingly, they asked a more complex set of questions: given a lay administrator, how 
would this person relate to the Pastoral Council; how would this person relate to the 
priest and bishop?  What they concluded was that in this new situation parish Pastoral 
Councils would need to be strengthened and that the lay administrator should be 
accountable to them.  In other words, they did not want a lay hierarch over them.  What 
no group in the diocese seemed to have taken a perspective on is how parish councils 
strengthened with governing authority would relate to the bishop and to pastors, or how 
giving governing authority to Pastoral Councils in a diocese that was committed to 
exclusive episcopal jurisdiction, might change not only the relations between councils 
and lay leaders, but also the relations between councils and clergy.  The All Saints group, 
unlike other groups, did not seem to take a perspective on the relationship between lay 
administrators and Pastoral Councils, nor those that exist between the parish and diocese, 
and between laity and clergy.  Instead, it saw these relationships as an assumed or 
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necessary component to securing the presence of a priest to preside at the Eucharist, 
baptism, weddings and funerals.    
What can be reasonably concluded is that both second order and third order 
consciousness are present, but second order likely dominates the group knowing at All 
Saints.  What needs further study is the extent to which theoretical, third order knowers 
may have simply yielded to a descriptive context created by the diocese.  That is, the 
group argued primarily from an instrumental, common sense knowing even while it may 
have had greater mental capacity at its disposal had it been challenged to access it.  Once 
they accepted the problem as defined by the diocese (there is a priest shortage/priests are 
overworked), and the solution (to examine prepared models for parish ministry and 
decide one that fits their community best), they required no greater complexity than 
second order consciousness or common sense.  The group did not appear to mind or even 
notice that the diocese posed the key problem, asked all the pertinent questions, and 
proposed a fixed range of solutions that made problematic the governing of parishes, 
leaving little room for presentations of theories and visions by lay parishioners.  This 
group can be scored, with the reservations already mentioned, as 2/3(4): second order is 
the dominant meaning making structure of the group; third order is subdominant, but 
strong; and fourth order is only hypothetically present.
76
  
                                                 
76 The parish data provides no clear indication of a fourth order constituency in the group.  However, it is 
difficult to imagine how displays of personal authority, or value-organizing visions, could appear on the 
survey instrument provided by the diocese to facilitators.  The instrument asked many contained-choice 
questions that called for respondents to ―check all that apply‖; many closed-ended questions that called for 
yes/no responses; when open-ended questions were asked, respondents were often prompted by suggested 
answers (see above and Appendix 2). 
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Figure 6.1: 1994 Parish Group Development 
Other parish groups as noted above broke out of the second order, common sense 
context created by the diocesan process by proposing solutions that would likely 
destabilize the balance of current power relations in the diocese.  This represents the kind 
of dialectic that helps expose different horizons of knowing (Lonergan 1972), in this 
case, a conflict between some groups and the diocese.  Given the fact that the bishop, in 
the following years, dropped the idea of lay parish administrators and waited seven years 
before starting over with an entirely new diocesan-wide process of parish restructuring, it 
suggests two things: either confusion on his part about what kind of lay constituency he 
was dialoguing with; or awareness that participants went beyond where he intended to 
take them.  Lay parishioners in general were not simply role-taking, rule following 
Catholics who fit comfortably into the descriptive habitat stewarded by the diocese.  
While mostly compliant many lay parishioners constructed a more complex habitat in 
which to engage in dialogue, one that had room for third order knowers who grasped the 
relational significance of the restructuring process, and fourth order knowers who grasped 
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also that the exercise of personal authority within the Catholic church must occasion 
meaningful forums for decision making by the laity.  Far from putting people in over 
their heads (Kegan 1994), the bishop may have discovered that he had a lake full of 
swimmers that would not stay close to the shore.   
 
The 2001 Parish Restructuring Initiative 
 
In the American Catholic Church bishops are by any estimate in an impossible 
bind.  Unable to discuss women‘s ordination, unwilling as a national episcopal body to 
risk Vatican censure by broaching the subject of relaxing the discipline on celibacy, and 
similarly unwilling to consider meaningful forums for lay representatives of parishes to 
meet face-to-face with bishops in dialogue, they are nearly bound to offend, unwittingly 
or otherwise, both laity and clergy.  On just the issue of parish restructuring, they are 
caught between the conflicting hopes and dreams of an aging clergy population weighed 
down not only by a dramatically increasing workload as their numbers decline, but by a 
qualitative change in the complexity of the work demanded of them.  All of this is 
occurring amidst a rising lay population (at least nationally).  On the one hand, bishops 
cannot continue to ask priests to take on more parishes as a strategy for addressing their 
declining numbers.  On the other hand, suppressing viable parishes simply because there 
are too few priests to pastor them leads to heartbreak, disillusionment, and defection for 
many lay Catholics who find their communities radically disturbed and their sacred 
spaces sold.  An equally serious dilemma exists on the question of governance.  Bishops 
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cannot indefinitely use a rhetoric of collaboration and participation while simultaneously 
exercising monarchical control.   
The bishop in the diocese of this study made a choice in 2001 that represents the 
worst of both worlds; he chose to limit the number of Masses priest could celebrate on a 
given weekend, and he proposed to further consolidate parishes, close some, and sell one.  
This decision qualitatively changed the way pastors would have to lead parishes by 
reconfiguring their ministries from single-parish pastors to multi-parish pastors, while 
simultaneously limiting their spiritual availability to the people.  In 1994, lay parishioners 
clearly spoke up about their desire to have pastors focus on the spiritual responsibilities 
of their ministries.  Frequent requests are that priests spend more time preparing good 
liturgies and meaningful homilies, and less time balancing budgets; attend to adult 
religious education and less time planning building renovations.  In short, be a visionary, 
spiritual leader; let go of the responsibility of administering the temporal affairs of the 
church by giving these to competent, educated lay persons; and make these accountable 
to Pastoral Councils empowered with governing authority in temporal matters.  By 
further consolidating parishes and limiting Eucharistic celebrations, what the bishop 
instead chose to do from the perspective of the 2001 group was to reduce the spiritual 
availability of pastors, and increase their temporal obligations; a decision that was the 
exact opposite of what parishioners throughout the diocese had recommended in 1994.  
This put priests also in an impossible bind.  Rather than supporting and challenging them 
to attend more to pastoral care, something parishioners highly value, priests were asked 
to assume greater organizational and administrative responsibility, something lay 
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professionals are as competent, and likely more competent to fulfill.  While the bishop 
may have been attempting to ease the workload of priest by placing limits on the number 
of Masses they had to celebrate, he went about it in a way that maximized the frustration 
of both clergy and laity, and had the further negative consequence of pitting clergy and 
laity against each other. 
 
Group Experience and Understanding 
 
The pastor, Fr. Charles, who was installed in 1996, gathered ten parishioners and 
two staff members (myself and the deacon) in 2001 for the purpose of drafting a response 
to a diocesan proposal to consolidate, close, and sell parishes in response to the priest 
shortage.  The two parish meetings were held prior to each of two scheduled deanery 
meetings.  It was here that two members of the group who had participated in the 1994 
event made the connection that the hierarchy may have been disingenuous in seeking 
their earlier participation.  Of the two members one was the facilitator of the All Saints 
group, and the other was a participant in the process for Calvary.  My role, together with 
the deacon, was as a staff representative of the parishes. 
The 2001 initiative was experienced as a stunning and traumatic blow to the 
group participants when they discovered that All Saints was on a list proposing that it be 
―closed (or sold).‖  The facilitator for the 1994 All Saints group reviewed the previous 
parish restructuring process for the 2001 group and argued that the new initiative 
―completely undermined all that work‖ in its proposal to unilaterally close and 
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consolidate parishes.  To him, it made no sense why the bishop would seek and receive 
input from thousands of Catholic parishioners about how to rethink parish ministry in 
light of the priest shortage, and then ignore that input in his new proposal.  It was a blow 
because not only had they participated in the 1994 initiative to prepare for change, but 
they had willingly undergone the challenging 1996 merger and felt their new twined 
community had been so successful that their experience could be used as a model for 
other communities facing a similar merger.  They felt their community was singled out 
among all the parishes of the diocese because of the ―or sold‖ parenthetical tag listed by 
its name.  The provocative proposal by the bishop galvanized the energy of the 
participants of the 2001 deanery process.
77
     
The event with the accompanying proposal for restructuring was framed as a 
―discussion‖ among the lay and ordained participants and in consultation with not only 
deaneries, but also the ―Presbyteral Council and the Diocesan Pastoral Council.‖  It is 
―only a proposal, a place to begin our discussions‖ (emphasis original) which the bishop 
hopes ―will, in the end, provide the diocese with a plan that will best serve the faithful.‖  
Some of the governing variables include the fact that ―priests should not be expected to 
celebrate more than four regular weekend Masses‖; that the results of the 2001 process 
was to provide ―recommendations‖ that will be forwarded to the chancery; and that the 
                                                 
77 The process began with a letter addressed to pastors from the bishop dated in the fall of 2001 in which he 
requested pastors to invite two or three lay persons from each parish to attend deanery meetings to discuss 
future staffing of parishes.  In the ensuing weeks, between three and four hundred parishioners from around 
the diocese participated in two deanery gatherings to discuss the bishop‘s proposal.  Nowhere in the 
diocesan documents is the 1994 process mentioned.  The central issue is described as meeting ―staffing‖ 
needs, by which the bishop means priests, and ―the need for to [sic] provide for the celebration of Sunday 
Mass.‖  He emphasized that in the near future there will be a significant and ―dramatic‖ disparity between 
new priests entering service and priests leaving active service.  He explicitly excluded ―related staffing 
issues‖ such as having lay parish administrators employed to staff parishes.   
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discussions are based around the restructuring proposal already on the table.  Not to be 
discussed: the priest shortage itself, vocations, lay administered parishes, or alternative 
plans that include leaving viable parishes intact. 
Fr. Charles invited comments on the proposal by group members, recording each 
on an easel board.  After both parish meetings he took the large sheets of paper and had 
the parish secretary transcribe them with very little redaction.  He then returned these to 
group members prior to the first deanery meeting for feedback.  The Response by the 
members of the group from both All Saints and Calvary represents the primary text for 
interpreting group complexity.
78
  At the deanery meetings the group had several 
opportunities to express their thoughts and feelings about the proposal and the content of 
their written response.  The gatherings were led by a trained diocesan facilitator whose 
job was to mediate a conversation about the proposal.  However, the poorly conceived 
proposal had the unfortunate effect of pitting the interests of clergy against the interests 
of parishioners; very often the facilitator lost his mediating role as many clergy and 
parishioners took defensive stands on behalf of their own interests.   
As the members of the group one by one advocated for parish interests, clergy 
forcefully rejected their response as turf-protecting, short-sighted, and inconsiderate of 
                                                 
78 Appendix A includes study method, but it is worth repeating here that group texts are understood as 
epistemological artifacts that may contain arguments assembled from different orders of mental 
complexity.  An important assumption is that the complexity of a given argument or assertion is not 
necessarily a reflection of the order of consciousness of the individual who made it.  This assumption is 
grounded in Lonergan‘s assertion that differentiated knowers operate within different levels of complexity 
depending on the exigencies of the given cognitive contexts.  Therefore, however likely it is that the 
complexity of the argument assembled reflects the complexity of the individual who assembled it, it also 
remains possible that a complex knower assembled a simple argument because the cognitive context was 
perceived to be common sense.  This study looks at the different complexities of assembled arguments and 
compares these with group action – what the group did with what it came to know as revealed in the text.  
After an analysis of both is a group score determined.  It is in the comparison of group scores across time 
that development can be observed. 
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the burdens pastors face.  The group responded by proposing that priests from smaller, 
neighboring parishes, might want to assist priests with larger communities by agreeing to 
help with weekend liturgies, particularly if their help would forestall parish closure.  This 
further provoked several among the clergy to flatly refuse to help other parishes by 
pointing out how much is already asked of them in their own communities.  One study 
participant, Molly, left the meeting deeply troubled when she witnessed priests strongly 
defending against increasing their already overburdened workload.  She made the 
following comments in a 2005 interview about the initiative. 
JD In the 2001 deanery meetings, which in your words, in ‗the running of the 
business,‘ something misfired. 
M Big time. 
JD What misfired?   
M Well, first of all, I couldn‘t get over how selfish all those people were. 
JD People as in? 
M The priests.  How selfish.  I mean, they keep thinking that we as 
parishioners have to change or be willing to change.  How about them?  You 
know, hearing these grown men talk about, well, ‗I get phone calls in the 
middle of the night.‘  Yeah, okay.  You know, they signed up for this… This 
is what their calling was.  And this is what comes with that calling.  And if it 
means helping your fellow priests, that‘s what really startled me.  My eyes 
were closed before I went into that.  I thought that this group of guys, first of 
all, liked each other.  I was very, very startled at the animosity between 
some of these men.  I understand that you don‘t have to like everybody.  But 
I guess, priests, jeepers, I was just awestruck at how they reacted to some of 
our suggestions as laypeople, you know, like helping out the priest in the 
next town over--- 
JD That does three Masses helping out the priest that does seven? 
M Exactly.  I was very, very troubled by that.  You know, they want so much 
for us to change, and when I say ‗us,‘ I mean parishioners.  You know, that 
if we close a church, then, okay, we‘re closing a church.  But what about 
you guys?  You know, here I thought our parish priest being responsible for 
seven Masses, having a school, plus the funerals, the weddings, the day to 
day operations.  And then I see another guy over there who‘s saying three 
Masses, just had a new rectory built, and was complaining about getting a 
call in the middle of the night from a drunk guy who was one of his 
parishioners.  That really troubled me, you know? 
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JD It troubled you in the sense that --- 
M It was like, do you even wanna be a priest? 
 
The discovery that priests might not want to be priests, that they find their ministries 
overwhelming at times, that they might not be able or even interested in helping other 
priests, and might not welcome lay people offering suggestions about how to do their 
ministries, while very troubling to her, reveals a flawed dialogue process put to use in an 
institutional structure that is straining under the weight of inevitable, and in this case, 
irreconcilable conflict.  She does not appear to take a perspective on her needs and 
interests, or hold them together with the needs of clergy simultaneously and internally 
and, further, relates the many variables, not to each other, but to herself.
79
  The piece, 
however, underscores the fact that what the bishop proposed and how he structured the 
dialogue, directed the contentious attention of clergy and laity not to him, but onto each 
other.  To use an overused metaphor, the relationship between sheep and shepherds was 
compromised by the ranch owner who kept demanding of his shepherds that they handle 
more and more flocks (more parishes) and demanding of the sheep that they be content 
with less nutritious pastures (fewer liturgies). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
79 The interview protocol consisted of questions designed to get at participant‘s learning and was not 
structured as a subject-object interview.  Therefore, the common sense, or second order structure that is 
apparent here remains a hypothesis, but it is not sufficient grounds for determining a score. 
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Group Complexity 
 
The 2001 group‘s Response included three main themes: initial comments; a 
response to the bishop‘s proposal; and a counter proposal.  In the initial comments, the 
group states ―What really is the reason for even suggesting to sell All Saints?  All Saints 
is a vibrant community with no debt, well-maintained facilities and an enthusiastic faith-
filled people with 800 families.‖80  The Response argues how damaging parish closure 
would be to the merged parishes and the broader community: All Saints houses all 
religious education for children and adults; it houses a rapidly growing Food Pantry that 
feeds three hundred families a month; and it houses the Children‘s Closet that offers free 
clothing, diapers, and furniture to families with infants and children.  It then argues that 
since the merger ―more ministries have emerged than previously existed‖ and that there 
―is a growing bond between the two parishes.‖  Finally, the initial comments state, ―A 
thorough and comprehensive educational program in the diocese should be undertaken 
for the purpose of exploring and understanding what it means to be ‗church‘ and to be 
‗priest today.‖ 
The comment, ―What really is the reason for even suggesting…‖ reflects the very 
un-redacted nature of this text.  The comment may represent a second order externalizing 
of the conflict between the group and the diocese – not one between entities in 
relationship, but between two opposing points of view not able to be held together.  At 
the same time it reflects the suspicion among some members of the group that the 
                                                 
80 The ―800‖ family figure is the on-the-books figure.  The actual figure was closer to 500 families in 2001. 
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bishop‘s proposal was a rebuke delivered to Fr. Charles who refused to reduce the 
number of Masses as requested by the bishop (from the seven All Saints and Calvary 
celebrated between them to four).  This suggests third order taking responsibility for the 
pastor‘s experience; something he neither commented on nor corrected when it emerged.  
The group may also be holding the bishop responsible for their experience, also third 
order.   
The catalogue of praise worthy things the parishes were doing does not 
demonstrate a recognition of the problem the diocese faced; while complaining that the 
bishop has not considered the parishes‘ needs and interests (to stay open) they do not 
seem to be holding together their own point of view and the point of view of the diocese.  
Are these assertions expressed on behalf of ongoing relationships within the parish or 
diocese (if so, then third order) or are they assertions embedded in needs themselves (if 
so, then second order)?  However, the sense of connection between the two parishes, and 
the connection these have to the larger community – the relationship the parish has to the 
poor – suggest the presence of at least third order meaning making. 
The final piece in the initial comment hints at fourth order – a vision forming 
program, but one that does not single out laity as worth exploring.  If it is a call to re-
examine parish restructuring out of a new vision of church and priest; one that 
subordinates authority (of bishops to simply close parishes) and relationships to its over-
arching vision, then we see the presence of fourth order.  In this case the pastor wanted a 
vision to guide the diocese in its conversation over parish restructuring, as he stated in the 
parish and deanery gatherings.  However, his call for the construction of a new vision of 
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church and priest was framed as a direct confrontation of the hierarch who in his 
understanding lacked such a vision.  He picks this theme up again in the 2003 initiative. 
The second part of the letter, the group‘s response to the bishop‘s proposal, is a 
series of bullet points that, without the bullets, reads:  
The model of the proposal seems to indicate that there can be no parish without a 
priest. The model does not seem to recognize the empowerment of the faithful.  
The model doesn‘t recognize any other criteria, except that of hierarchical, for 
parish viability.  Such as: Is it a stable community; is it a growing community; is 
it able to sustain itself financially; is it reaching out and meeting the needs of its 
own community members and those of the surrounding community?  To the 
above we must give a resounding YES.  There are many people and families 
depending upon the social outreach programs that are sustained and operated by 
the Roman Catholic Parishes of [city].  With the loss of All Saints there would be 
no place to offer these ministries. 
 
The critique of the dioceses‘ ―model‖ does not emerge out of a vision of church; there 
are, however, clear relational values present.  The response critiques the bishop for 
considering only needs of priests and for not considering an empowered laity, and is 
suggestive of a rupture in an implied relationship with the diocese (third order).  At the 
same time, while holding their own point of view (we‘re a viable parish), and 
demonstrating an awareness of the diocese‘s point of view, they are not holding the two 
points of view together.  Rather they are speculating (―seems‖) about the possible model 
the bishop must have used to shape his point of view (priest –centered, inconsiderate of 
lay empowerment).  They are inferring the bishop‘s ―ideology‖ without apparent 
awareness that they are not naming their own model; they name concrete actions a 
―viable‖ community engages it but not the model it assumes.  This includes both second 
and third orders, but not likely fourth order consciousness. 
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The section also does not demonstrate an awareness of holding the interests of 
clergy (to not keep having more parishes assigned to them) and lay parishioners (to keep 
viable communities open) together at the same time.  They do not see the diocese‘s 
proposal as an attempt to do this, even if inadequate; one which favored clergy needs 
over parishioner needs.  The way this piece engages in conflict has the feel of second 
order: the hierarchy is wrong and we are viable – thus externalizing opposition.  
However, the criteria they list clearly demonstrate a capacity for mutuality; they see 
themselves in relationship with their own community and beyond.  Again, second order is 
present, but third is as well. 
In the final section of the group‘s Response is a counter proposal that defines 
what the group believes constitutes a viable parish, and comments on the 1996 merger.  
To the group, All Saints is a viable parish; it is ―active, faith-filled,‖ and ―has no debts 
and its physical plants (Church building, Community Center, and Rectory) have been 
maintained in excellent condition,‖ and it is meeting the needs of the parishes and the 
broader community.  They ask, ―Is this the kind of parish we should be thinking about 
closing?‖  Referencing the merger, the text reads: 
As requested by the diocese, we are successfully combining two parishes.  Our 
combined commissions and one pastoral council work well together as well as 
one parish office.  Not only have we managed to survive with one priest for two 
churches, if anything, we are more active than ever with Faith Formation, Adult 
Education, and Community Outreach.  1 + 1 = 3! 
 
Given two communities that are working well together and given the viability of All 
Saints as a parish, they ask, ―what is the problem?  If the issue is long working hours and 
the number of weekend masses for one priest there may well be creative ways to resolve 
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that.‖  The group proposed making better use of retired priests, reducing the number of 
weekend liturgies, assigning a deacon or pastoral minister to assist the pastor.   
The basic solution in the counter proposal ―re-solutions‖ rather than reframes the 
problem.  It does not demonstrate that the crafters understood their parish crisis as a local 
manifestation of a diocesan and national problem; nor does it recognize themselves as a 
part within a larger whole which is also struggling.  It leaves out priest shortage as source 
of problem.  It does not ask, ―Why is there a shortage of priests; whose problem is it (the 
hierarchy‘s and lay parishioners who suffer community closure and bear the social and 
financial cost of reconfiguring parishes); and who is authorized to address it (the 
hierarchy and lay parishioners as they evolve self-authorizing capacities exercised 
together with ordained pastors similarly self-authored and on behalf of a more inclusive 
vision of church)?   
The group‘s re-solutioning also leaves out re-posing the problem (―given the 
priest shortage, shouldn‘t we both continue the 1994 dialogue on parish restructuring and 
look at new ways to staff parishes including rethinking lay parish administrators and 
ordination policies‖); and does not seriously acknowledge that there is, in fact, a real 
problem the diocese must face.  They are self-focused, but also relationally wounded.  
There is little evidence of a strong fourth order presence in the group.  For example, their 
counter proposal is not grounded in a vision of parish/church that understands 
parishioners as a part within a recognized whole, nor does their complaint seem to arise 
from a feeling that the bishop‘s proposal violated internally generated standards grounded 
in self-authorship.  Overall, the document never challenges the right of the hierarchy to 
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lead, nor do the authors set themselves up as competing authorities.  Rather, the 
document attempts to convince the hierarchy to lead differently so that its followers – the 
crafters of this document – would be less conflicted in their following. 
What is the group unable to take a broader perspective on (subject)?  While 
recognizing the unfairness to lay parishioners of closing viable parishes simply because 
there is a shortage of priests, it does not recognize the unfairness to priests of multiplying 
parishes they are asked to pastor, and that there is a problem the diocese must face.  It 
bequeaths to the hierarchy the right to determine their leaders while at the same time 
demanding that a scarcity of ordained leaders not become an issue detrimental to the 
sustainability of their parish.  What can some members of the group take a perspective on 
(object)?  Some take a perspective on the needs and interests of their own parishes even 
as they have a limited perspective on the needs and interests of the clergy or diocese.  
Because the group takes a perspective on its needs and interests it suggests a base of third 
order.  That is, this feature of the document is not subject to needs and interests, as the 
earlier section appears to be, but to relationships within the Church. 
Fourth order is minimally present in this proposal except for one bullet at the top 
and the final paragraph (but only if it represents a vision of how to proceed with parish 
restructuring – in this case, it simply calls for deliberation on solutions, not problem 
posing and vision generating); there is strong evidence of second order, but alongside the 
increasing hegemony of a third order constituency.  I score the group reflected in the 
document as 3/2(4):  a three base, strong presence of two, but less than three; and a weak 
presence of four – too weak to move the group to challenge the way the diocese has 
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framed the problem or to get behind a vision-generating project to redefine 
parish/laity/hierarchy/clergy, etc. as a framework for evaluating diocesan proposals and 
for re-posing the problem the diocese and parishes face.   
 
 
Figure 6.2: 2001 Parish Group Development 
 
Dialectic: Curriculum and Group Complexity  
Here, as with the 1994 process, the diocese created a purely descriptive context in 
which to engage in a dialogue.   It required no greater complexity than second order 
consciousness in order to fulfill its exigence.  However, the 2001 group, much more than 
the 1994 group, stepped out of this context by in its critique of what it saw as a solution 
that took into consideration the interests of priests but not the interests of parishioners; 
and at its hint that a vision of church and priest should guide the conversation.  However, 
the group lacked an organized set of values because it was not guided by a coherent and 
rigorous vision.   
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There was no talk, as there was in 1994, of the fear of losing regular Eucharist; 
the issue was the baffling proposal to close or sell a healthy viable parish, contradicting 
the goals of the 1994 initiative, and in a felt violation of the goals of the 1996 merger.  In 
responding to the diocesan rhetoric of the priority of universal church over the diocesan 
church, and the diocese over the local parish, one respondent, Clair, made the following 
comments in a 2004 interview about the 2001 initiative.  In it, she powerfully articulates 
the value of community as a measure of health in contrast to availability of leaders. 
To be cavalier about that and say, we‘re all one church anyway, and it doesn‘t 
matter, that‘s not the point.  The point is, this parish is working.  And it doesn‘t 
necessarily work the same way as [a neighboring Catholic church] might work or 
even the same way Calvary might work, as close as these two communities have 
become, because they have their own identity.  They have their own community.  
They‘re still welcoming to strangers who might be here visiting, and that‘s great.  
But they still do day to day stuff that‘s important to the church, that‘s important to 
the world that we live in, just as the members of the church have done for 2,000 
years.  Why would someone wanna screw that up?  Simply having somebody to 
say Mass, is that important?  Of course it is.  Is that the only thing that‘s 
important?  No, it‘s not.  And it‘s not simply because the brick and mortar that‘s 
here is so vitally important.  It‘s the community that‘s here is working.  And if it 
stops working in any of those ways so that it then becomes more of a burden than 
a joy and a celebration and a witness to our faith, that‘s when you should look at 
closing it, not because you‘re short of staff. 
 
The 2001 group came to the awareness that to allow the hierarchy to ―call all the 
shots‖ could cost them one of their parishes.  Rule following and role taking would not 
necessarily keep their parish open.  The fact that All Saints was proposed for closure 
created a powerful disorienting dilemma (Mezirow 1991) for the members of the group.  
They were loyal Catholics who loved their Church, valued their pastor, and respected the 
hierarchy but faced, perhaps for the first time, the possibility that their loyalty and 
devotion had little or no correlation to how the hierarchy would treat them.  While 
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arguing that the hierarchy was not ―playing by the rules,‖ and voicing that at the deanery 
gatherings, the outrage many felt was more about the damage the proposal did to the 
diocese-parish relationship and would do, if implemented, to the parish community.  
Similarly, the concern of the group was less about what the hierarchy could do to them if 
they adopted a confrontational stance (which they did) than it was about what they 
perceived as a breech in an implied relationship between parish and diocese and between 
laity and bishop.  They became confrontational, but in service to reestablishing the 
relationship damaged by the proposal.   
To summarize and conclude, why the structure and behavior of the group is not 
grounded in ideology, or self-authorship, because the group had no internal standard of 
what makes a viable community, what governs the relationship between parish and 
diocese or laity and bishop, etc.  Without a vision to guide them their confrontational 
efforts were not about raising consciousness within the Church about the vulnerability of 
parishes and the voicelessness of laity, but about reaffirming mutuality through the 
attempt to ground parish restructuring issues in the implied relationship that exists 
between parish and diocese, lay parishioners and bishop; and in reauthorizing the 
hierarchy with the trust and authority the group assumed it to have.  That is, the group‘s 
confrontational stance was motivated by their disillusionment, which they assumed was 
temporary, about hierarchical authorities who had let them down.  They stood up to 
representatives of the diocese and advocates for the diocesan proposal at both deanery 
gatherings (advocates among the clergy for parish restructuring – no lay person spoke as 
an advocate for parish consolidation or closure) not because that proposal violated their 
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own vision of how things ought to be (fourth order), but on behalf of reestablishing a felt 
breech in their relationship with the bishop and diocese.   
The structural evidence from the 2001 documents for the dominance of third order 
logic is supported by the behavioral evidence; after the close of the process, the group did 
not protest its own suspension or insist on (or even ask for) follow up meetings to discuss 
their options or to turn their complaints into an ecclesial vision that could strategically 
guide future action.  The motivation that under-girds this worked toward rebalancing a 
tottering relationship.  Once they vented, and once the diocese dropped its proposal, the 
group returned to status quo.  An important piece here is the fact that the group‘s re-
solutioning did not challenge the legitimacy of a structure of governance that a) presumed 
to close parishes without prior consultation with parishes; and b) invited parishioners, as 
they did in 1994, to decide about closings and restructurings of their communities without 
offering any education about their canonical rights as parishioners (Coridan, 1997), about 
the history of Catholicism in the United States; and without providing a comprehensive 
vision of lay ministry in a context of priest shortages.  Therefore, both the documents and 
actions of the group suggests the score of 3/2(4). 
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The 2002 Listening Sessions 
 
Group Experience and Understanding 
 
The 2002 listening sessions were gathered in response to the priest sexual abuse 
crisis.  They had a hard time getting off the ground, primarily because Fr. Charles did not 
support the idea and initially resisted opening up a space for such an event.  As the priest 
sexual abuse scandal continued to make headlines, many people petitioned the pastor to 
convene listening sessions so that people could at least talk about it and allow a forum for 
possible victims to come forward.  Fr. Charles eventually asked Arthur, one of the 
research participants of this study, if he would facilitate listening sessions, to which he 
agreed, and a notice was put in the bulletin announcing the date, time, and location of the 
gathering.  Approximately forty people attended the first session.  The pastor attended the 
first two sessions; he wore civilian clothes and spoke very little.  Thereafter, he had no 
direct leadership in the process. 
The 2002 Listening Sessions were attended by a very diverse group of 
parishioners – perhaps the most diverse I had personally witnessed in a Catholic parish.  
Most participants vented frustration and outrage at the hierarchical response to the crisis; 
some expressed concern that all priests would be painted with the same ―priest-abuser‖ 
brush.  The sessions included speculation about the source of the problem (―clericalism,‖ 
―secrecy among the hierarchy,‖ ―homosexuality among the clergy,‖ and ―lax 
seminaries‖).  A consensus emerged that priest sexual abuse was a real problem, but a 
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lack of hierarchical accountability was a bigger problem.  At the second session, the 
group decided to write a letter to the bishop and a drafting committee was formed made 
up of nine members.  Everyone who attended the listening sessions was invited to submit 
their own letter to the drafting committee.  The pastor also agreed to receive drafts of the 
letter from the committee.
81
  I attended the two large listening sessions, but was not a 
participant in the drafting committee‘s work of constructing the letter to the bishop. 
 
Group Complexity 
 
Four Letter Submissions 
Content from four participant letters were used to construct the final draft.  The 
first two represent a common sense, descriptive understanding of the crisis consistent 
with instrumental, second order knowing; the bishop was the supplier of needs, but 
because of gays and the media the bishop is under siege and the people‘s needs are not 
being met.  Rules have been broken.  Roles have become confused.  Therefore, the 
bishop needs to fix the problem by removing gays from the ranks of the clergy and 
communicating with the people so that things could go back to the way they were.   
The third letter attempts to preserve an idea of church that affirms unity through 
hierarchical authority.  Its author is uncomfortable with the parts of the body in conflict 
but recognizes that some church leaders have victimized many children creating 
                                                 
81 From the record of emails, the pastor was sent various drafts but never commented on them through 
email (he did respond in person when approached by a member of the drafting committee about a draft sent 
to him, but his comments were not reported in the emails). 
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confusion in the body and fodder for the media; a fact made worse by a failure of the 
hierarchy to communicate with the laity.  The letter‘s primary argument is restoration not 
change.  It sees the church as a complicated set of relations that includes victims who 
need healing, perpetrators who need prayers, laity that need direction, and hierarchy that 
needs to unambiguously lead.  The letter specifically cues the bishop toward this end in a 
possible attempt to reinvest him with authority on behalf restoring wholeness to the body; 
it suggests a mutuality consistent with third order consciousness.  The author uses 
military metaphors to pledge the laity‘s faithful obedience and loyalty to the bishop, but 
pleads that he teach the people what they are to do so that they can share in his sacred 
work of defending the church against enemies.   
The fourth letter begins not with an address to the bishop, but with an apology to 
victims whose stories were discounted or dismissed by many lay persons.  It states, ―We 
repent of our own willingness to collude with those who made excuses for the evil you 
suffered.  We are deeply saddened by our role in your victimization.‖  Concerned about 
priest predators, it expresses outrage at bishop who prolonged their careers.   
Bishops have proven by their actions that, in the hierarchy of values, their own 
personal image ranks above the most vulnerable members of our community.  
They have generated a far greater scandal, the scandal that our chief 
representatives of Christ are operating with a defective moral compass. 
 
The letter identifies systemic sources for the crisis in a hierarchy that does not listen to 
those beneath it ―in the long chain of command‖; in an insensitive, centralized 
bureaucracy that ignores the experience of local communities; and in a church that has no 
institutional structures that ensure that the voices of parishioners and parishes can be 
heard.  It seeks meaningful dialogue between the different parts of the body on behalf of 
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the health of the whole.  It articulates an ideology of church that organizes values of 
communal health and individual safety, lay voice, and communication through 
representation.  Unlike the previous letter, it does not embed itself in a relational ideation 
of church.  It is not defined by relationships, but takes a perspective on them.  This letter 
suggests a value generating mental structure that is neither embedded in external 
authority nor in relationships; it is able to take a perspective on both and suggests fourth 
order mental complexity.  However, its highly critical tone suggests an anti-
authoritarianism that was as interested in righteous condemnation as in constructive 
critique and reconstructive analysis. 
2002 Group’s Final Draft 
The final draft was not the best of what everyone hoped, but the least offensive to 
the drafting committee members.  Theresa describes the final version as follows: 
What we went through, as I recall, crafting that letter, was everyone in the group 
wanted their own letter in the way they would like it, and that it was passed 
around to all of us to read what each of us had to say.  And then from all the 
letters, we either selected or rejected certain format.  As I recall, one letter was so 
wishy washy that you could hardly understand what the letter was stating or 
requesting. What we had to do then was to craft a letter that was very 
straightforward, almost businesslike, and that‘s what a lot of parishioners rejected 
was our business format that we presented.  And the only reason we did that was 
that after taking everything out of all the contributions, eliminating everything 
that we didn‘t like as a group, and assuming everything that we did like as a 
group, it became a letter by a committee 
 
The final listening session draft of the letter began: 
We are shamed and saddened by the many incidents of sexual abuse of our 
children and young people by priests and religious. We must absolutely know that 
you and your staff are doing everything possible to relieve the pain and suffering 
of the survivors of these terrible crimes. We must be certain that not one more 
child in our diocese shall be abused, nor one more perpetrator finds shelter. This 
is the result we expect and trust that you will provide. 
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We want to express our support for our pastor, Father Charles, and all the other 
priests and religious of our diocese who work daily to minister to the needs of the 
faithful during these troubling times 
 
Characterizing their sentiments as ―shamed‖ is possibly reflective of second or 
third orders consciousness.
82
  The rest of the paragraph puts the onus on the bishop for 
attending to victims and protecting children.  ―This is the result we expect and trust you 
that you will provide.‖  It does not put the burden on themselves.  The scolding tone 
states that it ―expects‖ the bishop to meet their needs and serve their interests, which 
suggests second order.  The next paragraph, however, puts the priest sex abuse in a 
context bigger than the group‘s own needs and interest, which is beyond second order.  It 
sees itself in a relationship with clergy and religious – at least third order.  Further, the 
clergy and religious who exist to meet ―the needs of the faithful,‖ is likely not second 
order since it is able to take a perspective on their own needs as ―the faithful.‖  The 
paragraph begins with the announcement that the group supports its own clergy and 
acknowledges clergy who minister to the needs of the faithful, so there is a sense of 
complex, third order mutual reciprocity.  It does not appear that the paragraph‘s 
expression of support for worthy authority figures comes from a recognition that the 
members of the group stand alongside of and in relationship with clergy and religious as 
equal partners; nor does it come from a standard or vision that subordinates and organizes 
                                                 
82 Does ―shamed‖ mean that they feel embarrassed and exposed by the scandal?  If so, then it is possibly 
second order.  Does the presence of predators among clergy injure their theory of community, and bishops 
moving them into unsuspecting parishes injure their theory of relationships; do they feel guilt and this letter 
is an acknowledgement of their part in the scandal?  If ―injury‖ and ―guilt,‖ then possibly third order.  Do 
they regret their own inactivity, silence and past disbelief of victims regarding sexual abuse by priests 
because such behaviors violated their own standards of care and protection of children?  If ―regret‖, then 
possibly fourth order.   
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these relationships.  This suggests it is less than fourth order consciousness.  This 
paragraph is not second, is likely third, and not likely fourth. 
The draft continues, and includes the following, fairly radical list of requests and 
demands in three points, quoted in full: 
Most of the information we have received concerning your response to this crisis 
in our church has been through the media. We ask that you send us your written 
plan for dealing with the current crisis in the Diocese of [N]. We also ask that you 
regularly communicate with us on the progress being made.  
 
A group of elected lay representatives from each [diocesan] parish shall meet with 
you and other priests and religious on a regular and ongoing basis in regional and 
[diocesan] meetings to develop plans and recommendations for meeting the needs 
of the church in the 21st century.  
 
That you issue annual reports and financial statements for the Diocese of [N] 
showing details of all income and expenditures. 
 
The most radical statement here is the movement from ―we ask‖ discourse to ―you shall‖ 
discourse; from request to demand.  What is requested is that the bishop articulates the 
diocese‘s strategy for dealing with the priest sexual abuse crisis and a request for regular 
and direct communication.  What is demanded is a formal process that includes an 
assembly of elected lay representatives from each parish that regularly meets with other 
constituencies in the diocese.
83
  Behind the request is a call for better management of the 
diocese on the part of the bishop.  Behind the demand is a call to change the governing 
                                                 
83 The group did not understand the diocesan Pastoral Council, which included lay and ordained Catholics, 
as fulfilling their demand.  In the diocese of this study the members of the diocesan Pastoral Council, and 
the procedure for selecting membership, was unknown.  Moreover, diocesan Pastoral Councils do not 
represent parishes, but the diocese as a whole.  In this capacity, they represent the interests of the bishop.  
What the members of the 2002 group sought was, in Arthur‘s terms, a governing ―mechanism‖ of elected 
representatives of parishes that met regularly in order to address the fact that the bishop currently had no 
formal way to hear face-to-face the insights, concerns, and feedback of parishioners.  A demand such as 
this is hardly offensive to Canon Law since it frames lay parishioner assemblies as bodies that make plans 
and recommendations. 
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practices of the diocese in a way that would secure a voice for lay parishioners through an 
ecclesiastical mechanism through which that voice can be heard.
84
  Had bishops had 
access to elected lay assemblies with which they had to meet on a regular basis, some 
drafters argued, the crisis might have been averted.  This section suggests both third order 
and fourth order consciousness, the epistemological arguments of letters three and four – 
one restorationist (to restore what has been lost) and the other revisionist (to revise what 
is defective). 
The letter was broadly circulated.  This was a direct consequence of the group 
decision to seek input and signatures from other members of Calvary and All Saints.
85
  
The purpose was to invite comment into the letter and invite people who agreed with its 
content to sign any of the prepared sheets.  This was done over a two week period at 
fourteen Masses.  The outcome of the pulpit announcements and public reading of the 
letter was a favorable reception by the people, with 359 signatures.
86
  Two parishioners at 
Calvary expressed strong objections to the letter to the pastor.
87
  In the intervening two 
                                                 
84 One constituency in the group went beyond simply asking the bishop to be a better bishop by insisting on 
changes that would help the Church be a better Church.  Without a formal process of lay representation in 
the running of the Church, they reasoned, simple requests for communication and accountability would not 
address the scope of the priests sexual abuse crisis, and would do little to prevent further abuse.  This 
epistemological sentiment was influential enough to make it into the letter, but not strong enough to 
determine the group‘s response when the bishop rejected this notion by ignoring it (below). 
85 The group debated the issue at length and reviewed what other parishes had done.  While other parishes 
in the deanery had written letters to the bishop, one the group reviewed contained the names of all Pastoral 
Council members but was signed only by the chair of the Council; none had received a response from the 
bishop.  Theresa made the suggestion to invite parishioner signatures, made by others as well, and the 
group decided that it would take its final draft and put it in the bulletin as an insert and have members of 
the group make a prepared speech from the pulpit after Communion.   
86 The number might be higher, but I chose to count as one signature several that read: ―Jane and John 
Doe‖, or ―Mr and Mrs. Doe.‖ 
87 Arthur met with one, an elderly woman and active participant in most adult faith events in the parish.  He 
states his conversation with her in the following email sent to the 2002 group participants: ―I met with V 
tonight to listen to her feedback about the letter to Bishop N. She was not happy with the tone of the letter. 
She also felt that it should not say ‗We, the faithful‘ in the letter since she is part of the faithful but does not 
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weeks the local newspaper got a hold of the letter (which was inserted in over 1,000 
bulletins), interviewed Arthur, and published a front page article entitled ―Parishioners 
ask for Bigger Post-Scandal Role: Hundreds concerned about the handling of the issue 
sign a letter seeking financial data and meetings.‖  The journalist queried the 
spokesperson for the diocese as well as the Chancellor, and interviewed a moral 
theologian in a regional Catholic college.  The body of the unedited letter was published 
along with the article.
88
 
 
Dialectic: Curriculum and Group Complexity  
 
Intra-group Dialectic 
Conflict within the group occurred during the drafting phase over the four letters.  
The sources of conflict centered around the concerns over homosexual priests, and how 
deferential or confrontational the letter should be.  The author of the first letter kept up a 
multiple email argument over the ―problem‖ of gay priests, but what prevailed over other 
members of the group were arguments that pedophilia and homosexuality are two 
different and unrelated issues; that if the percentage of gays in the priesthood was as high 
as asserted, purging gays would mean losing twelve to sixteen thousand priest in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
agree with the letter and will not sign it. While I don't think we can make any major change to the letter at 
this late date I do think we can address her concern by changing the letter in two places to instead say ‗We, 
the undersigned faithful.‘ I have attached the revised letter to this note for your review.  What do you think? 
Should we make this small change?‖ 
88 This caused further difficulties for some parishioners.  One, Mr. P., felt that the group members, in a 
grandstanding move, had sent the letter to the media and had intended to embarrass the bishop.  He could 
not understand why the pastor did not prevent the letter from being drafted and sent out in the first place.  
Mr. P., whose brother and son are priests, wrote his feelings in a letter of protest to the pastor and decided 
to stop attending Mass at the parishes.  As far as I know, he was the only parishioner to take this step.  Fr. 
Charles shared Mr. P.‘s letter with me as well, which contained a strong rebuke to Fr. Charles. 
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United States; and that the group should presume good faith on the part of gay priests 
who, together with heterosexuals, take a vow of celibacy.  The group was also conflicted 
on how deferential their letter should be.  It ultimately rejected the tone of both letters 
three and four as overly deferential and overly confrontational respectively, and decided 
on a business-like format that included arguments from each letter.  While keeping both 
restorationist and revisionist arguments of letters three and four, the group letter was not 
framed within a vision of church; rather, it asserted a series of values and procedures that 
are necessary for restoring and changing the church. 
Curriculum Complexity 
In his letter of response, the bishop admitted that responding to parishioner letters 
was not something he generally entertained.
89
  It is unclear how much the media story 
contributed to his decision to write.  His rare willingness to entertain the 2002 group‘s 
concerns about protecting children, communication, and financial accountability indicates 
that he heard their requests.  However, the bishop also communicated that the listening 
session participants had little if anything new to teach him in their letter; he implies that 
they might not have needed to write if they understood how a diocese operates.  
The fact that the bishop did not address their demand that he meet with elected lay 
representatives as a strategy for future planning may indicate a discomfort with the idea 
of democracy in a hierarchical church; it may also indicate a rejection of the exercise of 
theoretical knowing or self authored on the part of the laity regarding the governing of 
the diocese.  His refusal to acknowledge the group‘s demand may indicate a discomfort 
                                                 
89 See Appendix 2 for a more thorough description and analysis of the bishop‘s response. 
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with demonstrations of knowing that go beyond common sense problem solving and 
advice-giving.  This hypothesis has further evidence in the bishop‘s reference to previous 
planning processes (unnamed).  He stated that the ―broader goal‖ in these were to ―help 
people understand their proper roles,‖ to ―increase lay participation,‖ and to encourage 
parishes to become ―schools of prayer‖ and evangelization.  His broader goals were not 
known to participants, something he implies were self-evident; but they likely governed 
how the diocese planned and structured the previous parish-diocese dialogues in 1994 and 
in 2001.  The bishop‘s stated goal of increasing lay participation, based on the outcomes 
of the two previous initiatives, did not mean lay participation in decision making in the 
Church, but participation in the bishop‘s already formulated strategy.  Because the 
planning processes in 1994 and 2001 which, as we saw above, were structured to 
anticipate a certain range of outcomes from the laity, and did not anticipate the generation 
of new knowledge, the bishop might have sought, not participation as understood by lay 
parishioners, but lay ―collaborators.‖ 
Group Complexity 
The 2002 group for the first time stepped out of the passive and reactive context 
of the two previous groups.  Where earlier groups did not question the dialogical contexts 
created for them by the diocese, but simply reacted positively (1994) or negatively (2001) 
to them, this group acted with a greater degree of agency.  This agency is reflected in 
their capacity first, to gather on their own, and second, to pose problems and ask 
questions.  The 2002 group created a cognitive context that allowed them to pose two 
problems.  First, children and parishes are vulnerable to abuse by bishops who shelter 
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perpetrators from public scrutiny and then move them into parishes without disclosing 
past allegations of abuse.  Second, parishioners have no sanctioned, non-deviant, way to 
make their voice heard by bishops.  The guiding heuristic evolved from ―what has 
happened?‖ (which led some to priest-blaming; i.e., homosexuals in the priesthood); to 
―how did this happen?‖ (which led others to bishop-blaming); and finally, to ―why is this 
happening?‖  This latter heuristic moved some in the group to step out of a purely 
descriptive context by asking a question that sought the relations of things to each other.  
They experienced Lonergan‘s systematic exigence and looked, not for subject-centered 
answers that relate everything to the self (in this case, the needs and interests of their 
parish), but explanatory answers that relate all the known variables to each other and, 
moreover, seek the invariant in the variables.  The variables – parishioner/pastor/bishop, 
victim/perpetrator/bishop, parish/diocese – were all governed by the actions of an 
absolute ecclesiastical monarch that could not listen to parishioners because there was no 
formal mechanism in which these voices could be expressed.  The discovery was that 
calls for better communication, transparency, and accountability would amount to little 
without ―elected lay representatives from each… parish [to] meet with [the bishop] and 
other priests and religious on a regular and ongoing basis.‖  The invariant, then, is the 
mode of governing that grounds decision making.  On the one hand is the monarchical 
episcopacy that is not used to multi-directional communication, is not familiar with 
multi-lateral decision making, and seemingly cannot tolerate jurisdiction for lay 
parishioners, even in strictly temporal affairs.  Therefore decisions are made at the top 
without complete information because various orders in the church have not been heard 
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on their own terms.  On the other hand is governance grounded in communication, full 
participation, and genuine collaboration.  The group was not exactly asking for 
democratic governance since it saw lay assemblies as a way to plan and make 
recommendations for the local church rather than as a decision making body.  The group 
saw no contradiction between a hierarchical church and the full participation of elected 
lay representatives in the collaborative running of the diocese. 
The group clearly articulated one set of values while assuming another set of 
values that were not brought into conversation with each other.  They espoused and 
practiced values of care, communication, participation, and power sharing.  All of these 
values were explicitly articulated in their letter to the bishop – something they expected 
him to practice – and were clearly practiced by the group as evidenced by their advocacy 
for victims, by their use of multi-directional communication; by opening their work to the 
critique and participation of the whole community; and by the exercise of mutual 
power.
90
  The assumed value was hierarchical governance; they assumed, without 
arguing the point, that an assembly of elected representatives was compatible with a 
hierarchically structured church.  They also may have assumed that the bishop would 
seriously entertain their demand.  This is strong evidence that the group was not guided 
by a vision capable, first of surfacing assumed values, and second, of organizing these 
                                                 
90 They advocated for victims by calling for transparent and accountable bishop aided by elected lay 
assemblies.  They communicated ―up‖ to the pastor regarding various letter drafts; they cross-
communicated with each other as evidenced in the 208 pages of emails and in their gatherings; and the 
communicated ―outward‖ to the parish in publishing the letter and inviting signatures.  The value of 
participation was practiced in that the boundaries of the group never closed so that any parishioner who 
wanted to could attend the listening sessions or the drafting sessions; and in the fact that they invited the 
whole parish to participate in the letter signing.  The value of power sharing is exhibited in the soft 
leadership of Arthur and the leadership of the whole group which exercised mutual power (Torbert, 2004) 
in constructing a conversation that allowed all voices to be heard, in the drafting of the letter, and by 
remaining open to suggestion to change the letter.  
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conflicting values into a coherent case for democratic participation in a hierarchical 
church.  Without such a vision of church, their value-grounded case was easy to dismiss 
because it allowed the bishop to pick which of the disparate values he would respond to.   
The bishop‘s response ignored their request for a lay assembly but instead invited 
parishioners to meet with his ―four member team with expertise in the various areas of 
your concern who would be available to sit with you, if you so desire, for an 
informational session.‖  The group did not protest, or even discuss further, the refusal of 
the bishop to address their call for a lay assembly.  Nor did the group notice that the 
dialogical listening they called for from the bishop was responded to by his proposal for 
an ―information session.‖  When the group agreed to meet with the four panel team, 
much of the meeting consisted of their listening to chancery officials repeat the lines of 
argument in the bishop‘s response: that they are already doing correctly what the group 
critiqued; that victims by and large appreciate they way the diocese has handled their 
cases; and that the laity are represented on the diocesan Pastoral Council, Finance 
Council and Public Policy Committee.   
Within the 2002 group were second, third, and fourth order constituencies.  It was 
more complex than the 2001 group in that it self-organized, raised new questions, and 
posed its own set of problems.  Second order, present in both groups, was a less 
influential presence in 2002 as evidenced by the group‘s refusal to blame homosexuals; 
fourth order was clearly present and, unlike the 2001 group, was influential by 
persuading the group to retain at least a partially confrontational stance, and to call for lay 
assemblies.  But fourth order was not determinative; its capacity to vision was 
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unsuccessful in drawing others into its orbit, perhaps because its ideology was perceived 
as coming at the price of adopting an anti-authoritarian stance.  When the bishop ignored 
the call for lay assemblies the group as a whole did not object; when he offered to have 
the group meet with his four panel team, many in the group saw it as a concession and a 
victory.   
I score this group as 3/2/4: third order is the base; second order is subdominant, 
but fourth order is also strong, only less so than second order.  Thus, in terms of 
numerical presence, it is likely that between the two groups (2001 and 2002), third order 
is maintaining its hegemony, second order is strong, but on the decline, and fourth order 
is rising.  That is, second order is evolving into third order which is also evolving into 
fourth; as third ―loses‖ numbers to a fourth order constituency, it ―gains‖ from an 
evolving second order constituency, thus maintaining its hegemonic balance.  Agency 
and communion are held in balance but, because third is hegemonic, communion was the 
base out of which the group enacted its knowledge production and decisional responses.  
Since the bishop in a rare move responded to their letter, and since he agreed to have the 
group meet with his team, the bishop had done all that he needed to do in order to be 
reinvested with authority by a third order base eager to do so.  The sense-making that 
third order does – what constitutes its understanding of being/reality/truth – made sense 
again.  For second order, its notion of reality – what works – was also reestablished by 
the fact that its demand for a response from the bishop ―worked‖ (he responded), as did 
the bishop‘s assertion that he is already doing what is necessary to protect children and 
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attend to victims – he who makes the rules is also, for this constituency, credibly 
following them. 
 
 
Figure 6.3: 2002 Parish Group Development 
 
2003 Group: Visioning with the Pastor 
 
Group Experience and Understanding 
 
At a diocesan wide gathering of priests in a resort town in the late spring of 2003 
the bishop gave a speech calling on priests to begin formulating a vision for the diocese 
for the next five to ten years.  The context, like the 2001 Deanery process and the 1994 
Vision 2000, was the consequences of the priest shortage and the challenges this 
presented to staffing parishes with priests.  What was new was that for the first time the 
diocese intended to engage in this conversation through the construction of a new vision.  
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It was a visioning process, however, that the bishop wanted only ordained members of 
the church to participate in.  Theresa commented on the fact that lay parishioners were 
excluded. 
I thought it was rather shortsighted on the part of the diocese not to have asked 
that other parishes contribute to responding to the letter because I thought that if 
these huge changes are about to occur, if they want them to occur peacefully and 
cooperatively, the only way they‘re going to accomplish that is by having the laity 
educated and to feel as though they‘ve participated in these decisions, and that 
they understand the need for the changes.  
 
Trying to understand why the diocese would want a ―comprehensive‖ vision 
without getting input from lay parishioners, I ask Arthur: 
JD Could it have been that the bishop was saying, ‗okay, we‘ve got input from 
the laypeople in the 1994 [process] and in the 2001 Deanery meetings.  Now 
we want input just from the priests.‘  Do you think that that could have been 
the reasoning? 
 
A Could have been, sure.  Wrong way to do it, but could have been. 
 
JD Why is it wrong? 
 
A Because they make up one percent of the church, and we make up 99% of 
the church.  And they are shrinking, and we are growing.  Who the heck do 
they think they are to try to hold on to all the control? --- It doesn‘t make 
any [sense]. They‘re going to fail if they do that.  The only way the Catholic 
Church will succeed at the local level and continue to be able to minister to 
its people is if they involve the laity much more than they do today. 
 
JD Okay. 
 
A And, and by involve, I mean the laity has to be involved in decision making 
and governance. 
 
By decision making Arthur is not arguing for participation in an educative experience 
initiated by the hierarchy to bring lay people up to speed about the priest shortage, a fact 
that necessitates restructuring parishes.  Rather, decision making means having lay 
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jurisdiction over particular competencies within the Church.  The significance of this, 
according to Arthur, is the very success of the Church depends on a redistribution of 
―control‖ in a way that includes the 99%.  Hierarchs are going to fail at the local level 
where the 99% gather unless they ―involve the laity‖; without such involvement, the 1% 
will ―not be able to minister to its people.‖  Arthur‘s logic might be: you cannot minister 
to people you are at the same time excluding from dialogue and governance. 
Clair comments on the frustration many participants felt about whether their input 
would matter to the diocese: 
C I remember that in 2003 when we were here, I remember Molly who 
probably [is] one of the most positive, a person who would give the benefit 
of the doubt to just about anybody ever.  I mean, she‘s just such a sweet 
person.  I remember her sitting here very frustrated saying, ‗this feels like 
we‘re right back we started,‘ and ‗here we go again.‘ 
 
JD And she was involved also in the 2001 process. 
 
C Yes.  And that comment coming from a person who might tend to be 
negative, eh.  But that coming from someone like Molly I think spoke 
volumes.  I think she‘s someone that takes a lot to frustrate.  It takes a lot to 
get angry, and by golly, they succeeded, you know.  They worked at it, and 
they finally got it right.  And, you know, when asked to participate, I try to 
do that.  And I was willing to do it, but the whole time I was doing it, in the 
back of my mind was, ‗we will do this, and it will go nowhere because 
nobody‘s really paying attention to what we‘re saying.‘ 
 
In the 2003 initiative the group was re-gathered by Fr. Charles and given the task 
of formulating with him a vision for the diocese.  His questions were the same ones 
raised in the 2001 initiative which he framed as, ―What does it mean to be priest and what 
does it mean to be church?‖  Though frontloading the process with his own questions, he 
nevertheless insisted on participants providing their own responses.  When one 
participant stated that she was simply happy to be invited at all and really wanted to hear 
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what Father Charles had to say, that she was putting on her ―learner hat,‖ Fr Charles 
responded by saying that she and everyone was invited because he believed they were 
visionary thinkers and that he expected her ―teaching‖ input and feedback.  The 
conversation was limited however by the pastor‘s own view of the issues.  The two 
questions he framed the conversation around omitted ―what it means to be laity‖ thus 
culturing the group within a context heavily biased toward a priest-centered model of 
church, his rhetoric of participation notwithstanding.  By his two questions it appears that 
he did not think the laity were a constituency alongside clergy and religious, but could be 
subsumed under the question of what it means to be Church whereas priests could not be 
so subsumed and needed special consideration.  During the planning phase, and again 
after the first session, I proposed several times asking the question, ―what does it mean to 
be laity?‖  While arguing that the laity is included in his initial questions, he soon agreed 
to include them in the visioning project and added another week to the gatherings to 
address the question.   
 
Group Complexity 
 
The fruit of these sessions was to revision three orders of the local Church; 
bishop, priest, and lay parishioners. The priest is a ―co-worker with the Bishop, 
collaborator with the laity… he is gifted but does not have every gift and thus invites 
others to share their gifts with the building up of the community of God.‖  Catholics are 
―baptized and confirmed Christians who have a duty and a right to gather, discuss and 
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discern issues that pertain to the church and their role in the church.‖  The Church needs 
to ―move from a priest- centered parish to a community-centered parish‖ and can be 
aided in this by calling ―a diocesan synod preceded by parish, cluster or deanery 
gatherings to help shape a possible agenda‖; a process that acknowledges the 
―hierarchical Church‖ but which has in place ―formal structures‖ for sustained adult 
conversation that is bishop-to-laity, priests-to-parishioner and parish-to-parish and parish 
to diocese.   
The 2003 Letter 
The letter the group constructed consisted of three paragraphs detailing what it 
meant to be church, priest, and laity.  It was followed by a bulleted summary of what they 
envisioned was the future of the church.  The first question, what it means to be church, 
reads: 
‗We‘ are church and it is important that we become aware that our baptismal call 
is both entitlement and empowerment to ministry.  ‗We‘ are a welcoming 
community of believers who celebrate the good news of Christ through prayer and 
liturgy and by caring and loving service to each other and all of God‘s creation.  
The center of authority is the Holy Spirit diffused through the people of God who 
are the preservers of the great truths of the Creed.  ‗We‘ are constantly renewed 
by the assembly gathered for the celebration of the Eucharist and seriously 
commit ourselves to be a people on a mission. 
 
This paragraph clearly articulates values of agency and communion.  The people are 
situated in a relational context of mutuality that includes caring for others in the 
community and for all of creation.  The people are also situated in an empowered, agental 
context where immersion in the community must be enacted in ministry (it faces inward) 
and mission (it faces the world).  The ―center of authority‖ is not located in revered 
leaders or in an institutional model of church, but in the power of the Holy Spirit whose 
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presence permeates the people of God on behalf of preserving Catholic faith, enlivening 
communal celebrations, and sending forth its renewed members into the world.  Its 
communal ethic is primarily ethno-centric attending to a specifically Catholic 
community; its agental ethic is primarily antro-centric.  Its expression of care for creation 
may indicate an eco-ethic that is both communal and agental, but it remained an 
undeveloped aside. 
The next paragraph attends to what it means to be priest, and reads as follows: 
What does it mean to be Priest in today‘s Church?  He is a co-worker with the 
Bishop, collaborator with the laity, liturgical and spiritual leader of the faith 
community and is presider at the Eucharist.  He is a shepherd, general, servant, 
loves being a priest and invites and empowers the lay people to take rightful 
ownership of their own faith and of their faith community.  He is one who breaks 
open the Word and tries to live the Gospel in his daily life.  He realizes that he is 
gifted but does not have every gift and thus invites others to share their gifts with 
the building up of the community of God.   
 
This paragraph describes the role and responsibility of a priest-pastor in terms radically 
different from those articulated in the 1994 process.  He is the clear leader of the 
community in that he gathers the people and presides at liturgy.  His leadership is 
characterized as one of integrity, collaboration, care, and service on behalf of 
empowering lay parishioners to take ownership of both their faith and their community.  
―Building up the community‖ is accomplished not through rules and roles but through 
―gifts‖ that are possessed by the pastor and by the whole community.  His ―role‖ is not 
described in functional terms (1994) but in relational terms; the ―rule‖ he is to follow is to 
seek out and invite others to share their gifts for the life of the community.  By their use 
of the metaphors of shepherd, general, and servant, the group intended to define the 
pastor‘s responsibilities of pastoral care (a shepherd who ministers to and guides the 
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people), staff management (a general who delegates and holds accountable), and service 
to the whole parish, especially the poor and oppressed (servant). 
Finally, the paragraph on the laity reads: 
What is the role of the laity in the Church today?  A continuously converting 
people who are chosen to share in the priestly, prophetic and kingly mission of 
Christ in the church and in the world.  They are baptized and confirmed Christians 
who have a duty and a right to gather, discuss and discern issues that pertain to 
the church and their role in the church.  We are called to be a disciple and an 
apostle and to continue to grow as an adult in the church.  We can ―do‖ and ―be‖ 
whatever is allowed and needed.  As we live our Christian lives we cherish and 
foster the gifts of all while at the same time using our own gifts to serve the 
community of faith. 
 
This third paragraph on what it means to be ―laity‖ also expresses clear agental 
and communal values.  The value of adult growth, of expressing gifts, and the value of 
the right of assembly are suggestive of agency.  The expressing, ―continuously converting 
people‖ does not mean proselytizing, but individual and community growth; it is a value 
of personal and social development occurring in the context of faith communities.  The 
laity are called (disciple) and sent (apostle);
91
 they are called to be informed and formed 
in community (communion) and, having experienced transformation, they are sent out 
into the world (agency).  The value of sharing in the ministry of the church, and its notion 
that lay identity and mission, suggest possible embeddedness in authority (what is 
allowed) and exigency (what is needed), and suggests further that for this group the laity 
are not self-determined. 
 
 
                                                 
91 These were key themes in Fr. Charles‘ teaching throughout his tenure at All Saints and Calvary. 
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Dialectic: Vision Construction and Group Complexity  
 
With the pastor, Fr. Charles, the 2003 group attempted the construction of a vision 
to inform the diocese in its own visioning process.  However, the vision was not acted 
upon by the group itself which may indicate that it had no organizing power.  Why this 
might be the case may have to do with the developmental level of the group; it may not 
have been able to generate a powerful vision.  What the group did instead, was assemble 
a collection of values about church, priesthood, and laity through intragroup dialogue.  
The vision it constructed was therefore not transformative for the group and its members.  
There are practical and explanatory reasons for this.  The pastor framed the work of the 
group as one of participation in his responsibility to submit a vision to the chancery.  
While they co-constructed the vision, it remained his vision.  Second, the group 
assembled a considerable collection of values under the rubrics of church, priest, and 
laity, but did not organize these very different values into a coherent and rigorous 
visional narrative; therefore the epistemological ground suggested by the new vision was 
not stable and supportable.  A third reason may have to do with the fact that there was no 
follow up by the pastor to these meetings except to send the group members copies of the 
letter by a chancery official acknowledging receipt of the group‘s letter.  The group was 
not re-gathered to critique the diocese's response, to further engage the three questions, or 
plan for future action.  Fourth, the work of the group was not shared with other governing 
or ministerial bodies, nor was the parish informed through bulletins or pulpit 
announcements.  This prevented the members from taking a leadership role in the parish 
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through the many other groups they were members of and engaging the parish in this 
important conversation.  It is further evidence that the pastor gathered these parishioners, 
many of whom were participants in previous groups studied here,
92
 not to form and 
transform the consciousness of the parish, but to inform the debate among clergy and 
hierarchy.  Finally, the group gatherings did not have a religious education component.  
Lacking this, the group was not able to put their own insights into conversation with 
scholarly sources to engage them and be engaged by them. 
The chief reason why the group did not enact its own vision, however, may have 
less to do with practical reasons than with explanatory, epistemological reasons; it may 
have more to do with the fact that fourth order had yet to replace second order for sub-
dominance.  The agental quality of the group was still instrumentalist because it (agency) 
was dominated by the second order constituency.  Third order was hegemonic; therefore 
communion provided a powerful source of energy for the group.  However, because 
agency and communion are theoretically held in balance in complex groups, the agental 
energy would be expended either instrumentally or ideologically.  As second order was 
subdominant, agency was expressed instrumentally in the group.  Thus, when the 
visioning work was complete and it came time to do something with the vision, the group 
simply sent it off and that was that.  The agental relationship between second and fourth 
was such that the weaker fourth order constituency was not convincing; it was not able to 
make itself felt in the enactment of the group‘s ―proto-vision.‖  Third order may have 
appreciated the fact that the pastor shared his visioning task with them; once the visioning 
                                                 
92 Seven members of the 2003 group were participants in the 2001 group. 
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task was complete, it was not their job to do anything more except wait on the pastor.  
Their very participation might have been experienced as a powerful affirmation of who 
they were as interpersonal knowers.  I score this group the same as the 2002 group: 3/2/4. 
 
 
Figure 6.4: 2003 Parish Group Development 
2004 Lay Collaborative Inquiry Group 
 
The 2004 group more than previous groups acted out the learning it engaged in; 
what it did was fairly consistent with what it claimed to know.  That is, the structure of 
knowing suggested by what it said was consistent with the structure of knowing 
suggested by what it did.  This suggests a more complex pattern of knowing than in 
previous groups; one that may be connected to the strong emphasis placed on religious 
education.  Of the events that occurred in the parish or in the diocese from 1994-2003, 
none offered education on a theology of the laity or parish, or on the canonical and 
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theological relationship between parish and diocese.
93
  Whatever the reason, at the very 
least it lessened participants‘ grasp of the issues and weakened any argument they would 
put forth.   
 
Group Experience and Understanding 
 
Work began on the groups in early summer 2004 through several meetings 
between myself and the pastor, the Faith Formation Commission chair, and the chair of 
the Pastoral Council in order to discuss curriculum, group design, and the potential 
usefulness of action research as a strategy for bringing the community into an intentional 
conversation with the diocese.
94
  The pastor and I worked out an initial reading list that 
emphasized the contemporary experience of being a lay Catholic.  We also looked at 
sources from theology and official church documents that highlighted the roles and 
responsibilities of the laity in carrying out the ministry and mission of the church.
95
  We 
                                                 
93 For example, none of the events offered instruction on the canonical relationship between the parish and 
diocese, between the bishop and the people, between the priest/pastor and lay parishioner, etc.  There was 
no short course on, ―The History of the American Catholic Church,‖ on ―Lay Movements,‖ ―Lay 
Governance,‖ or even on ―Lay Ministry and Leadership.‖  The parish and the diocese could both point to 
adult programs and even certificate programs for Lay Ministry (our parish, for example, was the only 
parish in the diocese whose own in-house leadership training program could issue Lay Ministry Certificates 
upon completion, signed by the bishop).   
94 The Lay Collaborative Inquiry group, though designed in light of my studies at Boston College, were 
carried out not as a researcher but as an employee of the parishes.  The theoretical sources that informed the 
group design were William Torbert‘s Action Inquiry (2004; I had just finished a doctoral seminar with 
Torbert in which we read, among other Action Research sources, the manuscript version of his yet-to-be 
published book), and Kegan/Lahey‘s How the Way We Talk can Change the Way We Work (2001). 
95 Included were the key diocesan documents which proposed a rationale for working toward a 
restructuring plan, which included a commentary by the bishop.  We also agreed to study chapters II and IV 
of Lumen Gentium (People of God and Laity), Christifideles Laici, and selections from numerous recent 
publications intended for a general audience: Thomas Groome, What Makes Us Catholic (2004); Paul 
Lakeland, The Liberation of the Laity (2003); Donald Cozzens, Sacred Silence; Peter Steinfels, A People 
Adrift; Francis Sullivan, ―St. Cyprian on the Role of the Laity in Decision-Making in the Early Church‖ 
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put together a flyer for the bulletin and the pastor made pulpit announcements at all the 
Masses advertising an ―Information Social.‖  With the heading reading, ―What Does it 
Mean to be a Lay Catholic in Today‘s Church?‖ the flyer held out the prospect for 
participants that they might find their faith challenged, and their voice heard.  In the 
middle of summer, after the Independence Day celebrations, we held the social.  The 
pastor gave a key-note address about the future of the Church and laity‘s role in that 
future.  I followed with a presentation about what the Church teaches about the laity, past 
and present.  I then gave a brief history of our community‘s past participation in diocese-
parish dialogues and the outcomes.  Finally, I proposed ―lay collaborative inquiry 
groups‖ in which participants could study, discuss, reflect, argue, judge, and take 
appropriate action.  This would not be a ―soup can‖ learning experience where parish and 
diocesan educators often teach survey courses that detail the can‘s label, the history of 
canning, and the can‘s nutritional content, but never hand over the can opener.  People 
leave these learning experiences feeling conflicted; they were made aware of their 
hunger, but often leave feeling un-satiated.  I emphasized that these were not ―courses‖ or 
―lectures‖ but participatory groups that would move from education, to knowledge 
creation, and to action deemed appropriate by the group.  We would become 
knowledgeable of the ―can‖ and its content, but we would also prepare the meal and eat; 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2004); Jane Regan, Toward and Adult Church (2002); Thomas Reese, ―Impact of the Sexual Abuse Crisis‖ 
(2004).  Finally, we read from a collection of statements made about the laity that I had put together from 
Vatican II and papal documents, the Catechism of the Catholic Church, and Code of Canon Law. 
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acknowledging the gifts of God, fruit of the Earth and the work of human hands.  Of 
approximately forty participants, thirty two agreed to become part of the lay groups.
96
   
During the course of the summer the 2004 group decided to write a letter to the 
bishop and the Central Committee that was currently crafting a plan to implement a 
restructuring scheme for the diocese.  Through study and reflection the group members 
came to the decision that it would ask the hierarchy questions that mattered to the group.  
The question of the appropriateness of lay people to preemptively asking questions of the 
bishop was difficult for some participants; reading the documents was perhaps as 
persuasive and instructive as group dialogue.
97
  The diocese, it was also pointed out, had 
                                                 
96 After the planning stage and initial social, two groups began (two different groups met on different nights 
for the convenience of the participants).  In the first session we established group rules and format.  Two of 
the more important rules turned out to be the two minute rule (no one speaks for more than two minutes), 
and the rule of advocacy over persuasion (that one can strongly advocate for their beliefs and positions, but 
not try to persuade others to those same beliefs and positions).  The rules, I pointed out, could be revisited 
as needed.  The general pattern of the group process consisted of five segments: initial gathering, 
presentation, small group reflection on the readings, re-gathering for general feedback, and close with 
―prayer partners.‖  Opening prayer was assigned to a new person each week, after which the gathering 
consisted of checking in and offering feedback on the previous session.  In the presentation portion I asked 
how the reading resonated with members‘ experience and invited general comments.  Then I gave brief 
overviews of the text prior to small groups discussion. 
97 Especially instructive were: a. (CCC 900) ―Since, like all the faithful, lay Christians are entrusted by God 
with the apostolate by virtue of their Baptism and Confirmation, they have the right and duty, individually or 
grouped in associations, to work so that the divine message of salvation may be known and accepted by all men 
throughout the earth. This duty is the more pressing when it is only through them that men can hear the Gospel 
and know Christ. Their activity in ecclesial communities is so necessary that, for the most part, the apostolate of 
the pastors cannot be fully effective without it.‖   
b. (CCC 911) In the Church, "lay members of the Christian faithful can cooperate in the exercise of this power 
[of governance] in accord with the norm of law" (CIC 129.2).  And so the Church provides for their presence at 
particular councils, diocesan synods, pastoral councils; the exercise of the pastoral care of a parish, collaboration 
in finance committees, and participation in ecclesiastical tribunals, etc.   
c. Paul VI, Apostolic Exhortation, Evangelii Nuntiandi 73: ―Hence the active presence of the laity in the 
temporal realities takes on all its importance. One cannot, however, neglect or forget the other dimension: the 
laity can also feel themselves called, or be called, to work with their pastors in the service of the ecclesial 
community for its growth and life, by exercising a great variety of ministries according to the grace and charisms 
which the Lord is pleased to give them.‖ 
d. (Lumen Gentium, 37) ―Let the spiritual shepherds recognize and promote the dignity as well as the 
responsibility of the laity in the Church. Let them willingly employ their prudent advice. Let them 
confidently assign duties to them in the service of the Church, allowing them freedom and room for action. 
Further, let them encourage lay people so that they may undertake tasks on their own initiative. Attentively 
in Christ, let them consider with fatherly love the projects, suggestions and desires proposed by the laity. 
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publicly stated that anyone with questions about the reconfiguration process should ask.  
The critical question that mattered to the participants was what constitutes a viable parish 
community in the criteria of the diocese?  The groups spent a session on their own ideas 
(honoring its mission of evangelization and social ministry, stable parish population, 
serviceable debt, facilities in good repair) but came to the conclusion that what they did 
not know was whether the diocese had a different criteria of parish viability.  Other 
concerns were questions of consultation – whether it would be two way, or one way, top 
down – and plans for training pastors, staff and parish communities for restructuring.  A 
drafting committee was selected to put together a letter based on submissions they 
received as well as their own insights, stating the desire of the group to be part of the 
conversation of the diocese in matters of parish restructuring, giving a brief description 
and history of the groups, and crafting the three questions on viability, consultation and 
training.  
Besides the event of the group itself, a major event occurred one month after the 
start of the sessions when Fr. Charles was placed on administrative leave pending an 
investigation by the diocese about his relationship with and support of a recently arrested 
sexual predator.  A temporary administrator, the Vicar General of the diocese, was 
appointed to the parishes and made pulpit announcements at the Masses in the week the 
pastor was put on leave.  He stated several times in his remarks that he would not be very 
visible in the parish because of his many responsibilities, and that ―this is not my 
                                                                                                                                                 
However, let the shepherds respectfully acknowledge that just freedom which belongs to everyone in this 
earthly city.‖ 
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problem, this is your problem.‖98  Five retired priests agreed to preside at the weekday 
and weekend liturgies for the duration of the investigation.  The bishop published a letter 
that was inserted in the bulletin listing the allegations against the pastor, outlining the 
investigation process, and appealing to persons who may have been victimized by the 
sexual offender to come forward and report to law enforcement.   
The group, as most parishioners, was deeply troubled by the circumstances of the 
pastor‘s removal.  Attendance at the gatherings increased.  Since the perpetrator was 
arrested and confessed to the sexual abuse of four minors, and since Fr. Charles knew of 
his past abuse and, it was disclosed, had been approached by one of the perpetrator‘s 
victims but did not help him or report the incident as required by the diocese, it was 
difficult to condone his (Fr. Charles‘) decision to allow this man to live in the rectory.  
Yet some did, noting that the pastor was only taking in a jobless, homeless sinner, as 
would Jesus.  Some also expressed anger at the bishop for including in his letter to the 
parish that Fr. Charles had one allegation of inappropriate touch that occurred in 1985; an 
allegation the diocese dismissed.  Why, except to smear Fr. Charles, would the bishop 
include an allegation he did not find credible, these group members asked?  Others 
expressed anger at the pastor for not letting at least the Pastoral Council and members of 
the staff know that his new guest should be watched and should not be allowed in the 
school or near children and youth.  Finally, some strongly condemned the pastor, not 
because his guest was unsupervised or because others did not know of his past, but for his 
                                                 
98 While he may have intended to praise the parishes for their capable leadership and their capacity to 
handle a crisis such as this, many participants felt it was insensitive because, to them, it represented his 
refusal to share in their struggles.  Others heard in his comments permission to work within whatever 
formal community-based channels remained in place. 
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allowing a known predator onto church property in the first place.  These noted that their 
pastor had engaged in the same behavior as had bishops in sheltering and supporting 
priest-abusers and that the attention of the parish should now focus on whether there were 
any victims at All Saints or Calvary.    
After a lengthy period of discussion the group proposed crafting a second letter, 
this time to the parish at large.  Their intention was to repeat the facts as they understood 
them about the case, and to reassure the parish that every ministry that was in place 
before his removal would continue to function; and that there were persons and groups in 
place ready to answer specific questions and refer potential abuse victims.  The same 
drafting committee was charged with putting together a letter to the parish based on 
versions members of the group submitted as well as their own ideas. 
 
Group Complexity 
 
In addition to structural evidence in the two letters produced by the group, there 
are important behavioral data prior to and after their drafting, more so than in previous 
groups.  Both of these allow one to make a strong case for group complexity and 
dynamism and, when compared to the 2003 group, noticeable development as well.  
When the two letters were crafted, a final summer session was scheduled in which all 
groups gathered to edit and approve final drafts.  A conversation ensued over whether or 
not the group needed approval for the letters.  The letter to the parish, it was quickly 
 276 
decided, needed approval;
99
 the group therefore decided to bring it to the Pastoral 
Council, which had recently been scheduled for an emergency session because of the 
current crisis, and accept whatever decision they came to.  Seeking approval for the letter 
to the bishop was another matter.  The group decided that since the spokesperson for the 
diocese had publicly stated that it was open to questions about the reconfiguration, that 
that was all the permission they needed.  The final, approved letter was therefore sent out 
to the bishop and the diocesan Central Committee, signed by over thirty participants who 
attended that session.  The responsibility-taking by the group represents a significant 
development from previous groups.   
The Parish Letter 
This letter cannot be analyzed in the same way the previous letters and documents 
were because of its heavily redacted nature.  Rather than construct a letter from many 
drafts (as in the 2002 group), or piece together a document from collage of comments 
taken from easel board sheets (as in the 2001 and 2003 groups) the 2004 drafting 
committee took its cues from the conversations that occurred in the group in the wake of 
the pastor‘s removal.  However, the letter they produced to the parish community 
includes fairly clear instrumental, ideational, and ideological patterns of knowing.  That 
is, it reveals the complexity of knowing likely present in the group in its articulation of 
rules and roles, values of communion and agency, and in its institutional vision of a 
                                                 
99 The reasons for this were two fold.  First, the group did not represent the parishes in an official capacity, 
and a letter signed by them might be confusing to parishioners; it might also create a worsening of the 
power confusion left in the wake of an absent pastor and absentee temporary administrator.  Second, the 
groups decided that without some official sanction they had no right to access the parish database and use 
parish resources to carry out an action plan they came to on their own. 
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church functioning well in a crisis; and it appeals to the knowing of each of the 
constituencies.   
The letter‘s instrumental knowing can be seen in how it describes the 
ecclesiastical rules and procedures involved in the pastor‘s removal and investigation:  
The intent of this letter is to be sure you are informed as to the current status of 
our Pastor…  Father [Charles‘] removal is an administrative action in order to 
facilitate further investigation by the diocese.  This procedure is guided by the 
Church‘s Code of Canon Law and not by the civil law and is consistent with child 
protection safeguards established by the Diocese.  It is important therefore not to 
equate ‗temporary administrative leave‘ with ‗guilt.‘ The investigation, which is 
being conducted by the diocese, is expected to last at least 60 days.  Our parishes 
will temporarily be administered by [the Vicar General]. 
 
This makes clear the rules of the juridical process and situates them not only within 
Canon Law, but also within the new diocesan rules regarding priest misconduct mandated 
by the Dallas Charter.  But it also reaffirms existing roles in the church: Fr. Charles is 
still the canonical pastor; his removal is for his own and the parish‘s protection which 
does not alter his role; the new temporary administrator is just that – his role is temporary 
and administrative (he is not the pastor).  Moreover, the letter makes clear that the 
functioning of the parish would continue uninterrupted by this crisis (below): regular 
Eucharist, weddings, funerals, faith formation, and ongoing administration of its temporal 
affairs.  Instrumental, descriptive knowers would be able to quickly recognize that their 
spiritual needs and interests would continue to be met. 
The letter also includes ideational knowing in that it situates its purpose in an 
explanatory context of relating the variables to each other rather than to the self.  The 
variables are the status of the pastor, the functioning of the parish, the nature of the 
diocesan juridical procedure, and the care of potential victims.  All of these are related to 
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each other in service to a well functioning parish community able to weather this 
particular storm.  The group in its letter wanted to convey to parishioners that the pastor‘s 
removal would not disrupt the liturgical and administrative functions of the parish.  It 
states, ―Be assured that [All Saints‘ and Calvary‘s] church operations, activities and 
events will continue as usual.‖  Its opening paragraph states:  
The intent of this letter is to be sure you are informed as to the current status of 
our Pastor Fr. [Charles] and what impact his absence will have on our parishes.  It 
is with a heavy heart we inform you [he] has been placed on a temporary 
administrative leave by [the] Bishop [who] conveyed his reasons in a letter, which 
you will find enclosed, to our church community.   
 
The letter expresses an obvious, but restrained, affection for Fr. Charles who has not 
himself been accused of sexual misconduct, and whose removal ―is an administrative 
action in order to facilitate further investigation by the diocese…  It is important therefore 
not to equate ‗temporary administrative leave‘ with ‗guilt.‘‖  Further, the letter‘s authors 
state, ―We invite you to join us in prayer for swift and appropriate resolution of Father 
[Charles‘] situation.  We encourage any who want to express their personal sentiments to 
[him] to do so by sending cards and letters to the rectory.‖ 
Unlike previous letters and documents this letter takes a perspective not only on 
the parish‘s own challenges, but also on those faced by the diocese.  It recognizes the 
painful reality for parishioners of having a pastor removed, but acknowledges the 
perceived diligence of the diocese in fulfilling the Dallas Charter.  It states, ―While the 
process at hand is unsettling, it speaks to the commitment of our Diocese to ensure the 
safety of our children and our entire church community.‖  This represents a significant 
development from previous groups where much of the attention was parish/parishioner-
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directed.  The letter assembles values that are both agental and communal (how the 
investigation will arrive at a resolution that is presumably fair to the pastor, the parish, 
and to potential victims; how the functioning of the parish will continue because of its 
many connections within and without the parish). 
Finally, in its address to the community the group that edited and approved this 
letter refused to take responsibility for Fr. Charles‘ actions preferring to let the 
investigation run its course rather than defend him or offer preemptive excuses for his 
choices; and it refused to take responsibility from the bishop in the exercise of his duty to 
investigate priest misconduct.  Instead, the group was responsible to itself in that it took 
responsibility for a felt authority that derived from the experience of the group in its own 
learning about what it means to be a Catholic parishioner.  Their decision to address the 
parish represents a benign claim to power made by the group in a context of power 
confusion.  It also suggests an intuition that the stability of the community and its ability 
to maintain its many ministries might be called into question by other members of the 
community; an intuition that they themselves could address by presenting and 
disseminating valid knowledge of the current situation.  While the group assumed a 
degree of power, they did not act on that power to the exclusion of other official bodies 
within the parishes (the group‘s decision to hand over their parish letter to the Pastoral 
Council to edit and make their own).  This is suggestive of post-ideational knowing.  But 
it is not self-consciously ideological because it assumes a group vision that has organized 
its many values.   
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The Letter to the Bishop: Intragroup Conflict 
With regard to the second letter addressed to the bishop and the new diocesan 
committee for parish restructuring, the group decided that once they framed their 
questions and crafted and edited the letter, they had only themselves to consult on 
whether and when to send it.  What they did not do was reason along the lines that their 
communication with the bishop had to be mediated by clergy (a message the hierarchy 
made clear by its past relations).  This is a fairly clear example of a group fully owning 
what belonged to it (the right and duty to address their concerns about parish 
restructuring to the bishop) and not owning what belonged to others (how others might 
respond to their decision).  Moreover, they kept separate the issues of parish restructuring 
and the removal of their pastor.  That is, they did not let their concerns about the 
circumstances of the removal of their pastor intrude into their letter to the bishop about 
their parish restructuring questions. 
Prior to the final summer session the only draft of the second letter the committee 
had was my own; no one else had sent in a draft.  I included the three questions that were 
written on an easel board during the last group session.  I also included a brief 
introduction about why the group was gathered taken from the informational flyer 
announcing the formation of the group, and from other bulletin advertisements used to 
promote parish adult educational events.  The drafting committee submitted the letter as-
is to the group along with the parish letter for editing.  Members of the group reacted to 
what they perceived was a potentially offensive statement in a sentence that framed 
parish-based learning within the larger diocesan restructuring initiative then underway.  I 
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wrote: ―Members of our parishes are determined to be part of that conversation [the 
diocesan initiative] from the start rather than taking a wait-and-see approach.  It is more 
responsible to pursue this rather than to react negatively to a plan whose formulation we 
did not participate in that could profoundly affect our faith community and our faith 
lives.‖100  It is the second sentence that people reacted to; many argued that it should be 
struck from the draft.  I pressed the group on why, explaining why I thought it expressed 
the desire to ―hold our own feet to the fire‖ while at the same time reminding the bishop 
that doing so was an act of lay responsibility-taking, something the group had arrived at 
on its own.  The group insisted that it be struck, naming the sentence‘s presumption that 
there would, in fact, be a negative reaction to the diocesan Central Committee‘s 
restructuring plan.   
What is significant is how the group reconfigured its relation to me, its facilitator.  
It did not want to be over-determined by its leader.  The group looked beyond its 
relationship with its immediate leader to its relationship with the diocese.  It had begun to 
integrate authority rather than assume the authority of the leader.  One might object to 
this analysis by pointing out (correctly) that as a lay person I did not wield the kind of 
authority the group would feel subject to or feel a compelling expectation from.  
However, the events that followed this exchange with the Vicar General (below) confirm 
the new meaning making ground the group stood upon. 
                                                 
100
 The edited paragraph reads: ―What does it mean to be a lay Catholic in today‘s Church?  We Catholics 
of [city] have gathered over the summer in Lay Inquiry Groups to ask this question.  These groups have 
gathered to prepare for the significant changes that will occur within the diocese during the next five years.  
We are meeting concurrently with the diocesan Central Committee that is constructing a plan to implement 
the rationale identified in ‗A New Evangelization for the Diocese of [N].‘  Members of our parishes are 
determined to be part of that conversation from the start rather than taking a wait-and-see approach. 
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Dialectic: Vision and Group Complexity 
 
Intergroup Conflict 
An emergency meeting of the Pastoral Council was called at the end of August.  
In attendance were fifteen members of the Council, about twenty parishioners who 
voluntarily showed up, and the temporary administrator.  Eight members of the 2004 
group were present, four on the Council itself.  After a lengthy discussion of the crisis the 
letters came up on the agenda.  The letter to the parish was reviewed and the Council 
decided that it would be good to get it into the hands of every member of the community.  
They also decided that it would be better if it was signed by the Pastoral Council with a 
post-script thanking the group for drafting it.  The temporary administrator felt it would 
be important to state at the beginning of the letter that it was approved by the Pastoral 
Council and himself.   
When the letter to the bishop came up it was apparent that the temporary 
administrator had not read it before hand.
101
  After a summary read, he vehemently 
rejected the letter, stating that it had not been run through the appropriate channels before 
being sent off.  He angrily argued that the letter created an ―us and them‖ atmosphere, 
and assumed that the bishop and his committee were not already asking the questions the 
group raised.  He asserted that it was insulting and offensive to both the committee and 
the bishop.  In a dramatic gesture, he crumpled the letter up and tossed it, striking a 
member of the council, saying, ―That‘s what I‘d do if that letter was addressed to me.‖  
                                                 
101 The agenda was emailed by Arthur to each council member and the temporary administrator with the 
two letters attached 
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After venting in this disturbing manner, the council was momentarily silent.  Then, one 
by one each group member including those not on the Pastoral Council calmly rebutted 
his charges: It is the opposite of ―us and them‖ since it explicitly states that the groups 
want to be part of the diocesan conversation; it did not need approval since the diocese 
formally invited questions; the questions were sincere and emerged over the course of 
weeks of research, discussion, and deliberation; and whatever tone he heard in the letter, 
it was the response from a group that had a long and remembered history with the diocese 
that, in 2001, had proposed closing and selling All Saints after it had been successfully 
merged with Calvary.  He dismissed the last point by stating that the community‘s 
response in 2001 was, ―blown way out of proportion.‖  He then repeated his charges. 
It was a significant moment to witness group members listening to strong 
objections to their action, holding their ground in the presence of a figure of power not 
only in the parish, but also in the diocese, and publicly reaffirming the validity of their 
knowledge and the appropriateness of their actions.  Here was a small community that 
moved from, ―can we do anything about the vulnerability of our parish?‖ to, ―is it okay to 
engage the bishops through inquiry?‖ to, ―these are good questions and they are our 
questions‖ and to, ―we expect the bishop to take our questions seriously by responding to 
them.‖  They not only generated new knowledge, they also claimed that knowledge as 
their own.  The fact that the group members present at the parish Pastoral Council did not 
retreat into a deferential attitude of docility when the temporary administrator violently 
rejected the tone and content of the letter to the bishop and the Central Committee is 
convincing evidence of ownership-taking.  They did not take responsibility for how he 
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experienced their letter.  Further, there was never a time at the council meeting or in the 
many sessions that gathered in the fall, that members of the group held me, the letter‘s 
original drafter, responsible for the administrator‘s outburst.  The letter they edited and 
sent was their letter; its content was the product of their own learning.  Standing on the 
knowledge that they had a responsibility to themselves to make their voice heard as lay 
parishioners, and that their decision to send the letter was right and timely, the group 
members present further demonstrated their unwillingness to relinquish that knowledge 
when an attempt was made by a most powerful figure to take it away from them.  The 
group members did not accept his characterization of their communication; nor did they 
accept that perceived weaknesses in the letter somehow disqualified it from getting a 
sincere reading. 
Three weeks from the sending of the letter the bishop sent a response directly to 
the group, a rare deviation from protocol since it did not go through the temporary 
administrator.  He opened the letter the letter with, ―Thank you for your reflections and 
questions that were transmitted to me on August 23
rd… You are asking some very good 
questions.‖ He went on to affirm that it was his intention to promote two-way 
consultation; that it was not his intention to close any parish or worship site, and that 
local communities would decide within clusters how they would continue to carry out 
their mission of evangelization.  On the viability question, the bishop repeated that local 
communities within clusters would determine their own facilities‘ needs and make their 
own determinations about worship sites.  The letter did not address the specific nature of 
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consultation.
102
  The bishop stated that training was essential, but that there were no 
finished proposals at this time.  On the viability question, the bishop did not give the kind 
of response the group was hoping for.  This proved crucial for the next three meetings of 
the 2004 group. 
Intragroup Conflict 
Because this group continued after the completion of its original mandate, there is 
additional structural and behavioral evidence, unlike previous groups.  Several group 
members expressed relief that the bishop had responded positively to their letter, unlike 
the temporary administrator.  Many in the group, however, were bothered by the bishop‘s 
letter, noting that he did not really answer their chief question; he did not tell them what a 
viable community consisted of.  But two members of the group, Arthur and Theresa saw 
his response as a positive development, arguing that the bishop had, in effect, put their 
own question back on them, and that it was their job to come up with a ―plan of 
viability.‖  It was further proposed that doing this required that the community begin to 
inquire into and tell its own story, its own history of faith.   
Members who, after critiquing the bishop‘s letter, succeeded in persuading other 
group members that the bishop‘s response was an opportunity to achieve what they 
ultimately wanted is a dramatic example of a group evolving sufficiently to be able to 
attend to and respond favorably to a fourth order evaluation.  Arthur and Theresa were 
able to prevail upon the group to move away from seeing the bishop‘s response as a 
                                                 
102 This raises many questions: What would lay input look like vis-à-vis the pastor? How would 
disagreements between pastors and lay parishioners be worked through?  If a ―parish‖ with multiple 
worship sites needs to close one of its sites, who decides, and according to what criteria?   
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vindication (relief that he did not share the temporary administrator‘s characterization), as 
a victory (they got a positive response from the bishop), or as a disappointment (he did 
not answer their key question).  It was not a vindication, a victory, or necessarily 
disappointing; it was an important opportunity for the group and the parishes.   
Their capacity to see the bishop‘s response as a chance to take greater charge of 
their own inquiry process proved decisive in advancing the project of the group.  The 
group had initially asked an authority-bound question (expecting the bishop, the authority 
of the diocese, to tell them what makes them ―real‖) and received a response that at least 
some took to be self-empowering.  In other words, many in the group made a complaint, 
suggesting an expectation that the bishop was supposed to tell them who they were (that 
they were not really viable unless he shared their criteria of parish viability), but were 
challenged by two individuals to take a more independent, self-authoring stance.  With 
this new way of understanding their context, the group decided it was necessary to begin 
the work of crafting their own parish narrative; they embarked on a project of defining 
themselves according to their own ―criteria of viability,‖ beyond what the bishop says.  
They called the new project, ―Our Parish Story‖ which continued for two more months.  
The new pastor, however, who was appointed after the investigation of Fr. Charles 
resulted in his permanent removal, unilaterally and without attending the sessions 
disbanded the group. 
Group Complexity, Dynamism, and Development 
As stated above, the group not only generated new knowledge, it also claimed 
ownership of that knowledge.  Knowledge production occurred in two essential ways.  
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First, simply reading Church documents gave more than an expanded awareness of the 
role of the laity in matters of Church governance.  The documents communicated a sense 
of power within the group that overcame the inertia of being passive learners.  The 
knowledge created was the fact that it was not only okay to gather as a community for the 
purpose of engaging the hierarchy, but that it was that community‘s responsibility to do 
so.  This educational piece did more than provide content – it helped to change the 
structure of the group‘s knowing. 
Second, the knowledge production that occurred in the wake of the pastor‘s 
removal is at least as significant as that gained from the documents since it provided an 
―exigency‖ through which the group changed its own mandate (its added decision to 
address the parish), and in doing so responsibly enacted its new learning.  The dissonance 
caused by the serious fall of a once respected pastor meant that the group‘s decision 
making could no longer be based on simple delegation from the pastor who in so 
delegating merely loaned for a time the capacity to be decisive, but gave up none of his 
governing power.  Lay parishioners in the group were in effect taking matters into their 
own hands, in the absence of a pastor and in the presence of an absentee administrator.  
The unusualness of this self-governing behavior is heightened in a Church that coaches a 
confusing curriculum of lay participation (see Appendix 2).  
It is the argument here that the group achieved this because of an agental shift in 
subdominance between second and fourth order constituencies.  While third order 
remained hegemonic, fourth order began to dominate the agental energy of the group, but 
not the group itself.  Fourth order moved from present but not influential (2001), to 
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influential but not determinative (2002 and 2003), to determinative but not dominant in 
2004.  What this may mean is that one or two late third order members made the move 
into fourth order to join others already there, and one or two late second order members 
made the move into third order; a small change in the cognitive complexity of the group 
that fundamentally altered its knowing and choosing.  The third order constituency 
remained hegemonic, but fourth order became for the first time convincing to earlier 
orders of mental complexity.  Second order was present but no longer determinative of 
the group‘s sense of agency.  Third order mutuality remained dominant which meant that 
its emerging vision of who they were and what they were about was still hinged to 
whether or not the new pastor supported its work.
103
  The group score, 3/4/2, indicates a 
group dominated by third order, but with a change in the agental quality of the group 
from second to fourth order consciousness. 
 
Figure 6.5: 2004 Parish Group Development 
                                                 
103 Several members of the group questioned the new pastor in order to affirm the importance of the Lay 
Collaborative Inquiry Groups and to ask why he disbanded them without inquiring about what their goals 
were.  He responded by stating that the parish group was unnecessary and that the diocese had its own lay 
group already functioning; further, he stated the diocese would be instituting new parish cluster groups in 
the near future. 
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The previous 2003 group was not able to organize its diverse set of values into a 
rigorous vision whereas the 2004 group, which had not embarked on a ―vision quest,‖ 
nevertheless succeeded in assembling and organizing a coherent set of values toward a 
self-consciously chosen process of vision creation.  This necessitates further clarification 
of what a vision is.  Visions, when dialectically constructed out of the history of a group‘s 
knowing and choosing, are potentially transforming for both the members of the group 
and the group itself.  Using Lonergan‘s transcendental method, a group‘s attentiveness to 
researching its own experience over time, its intelligence in interpreting that experience, 
and its reasonableness in correctly affirming the validity of its interpretation, moves a 
group into the kind of conflict (dialectic) that exposes different patterns of knowing.  Out 
of the experience of intra-group dialectic a vision can emerge that is rigorous, coherent, 
and clear; it is grounded in the patterns of knowing of different cognitive constituencies 
each of which inhabit, within different levels of complexity, the meta-story it tells.   
Kegan‘s constructive developmental theory is helpful in understanding how 
different cognitive constituencies experience the notion of vision or how they experience 
the process of vision construction.  All group members can know rules and choose roles, 
but second order is at home in these when the vision is clearly articulated; when rules and 
roles are translatable from the terms and relations of its ideology (its overarching, value 
organizing story), second order is able to enact the vision and therefore fully participate 
in the group.  Most members can know and choose values, but third order is at home in 
these when the vision assembles them in a coherent way; when relational values become 
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the means by which it shares in the vitality of the story it tells.  Finally, some members of 
the group can know and choose the epistemology of the vision itself because they are 
embedded in its ideological, metaphysical structure; they therefore know and support the 
vision‘s inferences, deductions, and assumptions, not through content knowledge alone, 
but also through a correct cognitive theory – they know what they are doing when they 
are knowing.  A vision can be understood as a meta-story that goes beyond an 
assemblage of community anecdotes.  A vision articulates the totality of the reality or 
truth the community inhabits (which is why it is ideological); it provides a social-
historical-temporal narrative within which a diverse set of values are organized and made 
intelligible (which is why it is ideational); and it creates a ―rule of life‖ generative of 
rules and roles that, when acted on, enacts the vision (which is why it is instrumental). 
But a vision by itself merely points to the need for transformation (conversion in 
Lonergan‘s parlance).  A vision by itself is not transformational unless the people 
experiencing it are drawn into, and inhabit, the story it tells – and the story it tells is the 
group‘s own history, identity, and mission; where they have come from, who they are, 
and what they are about.  It is the argument here that the process of constructing a vision 
out of intragroup and intergroup dialectic can simultaneously ―deconstruct‖ the group‘s 
―cognition‖ by exposing its different patterns of knowing.  Group cognitive 
deconstruction can occur also with an existing vision when it is clear, coherent, and 
rigorous; the very attempt to articulate or enact it can expose the presence of different 
horizons of knowing.  A vision can be transforming for a group when it includes every 
cognitive constituency – when it is practical (it works), ideational (it makes sense, it is 
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intelligible), and ideological (it is true/real/actual/complete).  A powerful vision is able to 
organize the lives of individuals and groups around itself because it is their story; it is 
converting.
104
  But groups are not cognitive monoliths; therefore transforming, converting 
visions are experienced differently by different orders of mental complexity.  The 
possibility that transformation can occur for individuals in intentional corporate settings 
may have something to do with the believability of what the vision has to say, its meta-
story, and how that story proves capable of drawing different people into its narrative.  
Can the vision fit within its ideology the different worlds of the group members; does it 
organize a diverse but coherent set of values; does it attend to communal (mutuality) and 
agental (independence and autonomy) yearnings; are its values generative of a clear set of 
rules and roles; and is it actionable, are there implications for meaningful decisions that 
enact the real, actual vision? 
In the educational experience of the 2004 group, and in its intergroup and 
intragroup conflict, the group began to live within an emerging, but as yet unarticulated, 
vision.  It was generating its own story, even before it attempted to tell the story of All 
Saints and Calvary; a story that held together diverse values of industry, mutuality, and 
personal authority.  It was a story that had power not because a fourth order constituency 
dominated the group, but because forth order became determinative of its agental culture 
                                                 
104 The inadequacy of a complete vision, one that articulates ―the totality of the reality‖ a group inhabits, 
will not likely become apparent to a group dominated by third order, however much fourth order holds the 
agental energy of the group.  It is likely that only a group dominated by fourth order, with third in decline 
and fifth on the rise would move toward recognizing the incompleteness of all visions.  When fifth order 
overtakes third order for subdominance of a group, its communal energy would shift from group mutuality 
to a more radical inter-communion.  At this point the group would begin to self consciously ground its 
metaphysical vision in ethics; in a notion of the good that organizes all ideologies on behalf of the inter-
penetrability and inter-dependence of all planetary communities, situating the human community as one 
part in the whole that is the living volatility of Earth.  
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of mind.  Its power enabled the group to begin enacting the nascent vision it inhabited.  
This fact put it considerably beyond the curriculum coached by the hierarchy as 
articulated at the beginning of this chapter. 
*** 
The bishop in the diocese of this study stated to ordained Catholics in 2003 that 
very little would change with regard to what it means to be priest; change was in store for 
what he termed ―infrastructure,‖ by which he meant the parish life of lay Catholics and 
how they would be led.  As we saw, the following year the bishop proposed in his 
Rationale to reduce the number of canonical parishes by about hundred by reducing their 
canonical status to ―worship site‖ and calling clusters of worship sites ―parishes.‖  
Parishioners were not informed about the implications for changing the canonical status 
of ―parish‖ to essentially ―mission‖ – from a legal, protected, juridic Person to an 
ephemeral, unprotected, and indistinct gathering;
105
 nor were parishes informed that by 
keeping their own Finance Councils the one ―cluster parish‖ with many worship sites 
would be a parish in name only – that worship sites would not lose their canonical status 
as juridic persons.
106
   
                                                 
105 Parishes as juridic Persons, once established, are not easy to suppress (Coriden 1997); only a bishop can 
close, or suppress, a parish and only for very compelling reasons – a shortage of priests is not a compelling 
reasons, argues Coriden (1997).  A worship site stripped of its parish status does not enjoy the canonical 
protections a parish does, and is therefore more vulnerable to closure. 
106 By keeping separate Finance Councils the ―worship sites‖ would remain canonical parishes.  All Saints 
and Calvary discovered this during 1998 when, after having already merged into ―one‖ parish, they spent 
six months coming up with a new name (by having parishioners propose names and vote on them), which 
they then submitted to the bishop for approval.  The two communities had merged their Pastoral Councils 
into one, but because of the significantly different financial needs between them, All Saints and Calvary 
decided to keep their own, separate Finance Councils.  When the bishop responded in a letter to their 
request he informed Fr. Charles that, because they had not merged their Finance Councils, they were in fact 
two distinct parishes, despite the merged Pastoral Council, shared staff, and shared pastor.  Therefore he 
rejected their proposed name, noting that when they merged the Finance Councils into one, the subject of 
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The 2004 initiative radically changed what it meant to be both parish and priest.  
The changes quantitatively increased the administrative workload of pastors and 
qualitatively changed how they would lead.  That is, the responsibilities now required of 
the pastor not only increased numerically, they grew in complexity.  He no longer leads a 
single or merged community, but a network of communities whose organizational 
exigencies require a new mode of being pastor.  Without a vision to guide him, without 
―re-tooling‖ him to intelligently, truthfully, and pastorally lead in this new context, he 
may simply become further submerged by administrative concerns and less able to attend 
to the care of souls in a way that is fulfilling to the people and meaningful to himself. 
With even a little forethought one can reasonable predict the long term outcome 
of this change.  An overwhelmed pastor, with one or two assistant priests in a ―parish‖ 
cluster of six or seven worship sites, may decide to close and sell what amounts to a few 
―out buildings‖ on behalf of achieving a more meaningful ministry.  How well this is 
received by the members of that community, or even how inclusive and collaborative the 
pastor was in making this decision, is beside the point.  By changing and reducing the 
status of definite gatherings of the faithful to mere worship sites, the bishop may be 
simply handing over to pastors the painful task of foreclosing on whole communities.  In 
so doing, he distances himself from the immediate turmoil that surrounds parish closure, 
but only by making overburdened priests, rather than himself, the likely target of 
parishioner anger and protest.   The normally good relations pastors have with 
parishioners (see chapter one), and the normally good relations local Catholic 
                                                                                                                                                 
naming the parish could be taken up again.  Fr. Charles presented this to the councils, who decided once 
again to keep the councils separate. 
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communities have with neighboring Catholic communities will likely experience a 
radical challenge. 
 
Some Findings: Evolving Communities and Leadership 
 
The groups of this study clearly grew in cognitive complexity over a ten year 
period, a fact all the more noteworthy considering the static, descriptive, answer-
providing curriculum coached by the hierarchy.  The curriculum was static in that it did 
not change, and it did not change perhaps because the changing complexity of lay 
parishioners was not recognized.  It was descriptive in that it consistently placed dialogue 
with parishioners in a common sense, problem solving context that required no greater 
complexity than second order consciousness.  It did not allow dialogue to occur on a 
theoretical, third order level where problems could be sourced and critiqued rather than 
simply solved; or on a self authoring level where disparate theories could be assembled 
toward the construction of an organized meta-theory.    
Several findings of this case study deserve attention.  One is that leaders of 
communities are simultaneously indispensable and oversold.  Groups often function well 
despite defective leaders; but because leaders exercise institutional power, their authority 
can disrupt the group‘s functioning, and sometimes destroy it.  The indispensability of a 
leader is not so much in her capacity to fashion a group in her own image and likeness, or 
in her ability to make a group or its individuals perform according to institutional theories 
and ideologies.  Rather, a leader is indispensable for evolving groups when she is able to 
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recognize how a group is evolving, what the group needs for ongoing support and 
challenge, and what she needs to do in terms of her own growth in order to adapt to the 
changing mental complexity of those whom she leads.  This is particularly the case when 
a fourth order constituency becomes determinative in the group, a fact that allows the 
group to begin to relativize the authority of leaders, subordinating them to a self 
conscious visioning capacity.   
What I have shown in this study is that a lot more is going on in growing groups 
than can be accounted for by its leadership structures, and that group growth may be a 
factor of groups rejecting the manner in which they are held by leaders in favor of a 
looser hold that allows them a more direct role in creating and enacting a group vision.  It 
turns out that leaders who are in the business of growing groups are also in the business 
of growing themselves, and that without such growth, they are ill-equipped to understand 
what is happening when a group evolves to a horizon where it is looking past or through 
its leaders; where leaders have been drawn into the group‘s expanding horizon in its 
achievement of relativizing their role to its own vision generating capacity.  This is, I 
argue, an astonishing achievement for a group, and a potentially startling experience for 
the one leading it; and moreover calls for that leader to change into something else, into 
something that can continue to challenge and support the group in its ongoing 
development.  But it also and perhaps most importantly calls for that leader to stay put, to 
stay in place, while the group relativizes his role as leader, and subordinates his vision-
setting responsibility to the group‘s own newly emerging capacity to do the same.  
Staying put and figuring out a new kind of embracing, rather than reacting to, 
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misinterpreting or rejecting group pushback, is perhaps the greatest challenge an evolving 
laity can put to church leaders.   Bishops and pastors could benefit from better 
understanding the complexity and dynamism of the Catholic parishioners they are 
charged to lead, and together with the laity construct a new, transforming vision of who 
they are as American Catholics. 
Another finding is that communities are already cognitively diverse and dynamic 
even without authoritative leaders.  A community can be understood as a complex 
organic system that organizes meaning toward the enactment of what it knows itself to be 
(its history and identity) and what is knows it is called to do (the ―inward‖ doing of its 
ministry and the ―outward‖ doing of its mission).  But what it knows itself to be is a 
reality, or being, that is in motion.  It takes in information and either assimilates it into its 
existing structures, or it is changed by that information, accommodating itself to it.  The 
organized gathering of Catholics in particular places and times constitutes such 
gatherings as organic communities – as organic parishes.  These gatherings have 
historically preceded the presence of ordained Catholics.  This historical anomaly may be 
unique to the United States where, except for proselytizing non-Christian Native 
Americans, missionaries usually traveled to the territories not to find ―heathens,‖ but to 
find and gather Catholics who were already there for the purpose of baptizing their 
children, marrying ―frontier‖ relations, and providing Christian burial for the dead.  
Communities were already in place as organized, unofficial gatherings of the faithful; 
they simply lacked the presence of regular religious leadership.  As dioceses became 
organized and diversified, diocesan priests were sent by bishops to provide more than 
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irregular missionary services to the people; they were sent in increasing numbers to be an 
organizing presence among them.   
A third finding is that leaders are more helpful to a group when they facilitate the 
construction over time of a clear, coherent, and rigorous vision that is capable of 
organizing a people around itself – an event made possible because the vision is the story 
and stories of the community itself.  Pastors can be understood as spiritual leaders called 
to gather and organize a particular community as an event of Christ.  The whole 
community in all its ―order‖ is that Christ-event; a community governed by the Holy 
Spirit to celebrate, evangelize, and serve, in its ministry and mission, the great mystery it 
inhabits.  It looks inward in its ministry and outward in its mission; as Fr. Charles would 
say, it calls people to listen to Jesus – to be disciples – and it sends people to evangelize 
and serve – to be apostles.  Community as Christ-event is, for its members, internally 
volatile and, for human culture, externally destabilizing.  This volatility has been 
observed in the groups of this study which became highly reactive habitats for 
development in mental complexity.  When communities grow they are in a better position 
to act as leaven in the world; to intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly introduce to an 
over-balanced world the destabilizing presence of justice, mercy, peace, and humility.  
The 2004 group had not evolved to the point where it could effectively engage the world 
in this manner, but it had evolved the capacity to engage itself and the diocese on the 
question of who gets to decide who and what they are as a Catholic community. 
What is evident in this study is that parishioners desire passionate spiritual leaders 
who do more than confect sacraments, administer parish operations, and manage staff.  
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They want doctors of the soul with ―degrees‖ in love, story telling, inclusiveness, and 
collaboration; a love that is safe because it is supportive, but unsafe because it is 
challenging; leaders who lead by serving and who serve by guiding the flock on the path 
toward becoming ―self-shepherding‖ – to not be a flock, but an in-spirited people.  But 
the parish restructuring and priest sexual abuse crises have been hard on both clergy and 
parishioners.  The Catholics in this diocese experienced a cumulative undermining of 
what little control they had over the temporal affairs of their parishes while 
simultaneously experiencing a shrinking availability of pastors – not simply because of 
the priest shortage, but because the bishop continued to increase the administrative duties 
of pastors.  This practice fundamentally undermines the capacity of pastors to be the 
spiritual leaders people want – something they went to Seminary for and are, presumably, 
experts in – because they are given more and more temporal responsibilities – something 
they did not go to Seminary for and are not likely experts in.  But hierarchs are choosing 
this path because they believe it is their job to exercise ownership and control over both 
the spiritual and temporal fruit of the People of God.  Because of this, both are withering 
on the vine. 
A final finding concerns conflict in the area of vision formation and enactment.  
Conflict cannot be avoided; it is inevitable, this study argues, because of the complexity 
of groups.  Understanding conflict as something to resolve by differentiating ―positions‖ 
from ―interests‖ (Cowen and Lee) may not be very helpful if the different positions and 
interests derive from different orders of mental complexity.  Moreover, conflict within 
the same order of mental complexity may derive from the fact that the parties are arguing 
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from different cognitive contexts (Lonergan, 1972).  That is, one may be arguing from a 
context of values while another is arguing from the level of vision.  What this means for 
leaders of cognitively complex groups is that they need to move from conflict resolvers to 
conflict facilitators, and they are in a better position to do this when they recognize the 
different orders of magnitude rules, values, and visions represent, and how different 
orders of mental complexity inhabit each.  What leaders may need to recognize is that 
what gets transcended by one order of mental complexity must be explicitly included in 
the group so that an earlier order of mental complexity can be included in vision 
enactment.  When a third order constituency values, it may de-emphasize the rules and 
roles it has transcended and relativized on behalf of mutuality.  This can become a source 
of conflict with second order, as I have argued; a conflict that is less about positions and 
interests than about different horizons of knowing.  While conflict is not something to be 
created, groups understood as cognitively complex make conflict a dynamic inevitability 
that not only exposes different horizons of knowing but also helps leaders correlate and 
coordinate the relationship between mental complexity and vision enactment in evolving 
groups.  It is the leader‘s job to make certain that rules, values, and visions, are included 
so that each cognitive constituency find its place in the evolving group.   
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Chapter 7: Dynamic Complexity Theory of Group Development  
 
Dynamic Complexity of Group Development 
 
This study has argued that the parish groups engaged in dialogue with the 
hierarchy evolved beyond the descriptive, instrumentalist curriculum coached by 
diocesan leaders.  It is proposed here that this achievement was the result of the gradual 
evolution of second, third and fourth order constituencies within the groups; each of 
which were related, correlated, and coordinated to each other in an object-subject 
dialectic and communion-agency dialectic.  The emergence and growth of a fourth order 
constituency was particularly significant in that it became over time more convincing to 
the groups because of changes in how it organized conflict within an emerging vision of 
what it means to be a parish community.   
Communities inhabit, tell, and retell the story of where they have come from, 
who they are, and what they are about.  A vision is the articulation of a community‘s 
history, identity, and mission in a powerful, overarching narrative.  Many communities, 
however, articulate their own story in ways that are unclear and confusing.  Pieces of 
their story are on the plaques that indicate families who paid for this or that piece of art 
that adorns the church; their story is told in the architecture of the church; it is told in the 
kind of liturgy they construct and celebrate; it is told in the way the people treat each 
other and treat strangers; it is told in how the community organizes itself in order to fulfill 
its ministerial and missionary mandates.  But it is perhaps a rare community that 
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articulates a clear, coherent, and rigorous vision that its people are aware of, believe, 
celebrate, and live.  The groups of this study had after ten years of engagement with the 
diocese become self-conscious of the need to work out their own evolving vision; to tell 
the story of who they are and who they are becoming.  Because it was in the early stage, 
visioning remained inward looking; the groups therefore lacked the capacity to recognize 
and judge the implications of that vision for how the community engages the world.  
Developing a transformational vision occurs in a transforming community.  The 
experience of ―conversion‖ among different orders of mental complexity is a 
consequence of evolving groups.  Below is an attempt to make some generalizations 
about the evolving dynamic complexity of each of the four different group developmental 
stages identified in chapter six. 
2/3(4) Group 
The group that gathered in 1994 was likely dominated by second order, 
instrumental knowers using common sense to solve a problem posed by the hierarchy.  In 
a 2/3(4) group, the dominant knowing is exercised on behalf of ―what works‖; and what 
works is that which serves individual needs and interests.  For the 1994 group this meant 
ensuring the availability of priests and regular Eucharistic celebrations.  As a group, 
―what are we?‖ is a question asked within a limited descriptive horizon; the answer can 
only come from outside the group, from experts who tell you who you are by telling you 
what to do.  The group inhabits someone else‘s vision and therefore becomes an 
organized collective gathered to solve a pre-defined problem whose resolution is oriented 
toward securing individual needs and interests.  Achieving this ego-centric, ―what 
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works,‖ ethic calls for correct rule following and appropriate role taking; it represents a 
good that was experienced by this constituency as fulfilling their half of a bargain with 
church leaders whose task was to supply their ongoing needs.   
Third order, theoretical knowers were present and ensured that the vitality of the 
community needs and interest were served by insisting on a set of organizational values 
on behalf of preserving the relationship between pastor and parish.  These interpersonal 
knowers were able to subordinate their own immediate needs and interests to a notion of 
faith community where priests were not just available as suppliers of sacraments, but 
available as authoritative spiritual leaders who presided over the whole community.  
Priests could accomplish this by sharing their many temporal responsibilities with 
competent, educated lay professionals in order to preserve their relationship with the 
community as a whole.  Third order, theoretical knowers, however, were a minor 
constituency in the group; unlike other groups in the diocese they were not able to initiate 
or sustain a conversation about how the parish model they chose raised important 
questions about the power relations between lay administrators and parish Pastoral 
Councils.  A group dominated by a second order constituency meant that overall, the 
group was not able to take a perspective on its own rule following, role taking capacity; it 
assumed that its compliance with the process would secure their needs and interests.  The 
presence of third order values and commitments, for example the value of pastors as 
spiritual rather than temporal leaders, would be generally understood as the achievement 
of correctly following procedures.  In a 2/3(4) group, rules and roles are not yet 
constitutive of values; they are the means to achieve practical ends which the group 
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confuses with values.  When second order is dominant, when authoritative leaders are not 
in conflict with other authoritative leaders, and when few peers take a defiant stance to 
the process – all of which was the case in 1994 – then third order goes along even if 
members of this constituency are more cognitively complex.  The descriptive, common 
sense context is supported by third order members on behalf of the relationships within 
the group and between themselves and church leaders.   
A group with this cognitive pattern is simultaneously amenable and vulnerable to 
the ideology of its leaders.  It neither understands the ideology nor the many values it 
organizes; but it does ―get‖ the story that ideology tells, and translates it into rules and 
roles.  The leadership ideology for this group, as for all the groups, was monarchical 
episcopacy.  The story the 1994 group inhabited was a hierarchical narrative in which 
ordained leaders, configured to Jesus Christ, shepherded a lay flock whose best interests 
they know, protect, and serve.  It proved to be a dangerous lay assumption many 
Catholics surfaced and addressed in the wake of the priest sexual abuse crisis.  A group 
dominated by a second order constituency, however, because it is embedded in the story, 
is a group that may be easy to press into the service of a clear leadership ideology.  In this 
diocese, the ideology of monarchical episcopacy was never clearly articulated and was 
therefore little understood.  Had it been clearly articulated, however, it is not likely that it 
would find many agreeable adherents among participants beyond second and third order.  
Articulating its ideology would likely arouse the indignation of a fourth order 
constituency whose personal authority was already expressed in 1994 by some 
parishioners who felt ―led like sheep.‖  The vision of monarchical episcopacy was slowly 
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discovered over a ten year period in the experience of parish-diocese dialogue.  A second 
order constituency could only be confused by a hierarchy that solicited their decision 
making, and then did the opposite.  The 1996 merger and the 2001 initiative both 
represent actions by the hierarchy that vacated the decisions group members believed 
they were making and set a cognitive stage for some common sense, instrumental 
knowers to become aware of a new horizon beyond their own – the discovery of a known 
unknown; a horizon toward which they could move by asking new questions or by 
recognizing that they had been asking the wrong questions.  
3/2(4) Group  
The 2001 group, as indicated by the 3/2(4) score, witnessed a change in the 
dominant cognitive constituency from second order to third order, and represented a 
significant development in group complexity.  A group dominated by a constituency no 
longer embedded in needs and interests began to place both in a higher, more complex 
explanatory context; it moved beyond a descriptive context where rules and roles were 
exercised on behalf of subject-centered needs and interests.  Accordingly, it was able to 
notice that its own rule following behavior (in the 1994 initiative and in the 1996 merger) 
did not guarantee a world where ―fairness‖ governed the interaction between parish and 
diocese.  The change in the group can clearly be termed a crisis in which an earlier way 
of knowing had to give way to a more complex way of knowing in order to address the 
exigency of the new situation.  The crisis it experienced upon discovering that All Saints, 
a healthy, viable parish that its people had worked hard to make so, was proposed to be 
closed or sold, led to the powerful emergence of a now dominant third order 
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constituency.  Their former contractual world of fairness moved to a relational world of 
values that relativized fairness (simple reciprocity) to mutuality (complex reciprocity) 
expressed on behalf of their parish‘s viability and sustainability.  The group was able to 
interpret the diocese‘s proposal as serving only the interests of pastors and the bishop and 
did not consider the interests and values of parish communities. 
Instead of third order going along with a dominant second order constituency 
(1994), this group witnessed second order going along with a dominant third order 
constituency.  The group acted to preserve their parish by arguing on behalf of its many 
connections within the Catholic community (the successful merger between All Saints 
and Calvary; the fact that total intra-church ministries increased after the merger than was 
the case before the merger) and outside the community (the new Food Pantry; the 
Children‘s Closet).  These connections were understood instrumentally by a still strong, 
but now subdominant second order (the community‘s status is enhanced by them) and 
relationally by dominant third order (the community is other-oriented; it cares for itself 
and for others). 
One essential difference between a 3/2(4) group and a 2/3(4) group is that agency, 
for it to find acceptance, had to be articulated in communal terms.  Needs and interest are 
now in service to interpersonal mutualism.  What the group could not take a perspective 
on was the larger problem they faced, who got to frame the problem, and how that frame 
determined the boundaries of parish-diocese dialogue.  They did not question the 
hierarchy‘s posing of the problem (priest numbers are shrinking).  While they did 
question the hierarchy‘s solution (parishes must consolidate and close), they concerned 
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themselves only with the solution as it related to their own parishes; they did not reflect 
on the hierarchy‘s strategy for solving the priest shortage by parish restructuring as a 
diocese-wide concern.  Assuming both the problem and the question, the group saw its 
task as coming up with a new answer by presenting a defense of its own community‘s 
viability, and then re-solutioning the solution in a way that kept All Saints open.  This 
was a strategy that was bound to offend already overworked priests who, as treated 
above, rejected their solution during the deanery gatherings.  The small fourth order 
constituency was not influential.  The pastor‘s call for a vision of priest and church to 
inform and direct parish restructuring initiatives was framed as a confrontation of the 
hierarchy‘s capacity to lead.  As such, it represented an anti-authoritarian expression of 
fourth order agency in that it called into question the bishop‘s capacity to properly lead 
the diocese through the priest shortage and its consequent parish restructuring crisis. 
3/2/4 Group  
The achievement of the 3/2/4 groups was an increased capacity to pose problems 
and ask questions.  As a result they were able to take greater responsibility for their 
knowing and choosing as they attempted, in 2002, to address the priest sexual abuse 
crisis.  The primary reasons for this was the increasing influence of a growing fourth 
order constituency that moved the group beyond venting about a tragedy and finding a 
population to blame; beyond simply asking why it happened and constructing theories to 
explain it; to addressing the organizational realities that had to be addressed to reduce the 
likelihood that it could happen again.  But beyond showing a group the path and getting it 
to start walking on it, fourth order could do little to keep the group on the path long 
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enough to achieve its (fourth order) goals.  There were two reasons for this.  First, second 
order, not fourth order, dominated the agental energy of the group.  The group‘s sense of 
mission was tied to practical, instrumental ends that interpreted the fact that the bishop 
responded to their letter, addressed most of their questions, with little cost to themselves, 
as ―mission accomplished.‖  Second, fourth order agency was expressed in 
confrontational, anti-authoritarian terms.  This was likely disconcerting for a dominant 
third order constituency that sought to reinvest the hierarchy with some of the authority it 
had shed in the priest sexual abuse crisis.  Had fourth order told a better story, one that 
did not paint bishops as bad guys, one that gathered the many relational and 
organizational values into a coherent and rigorous vision, it may have been more 
influential during this critical parish-diocese dialogue. 
3/4/2 Group  
The 2004 group experienced a major change in its expression of agental energy.  
While the group was dominated by relational third order, both fourth order and second 
order constituencies now expressed agental energy on behalf of communal interests.  
Prior to 2004, the groups‘ sense of agency tended to be both procedurally bound (second 
order) and anti-authoritarian (fourth order).  Here, agency is neither; self interest and 
personal authority have changed how they interact with the dominant third order 
constituency. 
In less developed groups, anti authoritarian expression of agency is not simply a 
critique of structures of power that govern by appeals to authority grounded in juridical 
precedent or in tradition.  It is also expressed against a third order constituency that is 
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itself embedded in authority.  Early fourth order individuals may be anti-authoritarian 
because of the threatening proximity of what they have recently differentiated from, but 
its expression may be enacted against both leaders in authoritarian structures and those 
whom they perceive to be followers within such structures.  Early second order 
individuals who have neither integrated (fourth order) nor internalized (third order) 
authority express agency on behalf of self interest.  They may experience values as 
muddying the clear waters of correct procedure.  What this may mean for groups 
dominated by a third order constituency is that agency will likely work against this 
constituency‘s communal interests which it articulates theoretically.  Value as a ―theory 
of rules and roles‖ is experienced as ―mumbo-jumbo‖ to early second order, and as a 
simplistic and inadequate framework to fourth order for moving a group to engage in 
intergroup dialogue.  
It was noted earlier that the agental energy in a 3/4/2 group shifted from 
instrumental to ideological as fourth order overtook second order for subdominance.  But 
this does not explain why each cognitive constituency appeared to cooperate much more 
than in earlier groups.  What may explain this cooperation is a fundamental change in the 
quality of agency because both second and fourth orders were evolving into late second 
and fourth orders of consciousness.  That is, the constituency made up of instrumental 
knowers may have entirely ―lost‖ its early second order members who evolved into late 
second order (from 2/3, 2(3) to 3/2, 3(2)).  At the same time, ideological knowers may 
have ―gained‖ late fourth order members (5/4, 5(4)).  Figure 7.1 below provides an 
illustration of hypothetical group evolution and shows how, as second and fourth order 
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constituencies evolve, communion as a fundamental yearning increases its expression 
within these agental orders of mental complexity.  Second order is the retreating outer 
ring; fourth order is the advancing outer ring; and third order is the central circle. 
 
Figure 7.1: Group Evolution 
What this means for the 3/4/2 group is that for the first time agental constituencies 
are either dominated by or have members who are dominated by communal yearnings.  
To recall from chapter two, Kegan‘s orders of consciousness generally include two 
epistemologies, one waxing and the other waning.  The order of consciousness is this 
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waxing and waning.  In a 3/4/2 group, agency, perhaps for the first time, can be expressed 
in terms amenable to communion because agental orders of consciousness have members 
with dominant, waxing communal epistemologies: fourth order has some fifth order 
capacities, and second order as some third order capacities.  This may explain why the 
ideological, fourth order constituency did not appear anti-authoritarian but expressed 
personal authority on behalf of the interests, ideas and vision of the group.  This may also 
explain why the instrumental, second order constituency did not appear antagonistic to 
third order theoretical, interpersonal knowing.   
The 3/4/2 group was also able to act on its own holding environment as more of 
its own ―identity‖ became held by its members.  Clearly I, as the group facilitator, was 
part of that holding environment, as was the pastor and the temporary administrator.  
When the pastor was put on administrative leave, the group did not seek to find a new 
―culture‖ to embed itself in; rather it began to do some of its own holding.  It became 
better able to organize itself and reconstitute how it needed to be led.  This was observed 
in how the 2004 group differentiated itself from its leader (me) and took greater charge of 
its own identity and mission.  It did not want an expert, but recognized its right to 
competent leaders who shared expertise on behalf of group-determined actions.  It 
became a group better able to look inward at its own intragroup functioning and critically 
reflect on how that functioning can be deployed in service to intergroup connection – in 
this case, between the parish and the diocese.  What this group did not reflect on is the 
implications for its slowly emerging vision on the relationship between church and world; 
on gospel and culture.  Its newly emerging vision was still inwardly focused. 
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If this group had continued, one might observe the further rise of fourth order and 
decline of second order (in a 3/4(2) group) and an increasing capacity of the group to 
judge how much of the world can fit into its evolving ideology.  When fourth order 
overtakes third order and becomes dominant in the group (in a 4/3(2) or 4/3(5) group), 
theoretically, second order would have declined to the point that few remain to evolve 
into third order.  The third order constituency would then mature as early third order 
members evolve but are not ―replaced‖ by late second order members in proportion to 
those evolving into fourth order.  That is, as a third order constituency evolves, its 
―bottom‖ will drop out because it is not ―replenished‖ by an evolving second order 
constituency; and its ―top‖ will rise into a now hegemonic fourth order.  It will shrink 
numerically as it feeds a stable fourth order constituency; but third order‘s shrinkage is 
linked to, and perhaps proportional to, the growth of a newly emerging fifth order 
constituency.  Hypothetically, the leveling off of the rise of fourth order will coincide 
with the rise of fifth order (formerly present but statistically insignificant).   
What this study also asserts is, 1) that the curriculum coached by the hierarchy in 
this diocese was one that required no greater complexity than second order, instrumental 
consciousness; 2) that it was not designed as a pedagogy of inquiry for the purpose of 
making new discovery; 3) that when parishioners demonstrated a complexity beyond the 
curriculum by generating new, unanticipated knowledge, the hierarchy disparaged or 
dismissed it; 4) and finally, the hierarchy misunderstood lay parishioner feedback 
because it does not know who lay Catholic parishioners are and, more importantly, it 
cannot know because there are no stable institutional structures for bishops and chancery 
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officials to actually hear and discover who they are.
107
  Also significant in the hierarchy‘s 
curriculum is that inviting lay collaboration and decision making (for example, deciding 
on a parish model in 1994) had no meaningful correlation to what diocesan leaders 
ultimately decided to do.  This effectively undermined commitment of every cognitive 
constituency represented in the groups.  The groups of this study became more aware of 
this fact, and of the fact of their voiceless status, and grew more insistent in their calls for 
assemblies of elected lay parishioners to meet with the bishop, or in their calls for a 
diocesan synod that included lay parishioner representation.   
 
Self Shepherding Sheep among Sheep in Shepherd’s Clothing 
 
Metaphors are powerful linguistic devices that shape human experience through 
the imagination.  Metaphors are simultaneously helpful and dangerous in that they 
establish, not likeness as in a simile, but identity.  One such is the sheep/shepherd 
metaphor which is used in Church documents to describe and explain the relationship 
between ordained and lay Catholics.  It is a pastoral relationship in which shepherds 
nourish, guide, and protect the flock under their care.  However, because these are 
metaphors and not similes, pastors are not like shepherds, they are shepherds.  Similarly, 
lay parishioners are not like sheep, they are sheep.  An important question to ask is 
whether the sheep/shepherd metaphor has become a dangerous use of language that, on 
                                                 
107 Again, the issue here is lay parishioners.  Diocesan Pastoral Councils do not represent parishioners.  
Their lay members, when they are known, represent a Catholic elite of highly advantaged, often wealthy, 
well placed individuals who advise the bishop in important matters of finance and management.  They are 
rarely, if ever, selected because of their attachment to and affection for the parishes they are members of 
and to the unique challenges of local communities of faith. 
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the one hand, perpetuates the misunderstanding, undervaluing, and occasional but 
devastating exploitation of lay parishioners by clergy and diocesan leaders; and on the 
other hand, represents a use of language to enact a particular organizational ideology 
without articulating the ideology.  Before exploring this one might ask, what is the 
metaphor and how has it been used in the Bible and in Church documents?    
The sheep-shepherd metaphor has its origins in the Bible, most notably Psalm 23 
which poetically describes the experience of the believer in right relationship before God.  
God, the caring shepherd, provides for every need of the sheep; they are well fed in 
verdant pastures; they are safe from predators lurking at the watering holes; they are at 
peace and restful.  God leads the sheep along the paths of health and abundance.  Even if 
that journey takes them through threatening places, God is their guide and they have no 
reason to fear.  In fact, predators harmlessly look on as God‘s sheep graze in bountiful 
meadows of peace and prosperity.  The psalmist beautifully describes the members of the 
flock renewed in vitality through God‘s intimate care; a vitality that produces in the sheep 
an almost strident confidence in the world, so certain are they of God‘s loving presence.  
Peace, rest, goodness, mercy, and abundance accrue to the flock because they have 
placed their trust in God and walk choice-fully, on God-directed paths.   
The use of the shepherd/sheep metaphor by biblical authors is multivalent.  It 
includes right choice-making sheep that are able to discern true from false shepherds, 
together with lost and scattered sheep.  It includes references to wicked shepherds who 
milk, fleece and eat the sheep and then pasture themselves (Ezekiel 34:2) along with 
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divine shepherds (Psalm 23).
108
  Catholic Church documents, however, tolerate no such 
opacity.  Bishops and priests are cast in the mold of the Good Shepherd of John 10 who 
lay down their lives for the flock; lay Catholics are always sheep.
109
  Church documents 
heavily redact the sheep/shepherd metaphor as it appears in the Bible, scrubbing it of 
reference to defective and exploitative shepherds, or liberated, choice making sheep.  The 
people are only helpless, dependent, and wandering, while priests are always caring and 
protective.  The priest sexual abuse scandal has shed blinding light on the fact that 
shepherds do occasionally exploit the flock – not its hardy and robust members, but the 
most vulnerable and defenseless – and many bishops as chief shepherds have been unable 
to demonstrate believable sympathy for the lambs that have been fleeced and consumed. 
Never a pastor of people, I have twice been a shepherd of sheep.  I find in Psalm 
23 insights about sheep and shepherds that are both valuable and troubling.  I grew up in 
                                                 
108 See also Pss 28:9, 49:15, 78:70-72, 80:1; Isa 40:1; Jer 23:3-4; Zec 13:7.  In the NT, Lk 1:48-52; Mk 
6:34, 14:27 (Jesus quotes Zec 13 above, also in Mt 26:31); Mt 9:36, 15:24, 18:12 25:31-45; and, famously, 
Jn 10:1-30, 21:15-19. 
109 In Christifideles Laici (21-23, 32), a document that carefully avoids putting the terms ―lay‖ and 
―ministry‖ together in the same sentence, the Good Shepherd is the ordained minister who holds the 
―primary position in the Church‖ (22).  Priests in ―their exalted office to be shepherds of the lay faithful‖ 
must recognize the ―services and charisms‖ of the ―lay faithful‖ (32), but never in a way that would confuse 
shepherd and sheep.  In fact lay persons share in the ministry of the pastor when ―necessity and expediency 
in the Church warrant it.‖  But it is a sharing that does not ―make Pastors of the lay faithful‖ (23) for ―a 
person is not a minister simply in performing a task, but through sacramental ordination.‖  Priests have 
ministries, laity have tasks. Pastores Dabo Vobis (22) refers only to the negative use of the sheep metaphor, 
even though it quotes passages where the positive metaphor is used by Christ.  Sheep are harassed and 
helpless without a shepherd, they stray, they are scattered, they require the shepherd‘s protection.  John 
10:3 is referenced, but only to highlight the qualities of the shepherd.  It leaves out the part where the sheep 
know the voice of the shepherd and follow him, and are discerning enough to avoid false shepherds.  It also 
references Psalm 23, but only to accentuate the care and feeding provided by the shepherd.  The Psalm‘s 
emphasis on a confident, discerning choice-making flock is silenced.  Ezekiel 34 with its withering critique 
of abusive shepherds is also referenced, but only as a prophetic announcement of the coming good 
shepherd, Jesus Christ.  Its condemnation of leaders who exploit their vulnerable charges because they are 
vulnerable is entirely absent from this document on priest shepherds.  Instead, it argues that ―priests are 
configured to Jesus the good shepherd‖ (22) and are therefore unambiguously beyond critique.  Lay 
Catholics are configured to sheep dependent on, and in constant need of (―habitual and daily care‖ LG 27) 
the priest‘s pastoral ministrations.  See also, Evangelii Nuntiandi 61; Go and Make Disciples, 133; Lumen 
Gentium I.6, III.20, III.27.   
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what might be called a ―sheep culture‖ and worked for a time in the wool business.  
―Draper‖ means ―worker in woolens or textiles.‖  My family celebrated its one hundred 
and fiftieth anniversary in the United States in the summer of 2006, commemorating not 
only our presence in this country but also continuous and uninterrupted work in the wool 
business.  My father was a wool buyer in Montana, Wyoming, Idaho and Canada and 
would take my brother and me with him during shearing season as he examined and bid 
on ―clips‖ from the western ranches and Hutterite colonies, some of which produced 
flocks numbering in the thousands.   
Raising sheep is of course very different from wool buying.  Drapers are rarely 
shepherds, but I could not resist the challenge and the romance.  With that experience in 
hand, I have concluded that shepherding is hardly romantic and sheep are nothing like the 
common stereotype.  There are certain pastoral responsibilities that inevitably come with 
domesticating sheep; responsibilities that can make one feel that there is a sort of 
covenant-relationship between sheep and shepherd.  It is ―sort of‖ because it is unilateral 
in its origins – sheep do not choose the relationship.  In exchange for their annual fleece 
and spring lambs, shepherds care for, feed and protect the animals they have 
domesticated.  The Psalmist notes that predators look harmlessly on as God protects the 
flock; so, too, do human shepherds keep the wolves, coyotes and dogs at bay.  Romance 
aside, only one predator is allowed in the flock: the shepherd who tolerates no 
competition for his prey, a fact both canines and sheep know well.   
Sheep, however, do not always cooperate with the strictures of their 
domestication.  It is their occasional refusal to cooperate that makes of sheep a handy 
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metaphor for describing a right relationship gone awry, thus necessitating swift 
intervention by the shepherd.  The sheep/shepherd metaphor has developed in other ways 
as well; ways far less flattering to sheep than to shepherds.  The ―conventional wisdom‖ 
holds that sheep are stupid, hapless, wandering creatures that would be unable to survive 
without the constant care and monitoring of the shepherd.  The best hope for sheep is 
submissive yielding before powerful and wise shepherds.  This prevailing notion of sheep 
is not held by many shepherds.  It is a notion that is more likely to be held by sheep 
producers (who in larger operations traditionally do little hands-on shepherding), by 
frustrated shearers, by wool merchants and manufacturers; and through these, the general 
population.  Sheep do not fit or deserve the unflattering tags that have been attached to 
their species.  Sheep as stupid and hapless, heading blindly toward destruction represents 
a metaphor in need of rehabilitation.   
Observant shepherds know better what sheep are like, their native preferences and 
peculiar characteristics.  That knowledge in turn becomes helpful in maintaining the 
unequal relationship between shepherd and sheep.  It is pretty simple.  Sheep move 
naturally from low ground to high ground, from dark places to lighted places, and from 
confined spaces to open spaces.  In a safe pasture they spread out; when they sense 
danger, they flock together.  When confined in a barn or shed, they stay clear of dark 
corners.  Sheep can be disturbed by metallic, clanking sounds, unless they associate the 
noise with food; sheep always move toward food.  Ewes tolerate the adult shepherd but 
are made nervous by, and avoid, children; in the early Spring after they produce lambs, 
they will stand between a child and their own young, and may even butt the child if it 
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gets too close (not a running butt like a ram who is less predictable, dangerous, and often 
indiscriminate in who or what he might challenge).  Unless the shepherd introduces some 
kind of stress to the flock, for example unusual or loud noises, or poor land management, 
sheep will usually choose these preferences.  With this awareness, a shepherd can handle 
her flock with gentle skill and enjoy the fruit of this relationship in the form of happy 
contented sheep that are more likely to produce beautiful fleeces and healthy spring 
lambs. 
Rehabilitating the sheep metaphor is not done here to make better use of it in 
official Church teaching and preaching, but on behalf of dropping the metaphor 
altogether.  Sheep are not stupid and hapless; but they are sheep; they are a different 
species than the shepherd who exploits them for his own ends.  The shepherd metaphor 
also stands in need of critique.  However caring and ―pastoral‖ he may be, a shepherd is 
the most efficient and dangerous predator sheep will ever encounter – and, being 
intelligent, sheep never forget their prey status.  Shepherds exploit sheep for wool, 
lanolin, leather, milk, manure, and meat.  A domestic lamb has a nearly one hundred 
percent chance of early death if it is a male; the percentage is less for female lambs 
depending on how many replacement ewes are needed to maintain the flock.  Ewes are 
annually exploited for their fleece and, when they become unhealthy, or ―gummers‖ (with 
few or no teeth) they are sold and slaughtered for low grade meat.  The only difference 
between an observant shepherd and an ignorant shepherd is the quality of the cruelty he 
will visit upon his flock – the former, through care and diligence, will reserve all cruelty 
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until the end while the latter, through carelessness and neglect, will torment and abuse his 
flock throughout its days. 
Sheep and humans are different species.  Shepherds relate to sheep instrumentally 
for the purpose of agri-culturally legitimized exploitation.  Short of a catastrophic failure 
to thrive for the human species, domestic sheep will not likely escape captivity or their 
status as a sentient crop producing primarily wool and meat for human use and 
consumption.  For this reason, the sheep/shepherd metaphor, after rehabilitation and 
modification, is in need of a well deserved retirement.  The metaphor cannot be re-
habituated into the new context most Americans currently inhabit.  In a postmodern 
world of globalization, few people understand it, many people have not been disabused of 
romantic notions of shepherds, and most adopt erroneous conventional notions of the 
nature of sheep.  Its continued use in Church documents is highly problematic whether 
used to describe the divine-human relationship or the relationship between ordained and 
lay Catholics.  The shepherd‘s care is always and intentionally exploitative, making 
mighty wolves appear as sickly lambs by comparison.   
Lay parishioners are not sheep; they are human beings slowly evolving toward 
self authored, or if you will, ―self-shepherding‖ knowing.  In the diocese of this study, the 
hierarchy led in ways that did not reflect even the shepherd metaphor.  Their shepherding 
is much more in line with literal shepherds who ―relate‖ to the flock instrumentally for 
their own purposes.  This diocese has shepherded parishioners as would an actual 
shepherd of sheep, which suggests that its ordained leaders believe that parishioners are 
actual sheep; beings one cannot dialogue with as equals, as adults.  The hierarchy never 
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constructed pedagogical events in ways that challenged parishioners to move beyond 
instrumental knowing.  Rather than thinking with Catholics, the hierarchy thought for 
them, and became confused when Catholics demonstrated complex theoretical and self 
authored knowing.  If bishops and chancery officials are get to know the ―flock‖ they 
―shepherd,‖ they may need to become ―observant shepherds‖ who take notice, who pay 
attention to those whom they lead.  Because Catholics are not sheep, this can only occur 
in conversation; in dialogue structured to make new discoveries that are enacted on 
behalf of the whole community in all its order. 
*** 
The Catholic Church is in crisis, not simply because of the clergy sexual abuse 
scandal or the priest shortage, but because the hierarchy does not appear to know how to 
dialogue with a laity whose cognitive capacities have evolved beyond the current 
ecclesiastical structures within which dialogue often occurs.  It is precisely these 
capacities that make of lay parishioners valuable dialogue partners with the hierarchy to 
address both concerns.  The whole People of God in its current American, Catholic, 
Christian incarnation is changing; it is growing in cognitive complexity.  This fact 
constitutes the generation of new wine that requires new wineskins in order to culture and 
preserve the vitality of the potent mixture that is the American Catholic Church.  By far 
the largest segment of the Catholic People of God is represented by lay parishioners who 
make up over 99% of the church.  This study claims that that ―part‖ of the Body of Christ 
is witnessing the emergence of fourth order capacity; an emergence no longer located 
within an elite population, but rising within the general population of Catholic laity.  This 
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is a gift of the church to itself and calls for a reinvigorated vision of dialogue and 
governance that welcomes, nourishes and challenges it. 
The presence of self authored individuals in any culture presents a challenge to 
that culture‘s institutions because their sense of agency is not grounded in external 
authority.  This disembedding from the authority of sacred texts, traditions, and 
leadership structures may be experienced by official representatives of those texts, 
traditions, and structures as rejection of their authority.  In fact, however, fourth order self 
authored agency may provide the context for a more intimate connection because these 
same external sources of authority are allowed to be fully and authentically what they are 
rather than sources that fill up one‘s own sense of self.  A whole and complete self is 
relating to a whole and complete tradition; because it is not embedded in the tradition, it 
has a relationship with the tradition and is better able to see that tradition in all its plural, 
spiritual, and historical complexity.  It is ideological because it gathers a network of 
―wholes‖ into a new and more comprehensive meta-whole.   
The third order self, because it is embedded in authority, relates to what it 
considers to be a whole tradition, when in fact it is only a part; it organizes all the parts of 
that assumed whole into a coherent idea and names it ―truth.‖  It represents sense making 
without critical validation that assumes the reality of what it believes is real, and the truth 
of what it holds as true.  Because a third order self assumes its idea of Catholicism is the 
fullness of the truth, it labels other Catholics who inhabit different ideations of 
Catholicism as ―smorgasbord‖ Catholics who pick and choose what to believe and 
practice, while remaining happily unaware that its own ideation represents the same 
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buffet-style religiosity.  Further, third order selves seek out communities that reflect their 
ideational view of religious tradition, and authorizes leaders to embody that authority in 
their teaching and care.  This may seem attractive to religious leaders who share the same 
ideation; however, failure to properly support and challenge this constituency may result 
in loss of members when what it ―trues‖ is confronted with a different, equally 
convincing, and authoritative truth.  The loss of millions of Catholics from the 1970‘s, 
through the 1990‘s to Evangelical and Fundamentalists churches may be an example of 
third order Catholics, confronted with Evangelical proselytizing, finding new 
authoritative communities to embed themselves in.  Loyalty is never absolute.  A 
community that does not recognize fourth order complexity, that under-challenges third 
order and over-supports second order, is a community that misunderstands the necessity 
of cognitive volatility in community development.  It sacrifices change on behalf of 
stability and inevitably purges members whose complexity is beneath or beyond its 
favored curriculum.  A community in which object-subject reactivity and communal-
agental reactivity have run down is a dying community. 
Fourth order takes disparate and even conflicting truths and organizes them into a 
rigorous ideology.  Since the Reformation the Catholic Church has likely experienced the 
voluntary purging of self authored individuals who lost hope that leaders would initiate 
meaningful change in their lifetimes.  But it has come at a significant cost to the whole 
People of God when those who are eager to collaborate, competent to enter critical 
dialogue, and who are complex visionary knowers leave the Church or sit anonymously 
at the fringes because they despair of finding dialogue partners among the hierarchy.  If 
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the current priest sexual abuse and parish restructuring crises are not to presage a new 
wave of self purging, the hierarchy must find new ways to become engaged in dialogue 
with educated and complex members of the Church.   
A new story needs to be constructed and told; one that organizes a diversity of 
values that include voice, participation, consultation, and deliberation for the members of 
every order in the Church.  Without such dialectical/dialogical values, voices become 
echoless noise uttered into the void, and the Church loses its vitality.  As stated in chapter 
five, God uttered into the void and made the material universe; Divine Love organized 
matter into life, and life into consciousness; God uttered Godself into the material world 
by becoming Word made flesh and the universe returned a twelve billion year echo to 
God.  The human voice is the echo of divinity; once uttered, it does not return empty.  
The hierarchy of the Catholic Church is the keeper of what is handed on; the laity are the 
voice of what is going forward.  The still, small voice of a billion lay parishioners does 
not fall empty into the void for it, too, is the voice of God.  If the Church is to remain one 
reverberation of the sacred noise of the universe – and it must remain so – the hierarchy 
must learn to hear the quiet thunder of the evolving multitudes. 
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Appendix 1: Methods 
 
This appendix does not repeat what is stated in chapter one but adds further 
important methodological considerations not included there. 
 
Method of Data Collection and Analysis 
 
Site and participant selection 
The sites are two Catholic parishes whose members over a ten year period were 
engaged in five major events over the issues of priest sexual abuse and parish 
restructuring.  Clergy abuse and parish consolidation and closings constituted for lay 
participants significant disorienting dilemmas (Mezirow, 1991) that surfaced assumptions 
they held about their leaders and the nature of their own participation in the community.  
I selected six participants who were lay, non-staff parishioners who participated in two or 
three of the five events for multiple interviews in which I probed for participant learning 
(below).  
Data collection 
Rather than casting myself as a ―social scientist,‖ with Piantanida, Tananis and 
Grubs (2004) I understand myself as a dissertation researcher within a ―practitioner field‖ 
– in this case, adult education in the Catholic community – attempting to generate 
substantive grounded theory that emerges from this particular context.  Consistent with 
the requirements of qualitative research to gather extensive amounts of data together with 
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thick description (Charmaz, 2003; Geertz, 1973), I have assembled a rich collage of data 
sources including, (1) ten years of archival material for each of the five events studied, 
including: nineteen institutional documents by educators and leaders (clergy, hierarchy 
and lay educators) who initiated gatherings, framed the discussion, summarized findings 
and responded to participants‘ inquiries; fourteen documents produced by lay participants 
at each event; and approximately two hundred pages of emails from participants to each 
other and to leaders; (2) interviews from the six lay participants who participated in most 
of the five events from 1994-2004; (3) and my own observations as a participant in three 
groups, and the facilitator of the final group.  I personally interviewed all participants in 
two sets of 90 minute sessions using a semi-structured interview protocol which included 
probing questions about what participants learned about themselves; changes in their 
understanding of their roles and relationships within the community; their experience of 
being educated in diocesan and parish contexts; and what they perceived their leaders 
were learning about their evolving participation as they, over time, turned knowledge 
production into creative action on behalf of their communities. 
Data analysis 
Data analysis includes separately coding, (1) digitally recorded and transcribed 
interviews using HyperResearch software, (2) group-produced documents from each of 
the five events, and (3) documents, speeches and event summaries from diocesan 
officials.  After coding for significant patterns and themes, I created broader thematic 
domains (Miles & Huberman, 1994); engaged in extensive memo writing for the purpose 
of building conceptual analyses and aiding theory building (Charmaz, 2000); and 
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engaged in writing narrative summaries (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996).  This enabled the 
making of tentative claims about the nature of the curriculum coached by leaders (Kegan, 
1994) as well as the general receptivity/non receptivity to this curriculum by participants.   
Next, adapting guidelines for interpreting subject-object data (Lahey et al., 1988) 
from individuals to groups, I scored the groups of participants from each of the five 
events using the threefold procedure of analysis consisting of, (1) structural analysis 
which included scoring each lay produced document for developmental orientation or 
epistemological structure; (2) behavioral analysis which included examining the group‘s 
response/reaction to its suspension after each event, asking, a) to what did participants 
return, or b) into what did they transform?; and (3) developmental analysis which 
included examining the evolution of the groups over time looking for development in five 
areas: a) movement from solution proposing to problem posing (Freire, 1970); b) changes 
in what the group could or could not take a perspective on; c) changes in responsibility 
taking – who or what they were/were not responsible to/for; d) changes in the group‘s 
response to authority; e) and changes in the way the group engaged leaders on parish and 
diocesan level.   
Structural analysis: Group produced texts were analyzed for cognitive complexity 
understood as a diversity of orders of consciousness.  The other forms of analysis did not 
occur until this phase was well under way.  The documents consist of letters to bishops as 
well as written responses to specific diocesan initiatives to restructure parishes that 
served both as talking points for the group in off-parish gatherings, and as documents the 
group submitted to leaders in off-parish events.  Why most of the documents are 
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particularly rich sources of structural data is because of the way they were produced (see 
Reliability below).  There are two primary ways the documents were crafted: 1) 
Facilitators wrote participant responses on easel boards which were then transcribed into 
working papers with little or no redacting.  These were returned to the group for feedback 
and editing.  2) Documents were also created through drafting committees made up of 
members of the groups.  Group members were invited to submit their own papers to the 
drafting committee which in turn used these as starting points for producing documents.  
Drafts were returned to the groups for feedback, editing and final approval. 
The documents as epistemological artifacts were copied into Word documents and 
were analyzed line-by-line for meaning making structures by creating text boxes to serve 
as space for analysis.  Following Lahey (1988), I made structural assessments of each 
section of the documents.  ―After generating a hypothesis or range of hypotheses about 
the underlying structure, you should address these 3 questions: 1) What structural 
evidence do you see for the score(s) you are assigning?  2) On what basis are you ruling 
out other plausible hypotheses?  3) If you are assigning more than one possible score, 
what additional information would you need to narrow this range of possible 
hypotheses?‖ (Lahey et al., 1988, 192).  Toward that end, when forming a hypothesis I 
sought disconfirming hypotheses before settling on one.  What the method proposed here 
adds is the comparative analysis between text and behavior, as well as a developmental 
analysis between one event and the next. 
Behavioral analysis is another important piece in the overall process of generating 
a group score.  When the texts generated by a group were given tentative scores, the 
 327 
behavior of the group was then analyzed.  Only then was the group scored.  Behavior 
analysis allows one to address two critical questions that arise once texts are scored.  1) Is 
this score possibly beneath the group mind; or 2) is this score possibly beyond the group 
mind?  In the first case, it is possible that the score given a particular text may be beneath 
the mind of the group.  This may be the result of a process that rigidly determines the 
kind of feedback given.  For example, in the 1994 experience the feedback the group was 
allowed to engage in precluded many important issues the group may have discussed in 
the weeks it gathered, but also the allowable feedback was framed in a way that made a 
certain kind of reportage likely.  In this case, the feedback may be beneath the group 
mind, with the caveat already mentioned, that were the group beyond the score its texts 
received, what did the group do to protest the inherent contradiction between the broad 
range of topics allowed to be discussed in group and the narrow range of feedback 
allowed to be reported.  If it did little or nothing to protest, then I tended to score the 
group the same score its texts received – that its lack of protest is likely an indication of 
an embeddedness in the structures and processes created for the group by the diocese, an 
embeddedness the group does not reflect on because it cannot reflect on it. 
In the second case, it is possible to imagine a leader operating with a late order of 
consciousness (fourth or fifth order) who is over-determining the group‘s thinking as is 
articulated in its texts, or a group process that demands self-directed participation.  In 
both cases, the products of the group (texts) may receive scores that are beyond the actual 
group mind.  In this case, examining group behaviors at the suspension of the group 
provides a helpful corrective and enables one to more precisely determine how a group 
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actually knows.  For example, in 2003 the group gathered to craft a vision for the diocese 
that was sophisticated enough to organize numerous strategies which in turn could direct 
certain actions toward the vision of broad, inclusive participation of every constituency in 
the Church, including and especially the laity, while at the same time preserving the 
hierarchical nature of the various orders in the church (bishop, priest, deacon, religious, 
laity).  And yet, when the group was suspended, it had not put in place any follow up 
gatherings in order to discover what the diocese did with its vision, nor did it press their 
call for diocesan synods or other mechanisms whereby bishop and lay parishioners could 
communicate in a two-way dialogue.  In this case, the process and the pastor may have 
over determined the kind of text the group would produce, even as it was a group 
production, and is therefore not an accurate measurement of group cognitive complexity.   
Analysis of Hierarchy-Produced Documents. Finally, the study examines 
hierarchy-produced documents in order to probe for educational ideologies as well as 
analyze the pedagogical processes and structures for assumptions they imply about the 
kind of lay participant officials believed they were coaching.  Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA) is a helpful frame through which to examine power relations at work in this kind 
of dialogue, and how language is used to enact and naturalize ideology (Bernstein, 2000; 
Fairclough, 1992, 1995; Gee, 1990; Rogers, 2004).  Since CDA looks at how discourse 
both points to and constructs the social context, it is a helpful theory and method for 
surfacing taken for granted ideologies in diocesan leaders‘ use of language.  A limitation, 
however, is that it does not explicitly analyze the cognitive complexity of that language 
and how it was used to construct dialogical events.  The question of the cognitive 
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complexity of a structured event, as well as the cognitive development of a community 
over time, is an epistemological question that is perhaps more fundamental than the 
question of power or power-relations.  The lay participants in the various parish-diocese 
dialogues not only held perspectives on the issues at hand, took responsibility and 
engaged leaders, but these also changed – very slowly – but always in the direction of 
greater complexity.  This phase of the study, while not looking for developmental 
orientations among leaders, is looking for clues as to the developmental orientations the 
curriculum assumes (i.e., what developmental orientation does the curriculum coach 
toward?) for the purpose of comparing these assumptions with the actual group scores 
(above).  Any agreement or mismatches between coaching and learner capacity is noted. 
Reliability  
The five groups of this study differed in the number and range of members, and in 
the way they joined.  For example, the 1994, 2002, and 2004 groups had all volunteer 
members who joined in response to bulletin or pulpit announcements whereas the 2001 
and 2003 groups had members who joined at the invitation of the pastor.  Regarding 
membership, every group had a range of new members that joined; at the same time, 
every post-1994 group had members who participated in previous groups and through 
discussion made that earlier history part of the new group.  The six interview participants 
of this study were selected in part on the basis of their involvement in two or three of the 
five groups.  Arthur was the only participant who participated in all four groups.  This 
raises questions about the continuity between groups and whether their semi-
discontinuous nature make claims of group cognitive growth across time less reliable.   
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There are, however, several points that make this study reliable.  First, the groups 
of lay parishioners that gathered between 1994 and 2004 were all gathered from the same 
two parish communities.  While semi-discontinuous, they were not separate, discrete 
groups that were detached from each other; nor were later groups unaware of the previous 
history of earlier groups.  There was continuity between and among all the groups that 
was recognized and valued by participants, one that shaped how they approached each 
new initiative.  Glenna in the study reported that the group became ―braver‖ as a result of 
this continuity and the willingness of members to share their own past experience; she 
notes that the group made a ―transition‖ over time in what I refer to in this study as 
agency. 
You know, we‘re looking at 2001, 2002, 2003, of course 2004, but that also 
shows the transition that we‘ve made that we no longer fear perhaps the things we 
did in 2002, or we‘ve become stronger as a group.  If there‘s just one or two of us 
that stay over into each committee time after time… There is a continuity that‘s 
gonna run through.  And maybe we do get a wee braver. 
 
Thus, the fact that there was genuine continuity from one event to the next, a 
continuity preserved by the presence of my six participants (with their memories, 
personal notes, other archival material, critical reflections, etc., and their willingness to 
share that learning and knowledge production at each new gathering – whether it was part 
of an official agenda or not), as well as other members not interviewed, should provide at 
least some firm footing for making tentative claims that this group evolved in these ways 
which makes its dynamic complexity different from, but continuous with, groups that 
preceded and followed. 
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Another argument for the reliability of the study is the way the documents were 
produced (see chapter six).  As Theresa states of the key 2002 letter written to the bishop: 
What we had to do then was to craft a letter that was very straightforward, almost 
businesslike, and that‘s what a lot of parishioners rejected was our business 
format that we presented.  And the only reason we did that was that after 
eliminating everything that we didn‘t like as a group, and assuming everything 
that we did like, as a group, it became a letter by a committee. 
 
Of the 2003 process, this same participant notes the fact that the document was a group 
product: 
When pulled together, it looked to me as though the Spirit was really working in 
that group because when you read the letter, it‘s phenomenal.  It‘s a great letter.  
It‘s a great statement pulled together by a lay group working with their priest. 
 
Though the final document in 2003 went through a redaction process
110
 lay participants 
recognized it as a group document that, however committee-like, reflected the ideas and 
concerns of the whole group: 
When Father Charles pulled together all of our comments in the response and let 
us all see how our individual observations and comments had been pulled into 
part of the definition, and I think I said once before that I could read his letter and 
recall almost who had said each one of the comments. 
 
Finally, it is a feasible study because, though the documents are ―committee‖ documents, 
some reflecting a ―businesslike‖ tone, I have early drafts of most of the documents, two 
hundred pages of emails created when they were drafted (for 2002, 2003 and 2004), my 
own observations about their development, as well as interview transcriptions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
110 The pastor took the comments he had written down on an easel to the parish secretary to include in the document – 
which included having me review the letter for accuracy before presenting to the group for their review and editing. 
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Strengths and Limits of the Study 
 
One key limitation is possible researcher bias in light of my history with the 
parishes of this study.  It was in the mid point of my doctoral studies that I shifted from a 
full time religious education director within the community to full time researcher a (no 
longer employed in the parishes) in the process of data analysis and theory building.  
Though my formal, IRB approved research began in 2005, the research in a sense began 
in 1997 when I began working as a director of religious education (DRE) for the two 
parishes recently merged the year previous to my employment.  My own role as 
participant in all but one of the diocese-parish initiatives included in this study presents 
research challenges such as the degree to which my known biases toward lay 
constituencies will obscure my ability to remain sufficiently detached when analyzing 
hierarchical documents and behavior.  It was at the time I was preparing my dissertation 
proposal that I realized I had to check my overt advocacy for lay parishioners, 
particularly the participants of this study, on behalf of developing a clear, coherent, and 
rigorous theory of group development.  This had three happy results.  Somewhat liberated 
from the role of the partisan, I became an admirer of lay parishioners whose knowing and 
choosing were bounded by the cognitive complexity and dynamism of the groups they 
inhabited.  Second, I became the admirer of the priests who are similarly caught up in the 
crises of parish restructuring and priest sexual abuse.  Finally, I began to better 
understand the canonical limits to governance bishops and chancery officials must 
operate within as well as what I consider unnecessary, and certainly unhelpful, limits they 
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place on themselves that affect how they structure dialogue with lay parishioners and 
interpret lay feedback.  As an insider, participant, observer, and retro-researcher, I may be 
better able to see subtleties and shades of meaning that might not otherwise be apparent 
in the observations and reflections of study participants, as well as the hierarchy‘s self 
reflection on the various initiatives it embarked on.  
One limit that other researchers familiar with constructive developmental theory 
may immediately point out is my decision not to invite the research participants to take 
subject-object interviews.  As a result of this, we do not know the orders of consciousness 
of the six participants and, accordingly, do not know how their participation in the groups 
correlates to their developmental orientations. Had each been given subject-object 
interviews we would know much more.  This is certainly true; and in fact calls for further 
research to confirm or disconfirm the claims of this study.  However, since the study was 
conceived in 2004-2005, no interviews were conducted prior to that point which makes 
judging group complexity based in part on individual scores obviously impossible.  A 
consequence of this study, however, is the development of a social-cognitive framework 
for describing and analyzing group dynamic complexity and development – something 
that would need to be done in any case.  Measuring an individual only tells us how that 
individual makes sense of the world.  Measuring two, three or more only tells us where 
each, as individuals, is at in terms of meaning making structures at one point in time.  It 
tells us little about the group other than that there are different orders of consciousness 
present, a fact that can be determined by other means of measurement as this study 
proposes.  If one is attempting to construct a theory of group cognitive development, the 
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meaning making structures of individuals represents only one starting point.  A 
researcher still must account for the relationship, interaction and movement over time of 
different orders of consciousness.  What this study claims is that different meaning 
making structures within groups can be discerned when groups produce texts that reflect 
their knowledge production, and when these texts are compared with group behavior.  It 
further claims that these different meaning making structures (complexity) represent 
constituencies within groups that interact and conflict (dynamism) in ways that can 
indicate group cognitive development. 
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Appendix 2: Complexity of Hierarchy Curriculum 
 
This appendix is a supplement to chapter six.  It provides a description and 
analysis of key diocesan documents.  For an explanation of the complexity of the 
diocesan curriculum see chapter six.  
 
1994 Parish Restructuring Initiative 
 
Lay Leadership 
In the diocesan documents for the 1994 initiative a general presumption of 
fearfulness and anxiety on the part of lay Catholics permeates the questions prepared for 
group facilitators.  This is especially the case as it regards the priest shortage and the 
possibility of future lay parish leaders.  After convincingly reporting the statistics of an 
aging priest population that is also declining in numbers, group facilitators were 
instructed to ask participants: ―Are you convinced that lay Catholics can and should take 
a greater role in parish life?  Are the lay people in our parishes ready to accept the 
leadership of other lay people in our parishes?‖  These close-ended questions seek only a 
yes/no judgment without an inquiry into parishioner experience and understanding, in this 
case of lay leaders, who for decades had been providing professional leadership in 
parishes and at the chancery (diocesan office) as chief financial officers, chancellors, 
business managers, pastoral associates, directors of religious education, and youth 
ministers.  Rather than inquiring into how a lay parish administrator would constitute a 
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different kind of lay leadership, or inquiring into the relationship between a lay 
administrator and parish Pastoral Councils; or the relationship between an absentee pastor 
and both administrators and councils, the process limits the inquiry to whether or not 
there ―should‖ be such leaders, and whether or not lay people are ―ready‖ for them. 
Further, as reviewed in chapter six, on the survey question about the priest 
shortage and lay leadership, except for a final ―other,‖  feedback was structured to give 
entirely negative responses (in order, ―a) fear… b) concern…c) worried… d) fear… e) 
concern… f) fear… g) worried… h) other‖).  The questions presume that one‘s Catholic 
identity is directly tied to priestly orders rather than baptism (for example, ―Worried 
about losing uniquely Catholic identity‖ in the absence of a resident priest); that lay 
persons might lack the training and competence to carry out the responsibilities of 
administering a parish (―b‖ and ―e‖) and, in any case, parishioners might not be ―ready‖ 
to accept such a development; and finally, that parishioners might be frightened that lay 
administered parishes would somehow make them like the Protestants with their 
congregational models of governance (―d‖ and ―g‖).  This suggests that it may be the elite 
leaders within a hierarchical structure who may be anxious, fearful, and concerned, and 
who therefore reassert that structure as the critical pieces of it are aging and declining in 
numbers.  
Significantly, the group leader‘s survey questions solicit different feedback when 
inquiring about group attitudes toward the hierarchy.  For example, in discussing the 
bishop‘s video introducing the 1994 process, instead of prompting ―fear, concern, fear, 
worried…‖ as it does when seeking input about lay leadership and priest shortage, it 
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prompts, ―Impressed, concerned, frustrated, surprised, interested, motivated, other‖ when 
inquiring about the bishop‘s video.  Beginning with ―Fear‖ when seeking feedback on lay 
leadership and priest shortage, but beginning with ―Impressed‖ when seeking feedback 
on the bishop‘s role reinforces the image of a fearful, possibly overwhelmed ―flock,‖ but 
one led by a competent shepherd, and has the effect of framing lay participants in the 
process as passive objects in the hands of active agent-subjects. 
Catholic Identity 
This claim is supported by the next phase of the process: defining Catholic 
identity.  If the above suggests that Catholics are dependent on priestly orders, this phase 
splits the notion of community into ―Christian‖ and ―Catholic,‖ which further divides 
clergy and laity by affirming a pre-Vatican II theology of the laity.  That is, the laity‘s 
apostolate is directed exclusively outward toward the world; when it is directed inward, it 
is limited to a feeling, or ―sense,‖ of belonging to an assembly of the people of God.  On 
the question of the marks of a Catholic community, the process overwhelmingly listed 
those identity markers that come only from priests and bishops.  A lay Catholic identity is 
defined almost exclusively in terms of the priesthood.  Absent is an identity constituted 
by baptism and participation in a local parish community; there is no hint of a Catholic 
identity grounded in responsibility-empowering Christian initiation within family and 
community. 
The Pastor’s Responsibilities   
It should be assumed that by listing the pastor‘s myriad responsibilities the 
intention of the diocese was to initiate a discussion about how these might be shared by 
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the laity; and yet it is remarkable that no questions in either the facilitator‘s survey are 
directed toward how these might in fact be shared.  The process simply wants 
parishioners to reflect on the many duties of its pastor and discuss how to inform other 
parishioners about their number and variety.  That lay parishioners can and do share in 
most of these responsibilities remains unsaid.  As noted in chapter six, it is clear that All 
Saints reflected on the necessity to ―relieve‖ the pastor of his administrative 
responsibilities by handing them over to a trained lay parish administrator whose 
authority was clearly defined.  The description of pastoral responsibility is functional, 
rule-oriented, and role-based, rather than relationship-oriented grounded in the values of 
mutuality and community where such responsibilities are bourn by the whole People of 
God.  ―Responsibilities‖ do not flow from the ministries and missions of an ecclesial 
body organized in a complex community, but from the role of its singular leader, the 
pastor.   
From a theological perspective, listing every major pastoral responsibility a parish 
has to its people and to the broader community, and putting them all under the heading, 
―The Pastor,‖ underscores an ecclesiology from above.  That is, ministries, or rather, 
tasks ―fall‖ to the laity by way of delegation, rather than evolving out of one‘s baptism.  
This runs counter to the Second Vatican II‘s insistence that lay participation is grounded 
in baptism, not episcopal delegation; moreover, it represents only an institutional model 
of the Church.  However, from a constructive developmental perspective the process 
defines the pastor instrumentally – he is his role, a role that is rule-defined.  This 
describes the priest more as a patron (chapter three) than as a pastor; one who sits at the 
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head of a club, or collegia, because of the honor of his exalted status.  He is defined by 
what he has (priestly honor) and by what he does, but not by who he is or who he is 
becoming.  This amounts to a second order depiction of the pastor. 
The Bishop’s “Summary Report” 
On August 2, 1994 the bishop sent a Summary Report to every pastor in the 
diocese of parishioner feedback on ―A Parish Dialogue on Ministry.‖  He states in a cover 
letter attached to the document: ―approximately 8,500 persons have participated in 
meetings in every section of the [diocese] to discuss together the fact of the declining 
numbers of priests and to examine possible ways of addressing the ministerial needs of 
their parishes in years to come.‖  He emphasized the fact that the report is only 
―preliminary… a kind of first step in our continuing discussion of this problem… This 
report is in no way the final word on the subject‖ (emphasis original).  In general, most of 
the 8,500 parishioners considered the 1994 initiative a success, as reported by the bishop 
in, but had certain reservations.  ―Where will all the decisions be made?  Will we be let 
down?  Can we ever be challenged as a people to find some course of action without 
having to wait for the Chancery?‖  The bishop states further, ―Many felt that they were 
being led, like sheep, to look at new models for parish staffing, when in fact it is the 
priesthood that needs a new model.‖  Finally, he states: 
There was a consensus throughout the parishes that indeed the parish of the future 
will need to operate out of a collaborative mode of ministry.  More and more the 
laity will be invited to share in the decision-making process on the administrative 
and pastoral levels.  Therefore the Diocese will need to prepare priests to accept 
lay leadership.  Those in authority will be called upon to be more aware, sensitive 
and respectful of the different gender, cultural and age groups representing the 
Church.  In its attempt to be inclusive, the Church will need to listen to all voices, 
seeking to be heard, that make up the Body of Christ (emphasis original). 
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The Summary Report on the feedback by lay parishioners said several things.  First, the 
bishop underscored the fact that he heard lay critique of the problems presented by the 
priest shortage and monarchical hierarchy: collaboration, listening, and shared decision 
making must become the norm between parishioners and pastors, parish and diocese, and 
laity and bishops.  Second, despite the dialogue process that presumed lay resistance to 
lay leaders replacing priests as parish administrators, the respondents were more 
concerned with how parish priests and the bishop would accept lay leaders.   
In light of the immediate aftermath of the diocesan initiative, however, the 
willingness of the bishop to openly report lay concerns did not coincide with a 
willingness to change governing practices toward increasing collaboration with a laity 
empowered with decision making capacity.  Only one parish in the diocese was assigned 
a lay parish administrator; when she stepped down a few years later, she was replaced by 
a priest, thus ending any further movement in the direction of lay led parishes.  Further, 
in 1996, just two years after the dialogue process, the bishop, without consulting the 
parishes, unilaterally assigned one priest to All Saints and Calvary, ordered them to be 
merged; and contrary to All Saints‘ feedback, did not put in place a business manager or 
administrator to support the pastor in carrying out administrative responsibilities.  
Finally, in the 2001 initiative that we discuss next, the bishop embarked on an entirely 
new process of parish consolidation and closures that left out any talk of lay parish 
administrators.  One can conclude from this that what parishioners experienced as a 
success, the diocese might have experienced as a failure.  The consensus throughout the 
parishes – ―the parish of the future will need to operate out of a collaborative mode of 
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ministry.  More and more the laity will be invited to share in the decision-making process 
on the administrative and pastoral levels‖ – was one the bishop ultimately rejected.  Why 
this might be the case may have to do with a misunderstanding of the lay constituency the 
diocese was dialoguing with, which includes a mismatch between the curriculum they 
were coaching and the complexity of mind of lay learners.
111
 
A Hierarchy in Deep Waters 
The Bishop wrote in his Report the following interpretation of lay feedback that 
he received from parishes in the 1994 process: 
One of the alarming fears expressed was the difficulty with the transition from 
priestly to lay leadership.  Several felt that if the laity is to be empowered, 
everyone (including and especially the Bishop and priests) must learn to accept 
and to affirm their calling, their gifts and their mandate to minister.  The laity are 
willing and eager to serve.  They feel however that they need to be trusted.  This 
may mean that the Bishop and the priests be more receptive to relinquishing some 
of their power and authority.  On the other hand, some stated that priests may 
have a problem letting go and so should be encouraged and given permission to 
let go of some of their present duties that could very well be performed by the 
laity.  There was a certain lack of consistency here, however.  For while many 
parishes spoke theoretically of the need for laity to assume roles of greater 
responsibility, when asked to choose structures for their own parish, they often 
then chose structures which gave laity the least responsibility and maintained as 
much of a role for priests as possible. 
 
The bishop goes on to list participants‘ concrete recommendations to the bishop and 
diocese ―to move in the direction [they had] envisioned.‖  Of the 34 recommendations, 
the following address leadership and governing concerns of lay participants generated in 
the 1994 experience: 
                                                 
111 It may also have to do with the fact that parishioner demands looked too much like the demands of 
parishioners in the Lay Trustee movement of the nineteenth century where boards of trustees administered 
the temporal goods of the church (Appleby 2004; Carey 1987; Dolan 1897; Hennesey, 1981). 
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o Parish councils should function as a board of directors. 
o Parish administrator could become accountable to the parish council. 
o Educate the Catholic laity about the opportunities for deacons including 
educational preparation and their role in the church. 
o Hold regional meetings with the Bishop to dialogue with parishioners. 
o Need to rethink our structures. 
o Strengthen parish council and its commissions. 
o Parishes setting goals for their own deanery. 
 
In the first paragraph above, the bishop shows a remarkable willingness to 
entertain the concerns and issues raised by the participants in the process as it relates to 
ministry, power and authority.  There are many assumptions here, however, not least of 
which is the assumption that there would, in fact, be a transition from priestly to lay 
leadership.  The bishop‘s openness to entertain a wide range of lay leadership, however, 
is over-open since the five models paint ether-or scenarios for parish leadership: either 
priest run or lay run, thus confusing the roles and relationships of priest-pastor, lay 
administrators, and parishioners.  Two critical questions were raised by participants: 
Would parishioners continue to have access to a priest; and what would be the 
relationship between new lay leaders and parish Pastoral Councils? 
―This may mean that the Bishop and the priests be more receptive to relinquishing 
some of their power and authority.‖  This ambivalent sentence is carefully worded by the 
bishop to avoid committing himself on the issue of governance in the Church.  A quick 
read suggests that there is a glimmer of hope that some kind of power sharing option 
between the laity and ordained leaders is possible.  However, it only ―may mean,‖ not 
that power sharing is an option, but that the bishop and priests are potentially ―receptive‖ 
to entertaining such an idea; and not even this: the bishop is reporting on what lay 
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parishioners want the bishop and priests to consider, not what they would, in fact, 
consider.  History bears out this interpretation since no changes were introduced in the 
diocese that would afford a governing role for lay parishioners as participants understood 
it, the idea of lay administrators was scrapped, and in fact, lay participation became more 
limited and controlled as each new initiative was introduced. 
What emerges in a close analysis of the process and the bishop‘s Summary Report 
are critical differences between the bishop and lay parishioners on the question of lay 
empowerment.  By ―empowering the laity‖ the bishop was not thinking of the great mass 
of lay parishioners, parishes or parish councils or of investing these with some of the 
―power and authority‖ bishops and priests possess and might presumably ―relinquish.‖  
Instead, he was thinking of empowering ―the laity‖ by putting one lay person in charge of 
parishes, while leaving undeveloped how they would be appointed, trained and 
supported, and leaving unsaid the extent of their authority and to whom they would be 
accountable.  Whatever alarm he created in his video about the chronic priest shortage 
and its likely consequences he exacerbated by suggesting a simplistic strategy of a 
possible transition from priestly to lay leadership without adverting to the power relations 
inherent in such a move.  This demonstrates probable confusion on the part of the diocese 
about what lay parishioners were concerned about: clarifying the role and authority of 
new lay leaders vis-à-vis parish Pastoral Councils, indicating the level of education and 
expertise that would be required of new lay leaders, and securing for parishioners a 
meaningful voice within their own parishes and within the diocese through stronger, 
more representative Pastoral Councils.   
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Astonishingly, the bishop frames parishioner response as containing ―a certain 
lack of consistency‖ because ―while many parishes spoke theoretically of the need for 
laity to assume roles of greater responsibility, when asked to choose structures for their 
own parish, they often then chose structures which gave the laity the least responsibility 
and maintained as much of a role for priests as possible.‖  The bishop seems to believe 
that his appointing a lay administrator to run the temporal affairs of the local community, 
answerable only to the bishop or more troubling, an absentee pastor, is an example of 
increasing lay participation and is what the parishioners mean when they express hopes to 
achieve a greater voice in the governing of the church.  But having a lay person in charge 
of a parish in a hierarchical church no more increases the voice and power of the laity 
than having a priest.  Said differently, lay parishioners understood that their role in 
governing would not qualitatively change by a model which placed over them a ―lay 
hierarch‖ answerable only to a pastor or bishop, and not to a council of parishioners.  
This is a critical piece in understanding why the hierarchy misunderstood the lay 
participants in future initiatives, most of which called for various forms of lay councils, 
assemblies, or gatherings to consult with the bishop.  It is also a critical piece that 
developed over time in the mind of the groups in the next ten years.  What began in the 
backdrop of their thinking, governing their concerns, complaints and critiques, slowly 
moved into the foreground and into their hands, governing they way they framed the 
problem and engaged the hierarchy.  This movement represented the gradual 
reconciliation in the mind of the group of the two conflicting motivations of affirming 
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and preserving a hierarchical structure while insisting on democratic participation.  It also 
represents a significant cognitive growth in the group, one we discuss below. 
 
2001 Parish Restructuring Initiative 
 
The bishop anticipated challenges to the proposal to consolidate, close, and sell 
parishes, and calls for discretion on the part of pastors:  
Once again I repeat, these proposals are very preliminary, a starting point.  It 
would be wise to avoid any unnecessary alarm for parishioners until a plan has 
been recommended by the deanery and I have had the opportunity to discuss it 
with the various consultative bodies.  However, it is always helpful to continue to 
educate the faithful about the declining number of priests, the need for more lay 
involvement and planning for such changes. 
 
As pointed out above, the same bishop seven years earlier in his write up of the 1994 
event made a similar statement in his Summary Report, that it is a ―preliminary‖ report 
and is a ―kind of first-step in our continuing discussion of this problem [priest shortage].‖  
It was merely intended to help parishes see how other communities responded and to be a 
catalyst for further reflection.  The bishop anticipates the possibility that lay parishioners 
will find the proposal alarming but prefers that the moment of alarm be deferred until a 
concrete plan emerges.  I.e., only after the plan has been formulated and discussed among 
various diocesan bodies (consultative) will the bishop feel comfortable dealing with the 
expected negative reaction. 
Instead of educating parishioners about the proposed deanery process, the 
canonical relationship between parish and diocese, or the evolution of these relationships 
in American Catholic history, the bishop instructs priests to educate parishioners about 
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the numerical priest shortages, and about their need to participate in planning for 
inevitable changes.  Thus, rhetorically, lay participation is promoted and encouraged.  
But in reality, participation by lay parishioners is more limited and constrained than the 
1994 process.  It suggests participation and inclusion through a process of ideology 
adoption rather than inquiry, research and collaborative dialogue.  Significantly, lay 
participation was not mandated by the bishop.  Priests did not have to invite parishioners 
to the deanery meetings and, in fact, many priests came with no lay parishioners from the 
parishes they led. 
Whatever was produced by the deaneries also had the status of recommendations.  
Lay participation was reduced to preparing to accept changes that will come.  The bishop 
decided to let priests see the proposal for the entire diocese, not just for their deaneries, 
stating, ―I thought it would be most helpful for you and others to see something of the 
changes that the diocese must face in the next few years‖ (my emphasis).  This 
naturalizing discourse assumes the inevitability of parish restructuring.  As such, the 2001 
initiative is a ―hegemonic process‖ (Fairclough 2004, 202) in which a particular outcome 
was anticipated, and discourses which could hinder that outcome (lay administered 
parishes; no restructuring) were excluded.  Norman Fairclough (1992, 2004, p. 202) 
refers to this as a socially constitutive mode of action in the interplay of text (written or 
spoken language – the bishop‘s 2001 letter), discourse practice (text production and 
interpretation, including distribution and consumption) and social practice (discourse as 
enacting ideology and power) (Fairclough 1995, p. 133-135).  The bishop framed the 
discussion: he wanted lay parishioners to participate in a process that guaranteed the 
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results he hoped to achieve – results which, if there was any confusion, he included in the 
proposal attached to his letter which suggested options for restructuring parishes 
throughout the diocese. 
The 2001 process was pivotal in bringing the study participants to act out against 
their status of powerlessness in the Church.  This was not so much a dawning awareness 
of their lack of power, for that is nothing new to most lay Catholics who, knowing their 
low status relative to bishops, rarely if ever saw fit to act out.  It was in the experience 
that their participation did not appear to matter to the hierarchy that was the source for 
their confrontational behavior in the 2001 process and again in the 2002 Listening 
Sessions and 2004 Lay Collaborative Inquiry Groups.  Before, they might have been 
willing to suspend their values of democratic participation in a church led by God‘s 
appointees who had their best interests at heart as representatives of Jesus the Good 
Shepherd.  Now, it was no longer the case.  With the discovery that the parish‘s work in 
1994 was abandoned by the hierarchy, with the awareness that their cooperation in the 
1996 merger with perceived exemplary outcomes was ignored, and with the knowledge 
that the bishop seriously proposed closing and selling a parish that was viable according 
to any reasonable standard, lay participants suddenly became energized to take action 
against their powerless status. 
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2002 Priest Sexual Abuse Listening Sessions 
 
When the group‘s letter was sent to the bishop the pastor decided to include a 
brief cover letter stating that it represents the sentiments of a fairly broad constituency 
within the parishes.  The lengthy three page response from the bishop came a little over a 
month later with the following opening comments: 
It has not been my practice to respond to parishes relative to petitions since it has 
been my experience that petitions do not necessarily represent the view of the 
majority of parishioners. However, since I received a letter from your pastor, 
Father [Charles], ‗that the petition represents‘ a group of parishioners who wanted 
to share with others their areas of concerns, I will now attempt to respond, at the 
same time, realizing any response in writing is not always as satisfying as one 
would like. 
 
The bishop points out how rare such letters from him are since, in his judgment, they do 
not represent a majority of parishioners.  As Arthur argued to the 2002 group, the 
bishop‘s stated reason for responding is not because of the merits of the parish letter and 
the signatures of over 350 parishioners, but because Fr. Charles attached a cover letter.  
The bishop implies that the majority view of a parish would secure a response from him, 
thus offering a nod toward democracy.  However, since there is no juridical process for 
measuring parishioners‘ concerns and interests, it is impossible for this bishop, or any 
bishop, to know majority or minority views.  Therefore, since it ―has not been my 
practice to respond to parishes relative to petitions‖ because ―petitions do not necessarily 
represent the view of the majority of parishioners,‖ the bishop uses the notion of 
democracy not to understand parishioner views but, curiously, to rule the articulation of 
their views out of court because ―it has been [his] experience‖ that they represent 
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minority views.  It is an unfair policy, based on the experience of one man, when 
petitions by parishioners are judged as unrepresentative in parishes that have no 
representation.  This paragraph anticipates the rest of the letter in which the bishop 
reminds the parishioners who signed the letter that they have nothing to teach him, that he 
is already correctly doing everything they critique him on; thus dismissing or disparaging 
the new knowledge the 2002 group produced. 
He suggested further that the group from the two parishes could have benefited 
from better leadership who would have been able to answer their questions right off.  He 
stated,  
First, many parishes throughout the diocese have had gatherings to discuss the 
current crisis in the Church…  For many people this has been very helpful.  It 
gave them an opportunity to express their views and feelings, and in those places 
where the pastor or some other knowledgeable person on the way a diocese 
functions was present, they find that they received many insights as to their 
questions.‖   
 
If the group had such a ―knowledgeable person‖ on how the diocese operates, they might 
not have needed to write down their questions in a letter.  The bishop stated that the 
diocese is implementing a new program to screen and educate all employees of the 
diocese about sexual abuse of children, and he is planning to release financial information 
about the diocese soon.  He stated, ―I mentioned the deanery structure, the Diocesan 
Pastoral Council, the Finance Council and I would also add the Public Policy Committee 
made up mostly of lay people. It seems that these structures are in place and should be 
seen as moving in the direction you suggest.‖   
The assembly of elected lay parishioners the 2002 group called for in order to 
have direct dialogue with the bishop and other diocesan bodies is not taken up by the 
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bishop.  He implies that the laity already have representation by lay membership in the 
various diocesan bodies he refers to.  However, as it has been argued in this study, the lay 
persons in these councils and committees represent the diocese and the bishop, not the 
interests of parishes and lay parishioners.  Moreover, they represent an elite of well 
placed, highly advantaged individuals who hardly represent the voice of the average 
Catholic parishioner.  If the work of these diocesan bodies is made public, it moves 
downward and unidirectionally, communicating in the form of ready-made programs and 
processes.  The parish restructuring initiatives are all examples of this, which meant that 
lay parishioners did not participate in the kind of theoretical knowing that framed the 
problems, posed questions, and proposed a range of answers.  Instead, parishioners were 
consistently invited to ―participate‖ by ―deciding‖ among a range of prepared answers; 
decisions that may or may not be acknowledged by the bishop.  Chapter six argued that 
the diocese thought for parishioners, not with them. 
In his letter, the bishop further argued that victims of priest sexual abuse in 
general appreciate the way they have been treated by the diocese.  ―For every case of 
discontent the media has printed, there are more cases in which the victims feel that the 
diocese has believed them, taken appropriate action, and treated them with respect.‖  This 
is a surprising and unverifiable assertion.  The victims that were ―not believed‖ felt 
compelled to file charges with the Human Rights Commission or to file lawsuits in court; 
those that settled with the diocese signed confidentiality agreements that both silenced 
victims and avoided admission of wrongdoing on the part of accused clergy and the 
bishop.  It is difficult therefore to understand how victims could feel as satisfied and 
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appreciative as the bishop suggests.  Again, this is the confident view from above, from a 
bishop who shows little evidence that he has heard and understood the suffering and 
―discontent‖ of victims of clergy sexual misconduct, even those reported in the media. 
The bishop touched on previous parish and deanery meetings whose goals had 
been to help guide the diocese in planning and direction.  
Since the early nineties, I have repeatedly asked the deaneries and the parishes in 
the diocese to participate in a planning process to set goals and direction for the 
diocese.  While the focus of these discussions have tended to be on the leadership 
of the parish and how to function with fewer priests, the broader goal has always 
been to help people understand their proper role in the Church, to increase lay 
participation, to identify the needs of the Church in the twenty-first century, and 
to find ways of responding to these needs.  It seems to me that evangelization and 
helping each parish to become a school of prayer are two foundational priorities, 
but I don‘t think others necessarily see this or realize the long range fruit of such 
priorities. 
 
An immediate question arises over the assumption by the bishop that his own priorities 
had in fact been communicated.  There is no evidence that participants understood the 
two previous initiatives as anything other than two separate programs designed to address 
the question of how to continue being church in an era of declining priests; i.e., 
―leadership of the parish.‖  The bishop‘s broader, long range priorities, such as his 
monastic notion of the parish as a school of prayer, and his notion of what constitutes 
―proper roles,‖ never made it into the hands of the participants of this study.  What was 
communicated, but only in 1994, was the proper role of the pastor which, as reviewed 
above, was a rule-defined role that dislocates pastors from the communities out of which 
they come and on behalf of whom they serve. 
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A second question is why the bishop included this paragraph in his response to lay 
parishioners who have asked him to render an account of what he is doing to protect 
victims, to improve communications, and to be transparent with regard to finances?  
―Since the early nineties‖ he as ―repeatedly‖ asked both parishes and deaneries to 
―participate in a planning process.‖  What the bishop understood as a broad range, long 
term, series of initiatives (1994? 2001? – he again does not mention them by name) 
intended to increase lay participation, to educate people about their proper roles, plan, 
and set goals for the diocese, the participants instead went in another direction.  These 
―others‖ who may not have seen the long range fruit of his priorities had apparently 
prevented their coming to fruition.  It again suggests that the bishop misunderstood lay 
parishioners concerns.  This paragraph about the role of deaneries and parishes who have 
repeatedly been asked to plan and participate but who instead seem to have thwarted his 
priorities, said to this group of parishioners, is very curious.  Was the bishop suggesting 
that the parishioners themselves, who obstructed the 2001 process by their negative 
critique of the restructuring proposal then on the table, and who now had sent him the 
2002 letter, were themselves somehow responsible for many of the problems they 
complain about in their letter?  If so, he does this without acknowledging the possibility 
that any perceived failure on the part of deanery/parish planning process could simply 
indicate that the diocese‘s initiatives had anticipated outcomes that did not match the 
outcomes parishioners arrived at; that parishioner goals turned out to be different from 
the diocese‘s goals.  As argued below, the diocese did not demonstrate that it was 
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learning from its experiences with parishioners, something the CPPDC study also found 
(Rexhausen 2004, 45).   
Identity and Roles in Episcopal Discourse 
―[T]he broader goal has always been to help people understand their proper role 
in the Church.‖  An important question is what role in the Church the bishop had in mind 
for ―people‖ in the context of his response to a letter written by lay persons critiquing his 
performance?  What is assumed is that it is the bishop‘s and diocese‘s responsibility to 
inform people of their proper role, and not lay parishioners to determine these for 
themselves.  He ―naturalizes‖ this ideology by framing it as common sense knowledge 
that readers should recognize as such.  He also implies that ―people‖ must not 
―understand their proper role.‖  It is perhaps significant that the bishop mentions his 
desire to ―increase lay participation‖ only after ―helping people understand‖ their correct 
roles.  But if the proper role of lay persons as witnessed in the previous initiatives is to 
listen (be educated about priest numbers), dialogue (over pre-existing proposals), and 
make recommendations (to the bishop who may or may not heed them), then his notion 
of participation and roles is clearly different from lay parishioners.   
 
2003Visioning Process 
 
The bishop began his speech in 2003 by assuring his ordained audience that little 
would change for priests of the diocese even as the impact of such a vision would likely 
affect every Catholic in the diocese.  ―Though my remarks are addressed to the priests, it 
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will become evident that what I have to say involves the whole church, deacons, religious 
and laity.‖  The role of pastors as authoritative leaders of parishes will remain essentially 
unchanged, assures the bishop, even as the way they lead will change.  What this means 
is that parishes will not be led by lay administrators.  What the bishop must have learned 
from previous initiatives is that models with lay leaders managing parishes are 
unacceptable.  His 1994 misunderstanding of lay ambivalence about the authority of lay 
administrators vis-à-vis parish Pastoral Councils, regional meetings of parishes, and their 
concerns about their relationship with, and access to, pastors, suggests a governing value 
or a tacit rule he is following: priests, and only priests, exercise the spiritual and temporal 
affairs of the parish.   
The specific things that will not change, he asserts, are the basic lives, powers and 
prerogatives of priests.  First, the priest-centered ―mission of evangelization‖ (through 
preaching, teaching, sacraments and by attending to the needs of the poor) will remain the 
same.  Second, the ―leadership role of the presbyterate [priesthood] will not change,‖ 
called ―from among the baptized‖ and ―set us aside within the Church community to be 
sacramental representatives of Christ for them.‖  Though priests and bishops are equal to 
laity in terms of their ―need of God‘s grace‖ and ―remain within the People of God, 
believers with them, not above them,‖ they are nevertheless ―ordained ministers‖ and 
their ―leadership in the Church is hierarchical.‖  Third, the purpose of their mission as 
leaders will remain the same – building up the body and ―linking up the local community 
with the Diocese and with the universal Church.‖  He quotes John‘s Gospel: ―I do not 
pray for them (the disciples) alone.  I pray also for those who will believe in me through 
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their word, that all may be one as you, Father, are in me and I in you; I pray that they may 
be one in us…‖  As treated in the next section on the 2004 initiative, the bishop called for 
a massive consolidation of parishes throughout the diocese, a fact that, contrary to his 
assurances, would greatly change the way priests carry out their ministries.  The bishop 
cloaked the radical change in how parish priests would likely experience their ministries 
in a discourse that affirms the unchanging theological and ecclesiological identity, 
function, and powers of the priesthood. 
What does the bishop suggest will change?  Without naming them as such, it is 
the community life of lay Catholics and the way they, as communities, are led.   
The change I am referring to pertains to the infrastructure, if you will, of our 
mission of evangelization, namely, our parishes and the way we pastor them.  The 
configuration of our parishes in the very near future, in light of the number of 
priests available to be pastors of these parishes, along with the way we pastor 
them are, it seems to me, the most pressing issues we face.  And I add, and I 
cannot stress this too strongly, facing them together as a presbyterate can become 
a most life-giving experience for us and the diocese at large. 
 
In this unequal encounter between the bishop and priests of the diocese, the 
bishop lays out the ideology according to which he and his priests will in the future 
maintain an unequal relationship with Catholic parishioners, his rhetoric of equality 
notwithstanding.  In this tight paragraph the bishop oversimplifies a complex problem.  
He represents as common sense the hierarchy‘s own ideological interests by taking for 
granted the reconfiguration of parishes without actually arguing the point.  In this way he 
―naturalizes‖ ideology as non-ideological common sense (Fairclough 1995).  The bishop 
does not argue: ―Because of a number of policies, disciplines, and teachings, we are 
experiencing an extended period of a shortage of priest candidates in proportion to the 
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number of parishes needing pastors, and therefore we have a serious staffing shortage for 
parishes; a fact which requires not only rethinking how parishes are administered, but 
how our ordination policies might be contributing to the problem.‖  The bishop instead 
argues: ―because of the priest shortage, we need to change the way we configure 
parishes.‖  By oversimplifying, the bishop narrows the debate, perhaps to avoid 
unanticipated outcomes. 
By framing the problem as one of ―infrastructure,‖ not only is the action – parish 
restructuring – presented as a common sense inevitability, but those acted upon – lay 
parishioners – become an invisible constituency.  The issue is not presented as people of 
faith losing familiar sacred spaces, but as ―structures‖ that need to be restructured by 
hierarchs in order to address a problem whose source cannot be investigated.
112
  
―Infrastructure,‖ the network of parishes and tens of thousands of Catholics in the diocese 
will potentially undergo massive change so that one bishop and one hundred priests will, 
in the bishop‘s own words, have to change very little.  Naming and naturalizing the ―most 
pressing issue‖ as parish restructuring and placing lay parishioners behind a linguistic 
veil, the bishop brackets out both the source of the problem (too few males entering 
seminaries) and its true cost.  The 99.9% who are the lay parishioners will bear the 
weight of most if not all of the major changes which include the financial cost of 
                                                 
112 This does not concern only the issues of celibacy and women‘s ordination, but the manner in which 
bishops handled priest abusers and the priest sexual abuse crisis itself.  Men who today consider the 
priesthood have to overcome not only the issues of celibacy, loneliness, long hours, and a job that is 
undergoing rapid change – that that to which he is drawn will likely change and may end up becoming 
something he would not have been drawn to had he known – but also the stigma attached to the name 
―Priest‖ by its association with ―priest abuser‖ and ―priest pedophile.‖  One example of this latter challenge 
is a professor friend who volunteered at his parish to teach the Middle School religious education class his 
sons were in.  He reported that two boys during the social began to wrestle when suddenly, the one who 
ended up on the bottom yelled, ―get off me you priest!‖ 
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reconfiguration (building new churches, remodeling old churches, etc.), changing times 
of worship, closing or consolidating parish schools, reconfiguring and re-staffing councils 
and commissions, and the downsizing and restructuring of parish staff. 
In the bishop‘s rhetoric, the costly and significant disruption of congregational life 
for parishioners whose gathering constitutes the very fact of a parish is located in a 
decontextualized, ahistorical and faceless ―infrastructure.‖  The bishop thus minimizes 
the real cost of such a change by turning the countless lay parishioners into a nameless 
infrastructure whom he explicitly excludes from his proposed visioning.  The success of 
the hierarchical ideology depended on the ability of the bishop to rally fellow priests to 
close ranks around the ―most pressing issues.‖ He promised that ―facing them together as 
a presbyterate can become a most life-giving experience for us and the diocese at large.‖  
His speech leaves unsaid that fact that except for the priest shortage, parishes in general 
are not otherwise vulnerable to restructuring – to suppression, twinning or clustering 
(because, for example, of poor conditions of finances or facilities, or a significant decline 
in parish membership).  What he hoped would be life-giving for priests and the diocese, 
could be experienced heart wrenching betrayal by many lay parishioners.    
The bishop, however, adverted to the fact that priests doubt the intentions of the 
hierarchy.  
You would not believe the number of times people have implied that we have 
already developed such a diocesan vision and that we are going to impose it on 
everyone.  The conclusion they draw is that since that is the case they therefore 
see no point in cluster planning…  Now we see [cluster planning] is imperative, if 
the work already done is not to lead to frustration… 
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The statement suggests evidence of doubts and suspicion about the diocese‘s intentions 
and processes; it suggests strong suspicion among clergy about hierarchical intentions for 
restructuring parishes.  It also suggests naiveté on the part of the bishop about the impact 
of diocesan initiatives and proposals upon priests and lay parishioners.  By stating, ―[y]ou 
would not believe the number of times people have implied,‖ but without taking up their 
argument, the bishop suggest that he does not take seriously those who imply a fait 
acompli on the part of the chancery.  A potentially sizeable group of ―people‖ – priests – 
have many times implied that the bishop is going to do whatever he wants to do 
regardless of the input and feedback of clergy and laity, and have further implied that 
their participation would therefore be pointless.  This is precisely what lay study 
participants reported: their own investment of time was wasted by a hierarchy that neither 
took seriously their input, nor did any discernable follow up; a fact which dampened their 
enthusiasm to participate.  According to the bishop, clergy who imply a fait acompli are 
simply wrongheaded and their argument is not worth taking up.  He dismisses them by 
asserting as fact ―what we have learned‖ from past initiatives, a learning that ―has 
enabled all of us to realize that we can‘t operate under the banner of things as usual.‖  
This represents a pedagogy that unwittingly steers people away from participation 
because it does not involve them in problem posing and inquiry. 
The bishop assumes everyone knows the whatness of ―what we have learned‖ 
when in fact the very calling of the new vision for the diocese without reference in his 
speech the 1994 initiative and the 2001 deanery gatherings, and without naming precisely 
what was in fact learned, suggests that what the hierarchy learned may not be what others 
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learned, or that what the hierarchy learned was not how to better address the 
consequences of the priest shortage, but how accomplish a vision with minimal resistance 
(Woodside-Jiron 2004).  Molly, one of the study participants, she made the following 
observation in an interview about what the diocese might be learning from its experience 
with lay parishioners: 
M So the Catholic Church, as much as it, you know, and here‘s this 78 year old 
guy who‘s now the Pope [Benedict XVI], he won‘t change anything.  
Women aren‘t gonna get to be priests.  Priests aren‘t gonna get to be 
married.  As I think we‘re changing and evolving and understanding, we‘re 
not. 
 
J So, the listening, and this is purportedly a session [2001] where the Diocese 
was gonna get to learn something about lay feedback.  Do you think 
listening happened there? 
 
M No. 
 
J Do you think any learning happened on the part of the Diocese? 
 
M On, on part of the Diocese? 
 
J Yeah. 
 
M Probably not to send out letters like that again [the 2001 proposal]…  It 
learned what not to do.  Not what to do.  I think it was more of a, how can I 
say this?  I think it was sort of a fake, you know, a fake play.  Like, well, we 
got all these people up in arms.  Let‘s just have a meeting, make it look like 
we‘re gonna listen, make it look like it‘s official.  Have them sign up.  Have 
them bring their people. 
 
The bishop‘s words also suggest a shared agreement among clergy about what was 
learned (without naming it) which is obvious and which is derived from the work and 
outcomes previous initiatives, also unnamed. 
A Bishop’s View of Lay Participation 
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In his 2003 address to priests, the bishop appears to call for broad based lay 
decision making and participation. 
What can we do to allow for the greatest participation by those who will be 
affected by the decisions that will need to be made?  How do we tap into the 
wisdom of the entire People of God of [the diocese]: our deacons, the religious, 
and the lay leaders in our Church, and at the same time respect the leadership role 
of the presbyterate? 
 
From the simple facts of numbers it seems that a realignment of our parishes is 
necessary.  To do this we need a broad-based, decision-making process to advise 
the Bishop on the future shape of those parishes. 
 
The bishop in fact offered no provisions for lay decision-making nor did he 
propose introducing processes or mechanisms for hearing lay parishioners‘ concerns and 
interests as they define them.  The bishop confusingly asked how to allow for the greatest 
participation by those who will be affected by the decisions that will need to be made.  
But it raises the question, who is making the decisions, and for whom?  Use of passive 
infinitive for the act of making big decisions implies 1) the inevitability of the decisions; 
2) ones that are made at the top; 3) and in advance of any initiative involving lay persons.  
If this assessment is accurate, what does the bishop mean by participation when it regards 
already-made, from-above decisions?  Participation by the greatest number, i.e., laity, is 
a non-decisive, passive activity for them.  Participation therefore means being involved in 
a passive process of assenting to prior decision-making by active agent-hierarchs.  
Participation is assenting to and learning to live with what is construed as inevitable, and 
that that constitutes participation.   
It is possible that by the statement, ―the decisions that will need to be made,‖ the 
bishop meant that laity will participate in decision making, but wanted to emphasize the 
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point that such decisions are inevitable and will affect all of the laity.  I.e., it is inevitable 
that we will need to reconfigure parishes in light of the priest shortage, so we might as 
well get to the task of inviting and involving lay parishioners to participate in deciding 
what shape the process will take.  The fact, however, that the bishop is addressing only 
priests, and commissions the Office of Parish Planning to issue a follow up letter to all 
priests of the diocese calling for the development of a common presbyteral vision, a 
follow up letter that never once uses the word ―laity‖ or ―lay‖ or ―parishioner‖ suggests 
that the two previous points are on target.  Moreover, there is not a concomitant call for a 
common lay Catholic vision for the diocese, and no follow up on the ―synodal like‖ 
gathering which would presumably include lay persons (below).  This further suggests 
that the participation he wanted from the laity is one of agreeing to or coming to terms 
with previous, inevitable and unilateral decisions from the hierarchy. 
Tapping into the wisdom of the whole church, including laity, and at the same 
time respecting the leadership role of the presbyterate begs several questions.  Is 
allowing a place at the table for the expression of lay wisdom potentially disturbing for 
priestly leadership?  Is the bishop concerned that giving voice to lay wisdom might in 
some way threaten priests?  Or are there known priests who would chafe at ―tapping into 
the wisdom of…laity‖ who need to be reassured and comforted by the bishop‘s qualifier?  
Tapping into lay wisdom seems to be a potentially dangerous activity for either the 
hierarchy, or the clergy, or both. 
Because of the priest shortage, we need a broad-based, decision-making process 
to advise the Bishop on the future shape of those parishes.  Decision making with respect 
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to the laity is a euphemism for giving advice to the bishop.  The bishop here refers to 
himself in the third person.  What does this mean?  Does he want to emphasize his status 
and power?  Or does he want to avoid drawing attention to the power relations operating 
in the diocese?  To say, we need a broad-based, decision-making process to advise me 
makes obvious the point that he is the decision maker, however ―broad based‖ the 
process is, and highlights the contradiction between calling advice-giving a process of 
decision making.  Moreover, to say, ―to advise me‖ would make it awkward when he says 
―we need.‖   Saying, ―we need a decision making process to advise the Bishop‖ allows 
him to include himself in the company of ―we‖ priests, religious and laity and share in 
their need for ―a process‖ thus reaffirming the inevitability of his proposals and 
downplaying his true power.  It smooths-over the dual awkwardness of equating advice-
giving with decision making, and the broad base with one hierarch who will decide.  At 
the same time, it suggests a role reversal between himself and the laity – they, in their 
lower level processes, will be making important decisions, while he will simply be 
receiving advice – when in fact they will not be making decisions, the bishop will; 
decisions which may or may not be based on the content of their advice-giving.  Finally, 
the audience he is downplaying his power to is an audience of priests who, as we saw 
above, already may be suspecting a fait accompli.  It is their doubts about his use of 
power that the bishop is possibly concerned with and addressing.  That the laity might 
also doubt his use of power might not be a serious concern for him since it will be the 
pastors that will have to face whatever consequences lay ahead when a vision is 
constructed and implemented. 
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The bishop continues: 
It is not my intention to imply that there has been no planning process operative 
until now.  But I will state that my own preference has been to give broad 
principles and then to encourage the local communities, especially the deaneries 
and clusters, to make concrete recommendations as to how they can be best 
implemented…  I felt that in approaching the situation in this way the local 
community would have a sense of ownership and embrace the decisions, rather 
than seeing them as something coming from the outside. 
 
[Quoting The Basic Plan for the Ongoing Formation of Priests, he states] The 
dynamics are simple but extraordinary: to come together, to listen to God, to 
listen to the needs of the people, to listen to the inner promptings of the Holy 
Spirit, to be in dialogue with one another and with Christ‘s faithful people, to be 
in spiritual conversation, and to make decisions that take into account how the 
word will be proclaimed, the mysteries of Christ will be celebrated, and the 
mission of the Church furthered. 
 
The bishop hoped to encourage local communities to take ownership and embrace 
the decisions by front loading the process with his own broad principles, by stating his 
preference that deliberation occur in clusters of parishes and deaneries (bigger clusters), 
not individual parishes, and by naming the outcome as making recommendations.  
Ownership by lay people means embracing the decision of hierarchs.  Ownership is 
equivalent to an act of assent or obedience.  The assumption here is that one can have 
ownership even without having a direct and immediate voice in making and taking the 
decision to restructure a parish – one can take ownership of that which one does not own.  
The bishop who makes a decision from without, hopes parishioners can embrace it as 
their own decision and not ―see‖ it as ―coming from the outside.‖  This masks his use of 
unilateral power by a rhetoric of community ownership and participation.  Also worth 
noting is the tendency of the hierarchy to include lay involvement in macro settings – 
clusters and deaneries.  This suggests new learning by the bishop from the 1994 initiative 
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which took place in parishes throughout the diocese, and is perhaps based on the 2001 
experience in which the focus, energy and power of local communities critiqued a poorly 
conceived hierarchical initiative.  The result of this learning seems to be that lay 
parishioners need to be replaced by lay ―representatives‖ of non-parish constituencies.   
The bishop in his gloss does not clarify the quote he makes from The Basic Plan, 
thus leaving open the question of what the hierarchy listens to vis-à-vis the laity.  Is it a 
listening to lay parishioners themselves in a context in which they lay out before the 
hierarchy their needs, or is it a listening to the ―needs‖ of the laity as determined by 
clergy and hierarchy, rather than listening the laity?  By not clarifying this ambiguity, the 
bishop gives the impression that discerning the needs of the people is something the 
hierarchy can do all on its own, that the needs of ―the faithful people‖ are decided for 
them, not with them or by them.  That is why it is now crucial for priests to ―seriously 
address the needs‖ not of the 99% who make up the laity, but ―the needs of this local 
Church,‖ and to do so as a college of presbyters apart from the laity; all the more ironic 
since what he quotes calls for ―dialogue…with Christ‘s faithful people‖ who have been 
entirely excluded from the process.  Or does he mean by ―faithful‖ only those who are 
ordained?  This implies that the further removed you are from the face of the people, the 
more authentic is the visioning, a fact not lost on the participants.  Discerning the needs 
of the people is through an undefined spiritual process that involves ―promptings of the 
Holy Spirit‖ but not stronger pastoral councils or lay assemblies, or diocesan synods. 
As we begin the process together what we‘ve learned from our cluster planning 
and what needs to be done, it will be to the Priests‘ Council that we will first turn.  
I could easily imagine this leading not to a synod, strictly speaking, but to a 
synodal like gathering so that all in the diocese will have a chance for in-put and 
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ownership.  But the first stage will be working together as a presbyterate in 
developing a diocesan vision, a vision that will affect the lives of all of us.  Such a 
vision will enable a priest or parish coordinator to transfer into another cluster 
knowing how it fits into the diocesan vision thus helping that cluster maintain its 
sense of direction. 
 
It is curious why the bishop wished to avoid calling for a diocesan synod, but 
instead a strange, ―synodal like‖ gathering except that canon law requires the presence of 
lay persons in a diocesan synod.  Does his synod-like gathering suggest that he is 
thinking of ways to limit or exclude lay participation from such an event – perhaps to 
avoid the confrontational displays from parishioners such as the participants in this 
study?  The highest priority, the ―first stage,‖ is for all priests to craft a vision for the 
diocese, one that will ―affect the lives of all of us.‖  Since the bishop is speaking to other 
priests in this address, does he means by ―all of us,‖ all priests?  If so, all of us, 
astonishingly, can be uttered in a way that excludes 99.9% of Catholics, thus reaffirming 
the low status of lay parishioners in the eyes of the hierarchy.  Parish reconfiguration is 
about the needs of the lives of priests first, then at some point, it is presumed that the 
needs of the community life of lay parishioners will emerge in an unspecified and 
unnamed second stage; an emergence which may or may not involve consulting the laity 
about their needs, but may involve determining what they are from an unnamed spiritual 
process. 
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